Chullin 115b (קטו:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yohanan said to him:

Why?

Is it an inferior

teaching,

that Rabbi taught

who derived this law from another source, as it is written concerning consecrated animals that were redeemed, with regard to their blood:

“You shall not eat it”.

This verse is superfluous, since many verses were written to prohibit blood. And they expound it:

The verse is speaking of meat cooked with milk,

which is prohibited for consumption.

You say that the verse is speaking of meat cooked with milk.

Or perhaps it

is

speaking only of one of all the other prohibitions

in the Torah,

[and not of meat cooked with milk]?

You must say: Go and learn

from one

of the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded:

“A matter learned from its context.”

If you do not know what the verse is speaking about, learn from the passage in which it was written. And here,

what is the verse speaking about? About two types!

For the consecrated animals that were redeemed are regarded as two types.

On the one hand, they are permitted for consumption like non-sacred animals, while on the other hand, they are prohibited for shearing and labor like consecrated animals.

So too here—the superfluous phrase

“you shall not eat it”

speaks of two types,

namely, meat cooked with milk.

Resh Lakish said to him:

If it were derived from that verse, I would have said that this applies only

to the prohibition

of consumption, but not to deriving benefit; therefore, it teaches us

the verse containing the word “cooked,” that meat cooked with milk is prohibited even for deriving benefit, just as a Paschal offering that was cooked is prohibited even for deriving benefit. For the law concerning all consecrated offerings that are unfit for consumption is that they are prohibited for deriving benefit and are taken out to the place of burning. And since meat cooked with milk is learned from the verse concerning the Paschal offering, their laws are alike, and meat cooked with milk is likewise prohibited for deriving benefit.

And Rabbi,

this prohibition against deriving benefit from meat cooked with milk,

from where does he derive it?

He derives it from here: It is stated here,

concerning meat cooked with milk,

“For you are a holy people to the Lord your God,”

and it is stated there,

“There shall not be a prostitute among the Children of Israel.”

Just as there,

the verse is speaking of deriving benefit, since sexual relations are a form of benefit,

so too here, it is speaking of deriving benefit,

and meat cooked with milk is prohibited for deriving benefit.

The school of Rabbi Eliezer taught:

It is written:

“You shall not eat any unslaughtered carcass

[etc.]

or sell it to a gentile,” and in the latter part of this verse, the prohibition against meat cooked with milk is written. And they expound it as follows:

The Torah says: When you sell it—

the unslaughtered carcass—to a gentile,

do not cook it

in milk

and sell it,

for if you cook it in milk, it will become prohibited for deriving benefit, and you will be forbidden to sell it to a gentile.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

From the fact that it is written

“You shall not cook a kid in the milk of its mother”

three times

in the Torah, we learn that

one

—

comes to prohibit consumption.

,

And one

comes to prohibit deriving benefit, and one

comes to prohibit cooking.

It was taught in a beraita: Isi ben Yehuda says: From where is it derived that meat cooked with milk is prohibited?

It is stated here—

concerning meat cooked with milk:

“For you are a holy people,”

and it is stated there

“You shall be holy people to Me; and flesh torn in the field you shall not eat.”

Just as there,

with regard to an animal mortally wounded,

it is prohibited

for consumption,

so too here, it is prohibited.

.

And I have derived only that it is prohibited for consumption.

From where

is it derived that it is prohibited for deriving benefit?

You must say: It follows by a kal va-chomer

that

orla, with regard to which no transgression was committed, is prohibited for deriving benefit.

Meat cooked with milk, with regard to which a transgression was committed,

for cooking meat with milk is a transgression,

is it not certainly prohibited for deriving benefit?!

And we challenge this inference:

What is true of orla is that it never had a period of fitness,

for it was prohibited from the moment it came into existence. Can you say the same with regard to meat cooked with milk, which had a period of fitness, as the meat and milk were permitted before they were cooked together?

And we reject the challenge:

The leavened bread on Passover proves otherwise,

as

it

had a period of fitness

before Passover, yet

it is prohibited for deriving benefit.

And we challenge this proof:

What is true of leavened bread on Passover is that one is liable to karet; can you say the same with regard to meat cooked with milk, for which there is only a prohibition?

Can you say the same concerning meat cooked with milk, for which there is only a prohibition?

And we reject the challenge:

The diverse kinds of a vineyard prove otherwise: one is not liable to karet for them, yet they are prohibited for deriving benefit.

And we ask:

Why do I need a gzera shava

of “holy” and “holy” to learn the prohibition of consumption of meat cooked with milk?

Let us derive the entire matter,

both the prohibition of consumption and the prohibition of deriving benefit,

by a kal va-chomer from orla.

Let us say as follows:

Just as orla, with regard to which no transgression was committed, is prohibited both for consumption and for deriving benefit, meat cooked with milk, with regard to which a transgression was committed, is it not certainly prohibited both for consumption and for deriving benefit!

And we explain: It is impossible to derive the prohibition of consumption because

one can say: Plowing with an ox and a donkey, and muzzling the mouth of a cow while it threshes—

—

prove otherwise. A transgression was committed with regard to them, yet

they are permitted

for consumption [but this challenge cannot be raised against the kal va-chomer that derives only the prohibition of deriving benefit from orla, by saying that plowing with an ox and a donkey, etc., proves that they are permitted for deriving benefit, because this can be refuted: What is true of plowing with an ox and a donkey, etc., is that they are permitted for consumption. This is not so with regard to meat cooked with milk, which we already know from the gzera shava to be prohibited for consumption. Rashi].

And we ask:

Why do I need to say,

when we challenged the proof from leavened bread by saying that one is liable to karet,

“The diverse kinds of a vineyard prove otherwise”,

and thereby needed to derive the law of meat cooked with milk from three matters— orla, leavened bread, and diverse kinds?

Let us say that orla proves otherwise,

for one is not liable to karet for it, yet it is prohibited for deriving benefit. And when you challenge that orla never had a period of fitness, the leavened bread on Passover proves otherwise.

And let us return to the original reasoning and derive it by the common denominator,

since neither of these is like the other: this one never had a period of fitness, while that one entails liability to karet. But the common denominator between them is that they are prohibited for consumption and prohibited for deriving benefit. I, too, will bring meat cooked with milk, which is prohibited for consumption [by the gzera shava mentioned above], and conclude that it should likewise be prohibited for deriving benefit. Why, then, was this not done in this manner, deriving it only from two matters!?

Rav Ashi said:

It is impossible to derive the matter by this common denominator

because one can say: An unslaughtered carcass proves otherwise! It is prohibited for consumption and permitted for deriving benefit.

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi:

Your challenge from an unslaughtered carcass is not a challenge, for

this is what we say in the name of Resh Lakish: In every common-denominator inference,

from the matters themselves—from those matters from which we established the common denominator—

we raise a challenge

if there is some matter in which they are not alike. But

from elsewhere,

by bringing an external matter as a proof that a certain point is different,

we do not raise a challenge.

And we return to the question:

If so, let us derive it by the common denominator.

Why, then, did we need to say that the diverse kinds of a vineyard prove otherwise?

And we answer:

Because one can raise the following challenge

against it:

What is true of the common denominator between them is that they are produce of the ground; can you say the same with regard to meat cooked with milk, which is not produce of the ground?

Can you say the same concerning meat cooked with milk, which is not a product of the ground?

And we ask:

If so, now too,

when you derive the law from the diverse kinds of a vineyard,

one can raise the challenge: What is true of the diverse kinds of a vineyard is that they are produce of the ground.

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: This is what we say in the name of Resh Lakish: In every common-denominator inference,

when one matter is derived from other matters by means of the common denominator,

we raise a challenge

even

with any difference whatsoever.

If we find anything in which the matter being derived is unlike those from which it is derived, even if that difference is neither a leniency nor a stringency, such as the challenge based on their being produce of the ground. But a challenge based on the formulation

“This is not so when you said”,

such as here, when you wish to say: “This is not so when you said this of the diverse kinds of a vineyard, since they are produce of the ground”—that is, one of the very matters from which one wishes to derive the new matter, and you challenge that it is not comparable to the matter being derived—in such a case,

by a kal va-chomer,

only a leniency or a stringency,

do we raise a challenge.

For if you wish to derive another matter from them as a leniency, we challenge: “This is not so when you said this of that matter, since it has another aspect of leniency.” And similarly, if you come to derive a stringency, we challenge if one of them has another stringency, as we challenged above that it is impossible to derive a stringency with regard to meat cooked with milk, to prohibit it for consumption, because what is true of orla is that it never had a period of fitness, and what is true of leavened bread on Passover is that one is liable to karet; since they possess another stringency, it is impossible to derive the law from them.

But

any difference whatsoever,

to challenge on the basis that they are not alike in a matter that is neither a leniency nor a stringency,

we do not raise as a challenge! [See Rashi.]

See Rashi.]

And we ask:

Why not challenge all of them

with this objection:

What is true of all of them—

orla, leavened bread, and diverse kinds—

is that they are produce of the ground;

can you say the same with regard to meat cooked with milk, which is not produce of the ground!? We had now thought that since the law is not being derived from one matter alone, as we had previously thought to derive it from orla alone, but from one of three matters, it is possible to raise any challenge whatsoever, and not only a challenge based on a leniency or a stringency.

Rather, Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: This is what we say in the name of Resh Lakish,

and this is the general rule.