Eruvin 103b (קג:) — the Talmud in English

And we raised an objection to this:

What is it?

From where do we know that Rabbi Eliezer concedes that one does not perform the act in its usual manner when it is possible to do so by altering the manner?

And we answer:

As it is taught in a beraita: A kohen who developed a wart

on his body, which disqualifies him from performing the Temple service—

another person cuts it off for him

on Shabbat

with his teeth,

so that he can perform the service.

And we infer:

“With his teeth”—yes.

He may cut it for him only with his teeth, since its prohibition is merely rabbinic, because this is not the usual manner of cutting.

But

with a utensil,

which is the usual manner of cutting,

no.

And likewise, it follows that even when he cuts it with his teeth, only

“another person”—yes.

It is specifically through another person that this is permitted, because another person cannot cut something properly from someone else without a utensil.

But

he himself

for himself,

no!

Because a person can train himself to cut his own wart with his teeth.

And we find that Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disputed this matter in tractate Shabbat 94b. Rabbi Eliezer holds that one who removes [cuts] his own fingernails on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering, even when he removes one with another or with his teeth. Only when another person removes them for him with his fingernails or with his teeth is he exempt.

And the Sages hold that even when he himself cuts them with his fingernails or with his teeth, he is exempt.

And now the Gemara proves:

Who is it,

who is the tanna who taught this beraita?

If you say it is the Sages,

who hold that the requirements of a mitzva do not override Shabbat. And here it teaches us that only a biblically prohibited labor does not override Shabbat, but a rabbinic prohibition, such as cutting off a wart through another person with his teeth, since

it

is

in the Temple,

does override Shabbat.

This cannot be said.

For

since the Sages say in general,

when no mitzva is involved, that even removing one’s own fingernails with one’s teeth is prohibited only

by rabbinic decree,

then

here,

where you permitted him to cut off the wart and violate a rabbinic prohibition because he is in the Temple—

what difference is there whether it is he or another person?

Rather, is it not Rabbi Eliezer

who

says in general,

when no mitzva is involved, that one who removes his own fingernails with his teeth

is liable to bring a sin-offering?

Only when another person removes them for him with his fingernails is it merely a rabbinic prohibition.

But here,

in the case of a kohen who developed a wart,

even though

Rabbi Eliezer holds

that the requirements of a mitzva override Shabbat

even with regard to biblically prohibited labor, nevertheless,

whenever it is possible to alter the manner, we alter it.

Therefore, we do not permit him to cut the wart himself, which would involve a biblically prohibited act, since it can be done through another person, in which case it involves only a rabbinic prohibition.

Thus, Rabbi Eliezer holds that with regard to the requirements of a mitzva, whenever it is possible to alter the manner, we alter it.

And we reject this:

No.

Actually,

this beraita is

the Sages’

opinion.

And if the wart developed

on

his abdomen—

so too,

he could have cut it himself with his teeth, which would likewise involve only a rabbinic prohibition.

Rather,

with what are we dealing here? With a case in which he developed a bite,

that is, a wart,

on his back or in the folds of his arms,

at his elbow.

He himself

could

not remove it,

and therefore another person cuts it off for him with his teeth.

But in fact, Rabbi Eliezer holds that the requirements of a mitzva override Shabbat even with regard to biblically prohibited labor, and even when it is possible to alter the manner and perform it through an act prohibited only by rabbinic decree.

And we raise an objection to the rejection:

And if it is the Sages’

opinion—

let him remove it for him by hand.

That is, the Sages should have taught us that another person may cut off his wart with his hands, which would also involve only a rabbinic prohibition, and then we would learn two things:

a. The requirements of a mitzva override only a rabbinic prohibition, but not a primary category of labor, as the kohen is prohibited from cutting it with a utensil.

b.

And it would also resolve

this matter,

that of Rabbi Elazar.

For Rabbi Elazar said: The dispute

between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages in tractate Shabbat applies specifically when one removes his fingernails

by hand, but

if he removes them

with a utensil, everyone agrees that he is liable.

This is a derivative of the labor of shearing, as he cuts a nail attached to a living person, which resembles shearing wool from a living animal.

And we would learn this novelty only if it had stated that it is permitted to cut it by hand; we would then infer that with a utensil it is not permitted, because that is a primary category of labor.

But now that it states that he cuts it with his teeth, this inference cannot be made, since even by hand, which also involves a rabbinic prohibition, they did not permit him [because a rabbinic prohibition involving the hand is more severe than one involving the teeth, as cutting by hand is more customary than cutting with one’s teeth].

And if so, perhaps even with a utensil it involves only a rabbinic prohibition?

And we challenge the one who raised the objection:

But according to your reasoning,

as you wish to establish the beraita in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, who requires that the act be performed through another person in order to alter the manner whenever possible,

raise the following difficulty:

According to Rabbi Eliezer too, let him remove it for him by hand!

After all, when another person cuts it by hand, that too is an altered manner; why, then, does it say that he cuts it specifically with his teeth?

And we answer:

This—

what of it!?

Granted, if you say

that the beraita is

Rabbi Eliezer’s

opinion, who holds that as a matter of fundamental law the requirements of a mitzva override even biblically prohibited labor, and both a primary category of labor and a rabbinic prohibition are considered permitted with regard to the requirements of a mitzva,

nevertheless, one must still alter the manner and lessen the severity of the prohibition wherever possible.

If so, just as one alters the act from a primary category of labor to a rabbinic prohibition,

that is

also the case

with the decree prohibiting the hand because of a utensil,

For what difference is there between a more severe rabbinic prohibition and a less severe one? And we conclude:

as one also alters the act from a more severe rabbinic prohibition to a less severe rabbinic prohibition. The hand involves a more severe rabbinic prohibition than the teeth, because cutting by hand is more customary than cutting with the teeth. Therefore, it more closely resembles using a utensil, and a decree must be made against using the hand because of using a utensil; consequently, we permit it only with the teeth.

But if you say that it is the Sages’

opinion, who hold that as a matter of fundamental law the requirements of a mitzva override only a rabbinic prohibition, but not biblically prohibited labor—

let him remove it for him by hand!

A kohen who was injured

For what difference is there between a more severe rabbinic prohibition and a less severe one? And we conclude:

And nothing more!

There is no further difficulty to raise regarding our establishment of the beraita as referring to Rabbi Eliezer and our proof that Rabbi Eliezer holds that whenever it is possible to alter the manner, we alter it.

Mishna:

A kohen who was injured

and wounded

on his finger

on Shabbat—

wraps a reed around it

if he is

in the Temple.

Although the reed heals the wound, this is permitted to him because it is necessary for the service, as it is improper for his wound to be visible during the service.

But he may not

wrap a reed around it if he is

outside the Temple.

For the Sages prohibited healing on Shabbat, as a decree lest one grind medicinal ingredients.

And if

his intention in wrapping the reed is

to draw blood,

by tightening the reed around the wound—

it is prohibited in both places.

For it is prohibited even in the Temple, since this is not necessary for the service.

Furthermore, he violates the biblically prohibited labor of causing a wound, and a fully-fledged labor was permitted in the Temple only for the sacrificial service itself.

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Hiyya, said: They taught

that it is permitted for the kohen to wrap it and perform the service

only in the case of a reed,

which is not considered a garment at all.

But

if he wraps around the wound a

small sash,

which is a

small

decorative belt—

it constitutes “an excess of garments”

and disqualifies his service.

For when a kohen wears an unnecessary garment during the service, he disqualifies the service by doing so.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: They said

that

“an excess of garments”

disqualifies him only when he wears it

in a place

appropriate for wearing

garments.

let the service be invalidated

But when it is not in a place where garments are worn,

such as here, where he wears a garment on his finger—

it does not constitute an excess of garments.

And we challenge this: How can we permit him to wrap a reed or a sash around his finger during the service? Granted, it does not constitute an excess of garments, but

let us derive

that it is prohibited

because of interposition,

as the reed or sash interposes between the kohen’s hand and the service.

For it is written: “And the kohen shall take,” and “And the kohen shall sprinkle,” implying that the service must be performed by the kohen himself, that is, directly with his hand and not through another object!?

And we answer: The permission to use a reed or sash applies when he wraps it around a finger

of the

hand

left,

with which no service is performed.

Alternatively,

even

on the

hand

right, but not in the place of the service,

such as when he wraps it around the back of the finger, in which case there is no interposition.

And this disagrees

with Rabbi Yohanan’s statement that when it is not in the place where garments are worn there is no disqualification of an excess of garments, implying that any garment, even one measuring three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths, does not disqualify him when it is not in the place where garments are worn—with

what

was

said by Rava.

For Rava said in the name of Rav Hisda:

In the place where garments are worn—

even a single thread

found between his flesh and the garment

constitutes an interposition!

Although this does not involve an excess of garments, since a thread is not a garment at all, nevertheless, there is an interposition between the garment and the kohen’s flesh.

And we derive this from that which is written: “And he shall wear linen trousers on his flesh”—the garment must be directly on his flesh, without an interposition between them.

But

when it is not in the place where garments are worn—

there is no deficiency of interposition; there is only the deficiency of an excess of garments.

And this deficiency of an “excess of garments” applies only when wearing a garment measuring at least

three

fingerbreadths

by three

fingerbreadths.

For then they [the three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths of the garment’s requisite measure]

constitute an interposition! [

It does not mean literally that they constitute an interposition. Rather, the intention is that they disqualify him under the law of an excess of garments. The wording “interposition” was used because Rav Hisda initially used this expression regarding a single thread in the place where garments are worn, where the disqualification is due to interposition and not to an excess of garments. Therefore, he continued using the wording “interposition” afterward as well, in reference to an excess of garments.]

But garments measuring

less than three

fingerbreadths

by three

fingerbreadths—

do not constitute an interposition! [

For they are not considered a garment, since they do not have the status of a garment.

Likewise, they do not interpose between the garment and his flesh, since this is not the place where garments are worn. Nor is it relevant to discuss interposition between the kohen and the service, because the interposition is on his body in a place where no service is performed.]

That is, Rava, in the name of Rav Hisda, disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan.

Rava held that even when it is not in the place where garments are worn, there is the deficiency of an excess of garments, whereas Rabbi Yohanan holds that there is no deficiency of an excess of garments except in the place where garments are worn.

And we raise a question concerning this: It is obvious to us that Rava, in the name of Rav Hisda, who says that even when it is not in the place where garments are worn there is the deficiency of an excess of garments,

disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan,

who says that there is no deficiency of an excess of garments—

they certainly disagree.

Rather, this is what we are asking: Does he also

disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Hiyya,

who says that a small sash [a small belt], even one that is not three by three fingerbreadths, is considered an excess of garments—

shall we say that

he also

disagrees

with Rava, in the name of Rav Hisda, since Rav Hisda said that specifically a garment measuring three by three constitutes an excess of garments?

Or perhaps Rav Hisda agrees with Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Hiyya, that a small belt is considered an excess of garments, like a garment measuring three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths, because of its importance?

And we resolve this:

A small sash is different, as it is considered significant.

Therefore, it is considered an excess of garments even though it does not measure three by three fingerbreadths.

There are those who state this version differently:

Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Hiyya, said: They taught

that it is permitted for a kohen performing the service in the Temple to wrap something around his finger

only in the case of a reed.

But a sash,

a

small

belt—constitutes an interposition.

That is, the disqualification is one of an excess of garments, and not one of interposition!

Rabbi Yehuda used the wording “interposition” because of his dispute with Rabbi Yohanan, which will be explained shortly.

And Rabbi Yohanan used the wording “interposition” deliberately,

because he says [below] that a garment measuring less than three by three fingerbreadths constitutes an interposition in the place where garments are worn. This disqualification is only because of interposition, and not because of an excess of garments, since a measure of less than three fingerbreadths does not involve the disqualification of an excess of garments.

It follows that there is no practical difference between the first version and the latter version regarding the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Hiyya; the entire practical difference appears below, in Rabbi Yohanan’s statement.

There is only a linguistic difference between the two versions.

The first version used the expression “an excess of garments” with regard to a small sash, according to Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Hiyya.

The latter version used the expression “interposition.”

But, as stated, even in the latter version the intention is an excess of garments, and not the disqualification of interposition.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: They said

that

interposition

disqualifies

when it is less than three by three

only in the place where garments are worn.

For the deficiency is due to interposition between the garment and his flesh, and this deficiency applies regardless of the size, since even a single thread constitutes an interposition. [

Here the intention is a literal interposition, and because of this statement the latter version consistently uses the expression “interposition,” even when the intention is the disqualification of an excess of garments.]