Chullin 108a (קח.) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this:

But according to your reasoning:

that you said that they did not distinguish between the cases,

what of that which Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yohanan said—

One who has only a single garment may launder it during the intermediate days of the festival?

Even though it is ordinarily forbidden for a person to launder clothing during the intermediate days of the festival, this is difficult: Why did they permit him to do so? According to your reasoning, here too it should be said:

They will say—

All patches are forbidden, but the patches of Beitus are permitted!?

And why did the Sages distinguish between one who has a garment and one who has no other garment?

And we answer:

There—

with regard to the garment—

Mar bar Rav Ashi said:

Its belt demonstrates this about it.

For the belt is always attached to the garment. When a person removes his garment in order to launder it and puts on another garment, he takes the belt from the garment being laundered and places it on the garment he is now wearing. But one who has no other garment launders his garment together with its belt. And anyone who sees him laundering the garment together with the belt knows that he has no other garment. Therefore, the Sages permitted him to launder it. This is not so with regard to the patches, or with regard to brothers who are particular with one another, since no one knows that these patches differ from other patches, and no one knows that these brothers are particular with one another.

Mishna:

If a drop of milk fell onto a piece

of meat that was placed inside a pot, and he did not stir the entire pot, but the drop of milk was absorbed only into this piece, then

if it contains

in the drop of milk a quantity that

imparts flavor to that piece

of meat—that is, more than one-sixtieth—

it is forbidden

to eat it, as is the law with regard to meat cooked with milk.

And in the Gemara they disagree about whether, if one cooked the piece of meat that became forbidden together with additional pieces, we say that the piece itself “becomes a forbidden entity,” meaning that it becomes a prohibited substance and forbids the other pieces; or perhaps we do not say that the piece itself becomes a forbidden entity, and since the other pieces contain more than sixty times the quantity of the drop of milk, they are not rendered forbidden on account of that drop.

And if, when the drop of milk fell onto the piece, he

stirred the pot

and mixed it in such a manner that the drop of milk immediately spread throughout the entire pot, before it had time to impart flavor to the piece of meat onto which it fell, then

if it contains

in the drop of milk

enough to impart flavor to the entire pot

—

it is forbidden

to eat the entire pot. If not, everything is permitted, even the piece onto which the drop of milk fell.

Gemara:

Abaye said:

The fact that, with regard to all prohibitions, we forbid

its taste

of the prohibition,

and

even when the mixture did

not

contain

its substance

of the prohibition [for example, when one removed the prohibited substance itself from the mixture after it had imparted flavor to it],

in general—

that is, with regard to all prohibitions involving eating, and not only meat and milk, where it is explicitly established that the prohibition of taste applies, since the meat and milk each become independently forbidden after they have been cooked—this law

is of Torah origin.

Do not say that their prohibition is only rabbinic. Rather, we learn from meat cooked with milk that the Torah forbade the taste of a prohibition, even though its substance is no longer present in the mixture.

If it enters your mind

that the prohibition of flavor applies only

by rabbinic ordinance,

you could say:

Why do we not derive from meat with milk

that flavor should be prohibited by Torah law? Because

it is a novelty,

since each of them is a permitted species, and only once they became mixed were they prohibited [Rashi further explained: they were prohibited through cooking, even without eating]. If so, the following difficulty arises:

if

meat with milk

is a novelty,

then

even though there is no imparting of flavor

of milk into the meat,

also

meat with milk should be prohibited!?

Rather, necessarily, this is not a novelty, since in this manner the Torah prohibited a mixture of meat with milk, even though both are permitted. Similarly, we find with diverse kinds in a vineyard: both are permitted species, yet the Torah prohibited their combination, and once they became mixed, the mixture became prohibited. Thus we see that at times two permitted substances that become mixed are prohibited.

And since this is not a matter of novelty, we derive the law of meat with milk from the foreleg cooked with the ram of the nazirite, [which is prohibited to non-kohanim but does not prohibit the meat of the shelamim offering, because it does not impart flavor into the meat]: meat with milk likewise contains no prohibition when the flavor is not discernible.

And now we derive from meat with milk, with regard to all prohibitions, that the flavor of a prohibited substance that enters a permitted substance is prohibited for consumption, even when the substance itself has been removed entirely from the mixture.

Rava said to him:

Meat with milk is indeed a novelty, and it is impossible to derive other prohibitions from it. As for what we said—that if it is a novelty, then even when there is no flavor it should be prohibited, since it is impossible to derive from the foreleg cooked with the ram that there must specifically be an imparting of flavor—we can reject this and say:

The Torah prohibited it in the manner of cooking,

as it is written, “You shall not cook,” and cooking is a manner of imparting flavor. Therefore, without imparting flavor, this is not the manner of cooking, and the Torah did not prohibit it.

Rav said:

Concerning what we learned in our Mishna, that if the drop of milk imparted flavor into the piece of meat, “it is prohibited”—

the entire pot is prohibited for consumption, even though the drop is capable of imparting flavor only into the piece of meat and not into the entire pot.

The reason is:

Once it imparted

the milk

flavor into the piece

of meat,

the piece itself becomes like a carcass!

The piece of meat into which the milk was absorbed and in which it imparted flavor is treated as though it itself were a “piece of carcass,”

and it prohibits all the pieces

in the pot,

all of them.

Even if all the permitted pieces together contain enough to nullify the prohibited piece—that is, more than sixty times its amount—they are all prohibited,

because they are of the same species

as the prohibited piece, and Rav held in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a substance mixed with another of its own species is not nullified.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: Since

Rav

in accordance with whom did he state his teaching? In accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a substance mixed with another of its own species is not nullified! Let us say that he disagrees with Rava?

For Rava said: Rabbi Yehuda holds that whenever there is a prohibited species

and its own species,

and its own kind

of permitted substance,

and

another permitted substance is added to the mixture,

a different substance

that is not of the same species as the prohibition, we say:

Remove its own kind,

the permitted substance,

as though it were not present, and “the substance not of its kind prevails over it,”

over the prohibited substance,

and nullifies it. [In other words, we do not regard the permitted substance that is of the same species as the prohibition as though it had joined the prohibited substance of its own species. Rather, we disregard it entirely and assess the ratio between the prohibited substance itself and the other substance—the permitted substance that is not of its species.] Here, in addition to the prohibited piece of meat and the permitted pieces, there was also gravy in the bowl, which is not of the species of meat. If so, what difference does it make that the pot contains pieces of meat of the same species as the prohibited piece? Why do we not take the gravy into account, and why do we not say that the piece is nullified by the gravy if the gravy contains sixty times its amount? Rather, it is proven that Rav disagrees with Rava and holds that since there are additional permitted pieces of the same species as the prohibition, the permitted pieces also join the prohibition [because they are of the same species], and all of them together are not nullified by the gravy.

He said to him

Ravina said to Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari:

If the prohibition fell

into

thin gravy

that was not made from meat,

so too,

the prohibition would be nullified in the gravy. However,

here, with what are we dealing? With a case in which the prohibition fell

into

thick gravy,

made from thin pieces of meat and fat. It follows that the gravy itself is of the same species as the prohibited piece of meat, and therefore the prohibition is not nullified by the majority.

And we raised a question concerning Rav’s statement, “the piece itself becomes like a carcass”:

And what does Rav hold

in the dispute concerning “if it can be squeezed out—is it permitted or prohibited”?

The tanna’im and amora’im below disputed the case of a prohibited substance that imparted flavor into a permitted substance: Does it cause the permitted substance to become prohibited, so that even if it is squeezed and the prohibited flavor that was initially absorbed in it is removed, it remains prohibited? Or is the entire prohibition of the permitted substance due to the prohibited flavor absorbed in it, so that if the prohibition is squeezed out and removed, the substance returns to its permitted status?

If Rav holds

Rav holds that “

if it can be squeezed out

it is permitted,”

and the piece that became prohibited because of the absorption became permitted after it was cooked with an additional permitted substance, and the flavor spread throughout all the permitted pieces in the pot and was nullified among them, then why did he say, concerning a drop of milk that fell onto a piece of meat, that “the piece itself becomes like a carcass and prohibits all the pieces, all of them, because they are of the same species”? If he holds that if it can be squeezed out it is permitted,

the piece

into which the milk was absorbed—

why does it become like a carcass!?

The prohibited drop of milk could be squeezed out of it and become mixed among the other pieces, and it is not of the same species as the pieces of meat. Why, then, would it not be nullified among them, with the piece of meat also returning to a permitted state!?

Rather,

necessarily,

he holds

Rav holds that

if it can be squeezed out—

it is prohibited!

For it was stated: “If it can be squeezed out”—

Rav, Rabbi Hanina, and Rabbi Yohanan say: If it can be squeezed out—

it is prohibited!

Shmuel, Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi, and Reish Lakish say: “If it can be squeezed out”—

it is permitted!

And we challenged this:

A

re

does Rav hold that “if it can be squeezed out” it is prohibited?

But it was stated: If an olive-bulk of meat fell into a large cauldron

of

of milk,

in which the meat is incapable of imparting flavor into the milk, whereas the milk imparts flavor into it—

Rav said: The meat is prohibited,

because the milk imparted flavor into it,

and

if

the milk is permitted

because it did not receive flavor from the meat.