Chullin 73a (עג.) — the Talmud in English

And anything destined to be cut,

such as this limb],

is considered as though it had been cut.

Therefore, the place of the cut between the protruding limb and the fetus is treated as cut and exposed, and not as a concealed place. And since the protruding limb and the rest of the fetus touch one another, the limb renders the fetus impure through impurity imparted by contact.

It follows that the view of Rabbi Meir in our Mishna—that the slaughter of the mother does not purify the fetus from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass—is not necessarily because Rabbi Meir holds that the impurity of a concealed place imparts impurity. Rather, our Mishna may even be in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that the impurity of a concealed place imparts impurity.

And the Gemara explains: This reasoning, that “anything destined to be cut is considered as though it had been cut”—on the basis of which Ravina established Rabbi Meir’s view in our Mishna as acceptable according to everyone—

in accordance with whom

was it stated?

In accordance with Rabbi Meir!

As we learned:

There is a halakha concerning the immersion of vessels: An impure vessel is purified from its impurity only when the entire vessel, in all its parts, is immersed, such as its handles and the like. If even a small part remains outside, the vessel is not purified by that immersion:

All handles of vessels that are long

beyond what is necessary

and are destined to be cut,

he

immerses

the vessel

up to the measured place.

That is, up to the place where he intends to cut the handle. The part destined to be cut may remain outside the immersion water, and the vessel is purified,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda

says:

The vessel is not pure

until he immerses all of it,

including the part destined to be cut.

That is, according to Rabbi Meir, anything destined to be cut is considered as though it had been cut; therefore, handles destined to be cut do not require immersion. Whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda, anything destined to be cut is not considered as though it had been cut; therefore, even these parts require immersion.

If so, our Mishna, which maintains that anything destined to be cut is considered as though it had been cut, cannot be in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda. For according to him, even with regard to the protruding limb of the fetus that must be cut, we do not say that it is considered as though it had been cut. If so, its contact does not render the rest of the fetus impure, since this contact is contact with a concealed place.

The Gemara rejects this:

You may even say

that our Mishna is in accordance with

the Rabbis,

that is, with the view of Rabbi Yehuda [in the Mishna cited there]. We can explain that only there, with regard to the handles of vessels, does Rabbi Yehuda hold that something destined to be cut is not considered as though it had been cut. But here, in our Mishna, Rabbi Yehuda will agree with Rabbi Meir that the fetus is rendered impure through contact with the protruding limb.

This is because

food connections

are considered as though they had already been separated.

They are regarded as though they were already detached, since they are soft and their connection is not as strong as that of vessels. The same applies to the connection of the limb with the fetus, which is considered like a food connection for this purpose.

Therefore, since

they touch one another,

the fetus and the limb touch one another, the fetus is impure according to everyone, even according to Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this:

Granted, according to Ulla,

who explained the reason for Rabbi Meir’s statement in our Mishna as being that, at the completion of the cutting, the place of contact with the limb is exposed and is not a concealed place, and therefore the fetus is impure, it is well.

This is why it teaches

in our Mishna, “He slaughtered its mother and afterward

cut it

[the limb],” since through this cutting the contact becomes exposed.

But according to Ravina,

who explains the reason for our Mishna as being that anything destined to be cut is considered as though it had been cut, and therefore even before the cutting the place is considered cut and exposed,

what

is the reason that our Mishna states that the case concerns

“he cut it”?

According to him, from the moment the limb emerged, even before it was cut, its connection was considered exposed contact, and for this reason the fetus is impure. Why, then, did the tanna establish the case as one in which “he cut it”? The Gemara answers:

Since the first clause teaches,

because at the beginning of the Mishna the case is one of

“he cut it

and afterward slaughtered its mother, the flesh is pure,” therefore

it also teaches the latter clause

[the law of “he slaughtered its mother and afterward cut it—the flesh is impure”] as a case of

“he cut it.”

But it is not necessary to establish the case specifically as one in which he cut it. Even if he did not cut the limb, the fetus is impure, since it is destined to be cut and is considered as though it had been cut. This is not contact with a concealed place.

We learned in our Mishna:

And the Sages say: The contact

of the limb that emerged with the rest of the fetus is considered like contact with

a tereifa—

and it is treated like contact with

an animal that was slaughtered,

and therefore the fetus is pure.

The Gemara asks: Since the Sages compare contact with the limb to contact with a slaughtered tereifa, it follows that a slaughtered tereifa has the status of something that can impart impurity through contact. But this is difficult: A

slaughtered tereifa—does it impart impurity?

It is pure!

The Gemara answers:

Yes.

It has the status of something that can impart impurity, in that some impurity takes effect through contact with it,

as stated by the father of Shmuel.

As the father of Shmuel said:

An animal that is

a tereifa that one slaughtered

is

rendered impure with regard to consecrated property.

That is, if the tereifa was an animal belonging to consecrated property and it was slaughtered, it renders whatever touches it impure. This impurity is a rabbinic decree, and this is why the Mishna states, “contact with a slaughtered tereifa.” We learned in our Mishna: The reason for the Sages’ statement that the protruding limb does not impart impurity through the slaughter of the mother is that

we find with regard to a tereifa that its slaughter purifies it.

And if so,

even the slaughter of

the

mother

animal

the mother,

will purify the limb

that protruded from the fetus.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Meir said to them,

the Sages:

Who purified this limb

that emerged from its mother

from

the impurity of

an unslaughtered carcass?

And according to your words, that

the slaughter of its mother

is what purified it,

then let it be permitted

even

for consumption.

Why, with regard to the prohibition against consumption, is it treated as an unslaughtered carcass?

They said to him,

the Sages [the answer contained in these words will be explained below]:

There is much

reason for this slaughter to

save

the fetus’s protruding limb,

which

is

not its body,

and purify it,

more than

it can save

its body

itself from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass.

For we learned

[in the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter]:

One who cuts from the fetus in its womb

and leaves the piece inside it, after the slaughter

it is permitted

to eat that limb which he cut,

as food.

But if one cuts

from the spleen or from the kidneys, it is forbidden as food,

even if the piece was inside the animal at the time of slaughter. The slaughter of the mother does not purify it.

It follows from here that the slaughter benefits the fetus more than it benefits the mother herself!

The Gemara asks:

What does he mean?

What answer did the Sages give Rabbi Meir by saying this?

Rava said, and some say

that this statement was said by

Kedei [the name of a sage ]:

A deficiency exists in the text,

the beraita cited is incomplete.

And this is what it teaches:

“

Rabbi Meir said to them,”

the Sages:

“

Who purified this limb

that emerged

from

the impurity of

an unslaughtered carcass?

And according to your words, that

the slaughter of its mother

purifies it from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass,

then let it be permitted

even

for consumption?”

The Sages said to him:

“

A tereifa proves this: Its slaughter purifies it from

the impurity of

an unslaughtered carcass, but it does not permit it for consumption.”

With regard to consumption, it remains prohibited as an unslaughtered carcass.

He said to them,

Rabbi Meir to the Sages:

No,

a proof cannot be brought from a tereifa. For

if the slaughter of a tereifa purified it,

the animal, from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass, it is because this slaughter is performed on

something that is its body,

but merely because of this,

will it purify the limb

that protruded, which is

something that is not its body,

of the mother, but only of the fetus?!

The Sages said to him:

“

There is much

reason for this slaughter to

save

this limb

which is not its body, more than

it can save something that is

its body

itself.”

For we learned: One who cuts from the fetus in its womb—

it is permitted for consumption. From the spleen or from the kidneys—

it is forbidden for consumption.

And since its power to save something that is not its body is greater, if slaughter purifies a tereifa from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass, all the more so it should purify the protruding limb, which is not its body, from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass.

It was taught likewise

as follows:

Rabbi Meir said to them,

the Sages:

“Who purified this limb from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass?” They said to him,

the Sages:

“The slaughter of its mother.”

He replied to them:

“If so,

if it has the power to purify it from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass,

let it permit it

even

for consumption.”

They said to him: “A tereifa proves this: Its slaughter purifies it from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass, but does not permit it for consumption!”

He said to them: “If the slaughter of a tereifa purified it, and the dangling limb

that

was in it [that is, a limb that became diseased or was partially severed from it, but still hangs from it and remains slightly attached; as long as it has not fallen off completely, the slaughter of its mother is effective in purifying it from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass], this is because they are included among

‘things that are its body.’”

And certainly one cannot say that

this slaughter will purify

the

limb

of

the protruding

fetus, which is not

part of

the body

of the slaughtered animal itself.

The Sages said to him concerning this distinction: Although the fetus is not something that is part of its body, nevertheless,

the slaughter saves much

the animal

from

something

that

is

not its body, more

than from something that is

its body

of the animal itself.

For we learned: One who cuts

a person

from the fetus in its womb—it is permitted for consumption.

But

from the spleen or from the kidneys

of the animal itself,

it is forbidden for consumption!

It necessarily follows that the power of slaughter to save the fetus, which is not part of its body, is greater than its power to save limbs that are part of the body of the animal itself.

The view of the Sages in our Mishna is thus clarified: The slaughter of the mother purifies the protruding limb from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass.

Concerning the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages,

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: As the dispute

between Rabbi Meir and the Sages

with regard to

limbs protruding from

fetuses

while they are still in their mothers’ wombs,

so is the dispute

between them

with regard to

the

limbs

that are dangling from the animal itself. According to Rabbi Meir, a dangling limb has the status of an unslaughtered carcass, like a limb protruding from an animal; whereas according to the Sages, slaughter purifies it from the impurity of an unslaughtered carcass, like a protruding limb.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: The dispute

between Rabbi Meir and the Sages is only

with regard to the limb

that protrudes

from a fetus.

According to Rabbi Meir, it is impure like an unslaughtered carcass, whereas according to the Sages, its status is like that of a slaughtered tereifa.

According to Rabbi Meir, it is impure like an unslaughtered animal, while according to the Sages, its status is like that of a slaughtered mortally injured animal.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the reason for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s position according to the Sages,

who explained that when a fetus extends its limb outside, the limb is purified by the slaughter of its mother, whereas when an animal has one of its limbs become detached, that limb is not purified by slaughter; rather, as soon as the animal is slaughtered, the limb becomes carrion?

But

if

this

limb of an animal has become detached,

it has no remedy

and cannot be remedied

by returning it inside.

Since it has become diseased and detached, it is impossible for it to recover and become healthy again. The case concerns a limb that has been damaged and has no cure. Therefore, it can never return to its original state and regain its original fitness.