Chullin 115b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yohanan said to him:

And is

ugly

this

that Rabbi taught,

who learned this law from another place, for it is written concerning consecrated animals disqualified [for the altar] that were redeemed, with regard to the blood, ")"

“you shall not eat it.”

And the verse is superfluous, since many verses were written to prohibit blood. And they expound:

the verse speaks of meat with milk,

which is prohibited for eating.

You say that the verse speaks of meat with milk.

Or perhaps it does not

speak

but rather of one of all the prohibitions

other

in the Torah?

You have said: Go out and learn

from one

of the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded—“

a matter learned from its context.”

For if you do not know of what the verse speaks, learn from the passage in which it was written. And here

of what does the verse speak? Of two kinds!

For consecrated animals disqualified [for the altar] that were redeemed are regarded as two kinds.

For on the one hand they are permitted for eating like unconsecrated animals, and on the other hand they are prohibited for shearing and labor like consecrated animals,

so here too—

the superfluity of “you shall not eat it,”

speaks of two kinds,

and that is meat with milk.

Resh Lakish said to him:

If [you derive it] from that [verse], I would say that these words

that it is prohibited—

for eating, but not for benefit; [therefore] it teaches us

the verse of “cooked,” that meat with milk is prohibited even for benefit, just as a cooked Passover offering is prohibited also for benefit, for with regard to all consecrated things that are unfit for eating, the law is that they are prohibited for benefit and are taken out to the place of burning. And since meat with milk is learned from the verse concerning the Passover offering, therefore their laws are equal, and meat with milk too is prohibited for benefit.

And Rabbi,

as for this—that meat with milk is prohibited

for benefit, from where does he derive it?

He derives it from here: It is stated here

concerning meat with milk, “

For you are a holy people to the Lord,”

and it is stated there, “

And there shall not be a prohibited sexual union among the Children of Israel.”

Just as there, [the prohibition] is for benefit,

as is evident, since sexual intercourse is a benefit,

so here too, [the prohibition] is for benefit.

For meat with milk is prohibited for benefit.

A tannaitic teaching of the school of Rabbi Eliezer:

It is written, “

You shall not eat any unslaughtered carcass”

[and so on]

or sell it to a gentile,” and in the conclusion of this verse the prohibition of meat with milk is written. And they expound it as follows:

The Torah said: When you sell it—

the unslaughtered carcass—to a gentile,

you shall not cook it

with milk

and sell it,

for if you cook it with milk, it becomes prohibited for benefit, and it will be prohibited for you to sell it to a gentile.

A tannaitic teaching of the school of Rabbi Ishmael:

From the fact that it is written

“You shall not cook a kid in the milk of its mother”

three times

in the Torah, from this they learn that

one

—

comes for the prohibition of eating

for this purpose.

And one—

for the prohibition of benefit, and one—

for the prohibition of cooking.

It was taught in a beraita: Isi ben Yehuda says: From where [do we know] that meat with milk is prohibited?

It is stated here—

concerning meat with milk: “

For you are a holy people,”

and it is stated there, “

And you shall be holy people to Me, and flesh torn in the field you shall not eat.”

Just as there,

with regard to an animal torn [by a wild beast]—

it is prohibited

for eating,

so here too—

it is prohibited.

And I have [derived] only [that it is prohibited] for eating.

From where [do I derive

that it is prohibited]

? You have said: It is a kal va-chomer

it.

And if orla, with which no transgression was performed, is prohibited for benefit,

meat with milk, with which a transgression was performed,

for cooking meat with milk is a transgression,

is it not logically [the case] that it is prohibited for benefit!?

And we refute [this]:

What is [the distinction concerning] orla? For it never had a time of fitness,

from the outset, since it was prohibited from the time it came into existence. Can you say this with regard to meat with milk, which had a time of fitness, since they were permitted before they were cooked together?

And we reject the refutation:

Leaven on Passover proves [otherwise].

For

indeed

it had a time of fitness

before Passover, and

it is prohibited for benefit.

And we refute [this]:

What is [the distinction concerning] leaven on Passover? For one is liable to karet,

can you say this with regard to meat with milk, concerning which there is only a prohibition?

And we reject the refutation:

The diverse kinds of the vineyard prove [otherwise], for one is not liable to karet, and [yet] they are prohibited for benefit.

And we raise a difficulty:

Why do I need a gzera shava

“holy” “holy” to learn the prohibition of eating with regard to meat with milk?

Let us bring the whole [law],

both the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit,

by a kal va-chomer from orla.

And let us say as follows:

And if orla, with which no transgression was performed, is prohibited both for eating and for benefit, meat with milk, with which a transgression was performed, is it not logically [the case] that it is prohibited both for eating and for benefit!

And we explain: It is impossible to learn the prohibition of eating

because it can be said: Plowing with an ox and a donkey, and muzzling a cow and threshing with it

—

prove [otherwise]. A transgression was performed with them—

and they are permitted

for eating [but this refutation cannot be stated against the kal va-chomer that learns only the prohibition of benefit from orla, for one could say: What is the distinction concerning plowing with an ox and a donkey, and so on? They are permitted for eating. This is not so with regard to meat with milk, which we already know from the gzera shava to be prohibited for eating. Rashi].

And we raise a difficulty:

Why do I need to say,

when, when we asked, “What is the distinction concerning leaven, for one is liable to karet,”—

“the diverse kinds of the vineyard prove [otherwise]”,

and we needed to learn [the law of] meat with milk from three things: orla, leaven, and diverse kinds?

Let us say: Orla proves [otherwise],

for one is not liable to karet for it, and it is prohibited for benefit. And when you raise the objection, “What is the distinction concerning orla, for it never had a time of fitness?”—leaven on Passover proves [otherwise].

And let the argument return and let us bring it by the common aspect,

since this one is not like that one, and that one is not like this one: this one never had a time of fitness, and that one entails liability for karet. But the common aspect in them is that they are prohibited for eating and prohibited for benefit; I too shall bring meat with milk, which is prohibited for eating [from the gzera shava as above], so that it shall be prohibited also for benefit. And now, in this manner, we have learned [it] from only two things—!?

Rav Ashi said:

It is impossible to learn the bama hatzad in this manner.

Because it can be said: An unslaughtered carcass proves [otherwise]! For it is prohibited for eating and permitted for benefit.

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi:

This objection that you raised from an unslaughtered carcass is not an objection, for

this is what we say in the name of Resh Lakish: With every common-aspect argument,

from its own body—from those things from which we made the common aspect in them—

we refute

if there is some matter that is not equal in both of them. But

from elsewhere,

to bring a refutation from outside, that such-and-such a matter proves [otherwise]—

we do not refute.

And we return to the difficulty:

If so, let it come by the common aspect.

And why did we need to say, “The diverse kinds of the vineyard prove [otherwise]”?

And we answer:

Because there is room to refute

as follows:

What is [the distinction of] the common aspect in them? For they are products of the soil,

can you say this with regard to meat with milk, which is not a product of the soil?

And we raise a difficulty:

If so, now too,

when you learn from the diverse kinds of the vineyard,

there is room to refute: What is [the distinction concerning] the diverse kinds of the vineyard? For they are products of the soil.

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: This is what we say in the name of Resh Lakish: With every common-aspect argument

in which you learn one matter from other matters by the common aspect,

we refute

even

any matter whatsoever.

If we find any matter in which the matter being learned is not equal to the matters teaching it, even if this matter is neither a leniency nor a stringency, such as the refutation concerning products of the soil. But a refutation based on “

It is not so if you say,”

as here, when you wish to say: It is not so if you say this with regard to the diverse kinds of the vineyard, for they are products of the soil—that is, one of those things from which they wish to learn the new matter, and you refute it on the ground that it is not similar to the matter being learned—in this,

a kal va-chomer,

only a leniency or a stringency,

we refute.

For if you wish to learn from them another matter as a leniency, we refute: It is not so if you say this with regard to one that has another aspect of leniency. And likewise, if you come to learn a stringency, we refute if one of them has another stringency, as we refuted above that it is impossible to learn a stringency with regard to meat with milk, to prohibit it for eating, because: What is the distinction concerning orla, for it never had a time of fitness; and what is the distinction concerning leaven on Passover, for one is liable to karet—that they have another stringency, and for that reason it is impossible to learn from them.

But

any matter whatsoever,

to refute on the basis that they are not equal in a matter that is neither a leniency nor a stringency—

we do not refute! [ועיין ברש"י] [And see Rashi.]

See Rashi.]

And we raise a difficulty:

And let us refute all of them

with this refutation:

What is [the distinction concerning] all of them—

orla, leaven, and diverse kinds—

for they are products of the soil,

can you say this with regard to meat with milk, which is not a product of the soil!? And we thought now that since we do not learn one from one, as we previously thought to learn from orla alone, but rather learn one from three, in this case it is possible to refute even any matter whatsoever, and not only a refutation of a leniency or a stringency.

Rather, Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: This is what we say in the name of Resh Lakish,

for this is the general rule.