Chullin 25b (כה:) — the Talmud in English

And the beraita continues:

And these are unfinished metal vessels: Anything that is destined

to be polished, inlaid, scraped, or engraved,

to make designs on it,

or hammered with a mallet

in order to straighten its protrusions, or if the vessel

lacks a base, a rim, or a handle,

then it is

pure.

However, if it

lacks a cover,

then it is

impure,

because the cover of the vessel is itself a vessel, and even without it the vessel is considered complete.

The Gemara asks:

What is different about these

unfinished wooden vessels, which are impure,

and what is different about these

unfinished metal vessels, which are pure?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan said: Since

metal vessels

are made for honor!

Therefore, as long as their manufacture has not been completed entirely, and one cannot be honored by using them, they are not considered vessels.

Rav Naḥman said: Since they are expensive!

Until their manufacture is completed entirely, they are attractive, and one can sell them at a high price, they are not considered vessels.

And the Gemara analyzes:

What is the practical difference between them,

between Rabbi Yohanan and Rav Naḥman?

And we answer:

The difference between them concerns bone vessels,

which are expensive but are not made for honor. According to Rabbi Yohanan, their status is like that of wooden vessels, whereas according to Rav Naḥman, their status is like that of metal vessels.

And Rav Naḥman follows his own reasoning, as Rav Naḥman said: Bone vessels are considered like metal vessels,

so that even unfinished bone vessels are pure. Since Rav Naḥman holds that the reason unfinished metal vessels are pure is that they are expensive, he consequently said that bone vessels have the same status as metal vessels.

And the Gemara analyzes:

By inference, bone vessels are susceptible to ritual impurity.

But is it not the case that the Torah does not mention at all that bone vessels are susceptible to ritual impurity? And we answer:

Yes. As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: What is the meaning of [Numbers 31] “

”

And every article made of goats shall you purify”?

That is, what item made from goats does the verse come to teach is susceptible to ritual impurity?

To include an object that comes from goats,

namely,

from the horns and from the hooves

of goats: If one made a vessel from them, it is susceptible to ritual impurity.

From where

do we derive that the horns and hooves of other domesticated animals and non-domesticated animals, when made into a vessel, are susceptible to ritual impurity?

The verse states: “And every article.”

The word “every” comes to include other animals.

If so, what does the verse mean by stating “goats”? It excludes birds.

If one made a vessel from them, it is not susceptible to ritual impurity. Thus, we have learned that bone vessels are susceptible to ritual impurity by Torah law.

Mishna:

There are two types of almonds: bitter and sweet. “

Bitter almonds” are not subject to tithing, because if one wishes to eat them after they have grown large and become bitter, he need not tithe them, as they are unfit for eating. But if one wishes to eat them while they are still small, they are subject to tithing, because it is customary to eat them then, while they are not yet bitter.

By contrast, “sweet almonds” are subject to tithing when they are large, but not when they are small, because it is not customary to eat them while they are still small, before the fruit has ripened completely. We learn from this that

one who is liable

for tithing

with regard to bitter almonds

is exempt with regard to sweet almonds.

And

one who is liable

for tithing

with regard to sweet almonds is

exempt with regard to bitter almonds.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: Bitter almonds,

when they are

small are liable

for tithing, but when they are

large they are exempt

from tithing.

Sweet

almonds,

when they are

large are liable

for tithing, but when they are

small they are exempt

from tithing.

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said in the name of his father: Both are exempt!

Small almonds are always exempt, whether they are bitter or sweet, since the fruit has not yet fully ripened.

And some say

that this is what Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said in the name of his father:

Both are liable!

Large almonds are always liable, whether they are bitter or sweet.

Rabbi Elaa said: Rabbi Ḥanina ruled in Tzippori in accordance with the opinion that says: Both are exempt!

And the Gemara analyzes:

But according to the one who says, “Both are liable,” what are

large bitter almonds

fit for?

They are bitter, after all.

And we answer:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Since they can be sweetened by means of fire,

by placing them over a fire, after which they become sweet.

Mishna:

1.

Tamad

is the name given to water placed over grape pits in order to make wine from them. It becomes wine only once it has fermented and begins to bubble; beforehand it is merely ordinary water. Therefore,

before

the tamad

has fermented, it may not be purchased with second-tithe money,

because one who redeems second-tithe produce with money takes the money to Jerusalem and purchases food and drink with it, except for water [and several other items], which may not be purchased with second-tithe money. Unfermented tamad likewise may not be purchased with second-tithe money, since it is still water.

And

likewise, since it is not yet wine, it

invalidates the mikveh,

like drawn water. If three log of such water fall into a mikveh containing less than forty se'a of rainwater, they invalidate the mikveh, so that even if one subsequently adds rainwater to bring it to a measure of forty se'a, the mikveh will not be valid.

Conversely, we find the opposite:

once

the tamad

has fermented, it may be purchased with second-tithe money

because it has become wine,

and it does not invalidate the mikveh,

because wine, like all liquids other than water, does not invalidate a mikveh if it falls into a mikveh that does not contain forty se'a of rainwater. Rather, one adds rainwater to the mikveh until it contains forty se'a of rainwater alone, and the mikveh is valid.

2.

Brothers who are partners

in property they inherited from their father—there are two possible forms of such a partnership.

The first is that the brothers divided the property they inherited between them and subsequently formed a partnership again with regard to that same property.

The second is that they have not yet divided the inheritance between them, and their partnership derives simply from their being heirs to the property they inherited.

There are differences in the laws governing these two forms of partnership, as follows:

When they are liable for kalbon,

when the half-shekel was given for the purchase of communal offerings, it was not given in an exact amount. Rather, each person was required to add a small coin to his half-shekel, and this was called a “kalbon.” Similarly, two people who jointly gave one whole shekel were required to add two kalbonot. But a father who weighed the half-shekel on behalf of his sons was exempt from adding a kalbon.

Therefore, if the partnership between the brothers was formed by dividing the inheritance and subsequently forming a partnership, their status is that of ordinary partners: If the two brothers jointly gave one shekel from the jointly owned property, each of them is obligated to give a kalbon as well.

When the partnership is of this kind, they are

exempt from the animal tithe,

meaning that all the offspring born to animals in which they are partners are exempt from separating one out of every ten animals as an animal-tithe offering. This is the law governing partners, who are exempt from the animal tithe.

Conversely,

when they are liable for the animal tithe,

that is, when their partnership is of the second kind, and they have not yet divided the property they inherited between them, so that they are obligated to tithe the offspring born to them jointly, since this property is considered as though it were still in their father’s possession, and the brothers are not considered partners with regard to it, they are

exempt from the kalbon.

If two brothers jointly gave one shekel, they are not obligated to add even one kalbon. The reason is that since the property is considered as though it belonged to their father, it is as though their father gave the shekel on their behalf. And the law is that a father who gives one shekel on behalf of two sons is exempt from giving a kalbon.

Gemara:

And the Gemara analyzes:

Who is the author of the Mishna? It is neither Rabbi Yehuda nor the Rabbis.

As we learned: One who prepares tamad

who makes tamad [this Mishna is discussing tamad made by placing water over wine dregs]

and measures the water

he placed over un tithed dregs,

and

after some time

finds exactly the measure

he initially placed—that is, the tamad has not increased in volume—then it is

exempt

from tithing. Even if the tamad has the taste of wine, since nothing has been added to it from the dregs, it is considered water.

But Rabbi Yehuda obligates

one to tithe, because in his opinion tamad is considered wine.

Now the following difficulty arises: Who is the author of our Mishna, which says that everything depends on whether the tamad fermented—in which case it is considered wine—or did not ferment—in which case it is considered water?

Who

is its author?

If it is the Rabbis,

who say that

even though it has fermented

it remains water as long as the tamad has not increased in volume.

If it is Rabbi Yehuda,

who says that

even though it has not fermented

it is wine [for the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda did not distinguish in their statements between tamad that fermented and tamad that did not ferment, indicating that each stated his ruling with regard to both cases].

And we answer:

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: