Chullin 83a (פג.) — the Talmud in English

The verse comes to impose a positive mitzva

of burning the leftover sacrificial meat of cattle

after

he violated

the prohibition

of “You shall not leave any of it,”

to teach that one is not flogged for it

for this prohibition, since it is a prohibition remedied by a positive mitzva. And for any prohibition remedied by a positive mitzva, one is not flogged,

the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

This tanna holds that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, a warning based on doubt is considered a warning. Therefore, were it not for the reason that the prohibition is remedied by a positive mitzva, Rabbi Yehuda would require lashes for leftover sacrificial meat, despite the fact that this involves a warning based on doubt. For when he is warned, “Do not leave it over,” it is not certain that he is violating the prohibition, since perhaps he will eat the sacrifice before the end of the night. And this tanna disagrees with the tanna who taught that, if one struck and cursed another one after the other, he is exempt because the warning was based on doubt.

Rabbi Yaakov says: This is not the reason!

He is exempt in the case of leftover sacrificial meat not because of the principle that it is a prohibition remedied by a positive mitzva,

but because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action,

since one who leaves the sacrifice over does not perform any action; rather, it becomes leftover sacrificial meat on its own.

And for any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged!

Come and hear

to resolve the issue concerning the opinion of Sumakhos: does he require two sets of lashes specifically when the bodies are distinct, or even for any two olive-bulk portions?

If one ate two sciatic nerves

of the sciatic nerve

from two thighs of two animals,

and both thighs are right thighs,

he receives eighty lashes!

That is, two sets of lashes for the two sciatic nerves that he ate.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He receives only forty lashes.

The Gemara discusses this:

What are the circumstances? If we say

that he ate them

one after the other and after two warnings,

this presents a difficulty:

what is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s saying

that he receives

forty lashes and no more?

He ate two sciatic nerves, both of which are prohibited, since they are from the right thigh, which is the prohibited thigh.

Rather, it is obvious

that the case is one in which he ate them

at the same time and after a single warning,

and therefore Rabbi Yehuda holds that he is liable for only one set of lashes.

And

who

is the

first tanna

who holds that one is liable for two sets of lashes for eating the two nerves at the same time and after a single warning?

If we say that it is the Sages who disagree with Sumakhos,

this presents a difficulty:

if there,

in the case of one who slaughters the middle animal after its mother and its offspring,

where the bodies are distinct, the Sages exempt him, here

in the case of one who eats two sciatic nerves, is it not all the more so that they should exempt him from additional lashes? For the significance of a distinct “body” as a means of dividing liability exists only with regard to a living creature, and not with regard to a nerve, which has no life of its own.

Rather, is it not Sumakhos?

And infer from this that Sumakhos requires two sets of lashes even in a case where the bodies are not distinct.

And we reject this:

Actually,

the case is one in which he ate the nerves

one after the other.

Therefore, the first tanna requires two sets of lashes.

And when you say

that if so,

what is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda

for requiring only one set? It is possible to explain that the case is

one in which one of them does not contain an olive-bulk

of the two nerves: only one contains an olive-bulk, while the other does not. Therefore, he is liable only for the nerve that contains an olive-bulk. But the first tanna holds that one who eats an entire sciatic nerve is liable even if it does not contain an olive-bulk, since it is a “whole entity,” and a whole entity does not require a minimum measure.

As it was taught:

If one ate the sciatic nerve

and it does not contain an olive-bulk—

he is liable

for lashes, since it is a “whole entity.”

Rabbi Yehuda says: He is not liable

until it contains an olive-bulk,

for the sciatic nerve is not considered a “whole entity.”

Mishna:

At four periods

times

during the year,

108 , one who sells an animal to another must inform him: I sold the mother

of this animal

today

in order

to slaughter it!

Or,

I sold its offspring

today

in order to slaughter it!

For during these four days Jews customarily prepare large meals for the following day, and one who purchases an animal presumably intends to slaughter it immediately. It is therefore likely that the first purchaser already slaughtered it today. Consequently, the seller must inform the second purchaser that he too should not slaughter it today, thereby violating the prohibition of “the mother and its offspring”.

And these are

the four periods:

The eve of the last Festival day of Sukkot

the Festival

of Sukkot. And the eve of the first Festival day of Pesaḥ.

And the eve of Atzeret—

Shavuot.

And the eve of Rosh HaShana.

And according to the words of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

also on the eve of Yom Kippur in the Galil

he must inform him, because in the Galil they were accustomed to eat the meat of cattle on the eve of Yom Kippur, whereas elsewhere they ate only poultry and fish.

Rabbi Yehuda said: When

he is required to inform him—

when there is no interval,

meaning that there was no interval of time between the sale to the first purchaser and the sale to the second. That is, he also sold the mother or the offspring to the first purchaser on the eve of the Festival.

But

if

there is an interval,

meaning that he sold it to the first purchaser yesterday and to the second purchaser today, on the eve of the Festival—

he need not inform him

the second purchaser, since presumably the first purchaser already slaughtered it yesterday.

And Rabbi Yehuda concedes that, when one sells the mother to the groom and the daughter to the bride, he must inform the second purchaser,

even if they did not both purchase on the same day, since

it is known that both will slaughter on the same day,

for the wedding feast.

During these four periods, the slaughterer is compelled to slaughter against his will!

The seller is compelled to slaughter the animal,

even

if it was a

bull worth one thousand dinars, and the purchaser has in that bull

only

one dinar

which he paid the slaughterer so that he would give him meat worth one dinar, while the slaughterer has no purchasers for the remainder of the meat. Nevertheless,

he is compelled to slaughter it

and give the purchaser meat worth one dinar. This law applies only during these four periods, because at these times the purchaser acquires a share in the bull merely by giving money, even if he did not perform the act of acquisition known as meshikha, as the Gemara will explain. And since he is a partner in the bull, he can compel the seller to slaughter it.

Therefore, if it dies,

the bull

it dies for the purchaser!

He loses the dinar that he paid, since his share also died.

But throughout the rest of the year this is not the case.

The slaughterer is not compelled to slaughter it, since the purchaser did not perform the act of acquisition known as meshikha, and the slaughterer may withdraw from the sale.

Therefore, if it dies,

the bull

dies

only

for the seller.

The entire bull belongs to him, and the purchaser receives his money back. [This explanation of the Mishna follows Rabbi Yoḥanan’s view in the Gemara.]

Gemara:

The tanna taught: If he did not inform him

the purchaser of anything during the four periods mentioned,

the purchaser goes

and

slaughters

it today,

and does not refrain,

since he need not be concerned that he may be violating the prohibition of “the mother and its offspring.”

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda said: When ...

and Rabbi Yehuda concedes that, when one sells the mother to the groom and the daughter to the bride.

And we inquire concerning this:

Why was it necessary to teach, “the mother to the groom and the daughter to the bride,”

specifically in this order? The same law would apply if he sold the mother to the bridegroom and the daughter to the bride. It would have been preferable to say: “He sold one to the groom and one to the bride.”

And we answer:

The Mishna teaches us something incidentally, by the way,

the Mishna,

that it is proper conduct for the groom’s family to exert themselves more than the bride’s family.

The groom makes a larger feast than the bride; therefore, he purchases the mother, which is larger, while the bride purchases the daughter, which is smaller.

We learned in the Mishna:

During these four periods

the slaughterer is compelled to slaughter against his will.

And we inquire concerning this:

But he did not perform meshikha

with the animal, so it was not acquired by the purchaser. Why, then, is the slaughterer compelled to slaughter it?

And we answer:

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav:

The Mishna is speaking

when the purchaser performed meshikha

with the animal.

And we challenge this:

If so, let us say the latter clause

of the Mishna:

“But throughout the rest of the year this is not the case. Therefore, if it dies,

it dies for the seller.”

And if it is as you say, this presents a difficulty:

but he performed meshikha;

if so, the purchaser acquired it even during the rest of the year. Why, then, is the slaughterer not compelled to slaughter it?

And we answer:

Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: Actually,

the Mishna is speaking in a situation

where the purchaser did not perform meshikha.

The purchaser did not perform meshikha.

And it is a case where he conferred the benefit of acquisition upon him

the purchaser

through

another person

.

The seller gave the bull to someone in the purchaser’s absence and without his knowledge, so that this person would perform an act of acquisition with regard to the bull and acquire, on behalf of the purchaser, meat worth one dinar from the bull.

Therefore,

during these four periods, since it is a benefit for him

the purchaser to have meat for the Festival meal, we say:

A person may acquire an item for another in his absence.

The purchaser acquired the meat that the other person acquired on his behalf.

But throughout the rest of the year, since acquiring the meat is a liability for him

the purchaser, because of the expense involved, we say:

One may impose a liability upon a person only in his presence!

And since the acquisition was carried out in the purchaser’s absence, he acquired nothing.

Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Yohanan said:

The Mishna deals with a case in which the purchaser did not perform meshikha but only paid money. Nevertheless,

in these four chapters

he acquires through the money, because

the Sages placed their words on the basis of Torah law!

By Torah law, the payment of money in fact serves as an act of acquisition, but the Sages nullified acquisition through money, as stated below. For the sake of Yom Tov, they left the Torah law in force, so that money effects acquisition in these four chapters.

As Rabbi Yohanan said: By Torah law,

according to Torah law,

money effects acquisition!

When one gives money for a specific object, the object becomes acquired by him, so that neither the seller nor the purchaser can retract.

And for what reason did they say

the Sages

that meshikha

alone

effects acquisition

and not money?!

As a decree, lest he say to him

the seller to the purchaser:

“Your wheat has been burned in the upper room.”

For if money effected acquisition, then if a fire broke out in the seller’s domain and burned the wheat for which the purchaser had paid, the seller would not trouble himself to save it, since the loss would be the purchaser’s, and the seller could say to him: “It was your wheat that was burned.” Therefore, the Sages nullified acquisition through money, so that as long as the wheat remains in the seller’s domain, it remains his. They instituted that acquisition is effected only through meshikha, whereby the purchaser will not come to suffer a loss, since ordinarily, after performing meshikha, he brings the object to his home. In these chapters, however, they nullified the need for meshikha in order that the acquisition should take effect and the slaughterer should be obligated to slaughter for the sake of Yom Tov .

Mishna:

The “one day” stated

in the Torah

with regard to “that one and its offspring,”

as it is written: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring on one day”—

the day follows

it

after the preceding night.

The day and the night preceding it are considered one day. Thus, if one slaughtered the mother at the beginning of the night, it is prohibited to slaughter its offspring throughout the entire night and the following day, until nightfall. But if one slaughtered the mother at the end of the day, he may slaughter its offspring immediately at the beginning of the following night, since it is already a different day .

This is what Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma expounded: It is stated in the account of Creation, “

And there was evening and there was morning,

one day,”

and it is stated with regard to “that one and its offspring,” “one day.”

From this we derive:

Just as the “one day” stated in the account of Creation

has the day follow the preceding night—

for it is written, “And there was evening and there was morning,” with evening first and morning afterward—

so too, the “one day” stated with regard to “that one and its offspring

has the day follow the preceding night

!

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

This is what Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma expounded: Since the entire matter

of “that one and its offspring”

speaks only of sacred offerings,

because the passage concerning that one and its offspring is adjacent to the passage dealing with sacred offerings, and with sacred offerings the law is that the

night follows the preceding day

, as offerings that may be eaten for one day may also be eaten during the night following the day on which they were offered, since that night is considered one day with the day of the offering.

If so,

one might also think that this

passage concerning “it and its offspring”

If so,

perhaps this too,

the passage concerning “that one and its offspring,”

is likewise

the case. Therefore, I derive as follows: