Chullin 120a (קכ.) — the Talmud in English

And some teach this dispute of Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish with regard to

the Mishna

at the beginning of our chapter, which teaches:

“The hide, the gravy, and the congealed residue, etc., combine to impart food impurity”

by virtue of serving as a shomer, as the hand does not combine with it.

Reish Lakish said: They taught this only with regard to a bone

and the other items taught in the Mishna

that serves as a shomer

for the meat;

but a hair does not serve as a shomer.

Rather, it serves as a handle, as he proceeds to explain.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even a hair likewise serves as a shomer.

Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yohanan:

How can you say that a hair serves as a shomer?

But is there such a thing as a shomer atop a shomer?!

And we answer:

It perforates throughout

the hide, reaching as far as the meat, and therefore the hair itself serves as a shomer for the meat.

Rav Aḥa raised an objection to this: If so, how do we write phylacteries? We require perfect writing, and that is absent,

since you said that the perforation made by the hair reaches the inner side of the hide?!

And we answer:

It escaped him

from Rav Aḥa

that which they say in the West: Any perforation through which ink passes is not considered a perforation!

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish:

We learned in a Mishna:

“A hide upon which there is an olive-bulk of flesh—

one who touches the strand protruding from it, or the hair opposite it, becomes impure.”

And Rabbi Yohanan inferred:

Is it not

the reason that the hair imparts impurity

because it is a shomer?

And this is a difficulty for Reish Lakish?

And we answer:

No,

it is not because it is a shomer, but

because it is a handle

for the impurity.

And we challenge this:

What use is one hair?!

For the Mishna apparently speaks of a single hair, and it cannot be considered a handle, since one hair cannot serve as a place of grasping.

And we answer:

As Rabbi Ila said with regard to “the refuse among the refuse,” so too here, it refers to a hair among the hairs;

the case is one involving many hairs.

And we inquire: And where was Rabbi Ila’s statement made?

And we answer:

With regard to that which we learned: “The refuse among the sheaves”—

“become impure and impart impurity, but do not combine.”

And we inquire:

What use is the refuse?

And concerning this

Rabbi Ila said: It refers to the refuse among the refuse. [

In summary: According to the first formulation, Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagree whether a single hair is considered a handle. But when it is together with many hairs, everyone agrees that it is considered a handle.

According to the second formulation, they disagree when the hair is together with many hairs, whether it is considered a handle. But when it is by itself, everyone agrees that it is not considered a handle.

According to the third formulation, they disagree whether a hair is considered a shomer

when it is opposite the flesh, because it perforates throughout, or whether it is considered a shomer atop a shomer.] We learned in the Mishna:

“And the gravy.”

It joins with the food to render it susceptible to food impurity, but by itself it does not contract impurity.

And we inquire:

What is the gravy?

And we answer:

Rava said: Fat.

The fat floating on the soup.

Abaye said

to Rava: If so,

should it itself contract food impurity?!

For it is fully-fledged food, whereas our Mishna indicates that it is considered food only when it is together with the meat.

Rather,

Abaye said: The gravy is

solidified broth—

the liquid that emerges from the meat and becomes solid, which is not classified as food except when it is together with the meat.

And we challenge this:

Why specifically “solidified”?

For even

when it is not solidified, too,

it is classified as food when it is attached to the food.

And if you would say that before it solidifies it is classified as a liquid and not as food, and food and liquid do not combine for food impurity, so that they combine specifically after it solidifies—this cannot be said,

for

this

Reish Lakish said: Brine

that emerged from a vegetable, and

which

is now found

on a vegetable—

combines

the brine with the vegetable

to the measure of a dried fig,

which is the measure for liability to karet for one who eats

on Yom Kippur.

Although food and drink do not combine, nevertheless the vegetable and the brine upon it combine. Thus it is evident that liquid that emerges from food, when it is attached to the food, is classified as food even if it is not solidified; and with regard to food impurity as well, let us say that they combine even before it solidifies!

And we answer: It is different

there,

with regard to Yom Kippur, where the liability to karet is not specifically for eating, but

because of settling one’s mind.

The Torah commanded one to fast, and whenever one’s mind is settled, he has not fasted, since

any amount settles his mind.

Therefore, one who eats half a dried fig and drinks half a revi'it is not liable to karet, since the Sages know by tradition that this does not settle his mind—neither with the satisfaction of eating nor with that of drinking. But one who eats a vegetable and the brine upon it does achieve the satisfaction of eating, according to the Sages, and is therefore liable to karet.

But

here,

with regard to food impurity,

it is a matter of combining.

We require food amounting to an egg-bulk to be combined together, and food and liquid do not combine at all. Therefore,

if it solidifies,

the gravy, since it is then considered food,

combines

with the meat.

If it does not solidify,

and is considered a liquid,

the food and the liquid do not combine

to form one measure.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And the congealed residue.”

And we inquire:

What is the congealed residue?

And we answer:

Rava said: Pir ma.

It is the thin portion of meat that sinks to the bottom of the pot.

Abaye said

to Rava: If so,

should it itself contract food impurity?

For it is fully-fledged meat.

And we answer:

Rather, Rav Pappa said:

The congealed residue is

spices

cooked together with the meat, which are not ordinarily eaten by themselves, but only together with the meat.

We learned there: “If he congealed

the blood

and ate it, or if he melted

melted

the fat

which is naturally solid,

and swallowed it—he is liable

to karet

for eating blood or fat.

And we inquire:

Granted

with regard to

congealing the blood and eating it,

it is understandable,

since once he congealed it,

he demonstrated its importance.

Therefore, he is liable even though he eats the blood in an unusual manner.

Rather, if he liquefied the fat and swallowed it,

ask: Why is he liable? After all,

“eating” is written with regard to it

in the verse concerning fat: “For anyone who eats fat, and the soul that eats it shall be cut off,”

but

this is not eating,

but drinking!? And we answer:

Reish Lakish said: The verse states

with regard to fat, “and the soul shall be cut off,” and we expound:

“soul” -

to include one who drinks it

as liable for karet. [“Soul” indicates any form through which the soul derives benefit.]

It was likewise taught with regard to leavened bread, in a similar manner: If he liquefied it,

the bread in water,

and swallowed it

on Passover,

if it is leavened bread—he is

liable for karet.

And

if it is matza—

if he liquefied the matza and swallowed it—he

has not fulfilled his obligation on Passover.

And we discuss this:

Granted,

the statement that

if it is matza, a person has not fulfilled his obligation on Passover

is understandable, since

“bread of affliction,” the Merciful One said, and this one, since he crumbled it

[that is, melted it]—

is not “bread.”

But

the statement that

if it is leavened bread, he is liable for karet

is difficult, since

“eating” is written with regard to it

in the prohibition of leavened bread on Passover, and this is not eating, but drinking !? And we answer:

Reish Lakish said: The verse states

with regard to leavened bread, “and the soul shall be cut off,” and we expound:

“soul”—

to include one who drinks it.

And it was likewise taught with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird, in a similar manner: If he liquefied it

the carcass of the kosher bird

in fire

[that is, with fire], and swallowed it—

he is impure.

But if he liquefied it

in the sun, he is pure.

And we discuss this:

Why, if he liquefied it in fire, is he impure? After all,

“eating” is written with regard to it

in the case of the carcass of a kosher bird, for only one who eats it becomes impure, but not one who drinks it . And we answer:

Reish Lakish said: The verse states

with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird, “And any person who eats a carcass,” and we expound:

“soul” includes one who drinks. 64 .

And we ask:

If so,

if he liquefied it

in the sun as well,

he should be impure, since his soul derives benefit from it?

And we answer:

In the sun—

it putrefies and becomes foul.

Since the carcass remained in the sun until it liquefied, it became putrid, and its designation as a carcass lapsed [for a carcass does not impart impurity until it is fit to be eaten].

And all three derivations are necessary—the derivation from “soul” to include one who drinks—with regard to fat, with regard to leavened bread, and with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird.

And all three derivations are necessary:

For had the Merciful One written

with regard to

fat,

that one is liable for it even when he liquefied it,

leavened bread could not be derived from it,

because fat is more stringent than leavened bread,

as it never had a time when it was fit,

since fat was prohibited from the outset, whereas leavened bread, before it became leavened or before Passover, was permitted and had a time when it was fit; therefore, it is possible that one is not liable for it until he eats it in the manner of eating, and not in the manner of drinking.

Carcass

too

could not be derived from it,

from fat, because fat is more stringent than it,

as one is liable for it by karet,

whereas with regard to a carcass, one who eats it is not liable for karet, but has transgressed a prohibition.

And had the Merciful One written it with regard to leavened bread,

then

fat could not be derived from it,

because leavened bread is more stringent than it,

as it has no permitted exception,

since all leavened bread in the world is prohibited, whereas there is permitted fat, namely, the fat of a kosher animal.

And carcass could not be derived from leavened bread

because of leavened bread,

as one is liable for karet

for leavened bread, whereas this is not so with regard to a carcass.

And had the Merciful One written it with regard to a carcass,

then

the others—

leavened bread and fat—

could not be derived from it,

because the carcass is more stringent than they are,

as

it

imparts impurity,

whereas they do not impart impurity.

And we ask: Indeed,

one cannot be derived from another,

as we said, but

let one be derived from the other two.

Let the Merciful One write “soul” with regard to only two of the three, and let the third be derived from them through a common aspect?

And we answer:

Which one can be derived?

Which one should not be written, but instead be derived from the other two?

Let the Merciful One not write it with regard to the carcass, and let it be derived from the others

—from fat and from leavened bread.

There is a basis to refute this:

What is true of the others? They entail liability for karet;

can you say the same with regard to a carcass, which does not entail liability for karet?

And if you wish, say:

Let the Merciful One not write it with regard to leavened bread, and let it be derived from the others

—from fat and from a carcass.

There is a basis to refute this:

What is true of the others? They never had a time when they were fit;

can you say the same with regard to leavened bread, which had a time when it was fit?

And if you wish, say:

Let the Merciful One not write it with regard to fat, and let it be derived from the others

—from leavened bread and from a carcass.

There is a basis to refute this:

What is true of the others? They have no permitted exception; can you say the same with regard to fat, which has a permitted exception?

Therefore, all three had to be written.

And we examine the statement that fat cannot be derived from leavened bread and a carcass because it is less stringent than they are in that it has a permitted exception:

And what is that?

Where do we find that fat has a permitted exception?

If we say it is the fat of a domesticated animal

that is permitted

for the sake of the Most High,

to offer the fat of a sacrifice on the altar, then

a carcass as well:

we find that it is permitted in a particular context for the sake of the Most High, since

the pinching of a bird is permitted for the sake of the Most High,

as the service of bird offerings is performed through melika, even though a non-sacred bird that is subjected to melika becomes a carcass through the melika; thus there is no longer any basis for considering fat more stringent than a carcass ?

Rather,

say that the fat was permitted from its general prohibition in the case of

animal fat,

which was permitted

to a layperson

for consumption. Even so,

a carcass too

was permitted to a layperson, since

the melika of the bird sin offering was permitted

for consumption

by the priests?

Since a carcass too was permitted from its general prohibition, although leaven was not permitted from its general prohibition, it is nevertheless possible to derive the law of fat from leaven and a carcass through the derivation of “bama ha-tzad,” since we do not find a single stringency that applies to both but not to fat. If so, the word “person” written with regard to fat is superfluous?

And we answer:

In fact,

the permission from its general prohibition in the case of fat refers to the fact that

animal fat was permitted to a layperson. But as for your difficulty,

that a carcass too was permitted through the bird sin offering

to the priests?

We resolved it: The fundamental basis of the permission of the carcass of the bird sin offering is that it is for the sake of the Most High, since

the priests receive from the table of the Most High.

Thus, they are considered to be eating from that which belongs to the Most High. But we do not find that a carcass is permitted to a layperson; this is found only with regard to fat. Therefore, it is impossible to derive the law of fat from a carcass and leaven.

And as it is taught in a beraita:

It is written: “These are the impure ones for you among all the creeping creatures,” and we expound the letter hei in

“the impure ones”

to prohibit their juices

[the liquid that issues from the creeping creatures],

their gravy

[the fat in their bodies],

and their sediment

[fine meat and spices that settle at the bottom of the pot],

belonging to them,

the creeping creatures, from being eaten.

And we inquire:

Why do I need

a verse to prohibit all these substances with regard to creeping creatures?

Let us derive it from these,

from fat, leaven, and a carcass, which remain prohibited even after they have been liquefied, and are prohibited for drinking as well. And we answer:

They are necessary.

For had the Torah not written

anything concerning creeping creatures, and we had derived their law from these sources,

I would have said:

“The measure of the derived law is no greater than that of the source from which it is derived.” Just as there,

with regard to fat, leaven, and a carcass, one is not liable

until there is an olive-bulk, so too here

one would not be liable for eating creeping creatures

until there is an olive-bulk.

Therefore, the Torah explicitly wrote the law of creeping creatures to teach that what is liquefied from them is like the creeping creature itself, for which one is liable for an amount the size of a lentil.