Chullin 129b — the Talmud in English

But

food that you cannot feed ![](pamud.bmp "

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to others,

such as a limb from a living creature, which is forbidden even to a gentile,

is not called “food.”

Therefore, the dangling limb and the dangling flesh, which are forbidden on account of a limb from a living creature, are not included in the category of “food” with regard to the impurity of food.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi:

If Rabbi Shimon is referring to the first clause, from where does Rabbi Yohanan know that Rabbi Shimon’s reason is that food which you cannot feed to others is not called food?

Perhaps Rabbi Shimon’s reason there

for declaring pure in the first clause, with regard to the impurity of food, is that he reasons:

since

the limb and the flesh

are attached,

having remained partially connected to the animal, they are like something

attached—that is, like something completely connected to the animal; and since a living creature does not contract impurity, perhaps this is the reason of Rabbi Shimon, who declares it pure?

And indeed, we find a tanna who holds so:

as it was taught in a beraita: A shoot,

a branch

of a

tree,

of a fig

tree,

with figs on it,

that was split off,

was torn off the tree,

and

it is still

attached by the bark

of the tree alone,

Rabbi Judah declares

the figs pure from contracting impurity, because the branch is still considered connected to the tree.

And the Sages say: If it is able

for the branch to reunite with the tree and return

to live,

it is like something connected and

pure, but if not

it is like something detached and

impure.

And Rabbi Zeira concludes:

And we would say to you: What is Rabbi Judah’s reason

who declares it pure even in a case in which it cannot return and live?

And you said to us

—Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Zeira—that

since

the shoot

is attached

still by part of the bark, it is like something

attached

completely, for it is considered completely connected to the tree.

And here too, should we not say that Rabbi Shimon holds likewise?

He said to him

Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Zeira: Rabbi Yohanan, who came to explain Rabbi Shimon’s reason—that he declares it pure because it is food that you cannot feed to others—

is referring to the middle clause

of the Mishna.

For it teaches:

“If the animal was slaughtered, it was rendered susceptible through its blood; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: It was not rendered susceptible through its blood.”

And concerning this

Rabbi Yohanan said: What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason

that the limb was not rendered susceptible through the slaughter of the animal?

And he explains: This is not because the slaughter was ineffective in rendering the limb susceptible, but rather because the limb does not contract impurity at all, even if it was rendered susceptible to impurity, for

the verse says: “From all food that may be eaten,”

and we expound:

Food that you can feed to others is called food,

but

food that you cannot feed to others is not called food.

And the dangling limb is forbidden to be eaten even after the slaughter, as we expounded above [73b] from the verse, “And flesh in the field torn by a predatory animal,” and it is forbidden for this reason even to the descendants of Noah; and since it is unfit to feed to others, it does not contract impurity at all . [And what Rabbi Shimon said, “It was not rendered susceptible,” is because Rabbi Meir said, “It was rendered susceptible.” But in truth, his intention is to say that it does not contract impurity at all—Ramban].

And we still ask: From where does Rabbi Yohanan know that this is Rabbi Shimon’s reason,

and perhaps Rabbi Shimon’s reason in that

middle clause is

either as Rabbah

that an animal does not become a handle for a limb,

or as Rabbi Yohanan

that if one holds the small part and the large part does not rise with it, it is not a connection, and therefore the limb was not rendered susceptible through the slaughter of the animal. But if the limb were rendered susceptible, it would be fit to contract impurity?

And we answer:

Rather, actually,

the conclusion of the Mishna, “And Rabbi Shimon declares it pure,” and Rabbi Yohanan, who explains his reason,

is referring to the final clause

of the Mishna.

And it is not concerning the limb

that is dangling,

but concerning the flesh

that is dangling.

For the final clause teaches:

“The animal died—

the flesh requires susceptibility, and Rabbi Shimon declares it pure,”

the flesh even from the impurity of food, and even if it should be rendered susceptible to impurity.

And concerning this

Rabbi Yohanan said: What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason?

For

the verse says: “From all food that may be eaten,”

and we expound:

Food that you can feed to others is called food,

but

food that you cannot feed to others is not called food.

And the dangling flesh is forbidden to be eaten on account of a limb from a living creature, for death causes detachment, and this is considered flesh that was detached from the animal before its death; therefore it is forbidden even to descendants of Noah, and food that is forbidden even to descendants of Noah does not contract impurity at all. [But the dangling limb contracts severe impurity even according to Rabbi Shimon, on account of a limb from a living creature].

Mishna:

This Mishna deals with the impurity of a corpse and with the impurity of a “limb” of a living person:

The impurity of a corpse exists in an olive-bulk of flesh from the corpse and in a barley-grain bulk of bone. [A barley-grain bulk of bone conveys impurity through contact and carrying only, and does not convey impurity through a tent until there is a measure of a quarter-kav of bones. But an olive-bulk of flesh conveys impurity even through a tent].

Concerning a complete limb that contains neither an olive-bulk of flesh nor a barley-grain bulk of bone, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua disagreed in tractate Eduyot [6:2] whether the limb conveys impurity through a tent, or whether it conveys impurity only when it contains an olive-bulk of flesh or a barley-grain bulk of bone.

A complete limb that separated from a living person conveys impurity through contact, carrying, and a tent, like the impurity of a corpse; but flesh that separated from a living person does not convey impurity .

When a complete limb separated from a living person, and afterward the flesh and bones separated from the limb, the tannaim disagreed in tractate Eduyot whether the flesh and bones convey impurity like the impurity of a corpse or not. And this is as follows in the Gemara.

The dangling limb and flesh in a person—

which were torn from the person’s body and remained partially attached to it—

are pure

from the impurity of a corpse, since they are still like things connected to the person. And although a limb that was completely torn from a person during his lifetime conveys impurity like a corpse, nevertheless, since the limb is partially connected, it does not convey impurity .

The person died—

the flesh

that is dangling

is pure,

because “death causes detachment,” and this is like flesh that fell from the person before his death; and flesh that separates from a living person is completely pure.

But

the limb

that is dangling

conveys impurity on account of a limb from a living creature,

which conveys impurity like a corpse, but

does not convey impurity on account of a limb from the dead,

for since death causes detachment, this is considered as though the limb fell during the person’s lifetime, and a limb that separated from a living person conveys the impurity of a limb from a living creature and not the impurity of a limb from the dead. [And there is a difference between the two impurities, as explained in the Gemara].

The words of Rabbi Meir.

And Rabbi Shimon declares it pure.

His words will be explained in the Gemara].

Gemara:

And we examine it:

And Rabbi Shimon,

who declares the dangling limb completely pure after death—what is his reason?

Whichever way you look at it, if

he holds

“death causes detachment,”

if so,

let it convey impurity on account of a limb from a living creature,

for this is considered a limb that separated during the person’s lifetime?

And if

he holds

“death does not cause detachment,”

then this is considered a limb that separated after the person’s death; if so,

let it convey impurity on account of a limb from the dead?

And why does Rabbi Shimon declare the dangling limb completely pure?

And we answer:

Rabbi Shimon is speaking generally.

Rabbi Shimon did not come to disagree concerning the dangling limb, that it conveys impurity like a limb from a living creature; rather, he came to disagree concerning the very principle of the impurity of a “limb from the dead.”

For the first tanna says, “And the limb conveys impurity on account of a limb from a living creature but does not convey impurity on account of a limb from the dead”; evidently

he holds that

a limb of the dead in general,

in a case in which it separated from him after death,

conveys impurity.

And Rabbi Shimon said to him,

the first tanna:

A limb from the dead in general does not convey impurity.

Rather, this is so only if there is upon it an olive-bulk of flesh or a barley-grain bulk of bone, in which case it conveys impurity under the law of flesh or bone from the dead.

For we have already found that tannaim disagreed about this:

as it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer said: I heard that “a limb from a living creature”

in a person

conveys impurity.

Rabbi Joshua said to him:

And because you heard that a limb from a living creature conveys impurity, do you think that

from the living

specifically,

and not from the dead? And

behold,

it is a kal va-chomer:

it is so:

What

of a

living person, who is pure

as long as he has not contracted impurity, do we say that

a limb that separates from him is impure; a dead person, who is impure, all the more so

a limb that separates from him is impure!

And proof of the matter: For

it is written in the Scroll of Fasts: “The Minor Passover”

[the Second Passover]

“on which one may not eulogize.”

And would you also infer there

“this”

Passover,

the Great

is permitted

to eulogize

on it?

Rather,

certainly,

all the more so

it is so that the First Passover is forbidden for eulogizing, and they stated the novel matter so that we would learn from it the simpler matter;

here too,

the Sages stated a limb from a living creature,

and all the more so

a limb from the dead.

He said to him,

Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Joshua:

This is what I heard

explicitly: specifically, a limb from a living creature conveys impurity, but not a limb from the dead!

And now, the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon likewise disagreed about this: Rabbi Shimon holds like Rabbi Eliezer, that a limb from the dead does not convey impurity unless it contains an olive-bulk of flesh or a barley-grain bulk of bone .

We learned in the Mishna: The [dangling] limb conveys impurity on account of a limb from a living creature, but does not convey impurity on account of a limb from the dead.

And we examine it:

And what

difference

is there between a limb from a living creature and a limb from the dead,

since both convey impurity like a corpse?

And we answer:

An olive-bulk of flesh and a barley-grain bulk of bone that separate from a limb

[from a living creature]

is the difference between them.

For when the flesh and bones separate from a limb from the dead, they convey impurity—the flesh in the measure of an olive-bulk, and the bones in the measure of a barley-grain bulk—whereas when the flesh and bones separate from a limb from a living creature, they do not convey impurity at all; rather, the limb conveys impurity only when it is whole.

And likewise we find that the tannaim disagreed about this:

as we learned

in tractate Eduyot:

An olive-bulk of flesh that separates from a limb from a living creature—

Rabbi Eliezer declares it impure! And Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKana and Rabbi Joshua—

declare it pure!

A barley-grain bulk of bone that separates from a limb from a living creature—

Rabbi Nehunya declares it impure! Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua declare it pure!

Here before us are three methods among the tannaim:

Rabbi Eliezer declares the flesh that separated from the limb impure, but does not declare the bones that separated from the limb impure.

Rabbi Nehunya declares the bones impure, but does not declare the flesh impure.

Whereas Rabbi Joshua declares both of them pure .

And now, the first tanna holds like Rabbi Joshua, who declares both the flesh and the bone that separated from the living person pure. In this, a limb from a living creature differs from a limb from the dead: when flesh or bone separates from a limb from a living creature, they are pure, whereas when flesh or bone separates from a limb from the dead, they are impure. [And according to Rabbi Eliezer too, their laws differ with regard to the bone, and according to Rabbi Nehunya their laws differ with regard to the flesh; but concerning a limb from the dead, we explained above that the first tanna holds like Rabbi Joshua].

Now that you have arrived at this

concerning the dispute of the tannaim regarding an olive-bulk of flesh and a barley-grain-bulk of bone that separated from a limb of a living creature, it is possible to say that the dispute between the First Tanna and Rabbi Shimon is not regarding a limb from the dead, as we said above, but rather

between the First Tanna and Rabbi Shimon as well, an olive-bulk of flesh and a barley-grain-bulk of bone

that separated from a limb of a living creature

is what they differ about,

whether only one of them is pure, or even both.

The First Tanna, who said that the dangling limb is impure on account of a limb from a living creature and not on account of a limb from the dead, holds that the difference between them is only in one matter: either regarding an olive-bulk of flesh that separates from it, in accordance with the view of Rabbi Neḥunya, who declares the flesh pure [but the bone that separates from it impure], or regarding the bone that separates from it, in accordance with the view of Rabbi Eliezer, who declares the bone pure [but the flesh that separates from it impure]. And Rabbi Shimon came to disagree, saying that both the flesh that separates and the bone that separates from a limb of a living creature are pure, in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua.

We have completed the chapter “The Skin and the Gravy.”