Chullin 116a — the Talmud in English

One from one—

for example, when at the outset we wanted to learn only from orla, in such a case

a leniency and a stringency—

we raise an objection,

but

anything whatsoever—

we do not raise an objection.

One from two—

as we wanted to learn when we raised an objection to the derivation from orla, saying that leaven on Passover would prove it; in such a case,

we raise an objection even with anything whatsoever.

One from three—

for example, when we said that diverse kinds would prove it: in such a case, if we raised some objection concerning diverse kinds that is not similar, and we would say that

if the argument returns and comes through the common aspect—

we raise an objection with anything whatsoever

against the common aspect.

But if not,

the argument has returned—specifically

a leniency and a stringency—

we raise an objection,

but

anything whatsoever—

we do not raise an objection,

even though we are learning from three. For these are the hermeneutical principles transmitted to us from Sinai.

Therefore, since we do not learn the matter of meat with milk from these three by means of the common aspect—for the argument did not return, and we did not say what the common aspect in them is—it is impossible to raise the objection that they are produce of the ground.

And we challenge:

But let us raise the objection

as follows:

What is there about the diverse kinds of the vineyard, since they never had a time of fitness

at all? For we had thought now that the seeds do not become forbidden, but only the produce that grew from them. Yet the produce never had a time of fitness, since as soon as it emerged from the ground it became forbidden; whereas meat with milk had a time of fitness before they were cooked together!?

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: That is to say,

from here it is proven that

as for the diverse kinds of the vineyard, their principal—

the seed that took root in the ground—is itself

forbidden.

And

behold,

they had

for the seeds

a time of fitness before taking root,

for from the time they came into existence they were permitted until they took root in the vineyard.

Rav Shemaya bar Ze'ira raised an objection: One who transfers a perforated flowerpot

containing seeds

into a vineyard,

and since the flowerpot is perforated, it draws nourishment from the vineyard,

if it added

one part

of two hundred

while it was in the vineyard—that is, there were one hundred ninety-nine parts of permitted substance, and the two-hundredth part was added while the flowerpot was in the vineyard—

it is forbidden.

For the diverse kinds of the vineyard are not nullified until there are two hundred parts of permitted substance and one part of forbidden substance.

If it added

two hundred parts—

no,

only then does it become forbidden.

If it did not add—

no!

And we see that the sowing itself does not become forbidden, but only the produce that was added, and they forbid the principal because they are mixed with it!?

Abaye said: Two verses are written

concerning diverse kinds.

It is written, “Lest the fullness be sanctified,”

which implies that specifically its fullness and its addition become forbidden.

And it is written “

the seed,”

which implies that the sowing itself becomes forbidden. And these two verses contradict one another!?

How is this so?

And what is the answer?

Sown from the outset,

having taken root inside the vineyard—

at the taking of root

it becomes forbidden, so that the sowing too becomes forbidden.

Sown and brought in,

having taken root outside the vineyard, as in the case of one who transferred a perforated flowerpot into a vineyard—

if it added—

no; if it did not add—

no.

And when it added, the principal also became forbidden, and not only the addition becomes forbidden, as we had understood earlier.

And we say:

Our Mishna,

which we learned, that meat with milk is forbidden in eating and in deriving benefit—

is not in accordance with this tanna.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Meat with milk is forbidden in eating, but permitted in deriving benefit. As it is stated

in the passage concerning meat with milk,

“For you are a holy people,” and it is stated there

in the passage concerning an animal with a fatal defect,

“And you shall be holy people to Me.” Just as there—

it is forbidden in eating but permitted in deriving benefit,

for it is written concerning an animal with a fatal defect, “You shall cast it to the dog,”

so here, it is forbidden in eating but permitted in deriving benefit.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva says: a wild animal and a bird

and so on

are not included by Torah law, as it is stated three times, “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk”: an exclusion of a wild animal, a bird, and an impure animal.

And we challenge:

These

three times that “You shall not cook a kid” is written—

have already been employed for that which Shmuel taught,

for he expounded them as follows: one—to include fat and an animal that died; if one cooked fat in milk or the flesh of an animal carcass, he transgresses on account of meat with milk. And one—to include a fetus, which is forbidden to cook in milk. And one—to exclude an impure animal; if one cooked the flesh of an impure animal even in the milk of a pure animal, he does not transgress!?

And we answer: Fat and an animal that died—the very meaning of the verse “You shall not cook a kid” implies them, and no special extra verse is needed to include them, for there is no novelty in this. If it is because they were already forbidden before he cooked them in milk, on account of the prohibition of fat and of an animal carcass, and the principle is that one prohibition does not take effect upon another—

Rabbi Akiva holds: one prohibition does take effect upon another.

And if so, it is obvious that he transgresses, and therefore

fat and an animal that died do not require a verse.

A fetus

also does not require a verse, since

it is a proper kid.

If so,

all of them are left over—

the verses [and all three instances of “You shall not cook a kid” are superfluous for exposition, since the verse could have written “You shall not cook an animal”], and we expound from them

an exclusion of a wild animal, a bird, and an impure animal.

We learned in our Mishna: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: It is stated, “You shall not eat.”

And we considered it:

What difference is there between Rabbi Yose the Galilean,

who excludes a bird from that which is written, “You shall not cook a kid,”

and Rabbi Akiva,

who excludes it from that which is written, “in its mother’s milk”—an exclusion of a bird, which has no mother’s milk? Ultimately, both of them exclude a bird.

And we explain:

A wild animal is the difference between them.

Rabbi Yose the Galilean holds

that the flesh of

a wild animal

with milk is

by Torah law,

for the verse excludes only one that has no mother’s milk, whereas a wild animal does have mother’s milk.

And Rabbi Akiva holds: a wild animal is by rabbinic law,

for it was excluded by that which is written three times, “You shall not cook a kid.”

And if you wish, say:

as for

a bird, the difference between them

is the practical consequence.

Rabbi Akiva holds: a wild animal and a bird

indeed

are not included by Torah law,

but they are forbidden by rabbinic law. For from his saying that they “are not included by Torah law,” it follows:

but by rabbinic law, they are forbidden!

And Rabbi Yose the Galilean holds: a bird is not forbidden even by rabbinic law.

It was also taught so,

that according to Rabbi Yose the Galilean, a bird is not forbidden in milk even by rabbinic law.

As we learned:

In the place of Rabbi Eliezer, they would cut wood to make charcoal, to make iron

for the circumcision knife. For Rabbi Eliezer held that the requirements of a mitzva—such as a circumcision knife—override Shabbat in the case of a mitzva that itself overrides Shabbat.

And it was further taught in that beraita:

In the place of Rabbi Yose the Galilean, they would eat bird meat with milk!

Levi happened to come to the house of Yosef the bird hunter

[a bird hunter],

they brought before him the head of a peacock

[cooked],

in milk

[in milk],

and he said nothing to them at all,

for he did not protest to them.

When

Levi

came before Rabbi, he said to him,

Rabbi:

Why did you not excommunicate them,

because they eat meat with milk? One must excommunicate them for this.

He said to him:

The place of Yosef the bird hunter—

its site

[its place]

belongs to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira.

And I said,

perhaps

he expounded for them

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, to the people of his place,

in accordance with Rabbi Yose the Galilean, who says: A bird that has no mother’s milk is excluded,

and he holds that there is no prohibition concerning it even by rabbinic law.

Mishna:

The stomach contents

of an

idolater’s

animal—that is, the coagulated milk inside the stomach—

and of an animal carcass

[and in the Gemara it challenges: that of an idolater’s animal and that of an animal carcass are the same thing]—

these are forbidden.