Chullin 129b (קכט:) — the Talmud in English

However,

food that you cannot feed

to others,

such as a limb severed from a living animal, which is forbidden even to a gentile,

is not called “food.”

Therefore, the limb and the dangling flesh, which are forbidden because of the prohibition against a limb from a living animal, are not included in the category of “food” with regard to tum’at okhlin.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi:

If Rabbi Shimon is referring to the first clause, from where did Rabbi Yohanan infer that Rabbi Shimon’s reason is that food which you cannot feed to others is not called food?

Perhaps Rabbi Shimon’s reason there

for declaring the limb and the flesh pure with regard to tum’at okhlin is that he holds:

since

the limb and the flesh

remain attached,

as they remain partially connected to the animal, they are like something

attached—that is, like something completely connected to the animal. Since a living creature does not contract ritual impurity, perhaps this is Rabbi Shimon’s reason for declaring them pure?

And indeed, we find a tanna who holds this way:

as it was taught in a beraita: A branch

of a

fig

tree

with figs on it,

which was broken off

that is, detached from the tree,

but

it is still

attached to the bark

of the tree alone,

Rabbi Yehuda declares

the figs pure with regard to contracting ritual impurity, because the branch is still considered connected to the tree.

And the Sages say: If it can

become rejoined to the tree and

come back to life,

it is considered connected and

pure; but if not,

it is considered detached and

impure.

Rabbi Zeira concludes:

And we said to you: What is Rabbi Yehuda’s reason

for declaring it pure even when it cannot come back to life?

And you said to us,

Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Zeira:

because

since

the branch

is

attached

to the bark to some degree, it is considered

attached

entirely, as it is considered completely connected to the tree.

Should we not likewise say that Rabbi Shimon holds this way?

He said to him,

Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Zeira: Rabbi Yohanan, who came to explain Rabbi Shimon’s reason for declaring it pure—that it is food which you cannot feed to others—

is referring to the middle clause

of the Mishna.

As it states:

“If the animal was slaughtered, its blood renders it fit,” the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: Its blood does not render it fit.

And concerning this

Rabbi Yohanan said: What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason

for holding that the limb was not rendered fit by the slaughter of the animal?

And he explains: It is not because the slaughter did not render the limb fit to contract ritual impurity. Rather, the limb does not contract ritual impurity at all, even if it was rendered fit to contract impurity, as

the verse states: “From any food that may be eaten,”

and we interpret it:

Food that you can feed to others is called food,

but

food that you cannot feed to others is not called food.

The dangling limb remains forbidden to eat even after slaughter, as we derived above [73b] from the verse “and flesh torn in the field,” and it is likewise forbidden to Noahides. Since it is unfit to be fed to others, it does not contract ritual impurity at all . [What Rabbi Shimon said—“It was not rendered fit”—was only because Rabbi Meir said that it was rendered fit. In truth, he intended to say that it does not contract ritual impurity at all—Ramban.]

We nevertheless ask: From where did Rabbi Yohanan know that this is Rabbi Shimon’s reason,

and perhaps Rabbi Shimon’s reason in that

middle clause is

either as Rabba

holds—that an animal does not become a handle for a limb—

or as Rabbi Yohanan

holds—that if one grasps the smaller part and the larger part does not rise with it, they are not considered connected, and therefore the limb was not rendered fit by the slaughter of the animal? If the limb were rendered fit, however, it would be fit to contract ritual impurity.

And we answer:

Rather, actually,

the conclusion of the Mishna—“and Rabbi Shimon declares it pure”—which Rabbi Yohanan explains

refers to the final clause

of the Mishna.

And it does not refer to the limb

that is dangling,

but to the flesh

that is dangling.

As the final clause states:

“If the animal died,

the flesh requires rendering fit, and Rabbi Shimon declares it pure,”

the flesh is pure even from tum’at okhlin, even if it is rendered fit to contract ritual impurity.

And concerning this

Rabbi Yohanan said: What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason?

As

the verse states: “From any food that may be eaten,”

and we interpret it:

Food that you can feed to others is called food,

but

food that you cannot feed to others is not called food.

The dangling flesh is forbidden to eat because of the prohibition against a limb from a living animal, since death causes it to fall away, and it is considered as though the flesh became detached from the animal before its death. Therefore, it is forbidden even to Noahides, and food that is forbidden even to Noahides does not contract ritual impurity at all. [However, the dangling limb contracts severe ritual impurity even according to Rabbi Shimon, because of the prohibition against a limb from a living animal] .

Mishna:

This Mishna deals with the ritual impurity of a corpse and with the ritual impurity of a “limb” of a living person:

The ritual impurity of a corpse applies to an olive-bulk of flesh from a corpse and to a barley-grain bulk of bone. [A barley-grain bulk of bone imparts impurity through contact and carrying only; it does not impart impurity through a tent until there is a quarter-kav of bones. An olive-bulk of flesh, however, imparts impurity even through a tent.]

With regard to an entire limb that contains neither an olive-bulk of flesh nor a barley-grain bulk of bone, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua dispute in tractate Eduyot [6:2] whether the limb imparts impurity through a tent, or whether it does not impart impurity until it contains an olive-bulk of flesh or a barley-grain bulk of bone.

An entire limb that became detached from a living person imparts impurity through contact, carrying, and a tent, like the impurity of a corpse; but flesh that became detached from a living person does not impart impurity .

When an entire limb became detached from a living person, and afterward the flesh and bones became separated from the limb, the tannaim dispute in tractate Eduyot whether the flesh and bones impart impurity like the impurity of a corpse. This will be explained below in the Gemara.

The limb and the dangling flesh of a person

that became detached from the person’s body but remained partially attached to it—

are pure

from the impurity of a corpse, since they are still considered connected to the person. Although a limb that became completely detached from a person during his lifetime imparts impurity like a corpse, nevertheless, since this limb remains partially attached, it does not impart impurity .

If the person died,

the

dangling flesh

is pure,

because “death causes it to fall away,” and it is therefore like flesh that fell from the person before his death; flesh that separates from a living person is entirely pure.

But

the limb

that is dangling

contracts impurity because of a limb from a living person,

which imparts impurity like a corpse, but

does not contract impurity because of a limb from a corpse,

because since death causes it to fall away, it is considered to have fallen while the person was alive. A limb that became detached from a living person contracts the ritual impurity of a limb from a living person, not the ritual impurity of a limb from a corpse. [There is a difference between these two types of impurity, as explained in the Gemara.]

The statement of Rabbi Meir.

And Rabbi Shimon declares it pure. [

His view will be explained in the Gemara.]

Gemara:

We inquire:

And Rabbi Shimon,

who declares the dangling limb entirely pure after death—what is his reason?

Whichever way you look at it, if

he holds

“death causes it to fall away,”

then

it should contract impurity because of a limb from a living person,

since it is considered a limb that became detached while the person was alive.

And if

he holds

“death does not cause it to fall away,”

then it is considered that the limb became detached after the person’s death, and therefore

it should contract impurity because of a limb from a corpse.

Why, then, does Rabbi Shimon declare the dangling limb entirely pure?

And we answer:

Rabbi Shimon is speaking generally.

Rabbi Shimon did not come to dispute the case of the dangling limb, which contracts impurity as a limb from a living person. Rather, he came to dispute the fundamental law of the impurity of “a limb from a corpse.”

For the first tanna says, “And the limb contracts impurity because of a limb from a living person, but does not contract impurity because of a limb from a corpse,” clearly

that he holds that

a limb from a corpse in general,

when it became detached from it after death,

does contract impurity.

And Rabbi Shimon said

to the first tanna:

A limb from a corpse in general does not contract impurity.

It does so only if it contains an olive-bulk of flesh or a barley-grain bulk of bone, in which case it contracts impurity by virtue of being flesh or bone from a corpse.

For we have already found that the tannaim dispute this matter:

as it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer said: I heard that “a limb from a living person”

in the case of a person

contracts impurity.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:

Do you think that because you heard that a limb from a living person contracts impurity,

from a living person

specifically

and not from a corpse?

Is it not

a kal va-chomer:

Just as

a

living person, who is pure [

as long as he has not contracted impurity], is considered such that

a limb that separates from him is impure, all the more so

a limb that separates from a corpse, which is impure, should be impure?

And there is proof of this:

It is written in the Scroll of Fasts: “The minor Passover

[the Second Passover]

is a day on which one may not eulogize.”

Would you also infer there

that

the

major

Passover is permitted

for eulogizing

on it?

Rather,

it is certainly

all the more so:

the first Passover is forbidden for eulogizing, and they stated the novel case in order that we derive the more obvious case from it.

Here too,

the Sages stated the case of a limb from a living person, and

all the more so

a limb from a corpse.

He said to him,

Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua:

This is what I heard

explicitly: Only a limb from a living person contracts impurity, but not a limb from a corpse!

Accordingly, the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon also dispute this matter: Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rabbi Eliezer that a limb from a corpse does not contract impurity unless it contains an olive-bulk of flesh or a barley-grain bulk of bone .

We learned in the Mishna: The [dangling] limb contracts impurity because of a limb from a living person and does not contract impurity because of a limb from a corpse.

We inquire:

What

difference

is there between a limb from a living person and a limb from a corpse,

since both impart impurity like a corpse?

And we answer:

An olive-bulk of flesh and a barley-grain bulk of bone that separate from a limb [

from a living person ]

are the difference between them.

When flesh and bones separate from a limb from a corpse, they impart impurity—the flesh in the measure of an olive-bulk and the bones in the measure of a barley-grain bulk. But when flesh and bones separate from a limb from a living person, they do not impart impurity at all; rather, the limb imparts impurity only when it remains whole.

And we likewise find that the tannaim dispute this matter:

as we learned

in tractate Eduyot:

An olive-bulk of flesh that separates from a limb from a living person—

Rabbi Eliezer declares it impure! And Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKana and Rabbi Yehoshua—

declare it pure!

A barley-grain bulk of bone that separates from a limb from a living person—

Rabbi Nehunya declares it impure! Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua declare it pure!

Thus, we have before us three tannaitic opinions:

Rabbi Eliezer declares flesh that separated from the limb impure, but does not declare bones that separated from the limb impure.

Rabbi Nehunya declares the bones impure, but does not declare the flesh impure.

Rabbi Yehoshua declares both of them pure .

Accordingly, the first tanna agrees with Rabbi Yehoshua, who declares both the flesh and the bone that separated from a living person pure. This is the difference between a limb from a living person and a limb from a corpse: If flesh or bone separates from a limb from a living person, it is pure, whereas if flesh or bone separates from a limb from a corpse, it is impure. [According to Rabbi Eliezer as well, their laws differ with regard to bone, and according to Rabbi Nehunya, their laws differ with regard to flesh. However, concerning a limb from a corpse, we explained above that the first tanna agrees with Rabbi Yehoshua.]

Now that you have arrived at this

concerning the dispute between the tannaim regarding a kezayit of flesh and a bone the size of a barley grain that separated from a limb of a living creature, it is possible to say that the dispute between the tanna kamma and Rabbi Shimon is not concerning a limb from a corpse, as we said above. Rather,

the difference between the tanna kamma and Rabbi Shimon as well is a kezayit of flesh and a bone the size of a barley grain

that separated from a limb of a living creature.

There is a difference between them:

whether only one of them is pure, or whether both of them are pure.

The tanna kamma, who said that the dangling limb renders one impure because it is a limb of a living creature and not because it is a limb from a corpse, maintains that the difference between them is in only one matter: either with regard to the kezayit of flesh that separates from it, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥunya, who declares the flesh pure [but the bone that separates from it impure], or with regard to the bone that separates from it, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who declares the bone pure [but the flesh that separates from it impure]. And Rabbi Shimon comes to disagree, maintaining that both flesh that separates from a limb of a living creature and a bone that separates from it are pure, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.

We have completed the chapter “The Hide and the Gravy.”