Eruvin 15a (טו.) — the Talmud in English

It was stated: lehi standing on its own,

that was not established for the purpose of rectifying the mavoi, and was not designated for that purpose:

Abaye said: It is a valid lehi

to permit carrying in the mavoi.

Rava said: It is not a valid lehi.

And we explain their dispute:

where we did not rely

upon it

as a lehi

from the previous day,

because there had been another lehi there, upon which they had relied, and that lehi fell on Shabbat—

everyone agrees

that the lehi that remained, upon which they had not relied,

is not a valid lehi!

They disagree where they relied upon it from the previous day

to permit carrying by virtue of it, as a lehi.

Abaye

said:

It is a valid lehi,

despite the fact that they did not erect it for the purpose of a lehi,

as they did rely upon it from the previous day

as a lehi.

Rava said: It is not a valid lehi.

Because

since initially,

when they erected it,

they did not have this purpose in mind,

they did not erect it for this purpose—

it is not a valid lehi!

It might have entered the minds

of the members of the academy that

just as Abaye and Rava disagree

with regard to

a lehi

that stands on its own, so too

they also disagree with regard to a partition

that stands on its own.

Therefore, they sought to prove the matter from a partition to a lehi, and they said:

Come and hear: One who makes his sukka among trees, with the trees serving as its walls—

it is valid.

It follows that a partition that stands on its own is a valid partition!

And we reject this:

With what are we dealing here? With trees that were planted

—that is, he planted the trees—

initially for this purpose,

so that they would serve as walls for the sukka.

And we ask:

If so—

it is obvious

that they can serve as walls?!

And we answer:

Lest you say: Let us decree

that one may not use this sukka,

lest he come to use the tree

and climb it and detach something from it on a Festival—

it teaches us

that we are not concerned about this!

Come and hear:

With regard to water pits in the public domain [which, because of their depth and width, are considered a private domain], it is permitted to draw water from them into the public domain if one made around the pit four “deyomadin” [see the introduction, explanation of the matter of the pasei bira’ot], which appear as eight posts.

That is, one makes, at a distance around the well, four corners in the form of a gutter [and Rambam calls them “angles”], each extending one cubit in one direction and a second cubit in a second direction. In this way, the area around the pit becomes a private domain, enclosed by partitions on all four sides, and it is then permitted to draw water from the pit into the area between the deyomadin.

And if

there was

at one of the corners

a tree or a stone fence

that enclosed one cubit, like a post, on each side [Rashi, Sukka 24b],

or

there was at the corners

a fence of reeds [

reeds that were planted in the arrangement of a partition]—

it is considered

the same

as a deyomed!

[See illustration 1.]

It is apparent that even an object that was not erected for the purpose of a partition is considered a partition! And we reject this:

Here too, we are dealing with a case where he made them initially for this purpose.

And we challenge this:

If so—

what does it teach us?

And we answer: This

teaches us

the law of

a fence of reeds,

which is a partition made

reed by reed,

when there are

less than three tefachim

between one reed and the next. It is effective, by virtue of the law of lavud, even for it to be considered a post of the pasei bira’ot!

As

he asked him below, on page 19b,

Abaye asked Rabba, whether a partition made reed by reed, with less than three tefachim between the reeds, is effective to serve as a deyomed of the pasei bira’ot. The reason for the uncertainty will be explained below, in its place.

And from this beraita it is possible to resolve it!

And this beraita can resolve the question!

And the Gemara brings another proof that a partition standing on its own is effective:

Come and hear: A tree whose branches spread

[provide shade]

over the ground,

and at the base of the tree there is a height of ten tefachim, while its branches extend until they are close to the ground—

if its branches are not three tefachim above the ground, one may carry beneath it,

since the branches, which are joined to the ground by lavud, are considered a partition.

It follows that a partition standing on its own is effective! And we reject this:

Here too, we are dealing with a case where he planted

the tree

initially for this purpose!

And we challenge this:

If so—

if the case is one where he planted it initially for this purpose, it is a complete partition, and if so,

one should be permitted to carry throughout

the entire area beneath the tree!?

That is, even when the tree’s branches spread over a large area.

And challenge this:

Why,

why

did Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, say: One may not carry in it

in the area beneath the tree

unless

the area was no more than

a beit se’atayim [

an area in which two se’a of seed can be sown. Its size is like the courtyard of the Tabernacle, which was one hundred cubits by fifty cubits, an area of five thousand square cubits]!?

And if the tree’s branches were very broad, so that the area beneath them exceeded “a beit se’atayim,” —

one may not carry in it.

And it might have entered our minds that the reason is that the tree’s branches are not a complete partition, since it stands on its own. Therefore, it is like an ordinary enclosure that is not fully rectified. For example, a partition consisting only of either vertical or horizontal components [and not both], or an enclosure that was not made for residence; in such a place, one may not carry if its area exceeds a beit se’atayim.

Now, according to the way Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, established the matter—namely, that the tree was planted initially for this purpose—it should be an enclosure that is fully rectified. If so, it should be permitted even when its area exceeds a beit se’atayim?!

And we answer:

Because

the law of “a beit se’atayim that was not enclosed for residence” applies, and therefore the area beneath the tree must not exceed a beit se’atayim.

For although this tree was planted with the intention that one reside beneath its branches, this is not ordinary residence; rather,

it is

“a residence whose use is for air.”

That is, it is intended for watchmen of the fields, to protect them from the hot air outside it [to save them from the heat].

They reside there only because they have no choice.

And every residence whose use

is only

for “air”—

is not considered a residence.

Therefore,

one may not carry in it, except

when its area is no more than

a beit se’atayim

and not more.

And the Gemara brings another proof that even a partition standing on its own is considered a partition:

Come and hear:

A person who spends the twilight period on the eve of Shabbat outside the city is considered to have his place of residence within four cubits around him. From there onward, he may walk two thousand cubits in every direction, the measure of the Shabbat limit.

But one who spends Shabbat at home outside the city has the entire house considered his place of residence, and from outside the house onward he may walk two thousand cubits in every direction.

Therefore, if

he spent Shabbat on a mound that is ten

tefachim high, the measure of a partition,

and it was wider

than

four cubits [

because if it is not four cubits wide, spending Shabbat on the mound does not add any area to his place of residence, since he would have had four cubits around him even if he had spent Shabbat on level ground]

and up to a beit se’atayim, we say with regard to the mound, “draw up the partitions”—the partitions surrounding the mound are considered to extend upward—and it follows that he spent Shabbat in a place enclosed by partitions. Therefore, the entire mound becomes like his house with regard to his place of residence.

[But if the area of the mound exceeds a beit se’atayim, its partitions are not effective for him, since an enclosure not made for residence is not effective when it exceeds a beit se’atayim. He is therefore like one who spent Shabbat on level ground, who has only four cubits.]

But if the area of the mound is larger than the size of two se’a, its partitions are not effective for him, since an enclosure not made for residential use is not effective when larger than the size of two se’a. He is therefore like one who remained on level ground, who has only four cubits.]

And likewise,

if he spent Shabbat

in a cleft,

a crevice between rocks,

that was ten deep

tefachim,

and from four cubits up to a beit se’atayim—

since it is enclosed by partitions, the entire crevice is considered his house.

And since it was not enclosed for residence, it is not effective when it exceeds a beit se’atayim.

And

likewise, if he spent Shabbat within

harvested grain,

where he harvested the grain in the center of the field but did not harvest the grain around it, and

stalks

ten high

surrounded it—

the entire area of the harvested grain is considered his house.

And in all these cases:

he may walk throughout it

as his place of residence.

And outside it—

he may walk an additional

two thousand cubits!

It is apparent that a partition standing on its own is a valid partition. This is a difficulty for Rava?!

And

if you would say

that the proof should be rejected, saying that

here too

the case is one where he

made

these partitions

initially for this purpose—

that is not so.

For

granted, when one spent Shabbat within

grain—

indeed!

It is possible

to establish that he had in fact sown the grain initially for this purpose.

But a mound and a cleft,

which he did not make—

what can one say?!

Because of this proof, the Gemara retracts the premise that just as Abaye and Rava disagree with regard to a lehi, so too they disagree with regard to a partition.

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that

with regard to partitions,

everyone agrees that

a partition made on its own

is a valid partition.

And when they disagree,

Abaye and Rava disagree specifically

with regard to a lehi; it is only concerning a lehi standing on its own that they disagree!

And the reason for their dispute is:

Abaye,

who says that a lehi standing on its own is a valid lehi, maintains

in accordance with his reasoning [

his position above, on page 5a, according to one interpretation—Tosafot],

that he says: A lehi is effective by virtue of a partition

and

it is effective.

And a partition made on its own—

is a valid partition.

And Rava,

who says that a lehi standing on its own is not a valid lehi, also maintains this

in accordance with his reasoning,

as he said [above, on page 12b—Tosafot]:

A lehi is effective by virtue of recognition.

Therefore, only

if it is made

for the purpose of a lehi

is it recognition.

But if not,

if it was not made by human action,

it is not recognition.

And the Gemara proves in accordance with Abaye’s statement, that a lehi standing on its own permits the mavoi:

Come and hear:

A fence built along the length of a mavoi, with, at the entrance of the mavoi,

stones of the fence protruding

[projecting]

from the fence

one above the other, into the width of the entrance of the mavoi:

If the stones protruding into the mavoi were

separated from one another by less than three

tefachim, we apply the principle of lavud to them. It follows that there is a lehi protruding into the mavoi to a height of ten tefachim. Therefore,

another lehi is not required

to permit carrying in the mavoi.

But if the protruding stones were separated from one another by

three

tefachim or more, so that the law of lavud does not apply to them, this is not a lehi. Therefore,

another lehi is required

to permit the mavoi.

It is apparent that a lehi standing on its own is a valid partition, which is difficult for Rava!

And we answer:

Here too,

the case is

that they

built the protruding stones

initially for this purpose.

And we challenge this:

If so, it is obvious

that they permit carrying as a lehi. What novelty is there in teaching this?!

And we answer:

Lest you say:

Even if they built them initially for the purpose of a lehi, they did not thereby create any indication.

Because people would say: The builder of this wall left stones projecting from it in order

to join

[connect, bind]

the construction. This is the usual practice of builders, who leave stones projecting from a fence so that, if they wish to make an additional partition from the fence extending along the mavoi toward the fence opposite it, the new fence can be joined to these stones [Ritva].

as builders commonly project stones from a fence so that, if they wish to make another partition from the fence along the alleyway toward the fence opposite it, the second fence can be joined to these stones [Ritva].

It teaches us

that nevertheless it is effective as a lehi, since they built it initially for the purpose of a lehi.

Come and hear

from that

which Rabbi Hiyya taught,

not in accordance with Rava: The lehi that permits carrying in the mavoi may be placed at the sides of the walls of the mavoi or as an extension of them.

Likewise, part of the extension of the wall can serve as a lehi if it appears as a lehi because it becomes wider or narrower. [See illustration.]

When the extension of the wall becomes narrower, the narrowed section of the wall appears as a lehi only to people standing outside the mavoi, but it does not appear as a lehi to people standing inside the mavoi.

When, by contrast, the extension of the wall becomes wider, the thickness of the wall appears as a lehi only to people standing inside the mavoi, but it does not appear as a lehi to those standing outside the mavoi, because they see it as the end of the wall rather than as a lehi.

And this is what Rabbi Hiyya taught:

A wall

thick of a mavoi,

one of whose sides

—the inner part of the wall’s thickness—

is recessed

from

its counterpart,

beginning or ending at a different point from the other part of the wall’s thickness. That is:

Whether the recessed area is visible

from the

outside.

That is, near the head of the mavoi the wall is narrow, while inside the mavoi it becomes wider. It follows that the wall is “recessed” only at the beginning of the mavoi. Therefore, only one standing outside the mavoi sees the thickening of the wall inside the mavoi and the recess in the wall near the head of the mavoi.

And

even with the interior,

where the entire thickness of the wall ends evenly, and the recess in the wall is not visible to one standing inside the mavoi, beyond the point where the wall is recessed.

Or whether the recessed area is visible

from

the inside,

where the wall is thick at the beginning of the mavoi and becomes recessed and narrower only farther inside, so that the recess and indentation are visible only to one standing inside the mavoi.

And even with the exterior,

where the point at which the wall is recessed is not visible to one standing outside; consequently, outside it does not appear as a lehi, but as a thick wall.

In either case, it

is considered a lehi.

It is apparent that an extension of the wall, which was not built for the purpose of a lehi, has the status of a lehi. This proves that a lehi standing on its own is a valid lehi. This is difficult for Rava?!

And we answer:

Here too

the case is

that he made it initially for this purpose.

And we challenge this:

If so—

what does it teach us?!

And we answer:

This teaches us: If it is visible from the outside and even with the inside, it

is considered a lehi!

Come and hear

from that

which occurred when Rav was sitting in a certain mavoi

—a mavoi—and

Rav Huna was sitting before him

of Rav.

He said to

Rav

his attendant

his servant:

Go, bring me a cup of water.

Go, bring me a cup of water!

By the time he came

back from his mission,

the lehi fell

—the lehi.

He showed him

—Rav showed his attendant—

with his hand,

showing him with his hand that he should remain standing and not carry in the mavoi.

The attendant stood

in

his place,

the attendant stood where he was.

Rav Huna said to Rav

: Is it the case that

the Master does not hold

that it is possible

to rely

upon something as a lehi

on the palm tree, upon the palm tree that was planted there beside the entrance of the mavoi, and to carry relying on its being there as though there were a lehi?!

on the palm tree that was planted there beside the entrance of the alleyway, and to carry on the basis that it was there as though there were a sidepost?!

Rav said:

Rav:

The one who resembles

—resembles

this scholar

someone who has not understood [

in other places in the Talmud the wording is “learned” rather than “understood”]

the teachings!

This scholar—Rav Huna—resembles people who have not learned.

Because

who—

does one

rely upon it

—upon this palm tree—to serve as a lehi—also

from the previous day,

so that it should be effective as a lehi?! Yesterday they relied upon the lehi and not upon the palm tree!

And the Gemara infers from Rav’s words:

The reason

that the palm tree cannot serve as a lehi is

that we did not rely

upon the palm tree from the previous day.

But

if so, if

we did rely

upon the palm tree from the previous day, even though it stands there on its own,

it is a valid lehi!

Evidently, the halakha is in accordance with Abaye!

And we ask: How does the Gemara resolve from Rav’s incident that the halakha follows Abaye in this dispute?

But it could be rejected and stated in the opposite manner: Let us infer from Rav’s incident that the halakha follows Rava:

And

let us say

that

Abaye and Rava disagree where we did not rely upon it

from the previous day; it is in that case that they

disagree.

But

where

we did rely upon it

from the previous day, everyone agrees that it

was a valid lehi.

And consequently, from Rav’s incident we see that he held that when we did not rely upon it from the previous day, it was not a valid lehi, and we should infer that the halakha follows Rava in this dispute?!

And we answer:

This cannot enter your mind,

that they disagree where we did not rely upon it.

For that platform

[porch]

that was at the house of bar Havu—the post supporting the porch, which was not made for the purpose of a lehi, stood at the entrance of another mavoi.

the post supporting the porch, which had not been made for the purpose of being a sidepost, stood at the entrance of another alleyway.

Abaye and Rava had disagreed about it

—about this post, which was not initially made for the purpose of a lehi—

both of them throughout their lives

[all their days], whether it was possible to rely upon it as a lehi.

Evidently, since both of them disagreed about it “throughout their lives,” they disagreed where one did rely upon it from the previous day.

Mishna:

With any

object

one may make leḥayin.

And

even with an object that possesses the breath of life.

And Rabbi Meir prohibits.

And

likewise, one

renders impure

an object that possesses the breath of life if he made it the covering for a coffin containing a corpse,

because of golel.

For a golel conveys impurity in a tent like the corpse itself [even if it is later removed from there]. As it is written: “And whoever touches that which is upon the open field”—this includes a golel.