Chullin 131a (קלא.) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara rejects this:

Here too

the case is one in which

they came into his possession while still in their untithed state—

the produce had been deposited with a kohen while it was still tevel—

and this tanna holds:

unseparated gifts

“are considered as though they had been separated,”

and the kohen acquired them, since he was the first to take possession of them. Thus, produce deposited with a kohen is considered his, as though it were “from the time of separation onward”; nevertheless, one who eats it must pay, since it is still not mattenot kehuna.

However, the precise framework of this law is seemingly unclear. It is understandable according to the reasoning that they are not considered as though they had been separated: separation serves one purpose, permitting the animal, which takes effect immediately upon its slaughter through the identification of the gifts; whereas the raising up, or separation, establishes the kohanim’s monetary rights in the gifts. Before that, the gifts are considered part of the animal’s flesh, and there is no taking from the animal that renders it permitted. But according to the opinion that they are considered as though they had been separated, and the status of mattenot kehuna already applies to them before separation, it is puzzling why separation is needed for that status to take effect. Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky already addressed this issue [there], but did not explain it. In Avi Ezri [Ma’aser 1:5] it is established that the gifts are considered as though they had been separated only with regard to ownership. This principle was stated concerning an Israelite who inherited untithed produce from his mother’s father, a kohen: he separates the tithes from it and they are his. Although the status of ma’aser had not previously taken effect, since if his mother’s father had separated it he would not have needed to give it to a kohen, it became his property, which he could bequeath to his sons. This principle was not stated with regard to the laws of the gifts, for the same was said concerning the lamb for the redemption of a firstborn donkey [Bekhorot 11]: If one inherited a firstborn donkey, he separates a lamb and it is his, even though he may decapitate the donkey. It necessarily follows that he inherits a monetary right by which the lamb becomes his. But with regard to separation and the status of mattenot kehuna in relation to liability for damage, they have no such status until he separates them. Nevertheless, it is evident below that the laws of the tribe’s property apply to the gifts, and only that they are not considered the property of the kohen who acquires them. For we challenge Rav Ḥisda from the case of the king’s agents who seize his granary: If they took it in payment of a debt, he must tithe produce from another source. Seemingly, this has no connection to one who damages gifts to a kohen, since the produce is still tevel; why should he pay the kohanim when the status of ma’aser has not yet applied to it? It must be that separation is needed only for the kohen to acquire the gifts, whereas while they are still tevel they are already considered the tribe’s property. See further below. Ta shma: If the king’s agents seized

[that is, took by force]

the granary

of an Israelite,

if

they seized the granary

in payment of his debt—

because of a debt that he owed—

he must tithe

from another source and give it to a kohen, because this is considered as though he had sold his granary to another person, who would be obligated to tithe it, since he had already become obligated in its tithe.

But if it was taken as an act of robbery—

they seized his granary gratuitously and unlawfully—

he is exempt from tithing!

In any event, it is evident from the wording, “if it was taken in payment of his debt, he must tithe,” that it is property with a claimant. For if he is not obligated to pay, why should he be obligated to tithe, given that no produce remains in his possession, since his granary was seized from him!? The Gemara rejects this:

There it is different,

for when they said “he must tithe,” they did not mean that it can be extracted from him in court, since it is property with no claimant. Rather, the owner must tithe because

he has benefited financially from it—

he has gained money, since he had been obligated to repay his debt, and through the tithe produce he repaid his debt.

Ta shma: If he said to him

an Israelite to a slaughterer:

“Sell me the innards of this cow,”

this cow,

and there were

in those innards

gifts to a kohen,

namely, the stomach,

he gives them

the purchaser—the gifts—

to a kohen, and he does not deduct for him

the slaughterer does not deduct from the purchaser

from the money

that he paid him the value of the gifts, for the purchaser knew that there were gifts among the innards and did not give money for them.

But if

he purchased it from him by weight—

that is, a pound of meat for a certain amount of money, and the slaughterer weighed out the stomach for him—

he gives them

the purchaser—the gifts—

to a kohen,

for they belong to him,

and deducts for him from the money,

since the slaughterer sold him something that was not his.

And

why

does the Israelite give them to a kohen?

Let

this slaughterer who sold the gifts

be considered one who damages gifts to a kohen or one who ate them!?

The Gemara rejects this:

There it is different, for they are present

those gifts

in their actual form,

and in such a case he is not exempt, since he can now give them to a kohen.

Come and hear: Nine

things

are the property of a priest

:

teruma, terumat ma'aser, ḥalla, the first shearing, the gifts, demai, the first fruits, and the principal and the fifth

[which an Israelite pays to a priest if he robbed a convert who has no heirs, swore falsely concerning it, and the convert died after which he confessed].

For what purpose—

for what matter did they say that “they are the property of a priest”?

Is it not to enable them to be extracted through litigation?!

The Gemara rejects this:

No.

Rather,

as we learned: Why—

for what matter—

did they say

that

“they are the property of a priest”?

To teach

that

the priest need not specifically eat the gifts, but rather

he may acquire with them

a priest

slaves, land, and non-kosher animals; a creditor may take them in payment of his debt

7 , and a woman may take them as payment of her marriage contract, and

he may also acquire with them

a Torah scroll

8 . This was referring to that Levite

[a Levite]

who would snatch the gifts

from children who were bringing the foreleg, cheeks, and maw to a priest.

They came

and

said to Rav.

He said to them

Rav:

Is it not enough for him

[is it not enough for him]

that

when he slaughters his animal,

we do not take from him

the gifts in order to give them to a priest,

but he also snatches gifts

from others!?

The Gemara asks:

And what is Rav's

reason?

If

he holds that Levites also

are called “the people,” he should take from them as well,

since it is stated concerning the gifts, “from the people, from those who slaughter the slaughtered animal.”

And if they are not called “the people,”

then

the Merciful One exempted them

from giving, as it is stated, “from the people”?

The Gemara explains: Rav

was uncertain whether they are called “the people” or are not called “the people,”

and because of the uncertainty he exempted them from giving, for the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.

Rav Pappa was sitting and reciting this halakhic discussion

—that Rav was uncertain whether Levites are called “the people.”

Rav Idi bar Avin raised an objection to Rav Pappa: There are four gifts to the poor in a vineyard,

namely:

the fallen grapes, the incompletely formed clusters, the forgotten, and the corner. And three

gifts to the poor

in grain,

which are:

the gleanings, the forgotten, and the corner.

And

two—

two gifts—

in a tree,

namely:

the forgotten and the corner. All of them—

all these gifts—

do not provide the owners with the benefit of discretion.

The landowner cannot give them to whichever poor person he wishes; rather, the poor person who comes first acquires them [and the Gemara below explains the reason].

And even a poor person who is an Israelite,

if he had a vineyard, grain, or a tree, they compel him and

extract from him

the gifts.

But

concerning poor tithe, which is distributed

to the poor

within his house

after he has brought the grain into the house, and not like the other gifts, which are given in the field,

the owners have the benefit of discretion,

for it is in his power to give it to whichever poor person he wishes. Through this, he may receive a benefit of discretion: another person may say to him, “Take this sela, and give all your tithes to my poor relative” .

And

so too concerning poor tithe,

even a poor person who is an Israelite—

they extract it from him.

And as for the other priestly gifts, such as the foreleg, the cheeks, and the maw, they do not extract them, neither from a priest

who gives the gifts of his animals

to another priest

nor

from one Levite to another Levite.

The Gemara explains the beraita:

The four gifts in a vineyard: the fallen grapes, the incompletely formed clusters, the forgotten, and the corner.

From where do we know that these gifts must be given?

As it is written: “And you shall not glean your vineyard”—

this refers to incompletely formed clusters. “

And you shall not gather the fallen grapes of your vineyard”—

this refers to fallen grapes.

And it is written: “When you harvest your vineyard, you shall not glean what is behind you,” and Rabbi Levi said: “

What is behind you”—

this is the forgotten,

for what is forgotten is always behind him, as we learned in tractate Pe'ah: “What is before him is not forgotten; what is behind him is forgotten.”

The corner—

it is derived

by a gzera shava: “

what is behind you”—

“what is behind you” from the olive tree, as it is written: “

When you beat your olive tree, you shall not strip it bare afterward,” and the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: You shall not remove its glory from it,

that is, you shall not take its corner from it [and he expounds the phrase “you shall not strip it bare” as “you shall not remove its glory.” This is similar to the expression “you shall uproot all my produce,” meaning uprooting from the root].