Chullin 78b — the Talmud in English

And Rava said: ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

This is a binyan av

from the verse [in Deuteronomy 14], “sheep of the sheep and sheep of the goats” , we learn by a binyan av that

every place where “sheep” is stated -

It serves only to exclude a hybrid!

And we answer: In the prohibition of “that one and its offspring,”

the verse says, “and ox

or

sheep,” and we derive from the superfluous word “or”—

to include a hybrid!

And we object: But

this “or”

is not superfluous, for

it is needed to distinguish,

so that one is liable for slaughtering an ox and its offspring alone, and for slaughtering a sheep and its offspring alone.

For it might enter your mind—

if “or” had not been written— -

that

until he slaughters an ox and its offspring

and also slaughters

a sheep and its offspring, he is not liable; this teaches us

the superfluous “or,” that he is liable also for each one of them separately.

And we answer:

To distinguish—

it is derived from “its offspring”!

For it is written in the singular, implying that he is liable for slaughtering each one of them with its offspring; and the “or” is superfluous to include a hybrid.

And we object:

But still, it is needed for that which was taught:

For it was taught:

If

it

had been stated, “an ox and a sheep and its offspring,” I would say

that he is not liable

until he slaughters

both

an ox and

also

a sheep, and the offspring

of one of them;

the verse therefore says, “an ox or a sheep, that one and its offspring.”

For it implies that he is liable for each one of them when he slaughters it with its offspring.

What, is it not derived for him from “or”

that the liability is even for slaughtering one of them with its offspring [but if we derive it merely from “its offspring,” I would still say that although for slaughtering one offspring one is liable, with regard to “that one”—that is, the ox and the sheep—one is liable only for slaughtering both of them together], and if so, the “or” is not superfluous for including a hybrid from it

? And we answer:

No,

we learn it not from “or,” but

from “that one,”

which is in the singular; from this we learn it. Even if “or” had not been written, but rather “and an ox and a sheep, that one and its offspring,” we would also know that an ox alone or a sheep alone is forbidden to slaughter with its offspring on one day. It follows that the superfluous “or” was written to include a hybrid.

And we still object:

This works for the Rabbis, for they find superfluous

this

“that one”

to teach us that one is liable for an ox alone and for a sheep alone .

But for Hanania, who does not find “that one” superfluous,

for he derives another teaching from it, as will be explained below, and it follows that the superfluous “or” comes to include a hybrid, if so,

to distinguish—

that one is also liable for slaughtering one of them with its offspring—

from where does he derive it?

And we answer:

To distinguish—

no verse is needed!

Since

he holds

Hanania

like Rabbi Jonathan.

For it was taught:

It is written,

“A man who curses his father and his mother

shall surely be put to death.”

I have only

if he cursed both

his father and

also

his mother.

But if he cursed

his father without

having cursed his mother,

or

if he cursed

his mother without his father,

that is, one of the two,

from where

do we know that he is liable for death?

The verse therefore says

in the latter part of the verse,

“His father and his mother he cursed,

his blood is upon him!” Since at the beginning of the verse the cursing is attached to “his father,” and at the end of the verse it is attached to “his mother,” we derive:

“His father he cursed

—his mother he cursed!”

For he is liable for each one of them if he cursed it,

the words of Rabbi Josiah.

Rabbi Jonathan says:

A verse is not needed to make one liable for cursing one of them. For “his father and his mother”

implies both together, and it also implies

each

one separately.

And everywhere that it is possible to interpret the verse in both ways, we take its intention to be to say—either this one or that one,

until the verse specifies for you “together,”

for we find that the Torah needed to write, “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together.” This implies that had “together” not been stated, we would have interpreted it as prohibiting plowing with an ox alone and with a donkey alone. And if so, also in “his father and his mother,” where “together” is not written, the intention is that it is forbidden to curse each one alone.

And since Hanania holds like Rabbi Jonathan, it follows that he does not need a verse to distinguish in “that one and its offspring,” for even if it had been written, “an ox and a sheep and its offspring,” we would know that the intention of the verse is that each one of them is forbidden to slaughter on one day with its offspring.

And we examine it:

What is Hanania and what is the Rabbis?

Where do we find that they disagree concerning the derivation from “that one”?

And we explain:

For it was taught: “That one and its offspring” applies to females and does not apply to males!

For only the mother is forbidden to slaughter with her offspring [or daughter], but if one slaughtered the father, it is permitted to slaughter his offspring after him.

Hanania says:

“That one and its offspring”

applies both to males and to females!

And we examine it:

What is the reason of the Rabbis?

And we answer: For it was taught:

It might have been that “that one and its offspring” applies both to males and to females.

And

is it not

a logical inference

that it should apply only to females? For

here one is liable

for slaughtering that one and its offspring,

and one is liable for the mother with the offspring,

in the mitzva of sending away the nest, in which it is forbidden to take the mother with the offspring .

From now, let us learn by a binyan av:

Just as when one is liable for “the mother with the offspring”—

with females

only is he liable,

and not with males,

for it is permitted to take the father with the offspring, since it is stated, “and the mother is crouching over the offspring,” and not the father —

so, when one is liable here

for “that one and its offspring,”

with females

only,

and not with males.

No!

You cannot learn one from the other. For

if you say concerning “the mother with the offspring”

that it has a leniency,

for it does not make that which is available like that which is unavailable.

For only if a bird’s nest happens to be before him on the road is there a prohibition against taking the mother with the offspring. But a bird that is available to him in his house is not subject to the mitzva of sending away the nest.

Can you say concerning “that one and its offspring”

that it is more stringent in that

it makes that which is available like that which is unavailable,

for even an animal in his house is forbidden to slaughter with its offspring !? And since it is more stringent, perhaps its prohibition also applies to males!

The verse therefore says, “that one,”

which implies

one and not two,

that it applies only either to males or to females .

And

since the verse distinguished

that it applies only to one of them, from now

I have arrived at the judgment,

it has become clear that it indeed applies only to females. For now we can learn the binyan av above as follows:

One is liable here

for “that one and its offspring,”

and one is liable for “the mother with the offspring.” Just as when one is liable for “the mother with the offspring”—

with females and not with males, so too when one is liable here—

with females and not with males.

And since we have already learned from “that one” that “that one and its offspring” does not apply to males and females, but only to one of them, it follows that the entire teaching from “the mother with the offspring” is only that this “one” is females and not males. Therefore, one cannot ask that since “that one and its offspring” is more stringent than “the mother with the offspring,” it should follow that its prohibition applies specifically to males and not to females, for there is no aspect of stringency in this. There is no preference for it to apply to males more than to females—

And if you wish to say,

to give another answer to the binyan av—there is another derivation from which to learn that “that one and its offspring” applies only to females.

For it is stated

“its offspring,”

and this implies that it appears as its offspring, teaching that the prohibition is to slaughter only with

one whose offspring is attached after it!

That is the mother, whose offspring is always attached after her to follow her, and appears as her offspring.

The male is excluded,

the father,

whose offspring is not attached after it,

and therefore it is not included in “that one and its offspring.”

And we examine it:

What is “and if you wish to say”?

What is there to answer concerning the teaching by a binyan av from “the mother with the offspring”?

And we explain:

And if you say

that one should not learn from “the mother with the offspring,” because

“that one”

stated concerning “that one and its offspring”

implies a male —therefore I bring another derivation, from the passage of “that one and its offspring.” For

I therefore bring another interpretation, from the passage concerning “it and its offspring.”

it indeed says, “its offspring,”

which implies

one whose offspring is attached after it; the male is excluded, whose offspring is not attached after it!