Chullin 116a (קטז.) — the Talmud in English

One from one -

for example, when initially we sought to derive the law from orla alone, in this case,

a leniency and a stringency -

we raise an objection,

but

any matter whatsoever -

we do not raise an objection.

One from two -

as when we sought to derive the law and raised an objection to the derivation from orla, saying that leaven on Passover proves the point, in such a case,

we raise an objection even on any matter whatsoever.

One from three -

for example, when we said that diverse kinds prove the point, in this case, if we were to raise some objection concerning diverse kinds that is not comparable, and were to say that

if the argument returns and is derived by the common denominator -

we raise an objection on any matter whatsoever

to the common denominator.

But if not,

the argument returns, specifically

a leniency and a stringency -

we raise an objection,

but

any matter whatsoever -

we do not raise an objection,

even though the derivation is from three cases. For these are the hermeneutical principles transmitted to us from Sinai.

And therefore, since we do not derive the law of meat with milk from these three by means of the common denominator—for the argument did not return, and we did not say what the common denominator among them is—it is impossible to raise the objection that they are products of the ground.

And we challenge this:

Let us raise the objection

as follows:

What is unique about diverse kinds in a vineyard is that they never had a time when they were fit

at any time, for we now maintain that it is not the seeds that become prohibited, but only the growths that sprouted from them. And the growths never had a time when they were fit, for as soon as they emerged from the ground they became prohibited; whereas meat with milk had a time when it was fit, before they were cooked together!?

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: That is to say,

this proves that

in the case of the essence of diverse kinds in a vineyard,

the seed that took root in the ground is itself

prohibited.

And

indeed,

they had

the seeds

a time when they were fit before taking root,

for from the time they came into existence they were permitted until they took root in the vineyard.

Rav Shemaya bar Ze'ira raised an objection: One who transfers a perforated flowerpot

containing seeds

into a vineyard,

and since the flowerpot is perforated, the seeds draw nourishment from the vineyard,

if it added

one part

of two hundred

while it was in the vineyard—that is, there were one hundred ninety-nine parts of permitted material, and the two-hundredth part was added while the flowerpot was in the vineyard—

it is prohibited.

For diverse kinds in a vineyard are not nullified until there are two hundred parts of permitted material and one part of prohibited material.

If it added

two hundred parts,

no,

only then does it become prohibited.

If it did not add

no!

And we see that the sowing itself does not become prohibited; only the growths that were added become prohibited, and they render the essence prohibited because they are mixed with it!?

Abaye said: Two verses are written

concerning diverse kinds.

It is written: “Lest the fullness

of the seed be sanctified,” which indicates that specifically its fullness and addition become prohibited.

And it is written,

“the seed,”

which indicates that the sowing itself becomes prohibited. And these two verses contradict one another!?

How is this possible?

And what is the answer?

Seeded from the outset,

having taken root inside the vineyard -

when it takes root

it becomes prohibited, so that the sowing itself also becomes prohibited.

Seeded elsewhere and then brought in,

having taken root outside the vineyard, as in the case of one who transferred a perforated flowerpot into a vineyard,

if it added -

no, if it did not add -

no.

And when it added, the essence also becomes prohibited, and not only the addition becomes prohibited, as we had previously understood.

And we say:

Our Mishna,

which we learned, that meat with milk is prohibited for both consumption and benefit,

is not in accordance with this tanna.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Meat with milk is prohibited for consumption but permitted for benefit. As it is stated

in the passage concerning meat with milk,

“For you are a holy people,” and it is stated elsewhere

in the passage concerning an animal with a fatal defect,

“And you shall be holy people to Me.” Just as there

it is prohibited for consumption but permitted for benefit,

as it is written concerning an animal with a fatal defect, “You shall cast it to the dog,”

so too here, it is prohibited for consumption but permitted for benefit.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva says: A wild animal and a bird

[and so on]

are not prohibited by Torah law, as it is stated three times: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk”—excluding a wild animal, a bird, and a non-kosher animal.

And we challenge this:

These

three instances in which it is written, “You shall not cook a kid,”

have already been used for the derivation of Shmuel.

He expounded them as follows: One is for inclusion of fat and an animal carcass: if one cooked fat in milk, or the meat of an unslaughtered carcass, he violates the prohibition of meat with milk. One is for inclusion of a fetus, which is prohibited to cook in milk. And one is to exclude a non-kosher animal: if one cooked the meat of a non-kosher animal even in the milk of a kosher animal, he does not violate the prohibition!?

And we answer: Fat and an animal carcass are derived from the plain meaning of the verse, “You shall not cook a kid,” and no special superfluous expression is needed to include them, as there is no novelty in this. If the reason is that they were already prohibited before one cooked them in milk, due to the prohibitions of fat and an animal carcass, and ordinarily one prohibition does not take effect upon another,

Rabbi Akiva holds: One prohibition does take effect upon another.

And if so, it is obvious that he violates the prohibition, and therefore

fat and an animal carcass do not require a verse.

A fetus

also does not require a verse, as

it is a full-fledged kid.

If so,

all of them are available

the verses—for all three instances of “You shall not cook a kid” are superfluous for exposition, as the verse could have written, “You shall not cook an animal”—and they are expounded to mean

excluding a wild animal, a bird, and a non-kosher animal.

We learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: It is stated, “You shall not eat.”

And we inquire:

What difference is there between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

who excludes a bird on the basis of what is written, “You shall not cook a kid,”

and Rabbi Akiva,

who excludes it on the basis of what is written, “in its mother's milk”—excluding a bird, which has no mother's milk? Ultimately, both exclude a bird?

And we explain:

The difference between them is with regard to a wild animal.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds

that the meat of a

wild animal

with milk is

prohibited by Torah law,

for the verse excludes only one that has no mother's milk, whereas a wild animal does have mother's milk.

And Rabbi Akiva holds that a wild animal is prohibited by rabbinic law,

as it was excluded by what is written three times, “You shall not cook a kid.”

And if you wish, say:

with regard to

a bird is the difference between them

in practical application.

Rabbi Akiva holds: A wild animal and a bird

indeed

are not prohibited by Torah law,

but they are prohibited by rabbinic law. For from his statement that they “are not prohibited by Torah law,” it follows:

But by rabbinic law, they are prohibited!

And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that a bird is not prohibited even by rabbinic law.

This was also taught in a beraita,

that according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, a bird is not prohibited in milk even by rabbinic law.

As we learned:

In the place of Rabbi Eliezer, they would cut wood to make charcoal, to make iron

for a circumcision knife. For Rabbi Eliezer held that the preparation of a mitzva—such as a circumcision knife—overrides Shabbat when the mitzva itself overrides Shabbat.

And it was further taught in that beraita:

In the place of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, they would eat bird meat with milk!

Levi happened to arrive at the house of Yosef the bird-catcher

[a bird-catcher],

and they brought before him the head of a peacock

[a peacock] cooked

in milk

[in milk],

and he said nothing to them

without protesting their conduct.

When

Levi

came before Rabbi, he said to him

Rabbi:

Why did you not excommunicate them

because they eat meat with milk? You should have excommunicated them for this.

He said to him:

The place of Yosef the bird-catcher -

its site

[its place]

belongs to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira.

And I said,

perhaps

he expounded for them

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, the people of his place,

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: A bird that has no mother's milk is excluded,

and he holds that it is not prohibited even by rabbinic law.

Mishna:

The rennet

of an

idolater's

animal—that is, the curdled milk inside the animal's stomach—

and of an unslaughtered carcass

[and in the Gemara it is challenged: that of an idolater and that of an unslaughtered carcass are the same thing] -

are prohibited.