Chullin 76b (עו:) — the Talmud in English

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: Since they are clear,

if they are translucent and have not actually become red, and are still somewhat white,

even though they are not white,

they are nevertheless included in the juncture of the tendons.

Ameimar said in the name of Rav Zevid: There are three tendons

three tendons

there are

in the juncture of the tendons.

One is thick

and thick,

and two are thin

and two are thin.

If

the thick one is severed,

the thick tendon is severed and cut,

the majority of the structure is gone

the majority of the structure of the juncture of the tendons is gone, and the entire juncture is considered severed, because the thick tendon constitutes the majority of the thickness of the juncture, as its thickness exceeds that of the two thin tendons.

If

the thin ones are severed,

the thin tendons are cut,

it is gone,

the

majority in number

the number of tendons, since two out of the three are severed. Even in this case the entire juncture is considered severed, and the animal is rendered a tereifa for this reason.

Mar bar Rav Ashi teaches

this matter

leniently,

as follows:

If

the thick one

the tendon is severed,

the thick

one among them, this does not render the animal a tereifa, since

there is

still

a majority in number,

as two of the three remain intact,

and likewise if

the thin ones are severed,

the thin tendons are cut, even in this case the animal is not rendered a tereifa, since

there is a majority in structure.

Quantitatively, the majority of the juncture remains intact, and the animal should not be rendered a tereifa for this reason.

It is thus clear that both according to Rav Zevid and according to Rav Ashi, with regard to the juncture of the tendons, one follows the majority.

A

nd

with regard to the juncture of the tendons in birds, which

there are sixteen

sixteen

tendons

in their juncture of the tendons,

if one of them is severed,

if one of them is cut —

it is a tereifa!

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: I was standing before

my father,

and they brought before him

they brought before him

a bird,

a bird,

and he examined it and found in it

he found

fifteen

fifteen tendons in the juncture of the tendons, and apparently one was missing, in which case it should have been declared a tereifa.

There was one that was such that it was equivalent to two of its fellow tendons,

there was one tendon that was thicker than the other tendons, and was equivalent to two,

he split it

he split and separated that tendon,

and found

and found that it was

two

two tendons, and he deemed the bird kosher.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: The juncture of the tendons that they said

renders the animal a tereifa when it is cut is when it is severed

through its majority.

The Gemara explains:

What is meant by “its majority”?

The majority of one of them!

If the majority of one of the three tendons is cut through its thickness, the animal is rendered a tereifa by this.

Rav Yehuda continues:

When I stated this before

when I stated this matter before

Shmuel, he said to me: Since

after all,

there are three

three tendons

there are

in the juncture. And

when

when

one of them is completely severed, this

there are still

there are

remaining,

two

two remaining tendons that are intact. If so, the majority of the juncture remains before us?!

Rather, certainly the animal is kosher because of this majority.

The Gemara infers from Shmuel’s statement, as transmitted by Rav Yehuda: Shmuel deems the animal kosher because the two remaining tendons are still intact. And it infers:

The reason

is only when

there are two

intact tendons that Shmuel deems it kosher.

But

if

there are not two

intact tendons,

not

does he deem it kosher.

And it disagrees

with this matter that Rav Yehuda transmitted in the name of Shmuel, Rav Yehuda disagrees

with

the statement of

Ravnai

in the name of Shmuel.

For Ravnai said in the name of Shmuel: The juncture of the tendons—even if there remains in it

in each of the three tendons

only as much as the thread of a cloak

[a thread that holds the collar of a garment, whose thickness is one-third the thickness of the tendons],

it is kosher.

It follows that Ravnai and Rav Yehuda disagree regarding Shmuel’s opinion. According to Rav Yehuda, if the majority of two tendons is removed, the animal is a tereifa. According to Ravnai, as stated, even if something remains—even one-third—the animal is kosher.

There are those who say

that Rav Yehuda transmitted the statement in the name of Rav as follows: The juncture of the tendons that they said renders the animal a tereifa when it is cut does not render it a tereifa unless it is cut through its majority.

A

nd what is meant by “its majority”? The majority of each and every one

of the tendons. Only in this manner is it a tereifa.

And Rav Yehuda continues:

When I stated this before

when I stated this matter before

Shmuel, he said to me: Since there are three

after all, there are three tendons in the juncture of the tendons.

And

there are three

one-third portions

of each and every one

and retaining this minority is sufficient. It follows that an actual majority of each one is not required. Rather, since one-third of each remains, it is considered as though its majority remains.

Indeed, according to this statement,

it supports Ravnai, for Ravnai said in the name of Shmuel—

the juncture of the tendons that they said

renders an animal a tereifa when it is cut,

even

if

only as much as the thread of a cloak remains in it, it is kosher.

We learned in our Mishna:

If the bone was broken,

if the majority of the flesh remains, its slaughter renders it permissible; but if not, its slaughter does not render it permissible.

Rav said:

If the bone was broken

above the joint

the lower joint—that is, the break was at the upper joint—the law is that

if the majority of the flesh

surrounding the bone

remains,

both this and that,

both the limb and the entire animal,

are permitted.

And if not,

if not only the bone but also the flesh was torn along with it,

both this and that

the limb and the animal

are forbidden.

The dangling limb is forbidden because of “meat in the field torn by a tereifa,” and it is like a limb from a living creature, since it has separated from the animal and became detached during its life.

The animal, meanwhile, is forbidden because it is a tereifa, since it is missing one of its limbs.

And if the bone was broken

below the joint,

the upper one—that is, at the lower joint—the law is as follows:

if the majority of the flesh

surrounding the bone

remains,

this

limb

and this

animal

are permitted.

A

nd if not,

but the flesh too was torn along with it, the

limb is forbidden

because it is a dangling limb,

a

nd the

animal is permitted.

For the animal does not become a tereifa because of the loss of a bone at the lower joint, even if it is completely severed.

Accordingly, that which is stated in our Mishna, “But if not, its slaughter does not render it permissible,” implying that specifically the limb is forbidden while the animal itself is permitted, refers to a case in which the bone was broken below the upper joint. For if it was broken at or above the upper joint,

and Shmuel said: Whether

the bone was broken

above

the joint,

or whether

it was broken

below

the joint, the law is that

if the majority of the flesh remains, both this and that

the limb and the animal

are permitted.

A

nd if not,

if the flesh does not remain, the

limb

is indeed

forbidden, but the animal is permitted!

For the limb is forbidden because it is a dangling limb. But the animal is not rendered a tereifa because of this detachment, and the limb is not considered completely severed, because the tendons remain attached.

Accordingly, that which is stated in our Mishna, “But if not, its slaughter does not render it permissible,” refers both to a break above the lower bone and to a break below, in the lower bone itself. The animal itself, as stated, is permitted. Rav Naḥman challenged Shmuel:

According to your statement, that although a dangling bone itself is forbidden, it nevertheless does not render the entire animal a tereifa, there is a concern here due to the appearance of impropriety. For

they will say

those who see it that

a limb from it is lying in the refuse heap

since it was cut off and discarded because of its prohibition. A dangling limb is a limb from a living creature,

and the animal is nevertheless

permitted.

They may consequently come to permit even a case in which the bone was completely severed above the joint, in which case the animal is a complete tereifa. If so, how can you permit an animal from which a limb has become detached?

Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna said to Rav Naḥman:

Why is this question directed only to Shmuel? After all, even

according to Rav,

who holds that only when the break occurred in the lower bone and even the majority of the flesh does not remain are the limb forbidden and the animal permitted, in this case too

they will say

those who see it that

a limb from it is lying in the refuse heap

[since they do not precisely distinguish which limb it is],

and the animal is

permitted.

And because of this, they too may come to permit an animal from which a limb was completely severed, rendering it a tereifa?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman: I did not intend to challenge Shmuel that whenever people see a bone lying in the refuse heap, they will consequently permit a tereifa. Rather,

this is what I am saying:

this is the challenge I intended: When one who sees

a limb from which the animal

lives

and because of whose absence it is a tereifa [such as the case that Shmuel permits, where the bone above the joint is broken, making the animal a tereifa while the animal is permitted], and this limb

is lying in the refuse heap while

the animal is

permitted,

they will come to permit a case in which the bone was completely severed. Therefore, I challenged only Shmuel, who permits the animal in this situation. But there is no difficulty from this according to Rav.

They sent word from the academy: The halakha is in accordance with Rav, that if the bone was broken above the lower joint [that is, from the bottom of the upper joint and onward], and the majority of the flesh does not remain, both the limb and the animal are forbidden!

the animal

is permitted. Only because of this bone will people come to permit a case in which the bone was completely severed. Therefore, I challenged only Shmuel, who permits the animal in this situation. There is no such difficulty according to Rav.

it is only because of this bone that they will come to permit a case in which the bone was completely cut. Therefore, I raised the objection only against Shmuel, who permits the animal in this situation. But against Rav there is no objection from this.

They sent a ruling from the scholars of the Land of Israel: The halakhic ruling is in accordance with Rav:

if the bone was broken above the lower knee joint—that is, from the bottom of the upper knee joint and upward—and most of the flesh does not remain, both the limb and the animal are forbidden!

They went back

and

sent

word that the halakha is

in accordance with him

as in the ruling

of Shmuel.

In this manner, the limb is forbidden, but the animal is permitted.

They went back

and

sent

word that the halakha is

in accordance with Rav.

Both the limb and the animal are forbidden.

And

yes, the

limb itself conveys impurity through

impurity of

carrying!

Although the halakha is that a limb hanging loosely from an animal does not convey impurity through carrying like a carcass—as is learned from that which is written, “When it falls,” meaning that the limb must fall off completely, and only then does it convey impurity like a carcass, as the halakha of a limb severed from a living animal—nevertheless, this applies only while the animal is alive. However, if the animal was slaughtered while the hanging limb was still attached to it, we learned above that slaughter causes the limb to be considered as having fallen off. That is, it causes the fallen limb to be considered completely detached. Its status is then that of a limb severed from a living animal, and it conveys impurity through carrying like a carcass.

Rav Ḥisda raised an objection:

We learned in a beraita, [cited above, 73a] Rabbi Meir said to the Sages:

No,

it is not possible to compare the slaughter of a tereifa, which purifies the tereifa from impurity of a carcass, to the limb of the fetus that protrudes outside, which, according to the Sages, should likewise be purified from impurity of a carcass by the slaughter of the mother. For,

if the slaughter of a tereifa purifies it

the animal,

and the hanging limb

that is

in it,

for as long as it has not fallen off completely, its mother’s slaughter is effective in purifying it from impurity of a carcass, this is because they are included in the category of

“something that is part of its body.”

And certainly one cannot say that this slaughter

will purify

this

the

limb protruding from

the fetus, which is not

part of

the body

of the slaughtered animal itself.

It is evident from this beraita that slaughter does not cause a limb to be considered as having fallen off. For according to everyone, slaughter purifies the limb that is part of the animal’s own body. This is not as they sent word, that the limb conveys impurity through carrying like a carcass?

Rabba said to him: Why do you need to go around looking for refutations,

why do you need to seek out the words of a beraita with which not everyone is familiar in order to raise this objection?

Raise an objection from the Mishna;

you can raise this very objection from an explicit Mishna?

For we learned in the Mishna: The flesh of an animal does not contract impurity during its lifetime, but only after its death. This is because an animal that has been slaughtered becomes “food,” and if it comes into contact with water, it is rendered fit to contract impurity of food.

During its lifetime, even if it came into contact with water or one of the other liquids that render everything fit to contract impurity, nevertheless these liquids do not render its flesh fit to contract impurity while it is alive.

And when

it was slaughtered,

the

animal became fit

as did the hanging limb within it,

through its blood,

the blood issuing from the slaughter, which is one of the liquids. For through slaughter the animal changed from a living animal into flesh—which is “food”—and it, as well as the hanging limb, became fit to contract impurity through the blood—

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Shimon says: They did not become fit

to contract impurity through the blood.

It is evident from this Mishna that the entire discussion concerning slaughtered animal flesh and the hanging limb within it concerns only whether the animal has been rendered fit to contract impurity of food. But according to everyone, there is no question concerning the hanging limb whether it is impure as a limb severed from a living animal, like a carcass. It therefore follows from this Mishna that the report sent from there is not correct: the hanging limb does convey impurity through carrying like a carcass.

Rav Ḥisda said to him,

Rabba: This objection that arises from the words of

the Mishna can be refuted;

it can be rejected

as we rejected

it above, on 73b, where the Gemara explains that the Mishna’s statement “they became fit” does not refer to the hanging limb. For a hanging limb is certainly impure with impurity of a carcass. Rather, the Mishna’s statement “they became fit” refers to flesh that separated from the living animal, which is not subject to the law of a limb severed from a living animal. The law of a limb severed from a living animal applies only when a limb separates in its complete form, with sinews and bones. But when merely a piece of flesh separates, it is not impure. Therefore it requires being rendered fit through the blood.

When Rabbi Zeira went up, he found him

he found

Rav Yirmeya sitting

who was sitting

and stating this teaching

this teaching reported in the name of Rav: If the bone was fractured above the joint and most of the flesh was not present, both the limb and the animal are forbidden.

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

Excellent!

This halakha is correct.

And Ariokh explained it

interpreted it

in Babylonia.

The Gemara explains:

Ariokh—

who is he?

Who is meant?

Shmuel!

He was given this name because “Ariokh” is a royal expression, as in “Ariokh, king of Ellasar.” And since “the halakha follows Shmuel in monetary matters,” he was given this name: he was expert in laws and judged the entire land like a king.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But he explicitly disagreed!

Shmuel disagreed with Rav, maintaining that even if a bone was fractured at the upper joint, the limb is forbidden but the animal is permitted?

The Gemara answers:

He retracted his position

he changed his mind

and followed Rav

to issue a ruling in accordance with Rav.

The Sages taught: If the bone was fractured and protruded outside

outside the limb,

if skin and flesh still cover most of it

of the bone,

the limb is permitted.

Since it is still covered as limbs ordinarily are, it is not considered a hanging limb. But

if not,

it is not covered over most of it—

the limb is forbidden.

the limb.

The Gemara clarifies:

How much

is

most of it

of the bone?

When

Rav Dimi

came, he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan:

When do we consider the bone to have protruded outside the limb? Only when

most of its thickness

and the cavity of the fractured bone have protruded and become exposed outside. But if only a minority of the thickness of the bone’s cavity has protruded, and only this minority is exposed outside, while most of the inner thickness of the bone remains inside, it is not considered to have “protruded.”

And some say

that “most of it” means

most of its circumference.

That is, it does not matter whether the thickness and cavity of the bone are exposed outward. Rather, the essential point is that the bone be surrounded by flesh at the site of the fracture, around its exterior, and in that manner it is kosher. But if the outer circumference of the bone is exposed, then even if the site of the fracture and the cavity of the bone itself are directed inward toward the flesh, while from the outside it is exposed, the animal is a tereifa. Since, in the end, the essential circumference of the bone is exposed.

Rav Pappa said: Therefore,

since we have heard both views regarding these two conditions,

we require

that the bone be covered in both respects:

a.

Most of its thickness

and the cavity of the bone must be covered within the flesh and must not protrude outside. b.

And we require

also that

most of its circumference

the outer circumference of the bone be covered with flesh.

Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

With regard to covering the bone so that the animal is not considered a tereifa,

skin

is equivalent to flesh.

Even where the bone is not covered by flesh in terms of its thickness or its circumference, if there is skin there covering it, its status is like that of flesh.

Rav Naḥman said to Ulla: Let the Master say

Since we say that skin is equivalent to flesh, let him say

that

the covering of the bone must be such that

skin combines with flesh.

That is, skin alone is insufficient; there must be at least half skin and half flesh, and together they must cover the bone. Skin alone is not enough. And he derives this stringency

for,

in the beraita

“skin and flesh

cover most of it”

it teaches.

This implies that both skin and flesh are required. Why, then, does Ulla say that flesh alone is sufficient?

He said to him,

Ulla:

We

I, who hold that skin alone is sufficient to cover the bone, interpret the beraita above as teaching that

it says either skin or flesh.

Some say

that Ulla’s statement was transmitted in the reverse manner:

Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Skin combines with flesh.

That is, the animal is kosher only if the bone is covered by both together.

Rav Naḥman said to Ulla:

From where do you know that merely combining the two is sufficient?

Let the Master say

Perhaps, since

the Master

teaches the words of the beraita, “skin and flesh cover most of it,” the meaning is not that half of one and half of the other is sufficient. Rather, the meaning is that if there is most of the flesh, the

skin

can

complete the flesh,

and the words of the beraita are taught

as a stringency:

the principal covering must be flesh, rather than a covering consisting of half skin and half flesh?

He said to him,

Ulla:

I know of an actual case.

I derive this halakha from an incident.

There was a fledgling

that fledgling of a bird

that was

which was

in the house

in the home of

Rabbi Yitzḥak,

and its leg was fractured, and this bone was covered in such a manner

that the skin combined with the flesh.

That is, half the bone was covered with flesh and the other half with skin.

And it came before Rabbi Yoḥanan, and he declared it kosher!

From this Ulla learned that it is permitted when skin combines with flesh.

Rav Naḥman said to him,

: Are you really seeking to prove your point from this incident involving

the fledgling

?

The two cases cannot be compared. For

a fledgling is soft,

its skin is as soft as flesh;

it is different

and the fledgling is treated like flesh, and therefore even when half the bone is covered by skin and half by flesh, it is kosher. But an animal has tough skin, which is not equivalent to flesh; therefore its skin cannot be treated like flesh, and the bone must be covered by most flesh.

Those

those

sinews

the

soft

sinews that combined with the flesh and together covered the fractured bone,

that came before

and this case was brought before

Rabba.

Rabba said:

These sinews combine with the flesh, and the animal is kosher. Rabba explains his ruling:

Why should we be concerned about them?

Why should we be concerned and forbid the animal? There is no reason to forbid it.