Eruvin 20a (כ.) — the Talmud in English

But what can you say?

Two types of tree.

Here too, two types of partition.

This teaching is explained according to the approach of the Gaon Yaakov. See Rashi’s wording carefully, as well as the versions of the Bach, the Maharām, and the Rashash in Rashi’s words.

E. Courtyard:

Abaye asked Rabba: In the case of a courtyard whose head enters between the partitions,

that is, it was built adjacent to the area between the partitions of the well and is open to it. [See illustration 1]

And Abaye asks: Since the Sages instituted that one may not carry on Shabbat from his courtyard to his fellow’s courtyard [unless they made an eruv of courtyards],

what is

the law concerning carrying from the courtyard

to the area between the partitions,

which does not belong to him?

And

similarly, what is the law concerning carrying

from between the partitions into it?

He said to him,

Rabba said to Abaye:

It is permitted!

Carrying from one courtyard to another is prohibited only when there are residents in each of the courtyards who prohibit carrying out, but there are no residents between the partitions who would prohibit it for him, so that he would be carrying from his domain into his fellow’s domain. [Meaning: The use made by the pilgrims is not considered residence. This is the language of the Ritva in his commentary on the Gemara.]

Abaye then asked Rava:

Two

courtyards that were both open to the area between the partitions—which is analogous to an alleyway shared by the courtyards—for we hold that it is prohibited to carry from one person’s courtyard into the alleyway shared by both of them,

what

is the law of these courtyards with regard to carrying into the area between the partitions? [See illustration 2]

He said to him,

Rabba said to Abaye:

It is prohibited

to carry from them into the area between the partitions, as Rav Huna explains the reason below. This is the language of Rashi.

Rav Huna said: Two

courtyards that are open to the area between the partitions

are prohibited

from carrying into the area between the partitions and from between the partitions into them.

And it is unnecessary to state this when the two courtyards did not make an eruv of courtyards with one another, in which case they are prohibited, just as any two courtyards open to one alleyway are prohibited from carrying from a courtyard into the alleyway and from the alleyway into a courtyard.

Rather,

even

if there was an opening between them and they

made an eruv

with one another—since ordinarily we consider them one courtyard, and it is permitted to carry from their courtyards, which have joined together, into the alleyway shared by both of them—here they are prohibited.

The reason is that, ordinarily, there are two ways to permit carrying from a courtyard into an alleyway:

a. The courtyards can make an eruv—when there is an opening from one to the other—with one another.

b. They can make a shared alleyway eruv and join together in the alleyway alone, even if there is no opening between them.

But here, in the case of courtyards open to the area between the partitions, the latter permission—that they join together in the alleyway alone—is inapplicable. When the Sages instituted a shared alleyway eruv, they instituted it for a closed alleyway, and when its length is greater than its width; but this area is open through to all four sides.

The conclusion of the matter is in Rashi’s words. The Ritva explained Rashi’s explanation: Although at times a public domain can be rendered permissible by means of side-posts [at both sides of the houses standing in the public domain], according to Rabbi Yehuda, or by means of a doorway-shaped partition [on one side] and a side-post [on the other], according to the Sages, and the people can join together in it, nevertheless it is a distinct domain in which it is possible to make doors that can be locked at night and to designate it for all their needs. Since this is so, a shared eruv is effective there. But the area between the partitions, which stands open through to all four directions of the world, is not a distinct domain belonging to the members of the courtyards whose heads enter there, so that a partnership would be effective there as it is in an alleyway or courtyard. This is the language of the Ritva.

And since the permission of a shared alleyway eruv is inapplicable here, the Sages decreed that even when there is an opening between them and they made an eruv with one another, it is likewise ineffective:

A decree lest one say: An eruv

[a partnership]

is effective for the area between the partitions,

so that an observer who does not know that there is an opening between them—and sees that, by means of the eruv, they carry into the area between the partitions—will say: These courtyards made a shared alleyway eruv, and that is why they carry there. He may then come to learn to permit carrying from these courtyards into the area between the partitions by means of a shared alleyway eruv, even where there is no opening between them. Therefore, the Sages prohibited it entirely.

Rava said:

If

they made an eruv

with these courtyards, where there is an opening between them,

it is permitted

to carry between the partitions, as we are not concerned about Rav Huna’s decree.

Abaye said to Rava: There is a baraita that supports you:

In the case of a courtyard whose one head enters between the partitions, it is permitted to carry from it into the area between the partitions, and from between the partitions into it.

But two

courtyards open to the area between the partitions

are prohibited. When does this statement apply? When they did not make an eruv. But if they made an eruv,

they are permitted!

There is an explicit baraita that supports Rava! And we ask:

Shall we say that

this baraita is

a refutation of Rav Huna,

who prohibits it even if they made an eruv?!

And we reject this:

Rav Huna could say to you:

This baraita means as follows: “Two are prohibited,” even when there is an opening between them and they made an eruv of courtyards with one another.

And that which we said: “When does this statement apply? When they did not make an eruv. But if they made an eruv, they are permitted”—the “eruv” mentioned at the end is not referring to an eruv of courtyards made with bread, for they certainly made an eruv of courtyards.

Rather,

they returned

[the members of the courtyards themselves returned]

and joined them

with one another—in addition to the opening between them—by making a large breach between them at its end [some explain: near the area between the partitions; others explain: on the other side of the wall between them]. It is evident that the courtyards are breached and open entirely into one another, and they appear to be one and are not fit to prohibit carrying for one another. In that case it is permitted to carry between the partitions, provided that the courtyards made an eruv of courtyards with one another. [According to Tosafot and the Ritva.]

F. If it dried up:

Abaye asked Rabba:

Since the Sages permitted making partitions for wells only because of the water needed by the pilgrims, if someone made partitions for wells and

the water dried up on Shabbat, what

is the law concerning carrying between the partitions?

Do we say: Since it is Shabbat, once it was permitted, it remains permitted?

Or perhaps, since the permission for the partitions is only because of the water, and the water has dried up, it is prohibited.

He said to him,

Rabba said to Abaye:

Was a partition made

—that is, was such a partition rendered permissible—

except for the sake of water?

But

water

is

not here,

and therefore

a partition is not here either.

Ravin asked

two questions:

a.

If the water dried up on Shabbat,

what is the law concerning carrying between the partitions [as Abaye asked Rabba]?

b. If he made partitions on the eve of Shabbat when there was no water in the well,

and

water

came

on Shabbat, for example, because rain fell, is it permitted to carry from that point onward?

Abaye said to him: If the water dried up on Shabbat, you need not ask about it

[and some versions read: “you need not ask

me”]—

the Ritva and the Ran—

for I asked

this question

from my master

Rabba, who was Ravin’s teacher,

and he resolved it for me as prohibited,

as we said above.

If water came

on Shabbat,

you likewise need not ask about it

[and some versions read

“me,”

Rashi and the Ritva]

because it is a partition made on Shabbat.

That is, the permission of the partition came into being on Shabbat.

And it was taught: Any partition made on Shabbat, whether inadvertently or intentionally, whether under duress or willingly, is a partition!

And we challenge this:

Was it not stated concerning

that baraita that we cited,

Rav Naḥman said: They taught

that a partition made on Shabbat is a partition

only with regard to throwing,

from the public domain into a place enclosed by partitions on Shabbat, for which one is liable, since according to Torah law it is certainly a partition.

But with regard to carrying

within an enclosure of partitions made on Shabbat,

no,

for the Sages decreed against it.

If so, one could reach the opposite conclusion: Where water came on Shabbat, making it a partition made on Shabbat, it should be prohibited to carry there by rabbinic decree. This is the language of the Ritva.

And we reject this:

When Rav Naḥman’s statement was made: A

partition made on Shabbat

was made intentionally,

that is what was stated. Since it is prohibited to make it on Shabbat, they imposed a penalty. But when it is made inadvertently, it is permitted; and certainly when water comes on Shabbat and the partition comes into being by itself—which is preferable to an inadvertent act—it is permitted.

Rabbi Elazar said: One who throws

from the public domain

into the area between the partitions of the wells is liable

to bring a sin-offering, since he throws from the public domain into a private domain.

And we wonder:

They said to him

[Yaavetz]:

It is obvious

that according to Torah law it is a complete partition?!

For

if it were not

that

it is a partition

according to Torah law, but rather it would be a public domain,

how could he be permitted

[how could it be permitted for him]

to draw water?!

Would the pressure of the pilgrims permit carrying from the well, which is a private domain, into the area between the partitions, which is a public domain according to Torah law?!

And we answer:

It is necessary

to teach us that Rabbi Elazar’s statement applies, for example,

when he made something resembling the partitions of the wells in the public domain

in a place where there was no well,

and threw into it,

and

he is liable.

And we wonder:

This too is obvious.

For

if it were not that ordinarily

—when there is no well there—

it is a partition, with regard to a well

how could he be permitted

to carry

without partitions?! And we answer:

It is necessary

to teach us this, but rather that

even though the public passes through it

between the partitions—since there is no well there, it is possible for the public to pass through it—even so, one who throws into the area between the partitions is liable!

And we wonder about this:

And what does

Rabbi Elazar

teach us

that the public will not come

and nullify the partitions

—is this not obvious?!

Did

Rabbi Elazar

not already say this once?!

As we learned: Rabbi Yehuda says: If the public thoroughfare

passes between the partitions and

breaks through them

at the partitions,

he must divert it

to the public thoroughfare

to the sides,

so that the public will not come and nullify the partitions!

And the Sages say: It is unnecessary!

And we say concerning this:

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar both say: Here they informed you

[Rashi] the Sages how great

is the power of partitions,

for they are not nullified because the public passes through them!

We see that Rabbi Elazar had already said that the public does not come and nullify partitions. Why, then, do we need both statements?!

And we reject this:

If from there

—from Rabbi Elazar’s statement that “here they informed you of the power of partitions”—we would not have known that this was Rabbi Elazar’s own opinion.

For

I might have said: “Here”

the Sages informed you,

but he does not hold

that Rabbi Elazar himself agrees with the Sages.

He teaches us

Rabbi Elazar here that what Rabbi Elazar said there—“Here they informed you, the Sages”—means

“Here, and he agrees with it”!

And we ask:

Let Rabbi Elazar say only

the statement

here,

where there is no uncertainty concerning his intent,

and he need not state this

statement there: “Here they informed you, the Sages”?!

And we answer: Rabbi Elazar never said both statements. Rather,

one was stated by inference from the other!

Rabbi Elazar said only the statement here, while the other statement there was said by his students by inference from this statement. This is the view of the Rashba and the Ritva. [See the Maharshal, who explained it in the reverse manner, and the Torat Chaim.]

We learned in the Mishna:

It is permitted to bring

the partitions

near the well,

provided that most of the cow is inside and it drinks.

We learned there: A person may not stand in the public domain and drink in the private domain,

nor may he stand

in the private domain and drink in the public domain, unless he inserts his head and most of his body into the place where he is drinking!

For we are concerned that he may draw his body toward the place where his feet are, and uproot the vessel together with the water in order to take it to the place where his feet are; he would then be carrying from one domain to another. The Ritva, in his understanding of Rashi.

We learned in the Mishna:

It is permitted to bring

the partitions

near the well,

provided that most of the cow is inside and it drinks:

We learned there: A person may not stand in the public domain and drink in the private domain.

Nor may he stand

in the private domain and drink in the public domain, unless he inserts his head and most of his body into the place where he is drinking!

For we are concerned that he may draw his body toward the place where his feet are, and take the vessel out with him, thereby carrying from one domain to another [and in such a manner that the initial act of taking place occurs in the private domain with the intention of carrying it into the public domain. The Ritva, in his understanding of Rashi].