Eruvin 20b (כ:) — the Talmud in English

And likewise

this that we establish

with regard to a winepress

of wine: A person may stand in the winepress and drink wine from it without tithing it [whether he diluted it there with hot water or with cold water. Since, as long as he has not taken the wine outside the winepress, this is not considered a fixed drinking, he is exempt from tithing].

Likewise in this case, he may not stand outside the winepress and drink from the wine in the winepress without tithing, unless he inserts his head and most of his body into the area of the winepress!

And we raise the following inquiry:

With regard to a person

who drinks in one domain from a place different from the place where his feet are located, there is no need to raise any inquiry, as

he already said that his head and most of his body are required.

But

with regard to a cow,

when one gives it water in a private domain, placing it by the cow’s mouth, while the cow’s feet are standing in another domain, we raise the following inquiry:

Do we require it

to have

its head and most of its body

in the domain where it is being given water, because we are concerned that he might come to carry the vessel to the domain where it is standing,

or

perhaps

we do not

require this, as we are not concerned about that?

And we explain our inquiry:

Whenever he is holding

[the drink] in his hand in a

vessel

[with which he is giving it water],

but is not holding it

by the halter around its neck, so that it cannot bend its head outward,

you need not ask

whether its head and most of its body must be inside the area where it is being given water.

For even if you should say that it is permitted to give it water from a vessel when he is not holding it [as even this is not obvious—as will be stated below], nevertheless, this much is obvious:

it requires

at least

its head and most of its body

of the cow

inside

[the domain], because we are concerned that it might bend its head, and he will carry [the vessel] after it [the explanation of Rabbi Meir Horowitz; elucidated according to Tosafot and the early authorities].

The inquiry arises

whether the cow’s head and most of its body must be inside

when he is holding the vessel

with which he is giving it water

and is holding

also

it

by a halter—

what is the ruling?

For since he is holding it, there is not such great concern that it will take its head into the domain where it is standing and that he will take the vessel in his hand there—Ritva.

He said to him [it is not explained who said this to whom—Ya’avetz]:

You have learned it

in our Mishna:

It is permitted to draw near to a well

provided that

the cow’s head and most of its body are inside, and it drinks.

Is it not

inferred from the fact that it taught “provided,” which is an expression of limitation, indicating that even one who ordinarily gives water

while holding it and holding

also

the vessel, cannot make partitions that are not distant enough to accommodate the cow’s head and most of its body—Ritva [see further there, and in the Rashba and Ran].

We see, then, that whenever he is holding the vessel, even if he is also holding it by a halter, it is not permitted, and its head and most of its body must be inside!

And we reject this:

No.

Perhaps the Mishna is speaking of a case

where he is

holding the vessel but not holding it, which is the usual manner of giving water to animals; only in that case do we permit it only when its head and most of its body are inside.

But when he is holding the vessel and also holding it by a halter, it is permitted even without its head and most of its body being inside.

And we challenge this rejection:

When he is holding the vessel

and

not holding it, is it permitted

to give it water, even when its head and most of its body are inside—rhetorically?!

But it was taught

that when he is not holding it, this is not permitted:

A person may not draw water

from between the partitions of the wells

and place it before his animal on Shabbat

, meaning that he may not hold the vessel in his hand and give the animal water [even when its head and most of its body are inside—Tosafot];

but he may draw water and pour it

before it,

and it drinks on its own!

It is explicit in the beraita that it is prohibited to hold the vessel and give one’s animal water with it. You must therefore say, in order that the Mishna—which permits this even when he is holding the vessel—not contradict the beraita [for it must necessarily be speaking of this case and not of pouring before the animal, since it requires its head and most of its body to be inside; whereas when he is not holding the vessel, there is no concern at all, and why would its head and most of its body need to be inside], that the Mishna is speaking of a case where he is also holding the animal [and the beraita prohibited it only when he is not holding it]. And if so, resolve our inquiry: even when he is holding it, its head and most of its body must be inside.

And we reject this: In fact, the Mishna is speaking of a case where he is holding the vessel but not holding the animal, and that is why its head and most of its body must be inside.

As for our objection—that in such a case it is not permitted even when its head and most of its body are inside, as stated in the beraita—that is not so, for

it was stated concerning it,

said Abaye:

The prohibition in the beraita is not due to concern that he will carry the vessel after the animal. Rather,

here,

in the beraita,

the case is of a manger standing in the public domain, ten handbreadths high and

four

handbreadths wide, which makes it a private domain, while the animal is standing in a house with a window opening from it to the manger and eats from it;

one end

of the manger

enters between the partitions

, and with regard to such a case the beraita says that the owner of the animal may not draw water from the pit between the partitions [which is a private domain] and carry the bucket with him while walking in the public domain [beside the manger], with the bucket in his hand over the manger [which is also a private domain], to the mouth of the cow, which is in a private domain on the other side of the manger.

Although generally we say that a person may stand in the public domain and manipulate an object in a private domain, nevertheless here it is prohibited, due to

a decree, lest he see it

[while carrying the water]

the manger, which is damaged

at its other end, which is standing in the public domain,

and come to repair it

the manger,

and carry the bucket along with him

[and place the bucket that he drew from the pit, which is a private domain, beside him] in order to repair the manger,

thereby carrying it from a private domain—

namely, the pit—

to the public domain,

since he is standing in the public domain. If he places the bucket from his hand beside his body, he has carried an object from a private domain into the public domain. [And if he wishes to give his animal water, he should pour the water inside the partitions, into the manger, and the water will flow to the animal on its own].

And we challenge Abaye’s explanation:

In such a case,

where he initially lifted the bucket without intending to carry it from a private domain into the public domain, and afterward, upon seeing that the manger was damaged, forgot and carried it—while it was already in his hand—into the public domain,

is he liable,

so that we would say that the Sages decreed even when he did not carry it at all, lest he carry it—rhetorically?!

But didn’t Rav Safra say that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who moves his objects from one corner to another

in a private domain

and then changes his mind about them

after lifting them, intending to take them into the public domain,

and takes them out—

is exempt,

because

the initial lifting was not for that purpose,

and with regard to Shabbat the Torah prohibited “constructive labor,” meaning labor performed with that intention. One is liable to bring a sin-offering when he inadvertently violated Shabbat, thinking that it was an ordinary day or that this labor was permitted; but when he did not originally intend to do so, he is exempt from a sin-offering.

Rather, we explain the beraita as follows: In truth, the Sages did not prohibit the case of the manger because of a decree concerning “carrying” the bucket into the public domain.

Rather, sometimes he repairs it

the manger [after placing the bucket beside it in the public domain],

and then “brings it in” again

[and brings the bucket back from where he placed it, over the manger, beside the cow],

thereby bringing it from the public domain into the private domain.

There are those who say

that they raise the earlier inquiry as follows:

With regard to a person, we say that “it is sufficient for him” that his head and most of his body be

in the domain where he drinks.

But

with regard to a cow, they raise the inquiry

[according to this version]:

“Is it sufficient for it” that its head and most of its body

be inside,

or not,

and is it prohibited even when its head and most of its body are inside?

And we explain our inquiry:

When he is holding the vessel and is also holding

it, you need not ask;

it is sufficient for it that its head and most of its body

be inside. This is proven from our Mishna, for certainly the Mishna prohibited the case only when he is holding the vessel [as otherwise, why should it be prohibited?], and nevertheless it permits it when its head and most of its body are inside; at the very least, it is proven that when he is also holding the animal, it is permitted.

Rather, when you raise the inquiry, it is when he is holding the vessel but not holding it: What is the ruling?

He said to him [it is not explained who said this to whom—Ya’avetz]:

You have learned it

in the Mishna:

“Provided that

the cow’s head and most of its body are inside and it drinks.” Is it not

speaking of a case where he is

holding the vessel but not holding it, and nevertheless it is permitted when its head and most of its body are inside? Resolve the inquiry!

And we reject this:

No; he is holding the vessel and also holding it,

and that is why it is permitted.

And we support this answer:

And so too, it is reasonable.

For if he is holding the vessel but not holding it, is it permitted?!

But it was taught: A person may not draw water and place it before his animal, but he may draw and

pour it, and it drinks on its own.

We see that when he is not holding the animal, at least in that case it is prohibited; therefore, the Mishna must be speaking of a case where he is also holding it.

And we reject this: That beraita cannot support the answer, for

it was stated concerning it: Abaye said: Here the case is of a manger standing in the public domain, ten handbreadths high and

four handbreadths wide,

and one end of it enters between the partitions,

and it is prohibited because

sometimes he sees that the manger is damaged, comes to repair it, carries the bucket along with him, and carries it from a private domain into the public domain.

And we challenge Abaye’s explanation:

In such a case, is he liable?!

But Rav Safra said that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who moves his objects from one corner to another, changes his mind about them and takes them out is exempt, since the initial lifting was not for that purpose;

and likewise here, how could he be liable?!

And we answer:

Rather, sometimes he repairs it, then brings it in again, thereby bringing it from the public domain into the private domain!

Come and hear

a proof to resolve the inquiry according to the first version, namely, whether, when he is holding the vessel and also holding the animal, its head and most of its body must be inside:

For it was taught:

A camel whose head and most of its body are inside

the domain where its manger is located,

they stuff

[this is the manner of a camel when it goes out into the desert and its owner fears that it will not find food: They force-feed it a great deal of fodder into its throat, more than it can eat, until its intestines become like a “manger”]

it

when the fodder is

inside.

Now resolve the inquiry:

But this stuffing—

which is done against the camel’s will—

is equivalent to holding the vessel and holding the animal,

that is, it must necessarily be a case where he is holding the vessel and holding the animal, since he stuffs it against its will and must restrain it,

and

nevertheless

its head and most of its body are required

to be inside. Resolve the inquiry!

And we reject this:

Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna said that Rav Sheshet said: Do not resolve the inquiry concerning the cow. Although with regard to a cow we are not concerned, when he is holding it, that he will carry the vessel outside, here, where the case concerns a camel,

a camel is different, since its neck is long,

and if its body is not inside, when it strains and bends its neck, it can reach the public domain. Therefore, even when he is holding it, its head and most of its body must be inside.

Come and hear

a proof concerning an ordinary animal in a similar case, as it was taught:

An animal whose head and most of its body are inside is stuffed from inside. But this stuffing

is equivalent to holding the vessel and holding the animal, and its head and most of its body are required

to be inside. Resolve the inquiry!

And we reject this:

What is the meaning of “animal,” which is also taught

here?

A camel, whose neck is long; and it is prohibited! And we challenge this answer:

But it was taught

in one beraita:

“An animal.”

And it was taught

in another beraita [cited above]:

“A camel.”

Thus, “animal” and “camel” are distinct.

And we answer:

Were

these two beraitot

taught together

[were the beraitot taught at the same time], so that you could say that one refers specifically to a camel and the other specifically to an animal?! That is not so. The one who taught the beraita that says “animal” did not teach the beraita that says “camel”; both referred to a camel.

And we support the answer that a camel is different:

It was also taught so: Rabbi Eliezer prohibits it with a camel, since its neck is long!

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Adda said: The partitions around the wells were permitted only for pilgrims,

[and likewise for all those traveling for the sake of a mitzva, such as to study Torah—as stated below].

And we challenge this:

But it was taught: The partitions around the wells were permitted only with regard to animals,

which implies that with regard to an animal, at least, they are permitted for everyone?!

And we answer:

What is the meaning of “animal”? The animals of pilgrims!