Eruvin 15b — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Meir declares it pure.

And its reason is: he holds that any partition standing by means of something that possesses the breath of life is not a partition, and therefore it is neither a lehi nor a golel.

And they write upon it

[upon something that possesses the breath of life],

divorce documents for women.

And Rabbi Yose the Galilean disqualifies.

Gemara:

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Meir says: Any thing that possesses the breath of life—

one does not make it:

neither a wall for a Sukkah, nor a lehi for an alleyway,

and

nor passin for wells, nor a golel for a grave.

That is to say: the name golel does not apply to it, to render it impure, if he made it a golel for a grave.

In the name of Rabbi Yose the Galilean they said: One may not even write divorce documents for women upon it.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yose the Galilean?

For it was taught in a beraita:

It is written concerning a divorce document: “And he shall write for her

a book

of severance and place it in her hand.”

I have only [learned] a book

[a parchment scroll] that is fit for writing a document of severance upon it.

From where [do we derive] to include every thing

such as a wooden board and an olive leaf [Rashi, Sukkah 24b], that it should be fit for writing the divorce document upon it?

The verse states: “And he shall write for her”—

in any case.

For we expound: “And he shall write for her”—a generalization; “a book”—a specification; and “place it in her hand”—it again generalizes.

A generalization, specification, and generalization—you derive only something similar to the specification!

If so, what does the verse “a book” come to teach?

That is to say: what does the specification of “a book” come to exclude from the generalization?

To tell you: just as “a book”

is

a thing that does not possess the breath of life and does not eat, so too every thing that does not possess the breath of

life

and

does not eat

is fit for writing the divorce document, to exclude something that possesses the breath of life, or that eats [according to the Ritva].

And furthermore, we explain:

and the Rabbis,

who do not expound in this manner, their reason is:

Because,

is it written

“and he shall write for her”

“in a book”,

which would imply that he should write the divorce document on a book?!

But, “and he shall write for her

a book” is written,

which implies that the verse comes to state the content of his writing: that he should write her a book, and

for relating

[a narrative—the Ritva]

mere words,

that he should write for her words of severance,

the verse came

for that!

And we challenge:

and the Rabbis,

for according to them “a book” does not imply parchment—the verse did not establish for us on what he should write the divorce document; if so, it automatically implies that he should write it on anything he wishes.

And if so:

this “and he shall write for her”—

what do they expound from it?

And we answer:

that “

and he shall write for her”

is needed

to teach:

She is divorced through writing, and she is not divorced through money!

For if he gave her money and said: “Be divorced through it”—she is not divorced.

For if not for the verse,

it might enter your mind to say: Since the departure

of a woman from her husband

was equated

with the betrothal of a woman to her husband, as it is written: “And she shall depart” from his house and go “and she shall become” another man’s wife—let us likewise equate it concerning this matter and say:

Just as becoming is through money

[as we derive at the beginning of Kiddushin, “taking” from “taking,” from the field of Ephron],

so departure is through money.

And therefore

the verse informs us

that she is not divorced through money.

And we explain:

and Rabbi Yose the Galilean,

who cannot derive that she is not divorced through money from “and he shall write for her,” since he uses it for another exposition,

this reasoning—

that she is not divorced through money—

from where does he derive it?

He derives it from “a book of severance”,

since “severance” was written adjacent to “book,” to teach:

“A book” severs her, and nothing else severs her.

And we explain:

and the Rabbis,

who do not derive that she is not divorced through money from “a book of severance,” their reason is: because

this “a book of severance”

implies “words of severance,” and

is needed

to teach that there should be “words of separation,”

for something that severs between him and her,

so that he should not impose a condition in the divorce in a manner that binds them together.

And

as it was taught in a beraita: “This is your divorce document on condition that you do not drink wine,”

or

“on condition that you do not go to your father’s house,”

if he stipulated that she should not do these things

“forever,”

then since all her days she remains bound to him, for because of him she refrains from drinking wine, and this condition continues and extends forever—

this is not severance!

Since they are not “words of separation.”

But if he stipulated that she should not do this, but only

“all

thirty days,”—

this is severance

immediately, for they are “words of separation” at the end of thirty days, and she is immediately permitted to another man.

And we explain:

and Rabbi Yose the Galilean—

who expounds “a book of severance” for another matter—

derives

this law of “words of separation”

from

the fact that the verse could have written: “a book”

“severance,”

but it wrote

“severances,”

to teach that he should write in the book: “severance,” which implies “separation.”

And

the Rabbis—

who required the entire verse of “a book of severance” to teach that there should be “words of separation,” and do not derive it from the amplification of “severance—severances”—their reason is that

“severance—

severances” they do not expound!

Mishna:

A caravan

[of three people—Gemara below, page 16b]

that camped in a valley,

which is a karmelit and is forbidden by rabbinic enactment to carry within it,

and enclosed it

before Shabbat with

animals’ equipment,

such as saddles and saddlecloths [Meiri]—

they may carry within it.

Provided that the fence

with which they enclosed it

is ten handbreadths high,

the measure of a partition,

and there are not

in it

breaches greater than the standing sections.

Any breach that is ten

[up to ten, and ten itself included]

cubits—

is permitted

even opposite the breach,

because it is

considered

an entrance,

provided that the standing section is greater than the breaches.

But if there was even one breach wider

than this

[than ten cubits]—

it is forbidden

to carry throughout the entire enclosed area, even if the entire remainder of the enclosure is standing.

Gemara:

It was stated:

If the entire enclosure was

breached equal to the standing sections

in equal measure—Rav Pappa and Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua disagreed about it:

Rav Pappa said: It is permitted,

to carry within it [like the law of a partition in which the standing section is greater than the breach—the Ritva].

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said: It is forbidden

[like the law of a partition in which the breach is greater than the standing section—the Ritva].

And we explain their disagreement:

Rav Pappa said: It is permitted,

because he holds:

This is what the Merciful One taught Moses—

within the general laws of partitions given to Moses at Sinai [as above, page 4]—

Do not let the majority be breached!

If the breach is equal to the standing section, it is permitted!

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said: It is forbidden,

because he holds:

This is what the Merciful One taught Moses: Enclose the majority!

But if the standing section is equal to the breach, it is forbidden!

And we challenge Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua:

But

we learned

in our Mishna:

“And there shall not be breaches ‘greater’ than the standing sections.”

And it implies:

if

the breaches were

like the standing sections

equally—

it is permitted!

And this is not according to Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua?! And we answer:

Do not say,

do not be precise so as to say:

if they are like the standing sections—

it is permitted.

Rather, say

that you should be precise as follows: only

if the standing sections are greater than the breach

is it

permitted!

And we challenge this:

But

if the breaches were

like the standing sections

equally—according to your words—

what, is it forbidden?!

If so, let it teach

in the Mishna:

“There shall not be breaches equal to the standing sections!”

And since it did not teach this, it implies: if they are equal to the standing sections, it is permitted!

And we conclude:

It is difficult!

Come and hear: One who roofs

who makes the roof of

his Sukkah

[as we do, arranging beams first in the place designated for roofing and placing valid roofing upon them—Rashi, Sukkah 15a]:

with metal spits,

which are disqualified for roofing because they are not products of the ground [Rabbenu Ovadiah of Bertinoro].

or with the long boards of a bed,

those boards that run along the length of the bed, which are rabbinically disqualified for roofing, since they are worn-out utensils that are susceptible to impurity [Rabbi Akiva Eiger].

If there is space between them—

of the spits or the long boards—

“equal to them,”

of equal width, and he placed valid roofing there—

the Sukkah is valid

the Sukkah.

And this should be difficult for Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua, who said: when the breach is equal to the standing section, equally, it is forbidden.

For here too there is invalid roofing equal to valid roofing?!

And we answer:

With what are we dealing here? With [a case where] one enters and exits!

That is to say: what the Mishna teaches, “equal to them,” means that there is so much space between them that spits or long boards equal to them can enter and exit through the space between them with room to spare; thus the space is greater than the measure of a spit, and is not exactly equal to it!

And it entered our minds that this is why we answer in this manner: because “equal to them” implies [a space through which one] enters and exits, since it is not customary to make it exactly precise.

And therefore we challenge:

But it is possible to make it exact

and arrange it so that the space between them is not greater than “equal to them,” which implies exact equality?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Ami said:

Even though it is possible to make it exact, nevertheless the Mishna is speaking of a case where he did not make it exact, but

in which he increased

where the space was greater than the measure of the spits. And “equal to them” that it teaches means: according to the measure of the spits when one enters and exits!

Rava said:

He gives another resolution for the challenge that we raised from the Mishna against Rav Huna:

The Mishna is speaking of a case where he does not place the valid roofing along the length of the spits, but rather:

if the

spits are

placed across

[widthwise] across the Sukkah,

he places

the valid roofing

lengthwise

[along the length].

For then he can support the valid roofing only if one of its ends rests on the spit here, and its other end rests on the spit there.

And since the valid roofing, besides covering the empty space, also covers a little of the invalid roofing, the valid roofing is the majority, and the invalid roofing is nullified in the minority [Rashi, Sukkah 15b, and Ritva].

And in the same matter, if the spits were placed—

lengthwise, he places

the valid roofing

across.

Come and hear

from the following Mishna:

A caravan that camped in a valley, and enclosed it

before Shabbat

with camels,

or

with saddles,