Chullin 78b (עח:) — the Talmud in English

And Rava said:

This is a binyan av

from the verse [in Deuteronomy 14], “sheep of the flock and sheep of the goats” , we learn through a binyan av that

every place where it says “sheep” -

It serves only to exclude a hybrid!

And we answer: With regard to the prohibition of “it and its offspring,”

the verse says, “

and an ox

or

a sheep,” and we derive from the apparently superfluous word “or” that it serves

to include a hybrid!

And we challenge this: But

this “or”

is not superfluous, since

it is needed to divide the cases, so that one is liable for slaughtering an ox and its offspring separately, and for slaughtering a sheep and its offspring separately.

so that one is liable for slaughtering an ox and its offspring by themselves, and for slaughtering a sheep and its offspring by themselves.

For it might have entered your mind that

if “or” had not been written, -

then

until one slaughters an ox and its offspring

and also slaughters

a sheep and its offspring, he would not be liable; this teaches us that the superfluous “or” means that he is liable for each one of them separately

.

And we answer:

The division

is derived from “its offspring”! Since it is written in the singular, this indicates that one is liable for slaughtering each one of them with its offspring; and the word “or” is superfluous and serves to include a hybrid

.

And we challenge this:

But it is still needed for that which was taught in a beraita,

as it was taught:

If

it

had said, “an ox and a sheep and its offspring,” I would have said that he is not liable

unless he

slaughters

both an

ox and

a

sheep, and the offspring

of one of them.

The verse therefore states: “an ox or a sheep, it and its offspring.”

This indicates that he is liable for each one of them when he slaughters it together with its offspring.

Is it not derived for him from “or”

that the liability applies even to slaughtering one of them together with its offspring? [But if we derive this merely from “its offspring,” I would still say that although one is liable for slaughtering one offspring, with regard to “it”—that is, the ox and the sheep—he is liable only for slaughtering both of them together.] If so, is “or” not superfluous as a means of including hybrids?

And we answer:

No,

we derive it not from “or,” but

from “it,”

which is singular. We learn from this that even if “or” had not been written, and the verse had said, “and an ox and a sheep, it and its offspring,” we would still know that it is prohibited to slaughter an ox alone or a sheep alone together with its offspring on the same day. It follows that the extra word “or” was written to include hybrids.

We still challenge this:

That works for the Rabbis, who find

this

“it”

superfluous, to teach us that one is liable for an ox alone and for a sheep alone .

But according to Ḥanania, who does not find “it” superfluous,

because he derives another teaching from it, as will be explained below, and it follows that the extra “or” serves to include hybrids,

the division—

that one is also liable for slaughtering one of them together with its offspring—

from where does he derive it?

And we answer:

For division,

no verse is needed!

Since

he agrees

with Ḥanania

with Rabbi Yonatan.

As it was taught in a beraita:

It is written:

“A man who curses his father and his mother

shall surely be put to death.”

I have only

that one is liable if he cursed both

his father and

his

mother.

But if he cursed

his father without

cursing his mother,

or

if he cursed

his mother without his father,

that is, one of the two,

from where

do we know that he is liable to the death penalty?

The verse therefore states

in the latter part of the verse:

“He cursed his father and his mother;

his blood is upon him!” Since at the beginning of the verse the curse is juxtaposed to “his father,” while at the end of the verse it is juxtaposed to “his mother,” we derive:

“He cursed his father”—

he cursed his mother!

He is liable for each of them if he curses that one,

the words of Rabbi Yashya.

Rabbi Yonatan says:

No verse is needed to make one liable for cursing one of them. For “his father and his mother”

can mean both together, and can also mean

each

individually.

Whenever the verse can be interpreted in both ways, we adopt the interpretation that it means either one or the other,

until the verse specifies “together,”

as we find that the Torah had to write, “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together.” This indicates that had “together” not been stated, we would have interpreted it as prohibiting plowing with an ox alone and with a donkey alone. Accordingly, regarding “his father and his mother,” where “together” is not written, the intent is that it is prohibited to curse each one separately.

Since Ḥanania agrees with Rabbi Yonatan, he does not need a verse to divide the cases of “it and its offspring.” Even if the verse had said, “an ox and a sheep and its offspring,” we would know that its intent is that each one of them may not be slaughtered on the same day together with its offspring.

And we inquire about this:

What are the positions of Ḥanania and the Rabbis?

Where do we find that they disagree concerning the derivation from “it”?

And we explain:

As it was taught in a beraita: “It and its offspring” applies to females but does not apply to males!

Only the mother may not be slaughtered together with her offspring [or daughter]; but if one slaughtered the father, it is permitted to slaughter his offspring after him.

Ḥanania says: “

it and its offspring”

applies both to males and to females!

And we inquire:

What is the reasoning of the Rabbis?

And we answer: As it was taught in a beraita:

It might have been that “it and its offspring” applies both to males and to females.

And

is it

not logically derived

that it should apply only to females? For

here one is liable

for slaughtering it and its offspring,

and one is liable for the mother with the offspring,

in the mitzva of sending away the mother bird, which prohibits taking the mother together with the young .

From this we may now derive through a binyan av:

Just as when one is liable for “the mother with the offspring,”

it is

specifically the female for whom one is liable,

and not the male,

as it is stated, “and the mother is crouching over the young,” and not the father ,

so too, when one is liable here

for “it and its offspring,”

it is

specifically the female

and not the male.

No!

You cannot derive one from the other, because

if you say regarding “the mother with the offspring”

that it has a leniency,

as it does not equate an available nest with an unavailable one.

The prohibition against taking the mother together with the young applies only when a bird’s nest happens to be before him in the wild. But a bird available to him in his house is not subject to the mitzva of sending away the mother bird.

Can you say regarding “it and its offspring”

that it is more stringent in that

it equates an available animal with an unavailable one,

so that even an animal in his house may not be slaughtered together with its offspring ? Since it is more stringent, its prohibition should also apply to males!

The verse therefore states, “it,”

which indicates

one and not two,

that it applies to either males or females, but not to both .

And

once the verse has divided

the cases, indicating that it applies to only one of them,

I have arrived at the logical conclusion:

it has become clear that it indeed applies only to females. We can now formulate the binyan av above as follows:

Here one is liable

for “it and its offspring,”

and one is liable for “the mother with the offspring.” Just as when one is liable for “the mother with the offspring”—

for females and not for males—so too, when one is liable here—

for females and not for males.

Since we have already learned from “it” that “it and its offspring” does not apply to both males and females, but only to one of them, the entire derivation from “the mother with the offspring” serves only to establish that this “one” is females and not males. Therefore, one cannot challenge that since “it and its offspring” is more stringent than “the mother with the offspring,” it should follow logically that its prohibition applies specifically to males and not to females, for there is no basis for such a claim of greater stringency: there is no reason for it to apply to males rather than to females.

And if you wish to say—

to offer another response to the binyan av—there is another derivation from which to learn that “it and its offspring” applies only to females.

For it is stated

“its offspring,”

which implies that it appears to be its offspring, teaching that the prohibition is to slaughter it only together with

one whose offspring follows after it!

That is the mother, since the young always follows after her, and appears to be her offspring.

This excludes a male,

the father,

whose offspring does not follow after him,

and therefore he is not included in “it and its offspring.”

And we inquire:

What does “and if you wish to say” mean?

What response is there to the derivation through a binyan av from “the mother with the offspring”?

And we explain:

If you might say

that one cannot derive from “the mother with the offspring,” because

“it”

stated in “it and its offspring”

indicates a male ,

I therefore bring another derivation, from the passage concerning “it and its offspring”:

for it says, “its offspring,”

which indicates

one whose offspring follows after it, excluding a male, whose offspring does not follow after him!