Eruvin 20a — the Talmud in English

Rather, what do you have to say ![](pamud.bmp "

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two types of tree.

Here too, two types of fence.

This teaching was explained according to the approach of the Gaon Yaakov; examine היטב the language of Rashi, and the versions of the Bach, the Maharam, and the Rashash in Rashi’s words.

E. Courtyard:

Abaye asked Rabba: A courtyard whose head enters between the partitions,

that is, which is built adjacent to the partitions of a well and is open to it. [See illustration 1]

And Abaye asks: Since the Sages enacted that one may not carry on Shabbat from his courtyard to his fellow’s courtyard [unless they made “courtyard eruvin”],

what is the law regarding carrying from within it

the courtyard

to between the partitions

which does not belong to him?

And

likewise—what is the law regarding carrying

from between the partitions into it?

He said to him

Rabba to Abaye:

Permitted!

For it is prohibited to carry from one courtyard to another only when there are residents in each of the courtyards who prohibit taking things out; but between the partitions there are no residents who would prohibit it for him, so that carrying from his domain to his fellow’s domain would be involved. [Explanation: the use of the pilgrims is not considered dwelling—Ritva’s wording concerning the Gemara.]

And Abaye then asked Rabba:

Two

courtyards that were both open to between the partitions—which is like an alleyway for the courtyards—as we hold: it is prohibited to take out from one person’s courtyard to the alleyway shared by both of them—

what

is the law of these courtyards regarding carrying to between the partitions? [See illustration 2]

He said to him

Rabba to Abaye:

It is prohibited

to carry from within them to between the partitions, as Rav Huna explains the reason [below]—Rashi’s wording.

Rav Huna said: Two

courtyards open to between the partitions

are prohibited

from carrying to between the partitions and from between the partitions into them.

And this is not necessary only where the two courtyards did not make courtyard eruvin with one another, in which case they are prohibited, just as any two courtyards open to one alleyway are prohibited from carrying from a courtyard to the alleyway and from the alleyway to a courtyard.

Rather,

even

if there was an opening between them and they

made an eruv

with one another—since ordinarily we consider them as one courtyard, and it is permitted to carry from their joined courtyards to the alleyway shared by both of them only—here they are prohibited.

And the reason is: ordinarily, in order to permit carrying from a courtyard to an alleyway, there are two ways:

A. That the courtyards make an eruv—when there is an opening from one to the other—among themselves.

B. That they make an alleyway sharing and participate in the alleyway alone, even when there is no opening between them.

But here, regarding courtyards open to between the partitions, this latter permission—that they participate in the alleyway alone—does not apply, for when the Sages instituted “alleyway sharing,” they instituted it for a closed alleyway, and when its length is greater than its width; but this one is open through to all four sides.

The end of these words is from Rashi’s wording. Ritva explained his explanation: Although at times a public domain is joined by means of side-posts [on both sides of the houses standing in the public domain], according to Rabbi Judah, or by means of a doorway-shaped partition [on one side] and a side-post [on the other], according to the Sages, and they participate in it, nevertheless it is a distinct domain in which it is possible to make doors that can be locked at night and to designate it for all their needs; and since this is so, sharing is effective in it. But the area between the (open passage) [partitions], which stands open through to all four (forms) [directions] of the world, is not a distinct domain for the people of the courtyards whose heads enter there, so that sharing would be effective there as sharing in an alleyway or courtyard—Ritva’s wording.

And since the permission of “alleyway sharing” does not apply here, the Sages decreed that even when there is an opening between them and they made an eruv with one another, it likewise is not effective:

A decree lest they say that an eruv

sharing

is effective for between the partitions,

so that an observer who does not know that there is an opening between them—and sees that by means of the eruv they carry to between the partitions—will say: These courtyards made “alleyway sharing,” and therefore they carry; and he will come to learn to permit carrying from these courtyards to between the partitions by means of alleyway sharing, even where there is no opening between them. Therefore the Sages prohibited it entirely.

Rava said:

If

they made an eruv

these courtyards, which have an opening between them, with one another,

it is permitted,

to carry between the partitions, for we are not concerned with Rav Huna’s decree.

Abaye said to Rava: There is a beraita that supports you:

A courtyard whose one end enters between the partitions—it is permitted to carry from within it to between the partitions, and from between the partitions into it.

But two

courtyards open to between the partitions

are prohibited. In what case is this said? When they did not make an eruv; but when they made an eruv—

they are permitted!

Here is an explicit beraita that supports Rava! And we raise an objection:

Shall we say that this be

this beraita

a refutation of Rav Huna,

who prohibits even when they made an eruv?!

And we reject this:

Rav Huna could say to you:

This beraita is saying as follows: “Two are prohibited,” even when there is an opening between them and they made courtyard eruvin with one another.

And that which we said: “In what case is this said? When they did not make an eruv; but when they made an eruv, they are permitted”—this “made an eruv” in the latter clause does not refer to a courtyard eruv with bread, for they certainly made a courtyard eruv.

Rather,

they returned

[that they returned] once again, the inhabitants of the courtyards themselves,

and joined them

with one another—in addition to the opening between them—by making a large breach between them at its end [some explain: near between the partitions; some explain: on the other side of the wall between them], so that it is apparent to the eye that the courtyards are breached and open through to one another completely, and appear to be one and are not fit to prohibit one another; then it is permitted to carry between the partitions, if the courtyards made courtyard eruvin with one another [according to Tosafot and Ritva].

And. When it dried up:

Abaye asked Rabba:

Since the Sages permitted making partitions for wells only because of the water of the pilgrims, one who made partitions for wells and

the water dried up on Shabbat, what is the law

regarding carrying between the partitions?

Do we say: Since it is Shabbat—once it was permitted, it remains permitted?

Or perhaps, since the permission of the partitions is only because of water, and it has dried up, it is prohibited.

He said to him

Rabba to Abaye:

Was a partition made,

that is, was such a partition permitted

except for the sake of water?

But

water

is

not here,

and if so,

a partition is not here either.

Ravin asked

two questions:

A.

The water dried up on Shabbat

what is the law regarding carrying between the partitions [as Abaye asked Rabba]?

B. He made partitions on the eve of Shabbat when there was no water in the well, and

water came

water

on Shabbat,

for example, rain fell—may one carry from then onward?

Abaye said to him: If it dried up on Shabbat, do not ask this of you

and some versions read: “ask this of you”

“of me”—

Ritva and Ran,

for I need

this question

from my master

Rabba, who was Ravin’s teacher,

and resolve for me that it is prohibited,

as we said above.

If water came

on Shabbat

you likewise need not ask this of you,

and some versions read

“of me”

Rashi and Ritva,

for it would be a partition made on Shabbat.

That is, the permission of the partition was made on Shabbat.

And it was taught: Any partition made on Shabbat, whether inadvertently, whether deliberately, whether under compulsion, or whether willingly, is called a partition!

And we raise an objection to this:

But was it not stated concerning it

that beraita which we brought,

Rav Naḥman said: They taught this only

that a partition made on Shabbat is a partition

with regard to throwing

from a public domain into a place enclosed by partitions on Shabbat, for which one is liable, since according to Torah law it is certainly a partition.

But with regard to carrying

within an enclosure of partitions made on Shabbat—

no,

for the Sages decreed concerning it.

And if so, resolve the opposite: Where water came on Shabbat, making it a partition made on Shabbat, it is prohibited to carry within it by rabbinic law—Ritva.

And we reject this:

When Rav Naḥman’s statement was stated, it was

a partition made on Shabbat

deliberately that was meant.

Since it is prohibited to make it on Shabbat, they penalized him. But when it was inadvertent, it is permitted; and all the more so when water came on Shabbat, so that it was made by itself—which is preferable to inadvertence—it is permitted.

Rabbi Elazar said: One who throws

from a public domain

to between the partitions of the wells is liable,

a sin-offering, for he is throwing from a public domain into a private domain.

And we wonder:

They said to him

[Yaavetz]:

It is obvious

that according to Torah law it is a complete partition?!

For

if it were not

that

it is a partition

according to Torah law, but it would be a public domain,

how is it permitted for him

[how is it permitted for him]

to draw water?!

And is it because of the pressure of the pilgrims that it would be permitted to take out from the well, which is a private domain, to between the partitions, which is a public domain according to Torah law?!

And we answer:

It is necessary

not to teach us this statement of Rabbi Elazar—that he is liable—but rather, it is a case

where he made something resembling the partitions of wells, in a public domain,

in a place where there was no well,

and threw into it,

and

he is liable.

And we wonder:

This too is obvious.

For

if it were not that ordinarily—

when there is no well—

it is a partition. Regarding a well,

how is it permitted for him

to carry

without partitions?! And we answer:

It is necessary

to teach us, rather:

even though the public pass through it

between the partitions—since there is no well, it is possible that the public pass through it—and nevertheless one who throws to between the partitions is liable!

And we wonder about this:

And what does he teach us

Rabbi Elazar,

that the public do not come

passing through the partitions

and nullify the partitions—

as a question?!

Did

already

Rabbi Elazar say this once?!

For we learned: Rabbi Judah says: If the public thoroughfare

passes between the partitions and

cuts them off

from the partitions,

he shall divert it

the public thoroughfare

to the sides,

so that the public will not come and nullify the partitions!

And the Sages say: It is not necessary!

And we say concerning this:

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar both say: Here they informed you

[Rashi] the Sages how great

is the power of partitions,

for they are not nullified because of the passage of the public!

We see that Rabbi Elazar already said that the public do not come and nullify partitions; why do we need both statements?!

And we reject this:

If from there,

where Rabbi Elazar said: “Here they informed you of the power of partitions,” we would not know that this is Rabbi Elazar’s own view.

For

I might have said: “Here”

the Sages informed you,

but he does not hold this view

Rabbi Elazar himself, like the Sages.

He teaches us

Rabbi Elazar here that what Rabbi Elazar said there, “Here the Sages informed you,” means

“Here, and he holds this view”!

And we object:

Let

Rabbi Elazar say only

this

which is here, where there is no uncertainty regarding his intention,

and he need not state this

which is there: “Here the Sages informed you”?!

And we answer: Rabbi Elazar never said both statements. Rather,

one was stated by implication from the other!

Rabbi Elazar said only this statement here, and the other one there was said by his students by implication from this statement—Rashba and Ritva. [And see Maharshal, who explained it in the opposite manner, and Torat Hayyim].

We learned in the Mishna:

It is permitted to bring near

the partitions

to the well,

provided that most of the cow is inside and it drinks:

We learned there: A person may not stand in a public domain and drink in a private domain,

and he may not stand

in a private domain and drink in a public domain, unless he inserts his head and the majority of his body into the place where he is drinking!

For we are concerned lest he draw his body toward the place where his feet are, and uproot the vessel with the water in order to take it out to the place where his feet are, and it turns out that he is taking out from one domain to another—Ritva in Rashi’s understanding.

We learned in the Mishna:

It is permitted to bring near

the partitions

to the well,

provided that most of the cow is inside and it drinks:

We learned there: A person may not stand in a public domain and drink in a private domain.

And he may not stand

in a private domain and drink in a public domain, unless he inserts his head and the majority of his body into the place where he is drinking!

For we are concerned lest he draw his body toward the place where his feet are, and take out the vessel with him, and it turns out that he is taking out from one domain to another [and in a manner that the uprooting was initially in the private domain with the intention of taking it out to the public domain—Ritva in Rashi’s understanding].