Chullin 120a — the Talmud in English

And there are those who teach this dispute

between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish—

with regard to the Mishna

at the beginning of our chapter which teaches:

“The hide, the gravy, and the kefipa, etc., combine to impart food impurity”

because of a shomer, [for the hand does not combine].

Resh Lakish said: They taught this only with regard to a bone

[and likewise the other things taught in the Mishna]

which is a shomer

for the flesh,

but a hair is not a shomer.

Rather, it is a yad, as he explains below.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even a hair as well is a shomer.

Resh Lakish said to Rabbi Yohanan:

How can you say that a hair is a shomer?

But is there a shomer over a shomer?!

And we answer:

It penetrates throughout

the hair, through the hide, until the flesh, and the hair is a shomer for the flesh itself.

Rav Aḥa raised an objection to this: If so, how do we write phylacteries?! We require complete writing, and there is none,

for you have said that the hole of the hair reaches until the inner side of the hide?!

And we answer:

It escaped him

from Rav Aḥa

that which they say in the West: Any hole through which ink passes is not a hole!

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Resh Lakish:

We learned:

“A hide upon which there is an olive-bulk of flesh—

one who touches the tissue protruding from it, and the hair opposite it, is impure.”

And Rabbi Yohanan analyzed it:

Is it not so

that the fact that the hair imparts impurity

is because of a shomer

? And it is difficult for Resh Lakish?

And we answer:

No,

it is not because of a shomer, but

because of a yad

it is.

And we ask:

What use is one hair?!

For apparently the Mishna is speaking of one hair, and it is not possible for it to be considered a yad, since one hair cannot be considered a place of grasping.

And we answer:

As Rabbi Ila said with regard to “the refuse among the refuse,” so too here, with regard to a hair among the hairs,

it is speaking of many hairs.

And we inquire: And where was Rabbi Ila’s statement said?

And we answer:

Concerning that which we learned: “The refuse among the ears of grain”—

“become impure and impart impurity, but do not combine.”

And we inquire:

What use is the refuse?!

And concerning this

Rabbi Ila said: “With regard to the refuse among the refuse.”

In summary: According to the first formulation, Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish disagreed whether one hair is considered a yad. But when it is together with many hairs, everyone agrees that it is considered a yad.

According to the second formulation, they disagreed when the hair is together with many hairs, whether it is considered a yad. But when it is by itself, everyone agrees that it is not considered a yad.

According to the third formulation, they disagreed whether a hair is considered a shomer [when it is opposite the flesh], because it penetrates throughout, or whether it is considered a shomer over a shomer.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And the gravy.”

[For it combines with the food to receive food impurity, but by itself it does not receive impurity.]

And we inquire:

What is gravy?

And we answer:

Rava said: Fat.

The fat that is upon the soup.

Abaye said

to Rava: If so—

should it itself impart food impurity?!

For it is completely valid food, whereas in our Mishna it is explained that it is considered food only when it is together with the flesh .

Rather,

Abaye said: The gravy is

solidified liquid—

the liquid that comes out of the flesh and becomes solidified, which does not have the status of food except when it is together with the flesh.

And we ask:

Why specifically “solidified”?

For even

when it has not solidified as well

it has the status of food when it is attached to the food?

And if you would say that before it becomes solidified it has the status of a liquid and not the status of food, and food and liquid do not combine for food impurity, and therefore they combine specifically after it becomes solidified—this cannot be said,

for

this

Resh Lakish said: Brine

that came out of a vegetable, and

which

is now found

upon a vegetable—

combines

the brine with the vegetable

to the measure of a dried fig,

which is the measure for liability to karet for a person who eats

on Yom Kippur.

And although food and drink do not combine, nevertheless the vegetable and the brine upon it combine. If so, it is explained that liquid that comes out of food, when it is attached to food, has the status of food even if it has not solidified; and with regard to food impurity as well, let us say that they combine even before it becomes solidified ?!

And we answer: Different is

there,

on Yom Kippur, for the liability to karet is not specifically for eating, but

because of settling the mind.

For the Torah commanded one to afflict oneself, and whenever his mind is settled, he has not afflicted himself, since

with anything at all his mind is settled.

Accordingly, one who eats half a dried fig and drinks half a quarter-log is not liable to karet, because the Sages know that through this he does not achieve settlement of mind—neither the settlement of mind of eating nor the settlement of mind of drinking. But one who eats a vegetable and the brine upon it—the Sages know that through this he achieves the settlement of mind of eating, and therefore he is liable to karet .

But

here,

with regard to food impurity,

it is because of combining.

For we require that an egg-bulk of food be joined together, and food and liquid do not combine at all. Therefore,

if it has solidified,

the gravy, for then it is considered food, it

combines

with the flesh.

If it has not solidified,

and it is considered a liquid,

it does not combine

the food and the liquid into one measure .

We learned in the Mishna:

“And the kefipa.”

And we inquire:

What is kefipa?

And we answer:

Rava said: Pirama.

It is the thin part of the flesh that sinks at the bottom of the pot.

Abaye said

to Rava: If so,

should it itself impart food impurity?

For it is completely valid meat.

And we answer:

Rather, Rav Pappa said:

Kefipa means

spice

that was cooked with the flesh, which is not ordinarily eaten by itself, but only together with the flesh .

We learned there: “If he solidified

[the blood]

and ate it, or if he melted

it,

the fat

[which by nature is solidified],

and swallowed it—

he is liable

to karet because of eating blood and fat.

And we inquire:

Granted

with regard to

“if he solidified the blood and ate it,”

it is understandable,

since he solidified it—

he accorded it importance.

Therefore he is liable even though he eats the blood in an unusual manner .

Rather, if he liquefied the fat and swallowed it,

ask: Why is he liable? But

“eating” is written concerning it

in the fat: “For anyone who eats fat, and the soul shall be cut off,”

but

this is not eating,

but drinking!? And we answer:

Reish Lakish said: The verse says

concerning fat, “and the soul shall be cut off,” and we expound

“soul” -

to include one who drinks

for liability to karet. [“Soul” implies in every manner through which the soul derives benefit from it.]

It was likewise taught concerning leaven, in this manner: If he liquefied it,

the bread in water,

and swallowed it

on Passover,

if it is leaven—

he is liable to karet.

And

if it is matza—

if he liquefied the matza and swallowed it—

a person does not fulfill through it his obligation on Passover.

And we inquire:

Granted,

the matter which it teaches,

“If it is matza, a person does not fulfill through it his obligation on Passover,”

is understandable, for

“bread of affliction,” the Merciful One said, and this, since he crumbled it

[that he melted it]—

is not “bread.”

But

the matter which it teaches,

“If it is leaven, he is liable to karet,”

ask: For

“eating” is written concerning it

in the leaven of Passover, and this is not eating, but drinking !? And we answer:

Reish Lakish said: The verse says

concerning leaven, “and the soul shall be cut off,” and we expound:

“soul”—

to include one who drinks.

And it was likewise taught regarding the carcass of a kosher bird, in this manner: If he liquefied it,

the carcass of the kosher bird,

by fire

[by fire], and swallowed it—

he is impure.

But if he liquefied it

in the sun, he is pure.

And we inquire:

Why, when he liquefied it by fire, is he impure? But

“eating” is written concerning it

in the carcass of a kosher bird, for only one who eats it becomes impure, but not one who drinks it ? And we answer:

Reish Lakish said: The verse says

concerning the carcass of a kosher bird, “and every soul which eats a carcass,” and we expound:

“soul” to include one who drinks 64.

And we ask:

If so,

if he liquefied it

in the sun as well

should he be impure, since his soul derives benefit?

And we answer:

In the sun—

it putrefies.

Since the carcass remained in the sun until it liquefied, it became foul, and the designation “carcass” lapsed from it [for a carcass does not render impure until it is fit for eating].

And they are necessary

the derivations of “soul,” to include one who drinks, regarding fat, regarding leaven, and regarding the carcass of a kosher bird.

For if the Merciful One had written

regarding

fat,

that one is liable for it even when he liquefied it,

leaven could not be derived from it,

since fat is more stringent than it,

for it never had a time of fitness,

since fat was prohibited from the very beginning, unlike leaven, which before it became leaven or before Passover was permitted and had a time of fitness; and it is possible that one is not liable for it until he eats it in the manner of eating and not in the manner of drinking.

Carcass,

it too

could not be derived from it,

from fat, since fat is more stringent than it,

for one is liable to karet

for it, unlike a carcass, for one who eats it is not liable to karet, but has transgressed a prohibition.

And if the Merciful One had written leaven,

then

fat could not be derived from it,

since leaven is more stringent than it,

for it was not permitted in any aspect,

for all leaven in the world is prohibited, unlike fat, for there is permitted fat, namely the fat of an animal.

And carcass could not be derived from it

from leaven,

for one is liable to karet

for leaven, unlike a carcass.

And if the Merciful One had written regarding carcass,

then

the others—

leaven and fat—

could not be derived from it,

since carcass is more stringent than them,

for

it

renders impure

and they do not render impure.

And we ask: Indeed,

one cannot be derived from one,

as we said, but

let one be derived from two.

Let the Merciful One write “soul” only regarding two of the three, and let the third be learned from them through a common aspect?

And we answer:

Which one can be derived?

Which one should not be written and be learned from the two?

Let the Merciful One not write it regarding carcass, and let it be derived from these

from fat and from leaven.

There is a basis for refuting this:

What is true of these, that one is liable to karet,

can you say the same regarding carcass, in which there is no karet?

And if you say:

Let the Merciful One not write it regarding leaven, and let it be derived from these

from fat and from carcass,

there is a basis for refuting this:

What is true of these, that they never had a time of fitness,

can you say the same regarding leaven, which had a time of fitness?

And if you say:

Let the Merciful One not write it regarding fat, and let it be derived from these

from leaven and from carcass,

there is a basis for refuting this:

What is true of these, that they were not permitted in any aspect; can you say the same regarding fat, which was permitted in an aspect?

Therefore, all three had to be written.

And we inquire concerning what we said: fat cannot be derived from leaven and carcass because it is lenient in this respect, since it was permitted in an aspect:

And what is it?

Where do we find that fat was permitted in an aspect?

If we say the fat of an animal

which was permitted

for the Most High,

to offer the fat of the sacrifice on the altar, if so,

carcass as well

was permitted in an aspect for the Most High, for

the pinching of a bird was permitted for the Most High,

since the sacrificial birds are performed through pinching, even though a non-sacred bird which is pinched becomes a carcass through the pinching; and therefore fat has no superiority over carcass ?

But rather,

say that the fat was permitted in its exceptional case through

the fat of an animal,

which was permitted

to a layperson

for eating—is it still the case that

a carcass too

was permitted to a layperson, for

the melika of the bird sin offering was permitted

for eating

to the kohanim?

And since a carcass too was permitted in its exceptional case, even though leavened matter was not permitted in its exceptional case, it is nevertheless possible to derive the fat from leavened matter and a carcass by the derivation of “bameh ha-tzad,” since we do not find one stringency that applies to both of them and not to the fat; and if so, “person” written regarding fat is superfluous?

And we answer:

In truth,

the permission in the exceptional case of fat is indeed that the permission of

the fat of an animal to a layperson. And that which is difficult for you

is that a carcass too was permitted through the bird sin offering to the

kohanim?

We answer: the fundamental permission regarding the carcass of the bird sin offering is on account of the Most High, for

the kohanim acquire from the table of the Most High.

And this is considered as though they are eating from the Most High. But we do not find permission of a carcass to a layperson, only in the case of fat; therefore, it is not possible to derive the law of fat from a carcass and leavened matter.

And as it is taught in a beraita:

It is written, “These are the impure ones for you among every creeping creature,” and we derive from the additional letter of

“the impure ones”—

to prohibit their juices [

the liquid issuing from the creeping creatures],

and their gravy [

the fat in their bodies],

and their kipa [

thin meat and seasoning that sink to the bottom of the pot]

belonging to them,

of the creeping creatures, for eating .

And we inquire:

Why do I need

a verse to prohibit all these in the case of creeping creatures?

Let us derive it from these,

from fat, leavened matter, and a carcass, for even after they have been liquefied, they remain in their prohibition, as they are prohibited for drinking!? And we answer:

They are necessary.

For if the Merciful One had not written

anything concerning creeping creatures, but we would derive it from these,

I would have said—

it is enough for what comes from the derivation to be like the subject of the derivation. Just as there

regarding fat, leavened matter, and a carcass, one is not liable

until there is an olive-size, so here too

one would not be liable for eating creeping creatures

until there is an olive-size.

Therefore, the Merciful One wrote concerning creeping creatures, to say that what is liquefied from them is like the creeping creature itself, for which one is liable even for a lentil-size.