Chullin 139a (קלט.) — the Talmud in English

We inquire concerning this:

What are the circumstances? If the judgment of this bird had already been concluded,

if its sentence of death had already been issued, then

it is liable to execution,

so how could it have escaped!?

Rather,

you are forced to say that the case is one

in which its judgment had not been concluded, but it must be brought to court,

in order

to fulfill in it

“You shall eradicate the evil from your midst.”

We inquire concerning this:

What are the circumstances of these consecrated animals?

If you say that he had

this man

a nest in his house, and he consecrated it, is he obligated

in Shiluach HaKen, even when it is ordinary, in such a case? But it is written:

“When you happen upon a bird’s nest,” excluding one that is prepared.

And this nest is prepared, as it is in his house!3a

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the case is one

where he saw a nest somewhere,

in a place that he did not own,

and consecrated it. But is it consecrated

in such a case? Does the Merciful One not say:

“When a man consecrates his house as sacred”?

And we derive:

Just as “his house”

is something that

is in his possession, so too anything

that a person consecrates, he can consecrate only if it is

in his possession.

But this nest is not in his possession?!

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the case is one

where he lifted

the chicks

before the fledglings and consecrated them, and then returned them

to the nest, in which case he is exempt from Shiluach, because the fledglings are consecrated.

But in

this

case,

he would not be obligated even if they were ordinary?!

As we learned in the Mishna: If one took the young and returned them to the nest, and afterward the mother returned to them, he is exempt from sending her away.

Since he acquired them, they are considered prepared.

And

rather,

perhaps you will say that the case is one

where he lifted the mother

first,

and consecrated her, and then returned her

to the nest.

But

from the outset,

when he found them,

he became obligated in sending her away before he consecrated her,

and consecrating her did not exempt him from the obligation?!

The proof that consecration taking effect on an object does not remove a mitzva in which one had already become obligated is:

As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yohanan ben Yosef says: If one consecrated a wild animal and afterward slaughtered it, he is exempt from covering

the blood. The blood of a consecrated wild animal is not subject to the mitzva of covering [as we said above, 83b, because this is an invalid slaughter, since it is forbidden to benefit from it]. But if he

slaughtered it

first

and afterward consecrated it, he is obligated to cover, for

he

had already become obligated to cover it before it came to be consecrated 7 .

And since he had already become obligated to send away the mother, and consecrating her does not exempt him, the question returns: In what manner is our Mishna speaking?

Rav said: The case is one who consecrated the fledglings

[young birds]

of his dovecote

for the Altar, as a voluntary burnt offering.

And

after those fledglings matured,

they rebelled,

and left and made their nest elsewhere. From that point they were no longer prepared. Had they been ordinary, in such a case he would have been obligated in Shiluach, but because they were consecrated, he was exempt.

And Shmuel said: The case is one who consecrated his hen for the maintenance of the Temple,

and it rebelled and made its nest elsewhere.

The Gemara asks:

Granted, Shmuel did not say in accordance with Rav,

because

he establishes it

even

with consecrated property for the maintenance of the Temple,

and he comes to teach that even consecration of monetary value exempts one from Shiluach, because “you are commanded to bring it to the treasurer.”

Rather, Rav, what is the reason that he did not say in accordance with Shmuel?

Rav could say to you: The nest is exempt from Shiluach specifically

in a case

such as the fledglings of his dovecote, which are consecrated for the Altar, because once they are consecrated

with

intrinsic sanctity, their sanctity does not lapse from them,

even though they rebelled.

But in the case of one who consecrated his hen for the maintenance of the Temple, which is not consecration for the Altar, for

it is merely

consecration of monetary value, once she rebels, their sanctity lapses, and she is obligated in Shiluach

9 . And Shmuel said:

Her sanctity does not lapse, because

wherever

this hen is,

she is in the treasury

[the storehouse]

of the Merciful One, as it is written: “The earth and all that fills it belong to the Lord.”

And Rabbi Yohanan likewise said: The Mishna is discussing one who consecrated his hen for the maintenance of the Temple, and she rebelled

this is the case discussed by the Mishna.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said to him: Once she rebelled,

has

her sanctity not lapsed?!

He said to him:

Wherever she is,

she is in the treasury of the Merciful One, as it is written: “The earth and all that fills it belong to the Lord.”

And they raise a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yohanan and another statement of Rabbi Yohanan, and between one statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish and another statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish.

For it was stated:

If a person said:

“This maneh

lying before me shall be

for the maintenance of the Temple,” and it was stolen

the money

or lost—

Rabbi Yohanan said: The one who consecrated it is liable

the consecrator

for its responsibility until it reaches the treasurer,

and therefore, if it was stolen before it reached the treasurer, he is liable.

And Reish Lakish said: Wherever it is,

wherever the money is found from the moment its consecration took effect, it is considered as though it is

in the treasury

in His storehouse,

of the Merciful One; as it is written: “The earth and all that fills it belong to the Lord,”

and wherever consecrated property is found, it is considered to be present in the domain of consecrated property, which is the domain of the property of the Most High.

Therefore he is exempt, since the money is in the domain of consecrated property and his vow has already been fulfilled.

The statement of Reish Lakish contradicts the statement of Reish Lakish,

for above he did not accept this principle that wherever it is, it is in the treasury of the Merciful One. And

the difficulty

also applies to

Rabbi Yohanan’s statement contradicting Rabbi Yohanan’s statement,

for above he accepted this principle, whereas here he did not accept it?!

Granted,

there is no difficulty according to Reish Lakish regarding Reish Lakish.

It can be said that

this

statement—that he understands that once it rebelled, its sanctity lapsed—was made

before he heard this derivation from Rabbi Yohanan, his teacher,

from the verse, “The earth and all that fills it belong to the Lord.” But

this

statement—that wherever it is, it is in the treasury of the Merciful One—he made

after he heard it from Rabbi Yohanan, his teacher,

for he retracted his earlier position.

But regarding Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Yohanan, is this not difficult?!

And we said:

Regarding Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Yohanan as well, there is no difficulty.

This statement,

that when he said that he is liable for their responsibility, it is referring to one who says, “Behold,

upon me

a maneh for hekdesh,”

for in that case, even though it is in the treasury of the Merciful One, nevertheless he has not fulfilled his vow, since he did not bring it into the possession of hekdesh. And

this

statement—that he is not liable for their responsibility—was

when he said, “This is” 11.

And we challenged this:

By inference, Reish Lakish

holds

that even when he says “Behold,

upon

me,” he is not liable

if they were stolen or lost?!

And it was taught in a beraita: What is a vow and what is a donation? A vow

is

one who says, “This is an olah.” And what is the difference between a vow and a donation? A vow

is that if it

dies, is stolen, or is lost, he is liable for its responsibility,

which is not the case with

a donation;

if it

dies, is stolen, or is lost, he is not liable for its responsibility.

And this proves that one who says “Upon me” is not comparable to one who says “This is”?!

Reish Lakish can say to you: This matter

—that one who says “Upon me” is liable for their responsibility—is referring to

consecrated offerings designated for the altar, since

he vowed to bring it to the Temple courtyard as an offering , and even though it is in the treasury of the Merciful One, nevertheless it

still requires offering.

But offerings designated for the Temple maintenance, which do not require offering on the altar—even when he says “Behold,

upon

me”—

he is not liable!

For through his act of designation he fulfilled his vow.

And we challenge this: Are offerings designated for the Temple maintenance different from offerings designated for the altar?!

But didn’t we learn in a Mishna: One who says, “This ox is an olah,”

or who says

“This house is an offering”

[he is referring to the Temple maintenance, since the Temple maintenance is also called an offering, as it is written: “And we shall bring the offering of the Lord, each man who found a gold utensil, and so on”], if

the ox dies

or

the house collapses, he is not liable for their responsibility.

But if he said

“This ox is an olah upon me,”

or if he said

“This house is an offering upon me,” the ox dies, and

or

the house collapses, he must pay.

Yet here we are dealing with offerings designated for the Temple maintenance, and we see that even in this case, if he says “Upon me,” he is liable!

And we answer:

This applies when

they no longer exist, as in that case,

when the ox dies and the house collapses;

there, specifically, he is

liable to pay,

for it cannot be said, “Wherever it is, it is in the treasury of the Merciful One,”

since

they

are not

anywhere.

But when they do exist,

as in the case here, where they were stolen or lost,

wherever it is, it is in the treasury of the Merciful One, as it is written, ‘The earth and all that fills it belong to the Lord.’

Rav Hamnuna said: Everyone agrees with regard to valuations

that

even when he says “My valuation is

upon

me,” he is not liable

for the responsibility of the money if it was stolen or lost.

What is the reason?

Because

it cannot be stated

[for he cannot say it in the formulation “This is”]

without

the wording

“upon me.”

For

how could he say it?

Could he say, “My valuation”

without “upon me”? “My valuation”—

whose?!

Upon whom does the obligation to pay this person’s valuation rest?!

Could he say, “The valuation of so-and-so”? Whose?!

Upon whom does the obligation to pay this person’s valuation rest?!

Rava raised an objection:

What is the difficulty?

Let him say, “I hereby undertake my valuation,”

or

“I hereby undertake the valuation of so-and-so,”

and he is liable to pay even if he did not say “upon me”!?

Furthermore,

this

was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Natan says:

It is written concerning one who redeems an ancestral field from hekdesh,

“And he shall give its valuation on that day, holy to the Lord.”

And the verse could have said, “And he shall give it,” or “And he shall give it.”

If so, “its valuation”—

what does this teach?

This indicates that the verse is referring to valuations. And this is

because we find that consecrated property and tithes can be redeemed onto ordinary money,

and their law is that if

the money is stolen

or

lost, one is not liable for its responsibility

[for the verse does not use language of “giving” with regard to them, so that we could say that the consecration does not take effect until it reaches the possession of hekdesh; rather, once he designates them, they become hekdesh, and the consecrated property and the tithe become ordinary property].