Eruvin 20b — the Talmud in English

And likewise

that which we hold

with regard to a winepress

of wine: a person may stand on the winepress and drink wine from it without tithing [whether they mixed it there with hot water or with cold water. Since, as long as he has not taken the wine outside the winepress, it is not fixed drinking, he is exempt from the tithe].

Even in this case, he may not stand outside the winepress and drink on the winepress without tithing, unless he brings his head and most of his body into the place of the winepress!

And we raise the following question:

with regard to a person

who drinks in another domain from the place where his feet are located, there is no question at all, for

he said that his head and most of his body are required.

But

with regard to a cow

which he waters in the private domain, and he gives [water] to the cow’s mouth while the cow’s feet are standing in another domain, we raise the question:

do we require her

to have

her head and most of her body

in the domain where he is watering her, because we are concerned that perhaps he will come to take the vessel into the domain where she is standing,

or

perhaps

not

do we require this, because we are not concerned?

And we explain our question:

wherever he is holding [the drink]

which he holds in his hand in a

vessel

[the vessel] with which he is watering her,

and he is not holding her

the cow herself by the halter around her neck, so that she cannot turn her head outward,

you need not ask

whether her head and most of her body must be inside the place where he is watering her.

For even if you should say that it is permitted to water her with a vessel where he is not holding her [for even this is not obvious—as below], this at least is obvious:

he requires

at the very least

the head and most of the body

of the cow

inside [from within], for we are concerned that perhaps she will turn her head, and he will lead [the Marei Horowitz] the vessel after her [this has been explained on the basis of Tosafot and the early authorities].

[the domain], because we are concerned that it might bend its head, and he will carry [the vessel] after it [the explanation of Rabbi Meir Horowitz; elucidated according to Tosafot and the early authorities].

But when you ask

whether we require the head and most of the body of the cow inside,

where he is holding the vessel

with which he is watering her,

and he is holding

also

her

by the halter—

what?

For since he is holding her, there is not so much reason to fear that she will extend her head into the domain where she is standing, and he will take the vessel in his hand there—Ritva.

He said to him [it is not explained who said this to whom—Ya'avetz]:

You have learned it

you have learned it

in our Mishna:

It is permitted to bring [the cow] near the well,

provided that the cow’s head and most of her body are inside and she drinks.

Is it not

since it taught “provided,” which is an expression of limitation, meaning that even one whose usual practice is always to water [the animal]

while holding her and holding

also

the vessel,

he too may not make partitions that are not distant by the measure of the cow’s head and most of her body—Ritva [see there further, and in the Rashba and Ran].

We have therefore seen that wherever he is holding the vessel, even though he is holding her by the halter, it is not permitted, and we require that her head and most of her body be inside!

And we reject this:

No.

Perhaps the Mishna is speaking of one

who is holding the vessel but is not holding her

which is the practice of most people who water animals; it is in that case that we permit it only when her head and most of her body are inside.

But when he is holding the vessel and holding her, it is permitted without her head and most of her body being inside.

And we challenge this rejection:

And when he is holding the vessel

and

is not holding her, is it permitted

to water her—even when her head and most of her body are inside?—this is astonishing!

But it was taught

that when he is not holding her, it is not permitted:

A person may not fill water

from between the partitions of the wells

and place it before his animal on Shabbat

that is, he may not hold the vessel in his hand and water her [even when her head and most of her body are inside—Tosafot],

but he may fill it and pour it

before her,

and she drinks on her own!

It is thus explained in the beraita that it is forbidden to hold a vessel and water one’s animal with it. You are necessarily forced to say, in order that the Mishna—which permits even when he is holding the vessel—not contradict [the beraita] [for necessarily this is what it is discussing, and not a case where he pours before his animal, since it requires her head and most of her body to be inside; and when he is not holding the vessel, there is no concern at all, so why would her head and most of her body need to be inside], that the Mishna is speaking of one who is also holding the animal [and the beraita prohibited only where he is not holding her]. Since this is so, resolve our question: even when he is holding her, we require her head and most of her body to be inside.

And we reject this: In reality, the Mishna is speaking of one who is holding the vessel but is not holding her, and that is why we require her head and most of her body to be inside.

And as for our challenge—that in such a case it is not permitted even when her head and most of her body are inside, as stated in the beraita—this is not so, for

it was stated concerning it

that beraita,

Abaye said:

In the beraita, it is not forbidden because of the concern that he will lead the vessel after her. Rather,

here

in the beraita it is speaking

of a manger standing in the public domain, ten handbreadths high and four

(or) broad

handbreadths

which is a private domain, while the animal is standing in a house whose window opens from it to the manger, and she eats from it,

and one of its ends

of the manger

enters between the partitions

and it is concerning such a case that we say in the beraita that the owner of the animal may not fill water from the pit between the partitions [which is a private domain] and carry the bucket with him as he walks in the public domain [beside the manger], with the bucket in his hand above the manger [which is also a private domain], to the mouth of the cow, which is in the private domain on the other side of the manger.

And although generally we say that a person may stand in the public domain and handle an object in the private domain, nevertheless here it is forbidden, because of

a decree, lest he see it [while he is carrying the water]

within the course of carrying the water

to the manger, which has become damaged

at its other end, which is standing in the public domain,

and he will come to repair it

the manger,

and carry the bucket along with him

[and the owner of the animal will place beside him the bucket that he took out from the pit, which is a private domain,] in order to repair the manger,

and he is thereby taking out from the private domain—

namely, the pit—

into the public domain,

for he is standing in the public domain, and if he puts the bucket down from his hand beside his body, that is taking out from the private domain into the public domain. [And if he wants to water his animal, he should pour the water inside the partitions, into the manger, and the water will flow by itself to the animal].

And we raise a difficulty against Abaye’s explanation:

And in such a case,

where he initially lifted the bucket not intending to take it out from the private domain into the public domain, and afterwards, when he saw that the manger had become damaged, he forgot and took it out—while it was lifted in his hand—to the public domain,

is he liable,

so that we should say that the Sages decreed even when he did not take it out at all, lest he take it out?—this is astonishing!

But Rav Safra said that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan: One who moves his objects from one corner to another

within the private domain

and changes his mind concerning them

after he had lifted them, intending to take them out into the public domain,

and takes them out—

is exempt,

because

the lifting was not initially performed for that purpose,

and with regard to Shabbat, the Torah prohibited “creative labor,” meaning that he intended this, and he is liable for a sin-offering if he unintentionally violated Shabbat, thinking that today was an ordinary weekday or that this labor was permitted; but when he did not intend this, he is exempt from a sin-offering.

Rather, we explain the beraita as follows: in truth, it was not because of the decree of “taking out” the bucket into the public domain that the Sages prohibited it at the manger.

Rather, sometimes he repairs it

the manger [after he has placed the bucket beside it in the public domain],

and then he “brings it in”

[and again “brings in” the bucket] from the place where he placed it, atop the manger beside the cow,

and he thereby brings it in from the public domain into the private domain.

There are those who say

and formulate the earlier question as follows:

With regard to a person, we say, “it is sufficient for him” to have his head and most of his body

in the domain where he drinks.

But

with regard to a cow,

they raise the question [according to the yesh omrim]:

“Is it sufficient for her” to have her head and most of her body

inside,

or not

is it sufficient, and even when her head and most of her body are inside it is likewise forbidden?

And we explain our question:

Where he is holding the vessel and is holding

also

her, you need not ask; it is sufficient for her to have her head and most of her body

inside, for this is demonstrated by our Mishna, since certainly the Mishna prohibits only when he is holding the vessel [for otherwise, why should it be forbidden?], and nevertheless we permit it when her head and most of her body are inside; at the very least, it is demonstrated that when he is also holding her, it is permitted.

Rather, when you ask, it is where he is holding the vessel but is not holding her: what is the law?

He said to him [it is not explained who said this to whom—Ya'avetz]:

the cow’s head and most of its body are inside and it drinks.” Is it not

you have learned it

in the Mishna:

provided that the

cow’s head and most of her body are inside and she drinks—is it not

that it is speaking of one who is

holding the vessel but is not holding her,

and even so we permit it when her head and most of her body are inside? Then resolve our question!

And we reject this:

No, it is where he is holding the vessel and holding her,

and that is why it is permitted.

And we support this:

And so too it is reasonable.

For if he is holding the vessel but is not holding her, is it permitted?!

But it was taught: A person may not fill water and place it before his animal, but he may fill it

and

pour it, and she drinks on her own.

We have seen that when he is not holding her, at least, it is forbidden, and necessarily the Mishna is speaking of one who is also holding her.

And we reject this: if it is because of this beraita, do not support us, for

it was stated concerning it, Abaye said: Here it is speaking of a manger standing in the public domain, ten handbreadths high and

(or) four cubits

handbreadths,

with its head entering between the partitions,

and it is forbidden because

sometimes he sees that the manger has become damaged, and he comes to repair it, and carries the bucket along with him, and thereby takes it out from the private domain into the public domain.

And we challenge Abaye’s explanation:

And in such a case, is he liable?!

But Rav Safra said that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan: One who moves his objects from one corner to another and changes his mind concerning them and takes them out is exempt, for the lifting was not initially performed for that purpose,

and here too, how is he liable?!

And we answer:

Rather, sometimes he repairs it, and then brings it in, and thereby brings it in from the public domain into the private domain!

Come and hear

to resolve the question according to the first formulation, whether, when he is holding the vessel and also holding her, we require the head and most of her body to be inside:

For it was taught:

A camel whose head and most of its body are inside

the domain where its manger is located,

they force-feed [the customary practice with a camel when it goes out to the desert and its owner fears that it will not find food is to force a great deal of fodder into its throat, more than it can eat, until it becomes like a “manger” in its intestines]

is equivalent to holding the vessel and holding the animal,

it

when the force-feeding is

inside.

And now resolve it:

But this force-feeding—

which is done against the camel’s will—

is analogous to one who is holding the vessel and holding her, as it were,

that is, necessarily, it is a case where he is holding the vessel and holding her, for he force-feeds her against her will and must hold her,

and

nevertheless

we require the head and most of her body

to be inside, so resolve our question!

And we reject this:

Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna said that Rav Sheshet said:

Do not resolve the question that we raised with regard to a cow, for although with regard to a cow we are not concerned, when he is holding her, that he will lead the vessel outside, here, where it is speaking of a camel,

a camel is different, since its neck is long,

and if its body is not inside, if it jerks and bends its neck, it will reach the public domain; therefore, even when he is holding her, we require her head and most of her body to be inside.

Come and hear

to resolve a similar case with regard to an ordinary animal, for it was taught:

An animal whose head and most of its body are inside, they “force-feed” it from inside. And this “f

o

rce-feeding” is analogous to one who is holding the vessel and holding her, as it were, and we require the head and most of her body

to be inside; so resolve our question!

And we reject this:

What does “animal” also mean, as it is taught

here?

A camel, whose neck is long, and it is forbidden! And we challenge this answer:

these two beraitot

But it was taught

one beraita:

an animal.

And it was taught

another beraita [which we brought above]:

a camel. Thus, animal by itself and camel by itself.

And we challenge this:

And we answer:

Are

these two beraitot

taught alongside one another [were the beraitot taught at the same time], so that it should be said that camel is one case and animal another?! That is not so. The one who taught the beraita of “animal” did not teach the beraita of “camel”; both were referring to a camel.

[разве эти барайты были составлены одновременно], чтобы утверждать, что одна говорит только о верблюде, а другая — только о животном?! Это не так: тот, кто передал барайту о животном, не передал барайту о верблюде, и в обоих случаях имелся в виду верблюд.

And we support the answer that a camel is different:

It was also taught thus: Rabbi Eliezer prohibits [it] with a camel, since its neck is long!

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Adda said: The partitions of the wells were permitted only for those who go up for the pilgrimage, [and likewise for all those going for the sake of a mitzva, such as to study Torah—as below].

[а также для всех, кто идёт ради заповеди, например изучать Тору, как будет разъяснено далее].

And we challenge this:

But it was taught: The partitions of the wells were permitted only with regard to an animal,

which implies that, with regard to an animal, at least, they are permitted to everyone?!

And we answer:

What does “animal” mean? The animals of those who go up for the pilgrimage!