Chullin 20b (כ:) — the Talmud in English

But according to the one who says that there is a Torah obligation of slaughter for a bird,

that a bird too is subject to the Torah obligation of slaughter, Rami bar Yeḥezkel concedes that, according to his view,

there is uprooting

of the simanim in a bird.

He said to him

Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava:

On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable!

According to the one who says that there is a Torah obligation of slaughter for a bird,

since the entire requirement of slaughtering a bird is not explicit in the Torah, but was transmitted orally to Moses at Sinai,

it can be said that this is what he taught him

that this is what was transmitted to Moses:

There is no uprooting,

meaning that uprooting of the simanim does not invalidate the slaughter of a bird.

And even according to the one who says

that we learned the slaughter of a bird through the juxtaposition stated in the Torah, “This is the law of the animal and the bird,” whereby the bird was juxtaposed to the animal to teach that a bird is subject to slaughter

like an animal.

Nevertheless, since the slaughter of a bird was stated at Sinai—for all juxtapositions were stated at Sinai—it may be said that at Sinai it was orally taught to Moses that

with regard to uprooting, it should not be

a bird

like an animal.

But according to the one who says that there is no Torah obligation of slaughter for a bird, but only a rabbinic one,

as the Sages instituted the mitzva of slaughter for a bird,

from where did they derive it,

upon what did the Sages base their enactment?

From an animal!

Since an animal is subject to slaughter, they instituted slaughter for a bird as well. And if so,

the entire matter is like an animal,

so that in all the laws of slaughter the status of a bird must be like that of an animal, including the uprooting of the simanim, which should invalidate the slaughter of a bird just as it does that of an animal.

Ravina said: Rava bar Kisna said to me: This teaching of Rami bar Yeḥezkel,

that

there is no uprooting of the simanim in a bird, was stated only with regard to melika.

Since melika differs from slaughter with regard to the disqualifications of pressing and concealing, which do not invalidate it, as will be explained below, the same applies to uprooting of the simanim: it does not invalidate melika.

But with regard to slaughter,

Rami bar Yeḥezkel concedes that

there is uprooting

of the simanim even in a bird.

And we raise an objection:

But didn’t Rabbi Yirmeya say that Shmuel said: Any act that is valid in slaughter—

its equivalent at the nape is valid in melika.

And we infer:

That

is to say, whatever is

invalid

in slaughter is

invalid

also in melika. And this is difficult for Rava bar Kisna, for according to his statement, uprooting of the simanim invalidates slaughter, whereas it does not invalidate melika.

And we answer:

That

statement of Rabbi Yirmeya in the name of Shmuel

disagrees

with Rava bar Kisna. According to Rabbi Yirmeya, there is indeed no uprooting of the simanim even in slaughter, while Rava bar Kisna does not accept Rabbi Yirmeya’s principle that slaughter and melika are interdependent.

Ze’iri said: If the spinal column was broken

at the back of the neck,

and most of

the width of the

flesh

over the spinal column was also severed

with it,

it is

a carcass

and not a terefa. Even if it has not yet died, it is considered as though it has died and already conveys impurity as a carcass. And even if one slaughters it, the slaughter does not enable it to be purified from the impurity of a carcass.

Rav Ḥisda said: We too have learned

in a Mishna in accordance with the opinion of Ze’iri. As we learned:

If one performed melika

on a bird consecrated for an offering

with a knife

rather than with a fingernail, the bird is a carcass, and it

conveys impurity

to the

garments

worn by a person when this bird is in his

throat

as is the law concerning the carcass of a bird, which does not convey impurity through contact, but only when a person eats from it; once it reaches his throat, it conveys impurity to him and to his garments.

And if you say

that when the spinal column and most of the flesh are severed,

it is a terefa

and not a carcass, why is this bird that was subjected to melika with a knife a carcass? It could be said that

its melika

with a knife, although it is not considered melika, nevertheless

is its slaughter.

And

the knife should be effective for purifying it from the impurity of a carcass,

like any slaughter performed with a knife.

And we reject this proof:

They said

to resolve the matter:

There,

when one performed melika with a knife, it is a carcass

because it is not slaughter at all.

What is the reason?

Rav Huna said: Because it conceals.

When one performs melika with a knife, the knife, as it cuts the simanim, is covered above by the two parts of the bone of the spinal column. Since the spinal column was severed beforehand, its parts did not separate from one another as they do in ordinary slaughter at the neck, where the place of slaughter widens; rather, they remain attached. This is concealment, which invalidates slaughter.

Rava said: Because he presses

the knife against the simanim, rather than moving the knife back and forth over them; he presses the knife forcefully against the simanim, as one does with a fingernail during melika. For he performed melika with a knife, not slaughter in the manner of slaughter. Consequently, there is here the disqualification of pressing.

And the Gemara analyzes:

As for the one who says: Because it conceals, why did he not say: Because he presses?

And we answer:

He holds

that

moving the knife back and forth during melika is valid.

And if so, what we learned concerning one who performs melika with a knife and conveys impurity to garments applies even where he moved the knife back and forth, since this too is considered melika. Consequently, it cannot be said that, considered as slaughter, it is invalid because of pressing.

The Gemara analyzes further:

And as for the one who says, “Because he presses,” why did he not say, “Because it conceals”? He would say to you: Concealment

that invalidates slaughter—

what is it like? Like a weasel that dwells in the foundations of

the

houses, being completely concealed.

It hides in holes in the houses and is entirely covered.

Here,

when one performs melika with a knife, although the parts of the bone are not separated from one another, nevertheless

it is visible

the knife, since through the cut in the bone one can see the knife during the slaughter.

Rava said: If there is a difficulty for me

concerning Ze’iri,

this is the difficulty for me:

How can he say that once the spinal column and most of the flesh have been severed, the bird conveys impurity as a carcass because it is considered dead? If so, how did the Torah say to perform melika on a consecrated bird? Before the simanim are severed, one severs the spinal column and most of the flesh,

and is it the case that

since it has already

died

through the severing of the spinal column and most of the flesh, how can he

proceed to perform melika?!

But if we were to say that severing the spinal column and most of the flesh renders it only a terefa, it would be possible to continue afterward and perform melika, since the bird would still possess life.

Abaye said to him

to Rava:

And this should also be difficult for you:

In every case of

a bird burnt offering, which requires two simanim

to be severed in its melika, how did the Torah say that one must sever the second siman as well?

And is it the case that

since it has already

died

through the first siman—for a bird dies through the severing of one siman, as is demonstrated by the fact that the slaughter of an unconsecrated bird requires only one siman—how can he

proceed to perform melika

on the second siman?

He said to him

Rava said to Abaye:

There,

in the case of a bird burnt offering, the severing of the second siman is not called melika, since it is only

in order to fulfill in it the mitzva of separation.

The mitzva of a bird burnt offering is that one separate its head from its body, as will be explained later in the discussion.

And the Gemara analyzes:

If so,

the

skin

of the neck of a bird burnt offering

also

should have to be severed in order to fulfill the mitzva of separation. Yet we do not find anyone who holds this way?

And we answer:

Anything that prevents slaughter,

namely, the second siman, for if it is absent the slaughter is not valid even through the first siman,

prevents separation,

and is therefore included in the mitzva of separation and must be severed.

But anything that does not prevent slaughter,

such as the skin, for even if it is absent it is possible to slaughter the simanim,

does not prevent separation

of the bird burnt offering.

And we raise an objection:

But what of the minority

of the

simanim

in a bird burnt offering,

according to the Rabbis,

who maintain below that in the melika of a bird burnt offering one must sever all the simanim, and it is insufficient to sever only most of them—

which does not prevent slaughter,

since slaughter is valid through severing only most of the simanim, and the minority does not prevent it,

but does prevent separation,

since the minority too must be severed in order to fulfill the mitzva of separation?

And we answer:

Rather, say: Anything that exists in slaughter,

including the minority of the simanim, for although it does not prevent slaughter, it is nevertheless initially a mitzva to slaughter all the simanim and not only most of them,

exists in separation.

Therefore, the Rabbis maintain that in a bird burnt offering all the simanim must be severed during melika.

But anything that does not exist in slaughter

—the skin, which one is not commanded to sever even initially—

does not exist in separation.