Chullin 79b (עט:) — the Talmud in English

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From the fact that Rabbi Abba relied on the identifying marks of the mules, conclude from it that he maintains that the halakhic rule is that

identifying marks are of Torah origin

[the Gemara in tractate Bava Metzia left this as an unresolved question]. For if it is only a rabbinic law—that they instituted the return of a lost object on the basis of identifying marks—their enactment is effective only with regard to a lost object, which involves monetary law; but we may not rely on identifying marks with regard to a Torah prohibition : How, then, did Rabbi Abba permit, on the basis of identifying marks, the prohibition against keeping two species together?

The Sages taught:

The prohibition of

“it and its offspring” applies to mixed species,

meaning that it is prohibited to slaughter the mother and her offspring born to her from an animal of another species.

And with regard to a koy,

which was born from a domesticated animal and a wild animal, it is prohibited to slaughter it and its offspring on the same day [even though the prohibition of “it and its offspring” does not apply to a wild animal].

Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to a mixed-breed animal born from a she-goat and a ewe,

both of which are species of domesticated animals,

“it and its offspring” applies to it,

meaning that it is prohibited to slaughter the mother and her offspring. But

with regard to a koy

born from a domesticated animal and a wild animal,

“it and its offspring” does not apply to it.

Rav Ḥisda said: What is the koy concerning which Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree? It is one born from a he-goat and a doe,

born from both of them.

And we raise a difficulty:

What are the circumstances? If you say

that they disagree

with regard to a he-goat that mated with a doe, and she gave birth

to a male that is a koy,

and he slaughters her

the doe

and her offspring

on the same day [and the same הדין applies to her daughter, and likewise throughout the sugya], then the following difficulty arises:

But Rav Ḥisda said: Everyone agrees that when it is a doe and its offspring is a he-goat,

meaning that it was born from a he-goat,

he is exempt

from lashes for “it and its offspring” if he slaughtered the doe and its offspring on the same day, since

the Merciful One said, “a sheep and its offspring,” and not “a deer and its offspring”!

Rather,

say that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree

with regard to a deer that mated with a she-goat, and she gave birth

to a koy,

and he slaughters her

the she-goat

and her offspring.

This case too presents a difficulty:

But Rav Ḥisda said: Everyone agrees that when it is a she-goat and its offspring

was born to it from a

deer, he is liable

for “it and its offspring” if he slaughtered the she-goat and its offspring, since

the Merciful One said, “a sheep and its offspring,”

and even an offspring

of any kind!

That is, even if the offspring is a wild animal, it is prohibited to slaughter it together with its mother. The Torah stated only with regard to the mother that the prohibition applies only when she is a domesticated animal; but with regard to the offspring, the Torah did not state that it must be a domesticated animal. Rather, since it is the offspring of the domesticated animal, it is included in the prohibition.

And we answer:

Actually,

Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree

with regard to a he-goat that mated with a doe, and she gave birth

to the doe

a daughter

that is a koy,

and

the daughter gave birth to a male, and he

slaughters her

the daughter

and her offspring

together on the same day.

The basis of their dispute is as follows:

The Rabbis hold: We are concerned about the seed of the father,

and it follows that the daughter born from the he-goat and the doe contains within her some of the father, which is a he-goat.

And “sheep”

written in the Torah means

even

if she is only

partly a sheep,

she is included in the prohibition. Therefore, it is prohibited to slaughter the daughter, who is partly a sheep, together with her offspring.

And Rabbi Eliezer holds: We are not concerned about the seed of the father,

and it follows that

we do not say, “a sheep, even if it is partly a sheep.”

Since the animal is not identified with the father at all, but with the mother, the daughter of the he-goat and the doe does not contain even “some sheep,” since the daughter’s mother is a doe. Once the daughter is considered a complete doe, it is permitted to slaughter the daughter together with her offspring.

And we raise a difficulty: Since we have explained that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree over whether we are concerned about the seed of the father, why did they need to disagree specifically with regard to a koy?

Let them disagree with regard to whether we are concerned about the seed of the father, in the dispute between Ḥananya and the Rabbis,

who disagree in the entire matter of “it and its offspring” whether it applies also to males [so that it is prohibited to slaughter the father together with its offspring], or whether it applies only to females [so that only the mother is prohibited from being slaughtered together with her offspring]. Their dispute depends on this reasoning—whether we are concerned about the seed of the father or not—as explained above.

And we answer:

If they had disagreed about that matter,

whether it applies to males or not,

it might have been said that, in this case

with regard to a koy,

even the Rabbis would agree

that it is permitted to slaughter the daughter of the he-goat and the doe together with her offspring. For even if we are concerned about the seed of the father, the daughter contains only “some sheep,” and

we do not say, “a sheep, even if it is partly a sheep”; this teaches us

that the Rabbis do say, “a sheep, even if it is partly a sheep.”

And we raise a difficulty:

But didn’t we learn in a Mishna: A koy may not be slaughtered on a Festival,

because the mitzva of covering the blood must be fulfilled with regard to a koy, due to the uncertainty whether it is a wild animal [as the mitzva of covering the blood applies only to a wild animal and a bird, and not to a domesticated animal]. On a Festival, however, the blood of a koy may not be covered, as the beraita proceeds to teach. Therefore, it should not be slaughtered ab initio, so as not to nullify the mitzva of covering.

And if one slaughtered it

on a Festival,

one may not cover its blood

that day, because moving earth for the purpose of covering the blood involves desecration of the Festival, and one may not desecrate the Festival for covering the blood when the obligation exists only because of the uncertainty.

What are the circumstances? If you say it is a he-goat that mated with a doe and she gave birth

to a koy, then the following difficulty arises:

According to both the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer—

let one slaughter

the koy on a Festival

and cover

its blood, since he is certainly obligated in covering it and not merely uncertainly obligated! For even according to the Rabbis, who are concerned about the seed of the father, and this koy contains some of the domesticated-animal component from its father, the he-goat [which is exempt from covering], nevertheless the koy is obligated in covering. This is because it also contains some of the wild-animal component on its mother’s side. And when the term

“deer”

is stated with regard to covering the blood, it means

even

if it is only

partly a deer, it is also included in the mitzva of covering.

it is also included in the mitzva of covering the blood!

Rather,

say that the prohibition against covering on a Festival is

with regard to a deer that mated with a she-goat and she gave birth

to a koy. This too presents a difficulty:

If according to the Rabbis,

who are concerned about the seed of the father, then

let one slaughter

it on a Festival

and cover its blood.

For this koy is partly a wild animal on account of its father, the deer. And

if according to Rabbi Eliezer,

who is not concerned about the seed of the father, then this koy is a completely domesticated animal like its mother and is certainly exempt from covering. It should therefore be permitted

to slaughter

it

without covering

its blood? And we answer:

Actually,

the prohibition against covering on a Festival is speaking

of

a koy born from

a deer that mated with a she-goat,

and this follows the method of the Rabbis, who are concerned about the seed of the father. However, this matter is not clear to them. Rather,

the Rabbis are uncertain

whether we are concerned about the seed of the father or whether we are not. Therefore, they ruled stringently that one may not cover the blood of the koy on a Festival, lest we are not concerned about the seed of the father, in which case it is entirely a domesticated animal like its mother, the she-goat, and is exempt from covering. On the other hand, one may not slaughter it on a Festival, lest we are concerned about the seed of the father, in which case it is obligated in covering like its father, the deer. Since, due to the uncertainty, its blood may not be covered, one should not slaughter it, so as not to nullify the mitzva of covering.

Likewise, with regard to “it and its offspring,” the Rabbis prohibit slaughtering a koy born from a he-goat and a doe, together with its offspring, due to the uncertainty whether we are concerned about the seed of the father, in which case the koy is a domesticated animal like its father.

And the Gemara infers:

And from the fact that with regard to the Rabbis

you said that

they are uncertain,

and therefore prohibit slaughtering the koy and its offspring, it follows that

with regard to Rabbi Eliezer,

who disagrees with the Rabbis and permits one to slaughter “it and its offspring” in the case of a koy ab initio,

it is certain to him

that we are not concerned about the seed of the father, as stated above.

And since that is so, we raise a difficulty:

But it was taught in a beraita: The foreleg, the cheeks, and the maw

which are given to the koen only from a domesticated animal and not from a wild animal

apply to a koy and to a mixed-breed animal.

Rabbi Eliezer says: A mixed-breed animal born from a she-goat and a ewe,

both of which are species of domesticated animals,

is liable with regard to the gifts,

the foreleg, cheeks, and maw given to the koen; but

a koy is exempt from the gifts. What are the circumstances? If you say it is a he-goat that mated with a doe and she gave birth

to a koy, then the following difficulty arises:

Granted, according to Rabbi Eliezer, who exempts

it from the gifts, it is possible that he

holds

that the verse states with regard to the gifts, “whether an ox or a sheep,” and in this koy

we do not say, “a sheep, even if it is partly a sheep”!

For according to his view, it does not contain even some sheep. Since it is certain to him that we are not concerned about the seed of the father, it is entirely a wild animal like its mother.

But according to the Rabbis, although they hold that “sheep,”

stated with regard to the obligation of the gifts, means

even

if it is only

partly a sheep,

and it is also liable for the gifts, nevertheless, this koy should properly be exempt from the gifts. For

granted, he does not give half.

That is, it is certain that even the Rabbis do not require one to give from this koy, whose father is a he-goat and whose mother is a doe, half of the gifts. For even if we are concerned about the seed of the father and obligate the koy in the gifts because it contains some sheep, nevertheless, one can be obligated only with regard to its domesticated-animal component, whereas the wild-animal component that it possesses on account of its mother is exempt from the gifts. Consequently, the owners give only one half of the domesticated-animal component, while they are exempt from the other half.

But there is still a difficulty: Why do the Rabbis require one to give the koen

the other half

if the Rabbis are uncertain whether we are concerned about the seed of the father?

Let him say to him

the owner should say to the koen:

“Bring proof that we are concerned about the seed of the father, and take it,”

the half. For the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, and as long as you have not brought proof, you should take nothing, since perhaps we are not concerned about the seed of the father, in which case it is entirely a wild animal like its mother and is entirely exempt from the gifts.

Rather,

if you establish that they disagree

with regard to a deer that mated with a she-goat and she gave birth

to a koy, the difficulty arises again. For

granted, according to the Rabbis,

there is no difficulty concerning why they said that all the gifts must be given. Although there is uncertainty whether we are concerned about the seed of the father, in which case the koy contains half a wild-animal component from its father, the deer, which is exempt from the gifts, one might say that they are obligated to give only half until the koen brings proof that we are not concerned about the seed of the father, in which case the obligation would also apply to the other half, since it is entirely a domesticated animal. This is not a difficulty, because one can explain that when the Rabbis said

“is liable,”

they meant

it is only for half the gifts

that he is liable, and not for all of them.

Rather, according to Rabbi Eliezer, it should be liable for all the gifts

since it is obvious to him that we are not concerned with the paternal lineage, and it follows that this koy is entirely a goat, like its mother, and is liable for the gifts?

And we answer:

In fact,

they disagree

with regard to a deer that mated with a she-goat and she gave birth

to a koy,

and Rabbi Eliezer, too, is uncertain whether paternal lineage is taken into consideration or not

as stated below.

And we question this:

And since according to the Rabbis it is uncertain whether

also

according to Rabbi Eliezer it is uncertain,

if so,

in what do they disagree

with regard to “that one and its offspring” and with regard to the gifts?!