Chullin 109a — the Talmud in English

By implication, Rabbi Judah holds that when he stirred from beginning to end and covered from beginning to end

also

it is forbidden [as is evident from the fact that Rabbi did not say: “Rabbi Judah said only when he did not stir at the beginning”].

as is evident from the fact that Rabbi did not say: “Rabbi Yehuda stated only in a case where one did not stir at the beginning”].

And let this be difficult:

Why? For it did not absorb anything at all! Since the meat of the first piece did not absorb more than the other pieces. Once he stirred at the beginning, the drop of milk was divided among all the pieces, and it is not of the same kind as the pieces. If so, it is difficult: why do they forbid when the drop of milk is not sufficient to impart taste to all of them!?

And we answer: That which Rabbi Judah forbade is not according to the essential law, but because of a decree lest the stirring at the beginning was not proper stirring, and the first piece absorbed it in a manner that imparts taste, and it became an object of prohibition, and that which emerges from it forbids all the pieces.

And so

let him say:

Rabbi Judah forbids when he stirred at the beginning because of the concern lest

he did not stir properly and did not cover properly.

And in this Rabbi disagreed with him, and did not accept this decree as a concern. But with regard to “once it can be squeezed out, it is forbidden,” he held like him, and likewise with regard to a kind with its own kind not being nullified.

The Master said: And

the words of the Sages appear to Rabbi

when he stirred and covered.

But when he did not stir, their words do not appear to him. This implies that the Sages permit in every circumstance, even if he did not stir at all!

And we inquire about it:

What is “he stirred,” and what is “he covered”

that Rabbi said?

If we say: He stirred at the end but did not stir at the beginning, and covered at the end but did not cover at the beginning,

and the piece initially received the taste of the milk

—

did you not say, “The words of Rabbi Judah appear in this case”!?

That is to say, if he did not stir at the beginning and the piece received the taste of the milk, we say: “Once it can be squeezed out, it is forbidden,” and the taste of the piece forbids all the pieces. If so, it is difficult: how did Rabbi say that the words of the Sages, who permit in this case, appear to him? For he had already said that the words of Rabbi Judah appeared to him.

Rather, “he stirred”—

from beginning to end, and covered from beginning to end.

It is in this manner that Rabbi regarded the words of the Sages, who permit, and because Rabbi held that there is no concern lest he did not stir properly [for this reason Rabbi Judah decreed], since he stirred properly at the beginning, the drop of milk does not forbid, because it is not sufficient to impart taste to all the pieces.

And from the fact that Rabbi said, “I regard their words as applicable when he stirred at the beginning,”

by implication, the Rabbis hold: If he stirred at the end but did not stir at the beginning, and likewise covered at the end but did not cover at the beginning—

it is permitted.

And their reason is that after the stirring, the drop of milk does not have the power to impart taste to all the pieces, and we do not say that the piece of meat into which the drop of milk was absorbed at first became an object of prohibition and that it should forbid through its taste.

It is evident that they hold

the Rabbis—

once it can be squeezed out, it is permitted.

And we learn from this that the dispute among the amoraim as to whether once it can be squeezed out it is permitted or forbidden is the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Judah.

Rav Aha of Difti said to Ravina: From where [do you know] that they dispute with regard to “once it can be squeezed out”?

And that which the Rabbis said, “Until it imparts taste to the gravy and to the pieces,” refers to the drop of milk, and the Rabbis permitted even the piece itself because they hold: “Once it can be squeezed out, it is permitted”?

Perhaps “once it can be squeezed out”—

everyone agrees that it is forbidden.

And the first piece, into which the drop was absorbed, is forbidden according to everyone.

And here

this is what Rabbi said: I regard the words of Rabbi Judah as applicable in forbidding all the pieces when he did not stir and the first piece received the taste of the milk, and it forbids the others when the piece of meat emits its taste, because a kind with its own kind is not nullified. But I do not regard his words as applicable when he decreed even when he stirred at the beginning, because of the concern lest he did not stir properly.

And I regard the words of the Sages as applicable when he stirred properly at the beginning, but not for their reason. For they permit even if he did not stir at all at the beginning, because they hold that when he stirs at the end, it will not forbid all the pieces, since a kind with its own kind is nullified.

And the Sages and Rabbi Judah

dispute with regard to a kind with its own kind.

And Rabbi Judah follows his own reasoning, for he said: A kind with its own kind is not nullified.

And the Rabbis follow their own reasoning, for they say: A kind with its own kind is nullified!?

And we reject this:

What is this?

How can you say that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Judah and hold that a kind with its own kind is permitted, and that this is their dispute here!?

For

if you say, granted, that with regard to a kind with its own kind here the Rabbis hold like Rabbi Judah,

who forbade it,

and

only

dispute with regard to “once it can be squeezed out,”

and the Sages permitted the first piece because they hold that once it can be squeezed out it is permitted, and “until it imparts taste to all the pieces” refers to the drop of milk,

this is what Rabbi said: “The words of Rabbi Judah appear in this case

when he did not stir at the beginning,

and the words of the Sages

who permit

in this case,”

when he stirred at the beginning and it did not absorb.

But if you say that with regard to “once it can be squeezed out,” everyone agrees that it is forbidden,

and that which the Rabbis permitted is only the taste of the piece that becomes mixed with the other pieces, because they disagree with Rabbi Judah and hold that a kind with its own kind is nullified, then it follows that when the Rabbis said, “Until it imparts taste to the pieces,” they did not refer to the drop of milk, but to the taste of the first piece,

and here they dispute with regard to a kind with its own kind.

This—

if so, what did Rabbi mean when he said that the words of the Rabbis appeared to him when he stirred at the beginning, and not like the words of Rabbi Judah, who decreed lest he did not stir properly? For in this the Rabbis did not disagree with Rabbi Judah, and they too are concerned lest he did not stir properly. All they said was that the stirring at the end does not forbid the other pieces, because a kind with its own kind is nullified; but the first piece remains forbidden by the law of “once it can be squeezed out, it is forbidden.”

And according to this,

he should have said to Rabbi, “The words of Rabbi Judah appear, and [his words] do not appear.” That is to say, the words of Rabbi Judah appear to him, that he forbids all of them when he did not stir at the beginning but only at the end, because Rabbi agrees with Rabbi Judah that a kind with its own kind is not nullified; but the words of Rabbi Judah do not appear to him, that he decreed when he stirred at the beginning lest he did not stir properly, [and the Rabbis too agree with him in this], but they are not concerned, since he stirred properly at the beginning, and nothing became forbidden, for the drop of milk was not sufficient to forbid all the pieces into which it became mixed immediately at the beginning.

And there is nothing more to say.

And this argument is indeed an argument, and the sugya cannot be changed to another approach!

Mishna:

The udder,

the udder of the cow, from which the milk is milked—

he must slit it and remove its milk.

And if he cooked it and

did not slit it—

he does not transgress on account of it,

not on account of eating meat with milk and not on account of cooking meat with milk, since the milk within the udder is not considered milk.

The heart—

he must slit it and remove its blood.

And if he cooked it and

did not slit it—

he does not transgress on account of it,

on account of eating its blood, to become liable for karet. And in tractate Keritot, the Gemara establishes this as referring to the heart of a bird, which does not contain an olive-bulk of blood

blood. But in the heart of an animal, which contains an olive-bulk of blood, he is liable for karet for eating it if he did not slit it after cooking and did not remove its blood. [Rashi; and see Tosafot] Gemara: It was taught in the Mishna that if he did not slit the udder and cooked it in its milk, “he does not transgress on account of it.”

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that if one did not slit the udder and cooked it in its milk, “one does not violate a prohibition because of it.”