Chullin 82b (פב:) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this: Is not

this

“you shall not slaughter”

needed for its own matter,

to prohibit slaughtering “that one and its offspring,” and therefore not superfluous for an exegetical derivation? And we answer:

If so,

if it had been written only for its own matter, it should have been

written “you shall not slaughter”

in the singular.

What is the reason for “you shall not slaughter”

in the plural? Learn from this that it was written for an exegetical derivation, to prohibit even two people from slaughtering it and its offspring.

And we challenge this:

It is still needed

to write “you shall not slaughter.”

For had the Merciful One written “you shall not slaughter,” I would have said

that if one

person

slaughtered it and its offspring, yes, he is liable—for the prohibition was stated only in a case in which one person slaughtered it and its offspring—but if

two

people slaughtered them, one slaughtering it and the other its offspring,

no,

the Torah would not have prohibited it. And for this purpose

the Merciful One wrote “you shall not slaughter,”

to tell you:

even two

who slaughtered them—the second is prohibited from slaughtering the second animal. If so, the verse is not superfluous to teach that it is prohibited for two people to slaughter the offspring and the offspring’s offspring.

And we explain:

If so,

if the verse comes to prohibit only the second person,

let the verse write

the wording

“they shall not be slaughtered,”

whose meaning would be that “that one and its offspring” may not be slaughtered on the same day, whether by one person or by two people.

What is the reason for “you shall not slaughter”? Learn from this two things!

For included in its meaning is also that when two people slaughter, both of them transgress the prohibition of “that one and its offspring.”

We learned in the Mishna:

If one slaughtered it and its daughter’s daughter

and afterward slaughtered its daughter, Sumakhos says: He receives eighty lashes!

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the reason for Sumakhos

who obligates two sets of lashes for one act of slaughter through which he transgressed the prohibition of “that one and its offspring” twice?

Does

Sumakhos hold

that a person who

ate two olive-bulk portions of forbidden fat

unintentionally

without awareness in between

—that is, he did not become aware between eating one olive-bulk and eating the other that he had sinned—

is liable to bring two sin-offerings?

Just as he obligates two sets of lashes on the basis of one warning and one prohibition, so he obligates two sin-offerings on the basis of one period of unawareness.

It would have been appropriate for him to teach us

Sumakhos’s position

in general,

in the case of one who ate two olive-bulk portions of forbidden fat during one period of unawareness, that he is liable for two sin-offerings even though they are not physically distinct.

And the reason that he teaches us

the dispute between Sumakhos and the Rabbis specifically

in this case,

the prohibition of “that one and its offspring,” although in this prohibition there are distinct physical entities, is only

to inform you of the strength of the Rabbis’ position: even though

the two sets of lashes for slaughtering the middle cow are imposed because of

distinct physical entities,

namely, two cows—one set of lashes being incurred because of slaughtering the middle cow’s mother, and the second because of slaughtering its daughter—nevertheless

the Rabbis exempt him

from two sets of lashes, and he is liable for only one set.

For according to the Rabbis, distinct physical entities cause liability for lashes for each entity only when the prohibition is performed upon two physical entities. Here, however, he performed both prohibitions upon the body of the middle animal, and their division is solely due to the mother and daughter that caused the prohibition. In such a case, there is no division of physical entities with regard to lashes.

Or perhaps, Sumakhos holds

that one who

ate two olive-bulk portions of forbidden fat during one period of unawareness is liable only for

one sin-offering.

And here,

in the case of “that one and its offspring,”

this is the reason for Sumakhos

who obligates two sets of lashes:

since

they arise

through distinct physical entities

of two animals. The same is not true of two olive-bulk portions of forbidden fat, which are considered one physical entity. And the Rabbis hold that an act performed upon one physical entity does not involve a division into physical entities, as stated above.

He said to him,

Rav Yosef to Abaye:

Yes! Sumakhos holds

even with regard to

one who ate two olive-bulk portions of forbidden fat during one period of unawareness

that he is

liable for two sin-offerings!

And we explain:

From where

do we know that Sumakhos holds this way?

As it was taught

in a beraita:

One who sows diverse kinds

and then sows

diverse kinds again receives lashes.

The Gemara analyzes this:

What is meant by “receives lashes”? Shall we say

that he

receives

a set of

one

set of lashes בלבד? But

it is obvious

that he receives at least one set of lashes.

And furthermore,

there is a difficulty:

What is the meaning of the wording “diverse kinds

again,”

employed by the tanna? Even for a single act of sowing diverse kinds, he is liable for one set of lashes.

Rather, it is obvious

that

two sets of lashes

are administered to him.

And

with what case are we dealing? Shall we say

that he sowed diverse kinds twice

one after the other and after two warnings,

being warned before each act of sowing? If so, what novelty does the beraita teach in this law? We have already

learned

in the Mishna that lashes are administered for each warning.

As we learned [in a Mishna in Nazir 42a]:

A nazirite who drank wine all day

without being warned between the acts of drinking

is liable only once.

But if

they said to him, “Do not drink,”

wine,

and he drank,

and they again warned him,

“Do not drink,”

and he drank, he is liable for each and every act.

Rather, it is obvious

that the beraita is discussing a case in which he sowed

at once,

holding wheat and a grape seed in one hand, and barley and a grape seed in the other,

with one warning

99 , and for this he receives two sets of lashes.

And

who

is the tanna who taught this beraita?

Shall we say it is the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos?

That cannot be, because

now, if in that case,

when one slaughters a daughter after its mother and its daughter’s daughter,

where there are distinct physical entities, the Rabbis exempt him, here,

where the two acts of sowing are considered one physical entity [since only living creatures are considered distinct physical entities],

is it not all the more so

that he is liable only once?

Rather, is it not Sumakhos!

And it is proven from the beraita concerning diverse kinds that Sumakhos disagrees even with regard to entities that are not distinct, and obligates two sets of lashes for them. The same should apply to one who ate two olive-bulk portions of forbidden fat during one period of unawareness: according to Sumakhos, he is liable for two sin-offerings.

And we reject this:

No! Actually,

the beraita of “one who sows diverse kinds” is in accordance with

the Rabbis.

It is discussing one who sowed diverse kinds successively and with two warnings. Nevertheless, this law is not known from what we learned in Nazir, where he is liable for two sets of lashes with two warnings, because one may say that the beraita is speaking of a case in which one act of sowing involved wheat and a grape seed, and the second involved barley and a grape seed.

And in passing, it teaches us

the beraita

that there are two types of diverse kinds!

Both wheat and a grape seed, and barley and a grape seed, each independently constitute diverse kinds.

And to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya.

For Rabbi Yoshiya said:

One is not liable for diverse kinds

until he sows wheat, barley, and a grape seed

with all three

in a single casting of the hand!

That is, he sows all three at once; but one species together with a grape seed does not constitute diverse kinds.

It teaches us

the beraita

that when he sows wheat and a grape seed, or barley and a grape seed,

he is likewise liable

for diverse kinds!

Come and hear

to resolve the question of Sumakhos’s position:

As we learned:

If one ate

two olive-bulk portions from the two sciatic nerves—for example, he ate

from this one

the nerve in the animal’s right thigh

an olive-bulk, and from this one

the nerve in the left thigh

an olive-bulk,

he

receives eighty lashes!

Since he transgressed the prohibition against eating the sciatic nerve twice.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He receives only forty lashes!

For Rabbi Yehuda holds that the prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies only to one of the animal’s thighs.

The Gemara analyzes this:

What are the circumstances?

Shall we say

that he ate both of them

successively and after two warnings,

then it is difficult:

What is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda

who obligates one set of lashes? He should not have to receive lashes at all, since Rabbi Yehuda is uncertain [according to one side of the Gemara’s later discussion] on which thigh the sciatic nerve prohibition applies—whether the right or the left. If so, when he is warned before eating each of the two sciatic nerves,

it is a provisional warning,

for perhaps this is not the prohibited nerve.

And have we not heard Rabbi Yehuda say: A provisional warning is not considered a warning?

Consequently, it should be impossible to obligate him to receive lashes for either nerve. [Examine Rashi’s words carefully.]

As it was taught [that Rabbi Yehuda holds that a provisional warning is not considered a warning]: If a person’s father is uncertain to us between two men—whether this man or that man—and

he

struck

the son

this one, and then struck that one,

meaning that he struck both men regarding whom we are uncertain which is his father; or he

cursed this one and then cursed that one; or struck

them

both at once,

this one with one hand and that one with the other;

or cursed

them

both at once—

he is liable

for death, since he struck or cursed his father, as one of them is certainly his father.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If he struck or cursed them both

at once,

he is liable!

For there is one warning here, and it is a definite warning. But if he struck or cursed them

successively,

he is exempt!

Because each blow has a separate warning, which is a provisional warning, since perhaps this is not his father; and there is no liability for death in this act. Rabbi Yehuda holds that a provisional warning is not considered a warning.

Rather, it is obvious

that the Mishna concerning the sciatic nerve is discussing a case in which he ate both nerves

at once and after one warning,

and in this manner it is considered a definite warning. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda obligates him for only one set of lashes.

And who

is the

first tanna

who holds that one receives two sets of lashes for eating the two sciatic nerves at once and after one warning?

Shall we say it is the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos

in the case of “that one and its offspring”? The following difficulty would arise:

Now, if in that case,

when one slaughters the middle animal after its mother and its daughter,

where there are distinct physical entities,

of two separate animals, and nevertheless

the Rabbis exempt him

from two sets of lashes,

here,

in the case of the sciatic nerve, where the two nerves are not considered “distinct physical entities,” since the status of a “physical entity” applies only to a living creature,

is it not all the more so

that he should be liable for only one set of lashes?

Rather, no; it is Sumchus

and one can infer from this that Sumchus holds one liable to two sets of lashes even in a case where the entities are not separate.

And we reject this:

No! Actually,

the case is that he ate the two sciatic nerves

one after the other, and

the Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of

the Rabbis

, and nevertheless one cannot object: Why does Rabbi Yehuda hold him liable to lashes, when this is a case of a doubtful warning? Because

this tanna

who cited Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion concerning the sciatic nerve

holds in accordance with the other tanna of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A doubtful warning is considered a warning!

And we find that the tannaim disputed Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion as to whether, in his view, a doubtful warning is considered a warning or not:

As it was taught in a beraita: “You shall not leave any of it until morning, and whatever of it remains until morning

you shall burn in fire!”