Chullin 109a (קט.) — the Talmud in English

It follows that Rabbi Yehuda holds that if one stirred from beginning to end and covered from beginning to end

as well,

it is forbidden

as is evident from the fact that Rabbi did not say: “Rabbi Yehuda stated only in a case where one did not stir at the beginning”].

And this is difficult:

Why? He did not absorb anything at all!

For the meat of the first piece did not absorb more than the other pieces. Since he stirred from the beginning, the drop of milk was distributed among all the pieces, and it is not of the same type as the pieces. If so, it should be difficult: Why do they prohibit the pieces when the drop of milk is insufficient to impart flavor to all of them?!

And we answer: The fact that Rabbi Yehuda prohibited it is not based on the fundamental law, but is a decree lest the stirring at the beginning was not done properly, and the first piece absorbed the drop in such a manner that it imparted flavor, thereby becoming an object of prohibition; and what emerges from it then prohibits all the pieces.

And this is what

say:

Rabbi Yehuda prohibits even when one stirred at the beginning, out of concern that

he did not stir thoroughly and did not cover thoroughly.

And Rabbi disagreed with him in this matter and was not concerned about this decree. But with regard to “efshar leshokhto is forbidden,” he held like him, and likewise with regard to the principle that min be-mino is not nullified.

The Master said: And

Rabbi sees

the statement of the Sages as applicable when one stirred and covered.

But when one did not stir, he does not see their statement as applicable. It follows that the Sages permit it in every circumstance, even if one did not stir at all!

We inquire about this:

What are the stirring and the covering

that Rabbi mentioned?

If you say that they refer to stirring at the end but not at the beginning, and covering at the end but not at the beginning,

and the piece initially absorbed the flavor of the milk—

did you not say: “Rabbi sees the statement of Rabbi Yehuda as applicable in this case”?!

That is, if one did not stir at the beginning and the piece absorbed the flavor of the milk, we say: “Efshar leshokhto—it is forbidden,” and the flavor of the piece prohibits all the other pieces. If so, it is difficult: How could Rabbi say that he sees the statement of the Sages, who permit it, as applicable in this case? After all, he had already said that he sees the statement of Rabbi Yehuda as applicable.

Rather, “stirred” means

from beginning to end, and covered from beginning to end.

It is in this manner that Rabbi saw the statement of the Sages, who permit it, as applicable, because Rabbi held that there is no concern that one might not have stirred properly [which is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s decree]. Since he stirred properly at the beginning, the drop of milk does not prohibit anything, because it is insufficient to impart flavor to all the pieces.

And from the fact that Rabbi said, “I see their statement as applicable when one stirred at the beginning,”

it follows that the Sages hold: If one stirred at the end but not at the beginning, and likewise covered at the end but not at the beginning—

it is permitted.

Their reasoning is that after the stirring, the drop of milk does not have the power to impart flavor to all the pieces, and we do not say that the piece of meat into which the drop of milk was initially absorbed became an object of prohibition and that it should prohibit the other pieces through its flavor.

Apparently, they hold that

the Sages—

“Efshar leshokhto is permitted.”

And we have thus learned that the dispute among the amoraim as to whether efshar leshokhto is permitted or forbidden is the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: From where do you know that they disagree with regard to efshar leshokhto?

And that which the Sages said, “Until it imparts flavor into the gravy and the pieces,” refers to the drop of milk, and the Sages permitted even the piece itself because they hold that “efshar leshokhto is permitted”?

Perhaps, with regard to efshar leshokhto—

everyone agrees that it is forbidden.

And the first piece into which the drop was absorbed is forbidden according to everyone.

And here

this is what Rabbi said: I see the statement of Rabbi Yehuda as applicable in prohibiting all the pieces when one did not stir and the first piece absorbed the flavor of the milk, thereby prohibiting the others when the piece of meat releases its flavor, because min be-mino is not nullified. But I do not see his statement as applicable in that he issued a decree even when one stirred at the beginning, out of concern that one might not have stirred properly.

And I see the statement of the Sages as applicable when one stirred properly at the beginning, but not for their reason. For they permit it even if one did not stir at all at the beginning, because they hold that when one stirs at the end, the other pieces will not be prohibited, since min be-mino is nullified.

And the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda

disagree with regard to min be-mino.

And Rabbi Yehuda follows his own reasoning, as he said: Min be-mino is not nullified.

And the Sages follow their own reasoning, as they said: Min be-mino is nullified?!

And we reject this:

What is this?

How can you say that the Sages disagree with Rabbi Yehuda and hold that min be-mino is permitted, and that this is the basis of their dispute here?!

For

it would be understandable if you said that, with regard to min be-mino, the Sages here hold like Rabbi Yehuda,

who prohibited it,

and

only

disagree with him with regard to efshar leshokhto.

The Sages then permitted the first piece because they hold that efshar leshokhto is permitted, and “until it imparts flavor into all the pieces” refers to the drop of milk.

This is why Rabbi said: “I see the statement of Rabbi Yehuda as applicable in this case

where one did not stir at the beginning,

and the statement of the Sages

who permit it

in this case,”

where one stirred at the beginning and it did not absorb the milk.

But if you say that, with regard to efshar leshokhto, everyone agrees that it is forbidden,

and the Sages’ permission applies only to the flavor of the piece that becomes mixed with the other pieces, because they disagree with Rabbi Yehuda and hold that min be-mino is nullified, it follows that when the Sages said, “Until it imparts flavor into the pieces,” they were not referring to the drop of milk but to the flavor of the first piece,

and here they disagree with regard to min be-mino.

In that case,

what did Rabbi mean by saying that he sees the statement of the Sages as applicable when one stirred at the beginning, rather than the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who issued a decree lest one not have stirred properly? After all, the Sages did not disagree with Rabbi Yehuda on this point; they too are concerned lest one not have stirred properly. All they said is that stirring at the end does not prohibit the other pieces because min be-mino is nullified, but the first piece remains forbidden because of the principle that efshar leshokhto is forbidden.

And according to this,

Rabbi should have said, “I see the statement of Rabbi Yehuda as applicable, but I do not see it as applicable,”

rather than what he did say. That is, he sees the statement of Rabbi Yehuda as applicable when he prohibits all the pieces if one stirred only at the end and not at the beginning, because Rabbi agrees with Rabbi Yehuda that min be-mino is not nullified; but he does not see the statement of Rabbi Yehuda as applicable when he issues a decree in a case where one stirred at the beginning, lest one did not stir properly [and the Sages too agree with him on this point]. Rather, they are not concerned, because once one stirred properly at the beginning, nothing is prohibited, since the drop of milk is insufficient to prohibit all the pieces with which it was immediately mixed.

And there is nothing further to say.

And this argument is sound, and the sugya should not be explained in another manner!

Mishna:

The udder,

the cow’s udder, from which the milk is extracted—

one must slit it and remove its milk.

And if one cooked it and

did not slit it—

he does not violate a prohibition on its account,

either because of eating meat with milk or because of cooking meat with milk, since the milk inside the udder is not considered milk.

The heart—

one must slit it and remove its blood.

And if one cooked it and

did not slit it—

he does not violate a prohibition on its account,

by eating its blood and thereby becoming liable for karet. In tractate Keritot, the Gemara establishes this ruling with regard to the heart of a bird, which does not contain an olive-bulk of blood of blood. But with regard to the heart of an animal, which contains an olive-bulk of blood, one is liable for karet for eating it if he did not slit it after cooking and remove its blood. [Rashi; see Tosafot]

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that if one did not slit the udder and cooked it in its milk, “he does not violate a prohibition on its account.”