Eruvin 15a — the Talmud in English

It was stated: A lehi that stands by itself,

which was not established for the purpose of repairing the מבוי, and was not designated for this purpose:

Abaye said: It is a lehi

to permit carrying in the מבוי.

Rava said: It is not a lehi.

And we explain their dispute:

Where we did not rely

upon it

as a lehi

from the previous day,

because there had been another lehi there, upon which they relied, and that lehi fell on Shabbat—

everyone agrees

that the lehi that remained, upon which they had not relied,

is not a lehi!

When do they disagree? Where we relied upon it from the previous day

to permit carrying by virtue of it, as a lehi.

Abaye

said:

It is a lehi,

even though they did not erect it for the sake of a lehi,

for we did rely upon it from the previous day

as a lehi.

Rava said: It is not a lehi.

For

since at the outset,

when they erected it,

they did not have this in mind,

they did not erect it for this purpose—

it is not a lehi!

It entered the mind

of the members of the study hall that

just as they disagree

Abaye and Rava

concerning a lehi

that stands by itself, so too

they also disagree concerning a partition

that stands by itself.

And therefore they wished to prove from a partition to a lehi, and said:

Come and hear: One who makes his sukkah among trees, and the trees are its walls—

it is valid.

It follows that a partition that stands by itself is a partition!

And we reject this:

With what are we dealing here? With trees that were planted

that is, he planted the trees

from the outset for this purpose,

so that they would serve as walls for the sukkah.

And we ask:

If so,

it is obvious

that they can serve as walls?!

And we answer:

Lest you say: Let us decree

that one may not use this sukkah,

lest he come to use the tree,

and climb it and detach something on the Festival—

it teaches us

that we are not concerned [about this]!

Come and hear:

Water pits that are in the public domain, [which, because of their depth and breadth, are considered a private domain], are permitted for drawing water from them into the public domain if he made around the pit four “deyomadin” [see the Introduction, explanation of the matter of “the boards of the wells”], which appear as eight boards.

That is, he makes, at a distance around the well, four corners, in the form of a gutter [and Maimonides calls them “angles”], each extending one cubit in one direction and a second cubit in a second direction. In this way the area around the pit becomes a private domain, enclosed by partitions on its four sides, and it is then permitted to draw water from the pit into the area between the deyomadin.

And if

there was

in one of the corners

a tree or a stone fence,

which encloses a cubit like a board, on each side [Rashi, Sukkah 24b],

or

there was in the corners

a partition of reeds [

reeds that had been planted in the arrangement of a partition]—

it is judged

the same thing

as a deyomed! [

See illustration 1]

It is apparent that even something that was not erected for the purpose of a partition is considered a partition! And we reject this:

Here too, with what are we dealing? With [things] that he made from the outset for this purpose.

And we challenge this:

If so—

what does it teach us?

And we answer: This

teaches us

the law of

a partition of reeds,

which is a partition made

reed by reed,

when there are

less than three handbreadths

between one reed and the next; that it is effective, by the law of lavud, even to be considered a board of the boards of the wells!

As

he asked him—below, page 19b—

Abaye asked Rava,

whether a partition made reed by reed, with less than three handbreadths between one reed and the next, is effective to serve as a deyomed of the boards of the wells. The reason for the uncertainty will be explained below, in its place.

And this can be resolved from this beraita!

And the Gemara brings another proof that a partition that stands by itself is effective:

Come and hear: A tree that forms a canopy [

that is, provides shade]

over the ground,

and at the base of the tree there is a height of ten handbreadths, while its foliage extends until near the ground—

if its foliage is not three handbreadths above the ground, one may carry beneath it,

since the foliage, joined to the ground by lavud, is considered a partition.

It follows that a partition that stands by itself is effective! And we reject this:

Here too, with what are we dealing? With a tree that he planted

the tree

from the outset for this purpose!

And we challenge this:

If so—

if it is speaking of a tree that he planted from the outset for this purpose, it is a complete partition, and if so,

let him carry throughout it,

the entire area beneath the tree!?

That is: even when the foliage of the tree extends over a broad area.

And ask:

Why,

why

did Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua say: One may not carry in it

in the area beneath the tree

except

if the area was up to

the area of two seah בלבד [

an area in which two seah of seed are sown. Its size is like the courtyard of the Tabernacle, which was one hundred cubits by fifty cubits, an area of five thousand square cubits]?!

And if the foliage of the tree was very broad, so that the area beneath it was more than “the area of two seah” —

one may not carry in it.

And it entered our mind that the reason is that the foliage of the tree is not a complete partition, since it stands by itself. Therefore it is like another enclosure that is not fully prepared. For example, a partition that has only warp or only woof [and not both warp and woof], or an enclosure that was not enclosed for habitation; in such a place one may not carry if its enclosure is larger than the area of two seah.

But now this is difficult: according to the way Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua established it, that he planted the tree from the outset for this purpose, it is an enclosure fully prepared. If so, it should be permitted even if its enclosure is larger than the area of two seah?!

And we answer:

Because

the law of “the area of two seah that was not enclosed for habitation” requires that there not be more than the area of two seah beneath the tree.

For although this tree was planted with the intention of dwelling beneath its foliage, this is not ordinary habitation; rather,

it is

“a habitation whose use is for air.”

That is, it is intended for the watchmen of the fields, to protect them from the hot air outside it, [to save them from the sun].

And they dwell in it against their will.

And every habitation whose use

is only

for “air”—

is not habitation.

And therefore

one may not carry in it, except

when its enclosure is up to

the area of two seah

and no more.

And the Gemara brings another proof that a partition that stands by itself is considered a partition:

Come and hear:

A person who spends the twilight period on the eve of Shabbat outside the city has the place of his residence considered to be four cubits around him. From there onward, it is permitted for him to walk two thousand cubits in every direction, the measure of the Shabbat boundary.

But one who spends the twilight period in his house outside the city has the entire house considered the place of his residence, and from outside the house onward it is permitted for him to walk two thousand cubits in every direction.

And therefore: if

he spent Shabbat on a mound that is ten

handbreadths high, the measure of a partition,

and it is broader

than

four cubits [

for if it is not four cubits broad, spending Shabbat on the mound does not add an area of residence for him, since he would have had four cubits around him even had he spent Shabbat on level ground]

and up to the area of two seah,

we say concerning the mound, “raise and extend the partitions” around the mound, and it follows that he spent Shabbat in a place enclosed by partitions. Therefore the entire mound becomes like his house with regard to “the place of his residence.” [

But if the area of the mound is more than the area of two seah, its partitions are not effective for him, since an enclosure not made for habitation is not effective for more than the area of two seah. It is therefore like one who spent Shabbat on level ground, who has only four cubits].

And likewise,

if he spent Shabbat

in a hollow,

a cleft between the rocks,

that is ten deep

handbreadths

and from four cubits up to the area of two seah—

since it is enclosed by partitions, the entire hollow is considered like his house.

And since it was not enclosed for habitation, it is not effective for more than the area of two seah.

And

likewise, if he spent Shabbat inside

a harvested standing crop,

where he harvested the standing crop in the center of the field but did not harvest the standing crop around it, and

ears of grain

ten high

surround it—

the entire place of the harvested standing crop is considered like his house.

And in all these cases:

he walks through all of it

as the place of his residence.

And outside it—

he walks an additional

two thousand cubits!

It is apparent that a partition that stands by itself is a partition. And this is difficult for Rava?!

And

if you would say

to reject the proof and say that

here too

it is speaking of one who

made

these partitions

from the outset for this purpose—

that is not so.

For

granted,

with one who spent Shabbat inside

a standing crop—

indeed!

It is possible to establish that he indeed sowed the standing crop from the outset for this purpose.

But a mound and a hollow,

which he did not make—

what is there to say?!

And because of this proof, the Gemara retracts from the approach that just as Abaye and Rava disagree concerning a lehi, so too they disagree concerning a partition.

Rather,

necessarily,

concerning partitions—

everyone agrees that a

partition made by itself

is a partition.

And when do they disagree?

Abaye and Rava disagree specifically

concerning a lehi;

it is with regard to a lehi that stands by itself that they disagree!

And the reason for their dispute is:

Abaye,

who said that a lehi that stands by itself is a lehi, holds

according to his reasoning [

above, page 5a, according to one version—Tosafot],

for he said: A lehi is effective because of a partition

that is why it is effective.

And a partition made by itself—

is a partition.

And Rava,

who said that a lehi that stands by itself is not a lehi, also holds

according to his reasoning,

for he said [above, page 12b—Tosafot]:

A lehi is effective because of recognition.

Therefore, only if

it is made

for a lehi

by hand is it recognition.

But if not,

made by hand,

it is not recognition.

And the Gemara proves Abaye’s words, that a lehi that stands by itself permits the מבוי:

Come and hear:

A fence built along the length of a מבוי, and at the entrance of the מבוי the fence has

stones of the fence that project [

protrude]

from the fence, one above the other, into the width of the entrance of the מבוי:

If the stones projecting into the מבוי

were

separated from one another by less than three

handbreadths, we apply to them the law of lavud. It follows that there is a lehi projecting into the מבוי to a height of ten handbreadths. Then

there is no need for another lehi

to permit carrying in the מבוי.

But if the projecting stones were separated from one another by

three

handbreadths or more, so that the law of lavud was not applied to them, this is not a lehi, and therefore

another lehi is required

to permit the מבוי.

It is apparent that a lehi that stands by itself is a partition, and this is difficult for Rava!

And we answer:

Here too,

it is speaking

of ones that he built

the projecting stones

from the outset for this purpose.

And we refute this:

If so, it is obvious

that they permit by virtue of a lehi; what novelty is it teaching us?!

And we answer:

Lest you say:

Even if he built them from the outset for the sake of a lehi, he did not thereby make any recognition.

Because people would say: The builder of this wall left projecting stones in it in order

to join [

to connect, to bind]

the building; that is what they were made for. This is the practice of builders, who make stones project from a fence so that, if they wish to make an additional partition from the fence along the מבוי toward the fence opposite it, the partition will connect to these stones [Ritba].

as builders commonly project stones from a fence so that, if they wish to make another partition from the fence along the alleyway toward the fence opposite it, the second fence can be joined to these stones [Ritva].

It teaches us

that nevertheless it is effective as a lehi, since he built them from the outset for the sake of a lehi.

Come and hear

from this

which Rabbi Hiyya taught, unlike Rava: The lehi that permits carrying in the מבוי may be erected at the sides of the walls of the מבוי or as their continuation.

contrary to Rava: The sidepost that permits carrying in the alleyway may be placed at the sides of the walls of the alleyway or as an extension of them.

Likewise, part of the continuation of the wall can serve as a lehi if it appears as a lehi by becoming wider or narrower. [See illustration]

When the continuation of the wall becomes narrower, the narrowed place of the wall appears as a lehi only to people standing outside the מבוי, but it does not appear so to people standing inside the מבוי.

But when the continuation of the wall becomes wider, the thickness of the wall appears as a lehi only to people standing inside the מבוי, but it does not appear as a lehi to those standing outside the מבוי, because they see it as the end of the wall and not as a lehi.

And this is what Rabbi Hiyya taught:

A wall

thick of a מבוי,

one of whose sides

the inner part of the thickness of the wall

is recessed

and

joins it,

beginning or ending unevenly with its other side; thus:

Whether the recessed place is visible

the recessed place

from outside.

That is, near the head of the מבוי the wall is narrow, and inside the מבוי it widens. It follows that the wall is “recessed” only at the beginning of the מבוי. Therefore only one standing outside the מבוי sees the thickening of the wall inside the מבוי and the recess of the wall near the head of the מבוי.

And

even if it is even from inside,

ending evenly along the entire thickness of the wall, so that the recess of the wall is not visible to one standing inside the מבוי, beyond the place where the wall is recessed,

and whether the recessed place is visible

the place of the recess

from inside,

where at the beginning of the מבוי the wall is thick, and only farther inside it is recessed and becomes narrow, so that the recess and indentation are visible only to one standing inside the מבוי.

and is even from outside,

so that to one standing outside, the place of the wall’s recess is not visible, and it therefore appears outside not as a lehi but as a thick wall.

In every case it

is judged as a lehi.

It is apparent that the continuation of the wall, which was not built for the sake of a lehi, has the law of a lehi. It is proven that a lehi that stands by itself is a lehi. And this is difficult for Rava?!

And we answer:

Here too

it is speaking

of one who made it from the outset for this purpose.

And we refute this:

If so—

what does it teach us?!

And we answer:

This teaches us: Visible from outside and even from inside—

it is judged as a lehi!

Come and hear

from this

that Rav was sitting in a certain מבוי

a מבוי, and

Rav Huna was sitting before him,

before Rav.

He said to him

Rav

to his attendant,

his servant:

Go, bring me a cup of water.

Go, bring me a cup of water!

While he came

the attendant from carrying out his mission,

the lehi fell,

the lehi.

He showed him—

Rav to his attendant—

with his hand,

he showed him with his hand that he should stand still and not carry in the מבוי.

The attendant stood

his attendant

in his place,

the attendant stood in his place.

Rav Huna said to Rav: Is it so that

you

do not hold

that it is possible

to rely

as a lehi

upon the palm tree,

upon the palm tree that was planted there beside the entrance of the מבוי, and to carry on the basis of its being there as though there were a lehi?

Rav said:

Rav

it seems to me

resembling

this scholar—

as one who has not explained [

in other places in the Talmud it says “learned” and not “explained”]

the people’s teaching!

This scholar—Rav Huna—resembles people who have not learned.

For

who—

that is, is it the case that—

we rely upon it

that this palm tree should serve as a lehi also

from the previous day,

so that it would be effective as a lehi?! But on the previous day they relied upon the lehi and not upon the palm tree!

And the Gemara infers from Rav’s words:

The reason

that the palm tree cannot serve as a lehi is

that we did not rely

upon the palm tree from the previous day.

But

if so,

we did rely

upon the palm tree from the previous day, even though it stands there by itself,

it is a lehi!

It follows that the halakha is like Abaye!

And we ask: How does the Gemara resolve from Rav’s incident that the halakha follows Abaye in this dispute?

But it is possible to reject this and say the opposite: Let us resolve from Rav’s incident that the halakha follows Rava:

And

let us say

that

Abaye and Rava disagree where we did not rely upon it

from the previous day; it is with regard to this that they

disagree.

But

where

we did rely upon it

from the previous day, everyone agrees that it

was a lehi.

And consequently, from Rav’s incident we see that he held that when we did not rely upon it from the previous day, it was not a lehi, and we should resolve that the halakha follows Rava in this dispute?!

And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

that they disagree where we did not rely upon it.

That certain porch [

an extension]

that was at the house of Bar Havou.

And the post supporting the porch, which had not been made for the sake of a lehi, stood at the entrance of another מבוי.

They had disagreed concerning it—

concerning this post that had not been made initially for the sake of a lehi—

Abaye and Rava, both of them throughout their lives [

all their days], whether it is possible to rely upon it as a lehi.

It follows that since they both disagreed about it throughout their lives, they disagree where we did rely upon it from the previous day.

Mishna:

With every

thing

one makes lehayin.

And

even with something that possesses life.

But Rabbi Meir forbids.

And

likewise

it renders impure

something that possesses life, if he made it a covering for the coffin of a dead person,

because of a golel.

For a golel renders impure in a tent like the dead person himself [even if it is removed from there]. As it is written: “And whoever touches upon the face of the field”—to include a golel.