Chullin 20b — the Talmud in English

But according to the one who says that there is Torah-based slaughter for a bird,

that the bird too is obligated in slaughter by Torah law, Rami bar Yehezkel concedes, according to his view, that

there is uprooting

of the signs in a bird.

He said to him

Rav Ashi said to Rav Aha, son of Rava:

On the contrary, the reverse is more reasonable!

According to the one who says that there is Torah-based slaughter for a bird,

since all the slaughter of a bird is not explicit in the Torah, but was transmitted orally to Moses at Sinai,

it may be said that this is how He taught him

this is what was transmitted to Moses:

that there is no uprooting,

that in the slaughter of a bird there is no disqualification of uprooting the signs.

And even according to the one who says

that we learned the slaughter of a bird from the juxtaposition written in the Torah, “This is the law of the animal and the bird,” whereby the bird was juxtaposed to the animal, to say that the bird is obligated in slaughter

like an animal.

Nevertheless, since the slaughter of the bird was stated at Sinai, for all juxtapositions were stated at Sinai, it may be said that at Sinai it was said orally to Moses that

with regard to uprooting it should not be

a bird

like an animal.

But according to the one who says that there is no Torah-based slaughter for a bird, but only by rabbinic statement,

for they instituted the mitzva of slaughter for a bird,

from where did they learn it,

upon what did the Sages base their institution?

From an animal!

Since the animal is obligated in slaughter, they instituted it also for a bird. And if so,

the entire matter is like an animal,

for with regard to all the laws of slaughter, the law of the bird must be like that of an animal, including the uprooting of the signs, which should disqualify the slaughter of a bird as it does that of an animal.

Ravina said: Rava bar Kisna said to me: This matter that Rami bar Yehezkel taught,

that

there is no uprooting of the signs in a bird, we stated only with regard to melika.

Since melika differs from slaughter with regard to the disqualification of “pressing” and “concealment,” which do not disqualify it, as will be stated below, the same is true that uprooting of the signs does not disqualify it.

But with slaughter

Rami bar Yehezkel concedes that

there is uprooting

of the signs even in a bird.

And we raise an objection:

But Rabbi Yirmeya said that Shmuel said: Everything that is valid in slaughter—

its corresponding position at the nape is valid in melika.

And we infer:

That

is, whatever is

invalid

in slaughter is

invalid

also in melika, and this is difficult for Rava bar Kisna. For according to his words, uprooting of the signs disqualifies in slaughter, whereas in melika it does not disqualify?

And we answer:

That

statement of Rabbi Yirmeya in the name of Shmuel

disagrees

with Rava bar Kisna. For according to Rabbi Yirmeya, indeed there is no uprooting of the signs even in slaughter, and Rava bar Kisna does not accept Rabbi Yirmeya’s principle that slaughter and melika are dependent upon one another.

Zeiri said: If the spinal column was broken

behind the neck,

and the majority

of the width of the

flesh

upon the spinal column was also cut

with it,

it is

a carcass

and not a tereifa. And even if it has not yet died, it is as though it has died and already renders impure from now as a carcass. And even if one slaughters it, the slaughter does not help to purify it from the impurity of a carcass.

Rav Hisda said: We too have learned

in the Mishna in accordance with the opinion of Zeiri. For we learned:

If he performed melika

of a consecrated bird

with a knife

and not with a fingernail, the bird is a carcass, and

it renders impure

the

garments

that the person is wearing when this bird is located in his

throat

, in accordance with the law of a bird carcass, which does not render impure through contact, but only when a person eats from it; and when it reaches his throat, it renders him and his garments impure.

And if you say

that when the spinal column and the majority of the flesh are broken it

is a tereifa

and not a carcass, why should this bird that was subjected to melika with a knife be a carcass? For it may be said:

Its melika

with a knife, even though it is not considered melika, nevertheless

this is its slaughter. And

And

the knife should avail for it to purify it from the impurity of a carcass,

like any slaughter performed with a knife.

And we reject this:

They said

to resolve it:

There,

when he performs melika with a knife, and therefore it is a carcass,

because it is not slaughter at all.

What is the reason?

Rav Huna said: Because it performs concealment.

For if he performs melika with a knife, when the knife slaughters the signs, it is covered above by the two parts of the bone of the spinal column. Since it was cut beforehand, its parts did not separate from one another as they do in every slaughter at the place of the neck, where the place of slaughter expands, but remained attached. This is concealment, which disqualifies slaughter.

Rava said: Because it presses

the signs, and he does not move the knife back and forth over them, but presses forcefully with the knife upon the signs, as one does with a fingernail in melika. For he performed melika with a knife and not slaughter, and as slaughter. Thus there is here the disqualification of “pressing.”

And the Gemara discusses:

As for the one who says: Because it performs concealment, why did he not say: Because it presses?

And we answer:

He holds

that

moving the knife back and forth in melika is valid.

And if so, what we learned concerning one who performs melika with a knife, that it renders garments impure, was stated even in a case where he moved the knife back and forth, for that too is considered melika. Consequently, it is impossible to say that in its capacity as slaughter it is invalid because of pressing.

The Gemara discusses further:

And as for the one who says, “Because it presses,” why did he not say, “Because it performs concealment”? He can say to you: Concealment

that disqualifies in slaughter,

what is it like? Like a mole that dwells in the foundations of

the

houses, which is concealed.

For it hides in the holes of the houses and is entirely covered.

Here,

when he performs melika with a knife, although the parts of the bone are not separated from one another, nevertheless

this is revealed

the knife, for through the cut in the bone it is possible to see the knife during the slaughter.

Rava said: If there is a difficulty for me

concerning Zeiri,

this is the difficulty for me:

How can he say that after the spinal column and the majority of the flesh are broken, it renders impurity like a carcass because it is like dead? If so, how did the Torah say to perform melika on a consecrated bird? For before the signs are subjected to melika, he breaks the spinal column and the majority of the flesh,

and is it so that

since it is already

dead

through the breaking of the spinal column and the majority of the flesh, how can he

stand and perform melika?! But if we were to say that the breaking of the spinal column and the majority of the flesh is only a tereifa, it is possible to continue afterward and perform melika, since the bird still has vitality.

But if we were to say that severing the spinal column and most of the flesh renders it only a terefa, it would be possible to continue afterward and perform melika, since the bird would still possess life.

Abaye said to him,

to Rava:

And let this too be difficult for you:

In every

bird burnt-offering that requires two signs

in its melika, how did the Torah say that he is obligated to perform melika also on the second sign?

And is it so that

since it is already

dead

through the first sign—for the bird dies through the cutting of one sign [as is demonstrated by the fact that the slaughter of a non-sacred bird requires only one sign]—how can he

stand and perform melika

on the second sign?

He said to him

Rava said to Abaye:

There,

in the bird burnt-offering, the melika of the second sign does not bear the designation “melika,” since it is only

in order to fulfill in it the mitzva of separation.

For the mitzva of a bird burnt-offering is that he separate the head from the body through it, as will be stated below in the discussion.

And the Gemara discusses:

If so,

the

skin

on the neck of the bird burnt-offering

also

should have to be cut, in order to fulfill the mitzva of separation. Yet we do not find anyone who holds this?

And we answer:

Everything that prevents slaughter,

namely, the second sign, for if it is not present the slaughter is not valid even through the first sign,

prevents separation,

and it is therefore included in the mitzva of separation and must be cut.

And anything that does not prevent slaughter

the skin, for even if it is not present at all, it is possible to slaughter the signs,

does not prevent separation

of the bird burnt-offering.

And we raise an objection:

But the minority

of the latter part of the

signs

in a bird burnt-offering

according to the Rabbis,

who hold below that it is necessary to cut all the signs in the melika of a bird burnt-offering, and it is not sufficient to cut only the majority,

does not prevent slaughter,

for slaughter is valid through cutting only the majority of the signs, and the minority does not prevent it,

but prevents separation,

for it is necessary to cut the minority as well in order to fulfill the mitzva of separation?

And we answer:

Rather, say: Everything that is present in slaughter,

including the minority of the signs, for although they do not prevent slaughter, nevertheless ideally it is a mitzva to slaughter all the signs and not only the majority,

is present in separation.

And therefore the Rabbis hold that in a bird burnt-offering it is necessary to cut all the signs in the melika.

And anything that is not present in slaughter [

the skin], for even ideally there is no mitzva to slaughter it,

is not present in separation.