Chullin 108a — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

but according to your reasoning

, that you said that they did not distinguish,

what about that which Rabbi Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan—

one who has only a single garment is permitted to launder it during the intermediate days of the Festival?

Even though an ordinary person is prohibited from laundering during the intermediate days of the Festival, this is difficult: why did they permit him? For according to your reasoning, here too it should be said—

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All the plasterers are prohibited, but the plasterers of Betos are permitted!?

And why did the Sages distinguish between one who has a garment and one who does not have another garment?

And we answer:

there—

with regard to a garment—

Mar bar Rav Ashi said:

its belt proves it.

For the belt is always attached to the garment. And when a person removes his garment in order to launder it and puts on another garment, he takes the belt from his garment that is being laundered and places it on the garment that he is now wearing. But that one who has no other garment launders his garment together with the belt. And one who sees that he is laundering the garment together with the belt knows that he has no other garment. Therefore the Sages permitted him to launder it. This is not so with the plasterers, or with the brothers who are particular with one another, for no one knows that these plasterers differ from the other plasterers, and no one knows that these brothers are particular with one another.

Mishna:

A drop of milk that fell upon the piece

of meat placed inside a pot, and he did not stir the entire pot, but the drop of milk was absorbed only in this piece, then

if it has

—in the drop of milk—a measure that is

capable of imparting flavor to that piece

of meat, namely, more than one-sixtieth,

it is prohibited

to eat it, according to the law of meat with milk.

In the Gemara they disagreed: If he cooked the piece of meat that became prohibited together with additional pieces, do we say that the piece itself “becomes a carcass,” meaning that it turns into a prohibited substance and prohibits the other pieces; or perhaps we do not say that the piece itself becomes a carcass, and since the other pieces contain more than sixty times the drop of milk, they are not prohibited on account of that drop?

And if, at the time when the drop of milk fell upon the piece, he

stirred the pot

and stirred it in such a manner that the drop of milk immediately spread throughout the entire pot, and it did not have time to impart flavor to the piece of meat upon which it fell, then

if it has

—in the drop of milk—

enough to impart flavor to that pot

in its entirety—

it is prohibited

to eat the entire pot. But if not, everything is permitted, including the piece upon which the drop of milk fell.

Gemara:

Abaye said:

That which we prohibited with regard to all prohibitions is

its flavor

—the flavor of the prohibition—

and

even when there was

not

in the mixture

its substance

of the prohibition [for example, when he removed the prohibition itself from the mixture after it had imparted flavor into it],

in general

, meaning, with regard to all prohibitions involving eating, and not only with regard to meat and milk, concerning which it was explicitly explained that the prohibition of flavor applies to them—for meat and milk each become prohibited separately after they have been cooked—this law

is by Torah law

. Do not say that their prohibition is only rabbinic; rather, we learn from meat with milk that the Torah prohibited the flavor of the prohibition, even though its substance is not presently found within the mixture.

If it should enter your mind

that the prohibition of taste is only

rabbinic

, you can say:

Why do we not derive from meat with milk

that taste should be prohibited by Torah law? Because

it is a novelty

for, since both of them are a permitted species and only once they became mixed were they prohibited [Rashi further explained: they were prohibited through cooking, even without eating]. And if so, it would be difficult:

if

meat with milk

is a novelty

, then

even though there is no imparting of taste

of milk into the meat,

also

meat with milk should be prohibited!?

Rather, necessarily, this is not a novelty, for in this manner the Torah prohibited a mixture of meat with milk, although both of them are permitted. And similarly we find with mixed species of the vineyard: both are a permitted species, yet the Torah prohibited their mixing together, and if they became mixed, the mixture became prohibited. Thus we see that sometimes two permitted things that become mixed will become prohibited.

And since this is not a novelty, we derive concerning meat with milk from the cooked foreleg of the nazirite’s ram [which is prohibited to non-priests, but does not prohibit the flesh of the peace-offering, because it does not impart taste into the flesh], that meat and milk have no prohibition when the taste is not discernible.

And now we derive from meat and milk concerning all prohibitions that the taste of a prohibited substance that enters a permitted substance is prohibited for eating, even when the substance of the prohibition itself has been removed from the mixture.

Rava said to him:

The matter is always that meat with milk is a novelty, and it is impossible to derive from it concerning other prohibitions. And what we said—that if it is a novelty, then even when there is no taste it should be prohibited, since it is impossible to derive from the cooked foreleg that specifically imparting taste is required—can be rejected by saying:

the Torah prohibited it by way of cooking

, as it is written, “you shall not cook,” and this is the manner of imparting taste. Therefore, without imparting taste, this is not the way of cooking, and the Torah did not prohibit it.

Rav said:

This that we learned in our Mishna, that if the drop of milk imparted taste into the piece of meat, “it is prohibited”

—the entire pot is prohibited for eating, although the drop has the capacity to impart taste only into the piece of meat and not into the entire pot.

And the reason for the matter is:

once it imparted

the milk

taste into the piece

of meat—

the piece itself becomes a carcass!

For we regard the piece of meat into which the milk was absorbed and in which it imparted taste as itself like a “piece of carcass,”

and it prohibits all the pieces

in the pot,

all of them.

And even if all the permitted pieces contain enough to nullify the prohibited piece—that is, they contain more than sixty times as much— all of them are prohibited,

because they are of its species

, and Rav held like Rabbi Judah, who says that a species with its own species is not nullified.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: Granted,

for indeed,

Rav—according to whom did he state his teaching? According to Rabbi Judah, who says that a species with its own species is not nullified! Let us say that he disagrees with Rava?

For Rava said: Rabbi Judah holds that anything which is a species of

prohibition

and its own species

of permission,

and

another permitted

thing

that is not of the species of the prohibition is added to the mixture, we say:

remove its species,

the permitted substance,

as though it were not there, and “that which is not its species increases over it”

, over the prohibition,

and nullifies it. [That is, we do not take into account the permitted species that is of the same species as the prohibited substance, as though it joined its prohibited species; rather, we do not take it into account at all, and we measure the ratio between the prohibition itself and the other permitted substance, which is not of its species.] For here, in addition to the prohibited piece of meat and the permitted pieces, there was also gravy in the bowl, which is not of the species of meat. If so, what difference does it make that there are pieces of meat in the pot of the same species as the prohibited piece? Why do we not take the gravy into account, and why do we not say that the piece is nullified in the gravy if the gravy contains sixty times as much as the piece? Rather, it is proven that Rav disagrees with Rava and holds that since there are additional permitted pieces of the species of the prohibition, the permitted pieces also join the prohibition [because they are a species with its own species], and all of them together are not nullified in the gravy.

He said to him

Ravina to Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari:

If it fell

the prohibition

into thin gravy

that is not made of meat,

so too

the prohibition would be nullified in the gravy. But

with what are we dealing here? With it having fallen

the prohibition

into thick gravy

, which is made of thin pieces of meat and fat. It follows that the gravy itself is of the same species as the prohibited piece of meat, and therefore the prohibition is not nullified by the majority.

And we inquire concerning Rav’s words, who said, “the piece itself becomes a carcass”:

And what does Rav hold

in the dispute concerning “if it can be squeezed out—is it permitted or prohibited”?

The tannaim and amoraim below disagreed about a prohibited substance that imparted taste into a permitted substance: does it cause the permitted substance to become prohibited, so that even if it is squeezed and the taste of the prohibition that was initially imparted into it emerges, it will remain prohibited? Or perhaps the entire prohibition of the permitted substance is only because of the taste of the prohibition absorbed in it, but once the prohibition is squeezed out of it and emerges, it returns to its permitted status?

If Rav holds

Rav: “

if it can be squeezed out” —

it is permitted,”

and the piece that became prohibited because of the absorption became permitted after it was cooked with an additional permitted substance and the taste emerged and spread throughout all the permitted pieces in the pot and was nullified in them, if so, why did he say, concerning a drop of milk that fell onto a piece of meat, that “the piece itself becomes a carcass and prohibits all the pieces, all of them, because they are of its species”? For if he holds that if it can be squeezed out it is permitted,

the piece

into which the milk was absorbed—

why does it become a carcass!?

For the prohibited drop of milk can be squeezed out of it and become mixed among the other pieces, and it is not of the same species as the pieces of meat. Why is it not nullified among them, with the piece of meat too returning and becoming permitted!?

Rather

, necessarily,

he holds

Rav that

if it can be squeezed out —

it is prohibited!

For it was stated: “If it can be squeezed out”—

Rav, Rabbi Hanina, and Rabbi Yohanan say: “If it can be squeezed out” —

it is prohibited!

Shmuel, Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi, and Resh Lakish say: “If it can be squeezed out” —

it is permitted!

And we challenge this:

A

rely

on Rav holding “if it can be squeezed out, it is prohibited”?

But it was stated: An olive-sized piece of meat that fell into a large cauldron

large

of milk

in which the meat does not have the capacity to impart taste into the milk, but the milk imparts taste into it—

Rav said: The meat is prohibited

, because the milk imparted taste into it,

and

if

the milk is permitted

because it did not receive taste from the meat.