Chullin 31b — the Talmud in English

And vessels are analogous to a person

are,

just as a person is a matter of

intention, so too vessels

are capable of intention,

when a person intends them

who is sitting beside them, that they should be pure.

Rava asks about his words:

And if you should say

[and if you say], if the Mishna is speaking

of one sitting and waiting

for the wave,

what does it teach

[what novelty does it teach]?

Rava answered: Although it is obvious that the immersion is valid by Torah law, nevertheless there was room to invalidate it by rabbinic law for two reasons:

a.

Lest you say, let us decree because of

the wave, which resembles a

torrent of rain

—that is, a stream of rain descending from the mountain—and immersion in it is invalid by Torah law, since rainwater purifies only when it is gathered . And although the waves of the sea are judged like a spring and purify while flowing, there is concern that they may be compared to a torrent of rain, and the torrent of rain will thereby be declared valid.

b.

Alternatively,

since even by Torah law not the entire wave is valid for immersion, but only the part that reaches the ground and is connected to it, and not the part that is in the air,

let us decree concerning its heads

that reached the ground

on account of its arches

that are still in the air and resemble an arch, lest he throw vessels there.

It teaches us that we do not decree

these decrees.

And we inquire:

And from where do you say that one does not immerse in arches? [and how do you know that one does not immerse in arches?]

[How do you know that one may not immerse in arches?]

And we bring the Mishna:

For we learned

One immerses in the heads

of the wave,

but one does not immerse in the arches

of it, because

one does not immerse in the air

but only in something connected to the ground .

And we return to the main discussion and inquire:

Rather,

immersion for the purpose of

non-sacred food, for which intention is not required—whence do we know this?

And we answer:

For we learned: Produce that fell into a water channel

that is valid for immersing hands ,

and he stretched out—

one whose hands were impure—

his hands

and took them

and thereby immersed the hands—

his hands are pure

even though he did not intend to immerse them ,

but the produce

was not rendered susceptible to impurity because it did not fall into the water with his consent, and

they are not in

the category of the verse in the Torah

“when water is put upon it”

whose meaning is that the water must be upon the produce with the person’s consent.

The Mishna continues:

And if

he inserted his hands into the water

in order that his hands should be washed

and become pure, certainly one who intended to purify his hands—

his hands are pure

166, and the produce is in “when water is put upon it”

since ultimately it is agreeable to him that the produce fell into the water, because through it his desire to purify his hands was fulfilled .

It is proven from this Mishna that the hands become pure without intention to purify them, and the same applies to immersion: it purifies without intention, in accordance with Rav’s view.

The Gemara does not challenge Rabbi Yochanan from this Mishna, because the impurity of hands is rabbinic, and according to Rabbi Yochanan one may say that the Sages were lenient concerning it .

Rava raised an objection to Rav Nachman

from a Mishna against Rav:

A person immersed

himself

for non-sacred food, and was established as being for non-sacred food

[he intended to establish his body as having the status of pure for non-sacred food]—

he is prohibited

that person

to

eat

second tithe

in Jerusalem, because the Sages were stringent concerning the purity of one who eats a sacred matter, requiring him to intend during immersion for the purpose of eating it [Chagiga 18b].

And Rava asks: It follows from the Mishna that if a person did not intend at all for the immersion, he will not be pure even for non-sacred food, for the Mishna says: “He immersed for non-sacred food and was established as being for non-sacred food.”

“Was established”—

yes, he was not established—

not

pure even for non-sacred food!

And Rav Nachman answers:

This is what the tan­ na says

the tanna:

Even though he was established as being for non-sacred food,

nevertheless

he is prohibited with regard to second tithe

and all the more so if he did not intend at all, he is prohibited with regard to second tithe; but with regard to non-sacred food, he is pure even when he did not intend at all.

He raised an objection

Rava from the latter clause of this Mishna:

He immersed but was not established—

it is as though he did not immerse. What, is it not

[is the meaning not]

as though he had not immersed at all,

and he is not pure even for non-sacred food!

And Rav Nachman answers:

No, it is as though he did not immerse for second tithe, but he did immerse for non-sacred food,

for that Mishna teaches the levels of purity with regard to second tithe, teruma, and sacrificial food .

He thought: He is merely rejecting him [Rava thought that Rav Nachman was rejecting him] and explaining Rav’s words with difficulty,

and

he went out, examined, and found

[Rav Nachman examined carefully and found a beraita in accordance with his words],

for it was taught: He immersed but was not established—

he is permitted with regard to non-sacred food and prohibited with regard to second tithe.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Shall we say that this is a refutation of Rabbi Yochanan

from this beraita, which says that intention is not required for non-sacred food?

He said to him

Rav Yosef: In truth, this beraita proves Rav’s position, but the tannaim disagreed in the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yochanan, and

it is Rabbi Yochanan who stated the view of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef

who derives from Scripture that immersion requires intention.

In the section concerning garment afflictions, the Torah says that if the koen sees after the first period of confinement that the affliction has not spread, he commands that the garment be washed and confines it for an additional seven days. This washing is not immersion but bleaching.

The Torah subsequently says: “And the garment, or the warp, or the woof, or any leather vessel that you wash, and the affliction disappears from them, and it shall be washed a second time and become pure” [Leviticus 13:58]. The second washing is immersion , and Rabbi Yonatan derives from this verse that immersion requires intention.

For it was taught: Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef says:

It would have been sufficient for it to be written

“and it shall be washed”; what does

[what do we learn] from the word

“a second time,”

when it is already known that this is a second washing? Rather,

the verse compares

the

second washing to the first washing

and compares them with regard to this law:

Just as the first washing

is

with intention

and by the command of the koen,

so too the second washing

must be

with intention

of the one immersing, and if the garment fell into the water on its own, the immersion is not effective for it .

If

you might think to say:

Just as there

in the first washing

we require the intention of the koen, so here

in the second washing

we require the intention of the koen

and the intention of the one immersing is insufficient,

the verse says “and it shall be washed a second time

and

become pure.”

This teaches that the garment becomes pure

in any event

and not through the intention of the koen.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi challenged him: And did Rabbi Yochanan say this,

that the ruling follows Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef?

But Rabbi Yochanan said: The halakha follows an unattributed Mishna, and we learned: If a knife fell and slaughtered, even though it slaughtered in the proper manner—

it is invalid.

And we inquired about it: The reason is that it fell; but if he caused it to fall—

it is valid, even though he did not intend?

And we said: Who is the tanna who holds that intention is not required for slaughter? And Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan,

and since the Mishna holds that slaughter does not require intention, the same applies to immersion, for both are acts that permit: slaughter permits the flesh for eating, and immersion permits the woman to her husband!

And we answer:

With regard to slaughter, even Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef

agrees with Rabbi Natan that it does not require intention. And although slaughter may be compared to immersion, nevertheless,

since the Merciful One explicitly revealed

that a

person occupied with sacrificial matters

who slaughters them without intention—that the offering is

invalid,

as it is written with regard to sacrificial matters, “You shall slaughter them for your acceptance” , which implies that the slaughter must be performed intentionally,

it follows that with regard to non-sacred food we do not require intention

for if intention were required for the slaughter of non-sacred food, the Torah would not have needed to teach this with regard to sacrificial matters.

And we inquire:

And the Rabbis

of Rabbi Natan—what will they answer to this? Surely it is proven from sacrificial matters that intention is not required with regard to non-sacred food?

And we answer: For the Rabbis,

although we do not require intention for slaughter

and to permit through this slaughter, as with sacrificial matters,

for cutting

the organs

we do require

intention.

Rava said: With this he defeated them [with this he overcame them]

Rabbi Natan defeated the Rabbis

in the battle of Torah:

Is it written

[is it written]

“and you shall cut”

that from this wording one could understand that intention is required for cutting? Surely

“and you shall slaughter” is written; if intention is required for cutting,

because the wording of the verse implies that one must intend for the action stated in it,

then intention should also be required for slaughter,

for slaughter is written in the verse.

If intention is not required for slaughter,

since it does not imply that one must perform slaughter intentionally,

then intention should not be required for cutting,

since it likewise does not imply that the action stated in the verse must be performed intentionally !

since the action mentioned in the verse need not be performed intentionally !

And we return to the main discussion and clarify:

What is the case

[in what case] did Rav and Rabbi Yochanan disagree concerning

a menstruating woman who was forced and immersed?

And we say:

If you say that her companion forced her

and

immersed her

in order to purify her and permit her to her husband? And we reject this: Rabbi Yochanan did not say that she is prohibited in this case, since

the intention of her companion is proper intention,

for the one immersing intends with regard to the purification of the vessels, and from there we learn that immersion requires intention !

And further

we reject: in this case Rav did not say that she is forbidden to eat teruma, rather

she also eats teruma.

And we bring a Mishna:

for we learned: the deaf woman, the mentally deranged woman, and the blind woman

and she whose mind has become deranged

and they are unable to purify themselves from the impurity of their niddah by themselves,

if they have intelligent women

who will perform the necessary examinations and immerse them, then they

render them fit,

and

eat teruma 178 . [נדה י"ג ב]Niddah 13b.

(Nidda 13b).

Rav Pappa said:

the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yohanan is that, according to Rav, immersion is to be likened to slaughter, and therefore

according to Rabbi Natan

who validates the slaughter when the knife falls, in immersion he permits even in a case

where she fell from the bridge

into the river.

And according to the Rabbis,

who validate slaughter only in a case where there was intention to cut, in immersion as well they permit only in a case

where she descended to cool herself

and not for the purpose of purification. And Rabbi Yohanan purifies only when there was intention to become purified.

The Gemara brings a law from the laws of the red heifer connected with the dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis.

Rava said: If he slaughtered a red heifer

red,

and slaughtered another animal

of unconsecrated animals

with it

in one act—

according to everyone

the heifer

is invalid

because a red heifer is invalidated by performing another labor with it, for this involves distraction of mind, which invalidates the heifer. And the slaughter of the unconsecrated animal is valid even according to the Rabbis, since he slaughtered it intentionally.