Chullin 31b (לא:) — the Talmud in English

And vessels are analogous to a person

in this regard:

Just as a person requires

intention, so too vessels

must be objects to which intention applies,

for a person intends that they

who is sitting beside them become pure.

Rava challenges his statement:

And if you would say

[that is, if you would ask], if the Mishna is speaking

of one who sits and awaits

the wave,

what does it teach us

[that is, what novelty does it introduce]?

Rava replied: Although it is obvious that the immersion is valid by Torah law, nevertheless, there would have been room to invalidate it by rabbinic decree for two reasons:

a.

Lest you say, let us decree because

the wave resembles a

cascade of rainwater,

which is a flow of rainwater descending from a mountain, and immersion in it is invalid by Torah law, since rainwater purifies only when it is gathered . And although waves of the sea are considered like a spring and purify while flowing, there is concern that people might liken them to a cascade and thereby permit immersion in a cascade.

b.

Alternatively,

since even by Torah law not the entire wave is valid for immersion, but only the part that reaches the ground and is connected to it, and not the part that is still in the air,

let us decree regarding its heads

that have reached the ground

on account of its arches,

which are still in the air and resemble an arch, lest one throw vessels there.

It teaches us

that we do not enact these decrees.

We inquire:

And from where do you say that one does not immerse in arches?

[And how do you know that one does not immerse in arches?]

And we cite a Mishna:

As we learned

One may immerse in the heads

of a wave,

but one may not immerse in its arches,

because

one does not immerse in the air,

but only in water connected to the ground .

We return to the main discussion and inquire:

Rather,

immersion for the purpose of

non-sacred food, which does not require intention— from where do we know this?

And we answer:

As we learned: If produce fell into a water channel

that is valid for immersing the hands ,

and one extended—

one whose hands were impure—

his hands

and lifted them,

thereby immersing his hands,

his hands are pure,

even though he did not intend to immerse them .

And the produce

was not rendered susceptible to impurity, because it did not fall into the water with his consent, and

it is not included in

the statement written in the Torah,

“when water is placed upon it,”

which means that the water must be upon the produce with the person’s consent.

The Mishna continues:

And if

he inserted his hands into the water

so that his hands would be washed

and purified, then certainly, since he intended to purify his hands,

his hands are pure

166, and the produce is included in “when water is placed upon it” ,

since ultimately he is pleased that the produce fell into the water, because through it his intention to purify his hands was fulfilled .

It is evident from this Mishna that the hands become pure without intention to purify them; likewise, immersion purifies without intention, in accordance with Rav.

The Gemara does not challenge Rabbi Yohanan from this Mishna, because the impurity of hands is rabbinic, and according to Rabbi Yohanan one may say that the Sages were lenient in this matter .

Rava raised an objection to Rav Nahman

from a Mishna, challenging Rav:

If a person immersed

for non-sacred food,

and established himself as pure for non-sacred food

[that is, he intended to establish his body as presumed pure for non-sacred food],

he is prohibited

from

eating

ma'aser

Sheni in Jerusalem, because the Sages imposed a stringency concerning the purity of one who eats something sacred, requiring him to intend during immersion that it be for the sake of eating it [Hagiga 18b].

in Jerusalem, because the Sages imposed greater stringency on the purity of one who eats sacred food: he must intend during the immersion that it be for the sake of eating that food [Chagiga 18b].

Rava objects: It follows from the Mishna that if a person had no intention at all when immersing, he is not pure even for non-sacred food, since the Mishna says: “He immersed for non-sacred food and established himself as pure for non-sacred food.”

“Established himself”—

yes; if he did not establish himself—

he is not

pure even for non-sacred food!

Rav Nahman answers:

This is what the tanna is saying:

:

Even though he established himself as pure for non-sacred food,

nevertheless

he is prohibited from eating ma'aser.

And all the more so, if he had no intention at all, he is prohibited from eating ma'aser; but with regard to non-sacred food, he is pure even when he had no intention whatsoever.

Rava raised another objection

from the latter clause of this Mishna:

If he immersed but did not establish himself as pure—

it is as though he did not immerse. Is that not to say

[is this not the meaning] that it is

as though he had not immersed at all,

and he is not pure even for non-sacred food?

Rav Nahman replied:

No; it is as though he had not immersed with regard to ma'aser, but he did immerse with regard to non-sacred food,

because that Mishna teaches the levels of purity with regard to ma'aser, teruma, and sacred offerings .

He thought that Rav Nahman was merely fending him off,

[Rava thought that Rav Nahman was rejecting him and was offering a forced explanation of Rav’s words],

but he went out, examined the matter, and found

[Rav Nahman examined the matter carefully and found a beraita supporting his position],

as it was taught: If he immersed but did not establish himself as pure—

he is permitted with regard to non-sacred food but prohibited with regard to ma'aser.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Shall we say that this is a refutation of Rabbi Yohanan

from this beraita, which states that intention is not required for non-sacred food?

He said to him,

Rav Yosef: Indeed, this beraita supports Rav’s position. But the tanna'im disagree in accordance with the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yohanan, and

it is Rabbi Yohanan who stated his view in accordance with Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef,

who derives from the verse that immersion requires intention.

In the passage concerning lesions of garments, the Torah states that if the koэн sees after the first period of confinement that the lesion has not spread, he commands that the garment be washed and confines it for an additional seven days. This washing is not immersion but laundering.

The Torah then states: “And the garment, or the warp, or the woof, or any leather vessel, which you shall wash, and the lesion disappears from them, and it shall be washed a second time and become pure” [Leviticus 13:58]. The second washing is immersion , and Rabbi Yonatan derives from this verse that immersion requires intention.

As it was taught: Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef says:

It would have been sufficient for the verse to write only

“and it shall be washed”; what is the meaning

[what do we learn] from the word

“a second time”?

Is it not already known that this is the second washing? Rather,

the verse compares

the

the second washing to the first washing,

and equates them with regard to this law:

Just as the first washing

is

intentional

and performed at the command of the koэн,

so too the second washing

must be performed

intentionally

by the one immersing it; and if the garment fell into the water on its own, its immersion is not effective .

Perhaps

you might think:

Just as there,

in the first washing,

the intention of the koэн is required, so here too

in the second washing,

the intention of the koэн is required,

and the intention of the one immersing it is insufficient.

The verse therefore states:

“And it shall be washed a second time

and become pure.”

This teaches that the garment becomes pure

in any event,

and not specifically through the intention of the koэн.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi challenges this: Did Rabbi Yohanan really say this,

that the halakha follows Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef?

But Rabbi Yohanan said: The halakha follows an unattributed Mishna, and we learned: If a knife fell and slaughtered—

it is unfit, even though it slaughtered in the ordinary manner.

And we discussed it: The reason is that it fell; but if he caused it to fall,

it is valid, even though he did not intend?

And we said: Who is the tanna who holds that intention is not required for slaughter? And Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan,

and since the Mishna holds that slaughter does not require intention, the same should apply to immersion, as both are acts that effect a permissibility: slaughter permits the meat to be eaten, and immersion permits a woman to her husband!

And we answer:

With regard to slaughter, even Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef

agrees with Rabbi Natan that it does not require intention. And although slaughter may be compared to immersion, nevertheless,

since the Merciful One explicitly indicated

that a

person occupied with sacred offerings

who slaughters them without intention causes the offering to be

invalid,

as it is written concerning sacred offerings: “You shall slaughter them for your acceptance” , which implies that the slaughter must be performed intentionally,

it follows that with regard to non-sacred animals intention is not required.

For if intention were required for the slaughter of non-sacred animals, the Torah would not have needed to teach this with regard to sacred offerings.

We inquire:

And what will the Rabbis

of Rabbi Natan answer to this? Is it not demonstrated from sacred offerings that intention is not required for non-sacred animals?

And we answer: With regard to the Rabbis,

although we do not require intention for the slaughter

to effect permissibility through this slaughter, as with sacred offerings,

for the cutting

of the signs

we do require

intention.

Rava said: With this he defeated

[he vanquished them with this argument]

Rabbi Natan defeated the Rabbis

in the battle of Torah:

Is it written

[is it written]

“and you shall cut”,

which could imply that intention is required for cutting? Surely,

“and you shall slaughter” is written. If intention is required for cutting,

because the wording of the verse implies that one must intend the action mentioned in it,

then even for slaughter intention should be required,

since slaughter is written in the verse.

If intention is not required for slaughter,

because it does not imply that slaughter must be performed intentionally,

then intention should not be required for cutting either,

since it likewise does not imply that the action mentioned in the verse must be performed intentionally !

We return to the main discussion and clarify:

What are the circumstances

[in what case] did Rav and Rabbi Yohanan disagree concerning

a menstruating woman who was forced and immersed?

And we say:

If we say that

another woman

forced her and immersed her

in order to purify her and permit her to her husband—this cannot be the case. We reject this: Rabbi Yohanan did not say that she is prohibited in such a case, for

the intention of the other woman is valid intention,

since the person immersing vessels has intention, and from there we derive that immersion requires intention !

Furthermore

we reject this: In this case Rav did not say that she is forbidden to eat teruma; rather,

she may also eat teruma.

And we cite a Mishna:

As we learned: A deaf-mute woman, an imbecile, and a blind woman

and one whose mind has become deranged

who are unable to purify themselves from the ritual impurity of their menstruation on their own—

if they have competent women

who perform the necessary examinations and immerse them, they

render them fit,

and

they eat teruma 178 .

(Nidda 13b).

Rav Pappa said:

The dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yohanan is as follows: In Rav’s view, immersion is analogous to slaughter. Therefore,

according to Rabbi Natan,

who validates slaughter when one drops the knife, in the case of immersion he permits it even when

she fell from the bridge

into the river.

But according to the Rabbis,

who validate slaughter only when there was an intention to cut, in the case of immersion they permit it only when

she went down to cool herself

and not for the purpose of purification. But Rabbi Yohanan declares her pure only when there was an intention to purify herself.

The Gemara cites a law concerning the red heifer that is related to the dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis.

Rava said: If one slaughtered a red heifer

and

slaughtered another animal

of non-sacred status

with it

in a single act—

everyone agrees

that the red heifer

is disqualified,

because a red heifer is disqualified when another labor is performed with it, as this constitutes the distraction that disqualifies the red heifer. But the slaughter of the non-sacred animal is valid even according to the Rabbis, since he slaughtered it with intent.