Eruvin 15b (טו:) — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Meir declares it pure.

And the rationale: He maintains that any partition standing by means of something that possesses the breath of life is not a partition; therefore, it is neither a lehi nor a grave-cover.

And one may write upon it

[upon something that possesses the breath of life],

bills of divorce.

And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disqualifies it.

Gemara:

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Meir says: Any object that possesses the breath of life—

one may not make it:

neither a wall for a sukka, nor a lehi for a mavוי,

and

neither pessin for wells, nor a grave-cover.

That is to say: If one made it a grave-cover, the designation of grave-cover does not apply to it with regard to rendering one impure.

In the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili they said: One may not even write bills of divorce upon it.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili?

As it was taught:

It is written concerning a bill of divorce: “And he shall write for her

a scroll

of severance and place it in her hand.”

I have derived only a scroll

[a parchment scroll] that is fit for writing a bill of divorce upon it.

From where is it derived to include every object

such as a wooden board or an olive leaf [Rashi, Sukka 24b], so that it is fit for writing the bill of divorce upon it?

The verse states: “And he shall write for her”—

in any case.

For we expound: “And he shall write for her”—a generalization; “a scroll”—a specification; “and place it in her hand”—a generalization once again.

A generalization, specification, and generalization may be interpreted only as referring to things similar to the specification!

If so, what does the verse “a scroll” teach?

That is to say: What does the specification of “a scroll” come to exclude from the generalization?

To tell you: Just as “a scroll”

is

an object that does not possess the breath of life and is not food, so too every object that does not possess the breath of

life

and

is not food

is fit for writing a bill of divorce, excluding an object that possesses the breath of life or that is food [according to the Ritba].

And we further explain:

And the Rabbis,

who do not expound it in this manner, have the following rationale:

Because

is it written

“and he shall write for her

‘on a scroll’,”

which would indicate that he must write the bill of divorce on a scroll?!

But, “and he shall write for her

‘a scroll’ is written,”

which indicates that the verse comes to state the content of his writing: He should write for her a scroll, and

to recount

[a narrative—the Ritba]

mere words,

that is, words of severance,

is what

the verse comes to teach!

And we challenge this:

And the Rabbis,

for according to their view “a scroll” does not indicate parchment—the verse did not establish upon what he must write the bill of divorce; if so, it follows by itself that he may write it on any object he wishes.

And if so:

This phrase “and he shall write for her”—

what do they expound from it?

And we answer:

That phrase “

and he shall write for her”

is needed

to teach:

A woman is divorced through writing, and she is not divorced through money!

If he gave her money and said, “Be divorced with it,” she is not divorced.

For without the verse,

it might enter your mind to say: Since the departure

of a woman from her husband

is equated with the becoming

of a woman betrothed to her husband, as it is written: “And she shall go out” from his house and go “and become” another man’s wife—let us equate them in this regard as well, and say:

Just as becoming betrothed is through money

[as we derive at the beginning of Kiddushin by means of the verbal analogy “taking”—“taking” from the field of Ephron],

so too departure is through money.

And therefore

the verse teaches us

that she is not divorced through money.

And we explain:

And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

who cannot derive from “and he shall write for her” that she is not divorced through money, since he uses it for another exposition,

this reasoning

—that she is not divorced through money—

from where does he derive it?

He derives it from “a scroll of severance,”

as “severance” is written adjacent to “scroll,” to teach:

“A scroll” severs her, but nothing else severs her.

And we explain:

And the Rabbis,

who do not derive from “a scroll of severance” that she is not divorced through money, have the following rationale: Because

this phrase “a scroll of severance”

means “words of severance,” and

it is needed

to teach that there must be “words of separation,”

referring to something that severs him from her,

so that he may not impose a condition on the divorce in a manner that binds them together.

And this is

as it was taught in a beraita: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you do not drink wine,”

or

“on condition that you do not go to your father’s house,”

if he stipulated that she not do these things

“forever,”

then, since she remains bound to him all her life—for because of him she refrains from drinking wine—and this condition continues indefinitely,

this is not severance!

Since these are not “words of separation.”

But if he stipulated that she not do so only

“for

thirty days,”

this is severance

immediately, for they are “words of separation” at the end of thirty days, and she is permitted immediately thereafter to marry another man.

And we explain:

And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili—

who expounds “a scroll of severance” for another matter—

derives

this law of “words of separation”

from

the fact that the verse could have written: “a scroll,”

“severance,”

but it wrote

“severances,”

to teach that he should write in the scroll the word “severances,” which indicates “separation.”

And

the Rabbis—

who require the entire verse “a scroll of severance” to teach that there must be “words of separation,” and do not derive it from the added form “severance—severances”—have the following rationale:

“Severance—

severances” they do not expound!

Mishna:

A caravan

[of three people—the Gemara below, 16b]

that encamped in a plain

which is a karmelit and is prohibited by rabbinic decree to carry in,

and enclosed itself

before Shabbat with

animals’ gear,

such as saddles and saddlecloths [Meiri]—

may carry within it.

Provided that the enclosure

with which they enclosed themselves

is ten handbreadths high,

the measure of a partition,

and there are not

in it

breaches greater than the standing portions.

Any breach that is ten

[up to ten, including ten]

cubits—

is permitted,

even opposite the breach,

because it

is considered

an entrance,

provided that the standing portion is greater than the breached portions.

But if even one breach was wider

than this

[than ten cubits],

it is prohibited

to carry throughout the entire enclosed area, even if the entire remainder of the enclosure is standing.

Gemara:

It was stated: If the entire enclosure was

in a state of

breaches equal to the standing portions,

the matter is disputed by Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua:

Rav Pappa said: It is permitted

to carry within it [in accordance with the general law of a partition in which the standing portion is greater than the breached portion—the Ritba].

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: It is prohibited

[in accordance with the general law of a partition in which the breached portion is greater than the standing portion—the Ritba].

And we explain their dispute:

Rav Pappa said: It is permitted,

because he holds:

This is what the Merciful One taught Moses—

among the laws of partitions given to Moses at Sinai [as above, 4b]—

“Do not let the breach exceed the majority!”

If the breach is equal to the standing portion, it is permitted!

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: It is prohibited,

because he holds:

This is what the Merciful One taught Moses: “Enclose the majority!”

But if the standing portion is equal to the breached portion, it is prohibited!

And we challenge Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua:

But

we learned

in our Mishna:

“And there shall not be breaches ‘greater’ than the standing portions.”

And it indicates:

If

the breaches were

equal to the standing portions

equally,

it is permitted!

And this is not in accordance with Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua?! And we answer:

Do not say,

do not infer as follows:

“If they are equal to the standing portions”—

it is permitted.

Rather, say:

Infer as follows: Only

if the standing portion is greater than the breach

is it

permitted!

And we challenge this:

But

if the breaches were

equal to the standing portions

equally—according to your view—

what, is it prohibited?!

If so, let the Mishna state

in the Mishna:

“There shall not be breaches equal to the standing portions!”

And since it did not state this, it indicates that if they are equal to the standing portions, it is permitted!

And we conclude:

This is difficult!

Come and hear: If one roofs

the ceiling of

his sukka

[as we do, first arranging beams in the place designated for the roofing and placing valid sukka roofing upon them. Rashi, Sukka 15a]:

with metal spits,

which are invalid for sukka roofing because they are not products of the ground [Rav Ovadya of Bartenura].

or with the long boards of a bed,

those boards that run along the length of the bed, which are invalid for roofing by rabbinic decree, since they are worn-out utensils susceptible to impurity [Rabbi Akiva Eiger].

If there is space between them—

between the spits or the long boards—

“equal to them,”

of equal width, and he placed valid roofing there—

the sukka is valid

.

And this presents a difficulty to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, who said: When the breach is exactly equal to the standing portion, it is prohibited.

For here too, the invalid roofing is equal to the valid roofing?!

And we answer:

With what are we dealing here? With a case where one can enter and exit!

That is to say: The statement in the Mishna, “equal to them,” means that there is enough space between them that spits or long boards of the same size could enter and exit through the space between them with ease. Thus, the space is somewhat wider than the spit and is not precisely equal to it!

And it might have entered our minds that this is why we answer in this manner: “equal to them” indicates a case of entering and exiting, since it is not customary to measure with absolute precision.

And therefore we challenge this:

But it is possible to measure precisely

and ensure that the space between them is no greater than “equal to them,” which indicates an exact measurement?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Ami said:

Even though it is possible to measure precisely, nevertheless, the Mishna is speaking of a case in which he did not measure precisely, but

left extra space,

so that the space was greater than the width of the spits. And “equal to them” in the Mishna means: equal to the width of the spits in a manner that allows one to enter and exit!

Rava said:

He offers another resolution for the challenge posed from the Mishna against Rav Huna:

The Mishna is speaking of a case in which he does not place the valid roofing along the length of the spits, but rather:

If the spits were

the

widthwise

[across] the sukka,

he places

the valid roofing

lengthwise

[along their length].

In that case, he can place the valid roofing only if one of its ends rests on a spit here, while its other end rests on a spit there.

And since the valid roofing, in addition to covering the open space, also covers a small portion of the invalid roofing, the valid roofing is the majority, and the invalid roofing is nullified as the minority [Rashi, Sukka 15b, and the Ritba].

In the same manner, if the spits were placed

lengthwise, he places

the valid roofing

widthwise.

Come and hear

from the following Mishna:

A caravan that encamped in a plain and enclosed itself

before Shabbat

with camels,

or

with saddles,