Chullin 104a — the Talmud in English

A person who makes a vow intends to make the vow according to the speech of people. Therefore, a person

who vows

not to eat

of the flesh

is forbidden all kinds of flesh, whether the flesh of a domesticated animal or the flesh of a wild animal and a bird, since it is the way of people to call the flesh of a wild animal and a bird also “flesh.”

But he

is permitted [to eat] the flesh of fish and grasshoppers,

because it is not the way of people to call them “flesh.”

Gemara:

The Gemara reasoned that this which is stated in the Mishna, “All the flesh is forbidden to cook with milk,” is a prohibition by Torah law. And if so, it will be proven:

but a bird—

is forbidden by Torah law

to cook it with milk.

And we say:

According to whom

does the Mishna hold?

Not according to Rabbi Akiva!

For if [it is according to] Rabbi Akiva, he said:

the prohibition of cooking the flesh of

a wild animal and a bird

with milk

is not by Torah law,

because the flesh of a bird is not called “flesh.”

But the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Say the latter clause: One who vows “

of the flesh,”

is permitted [to eat] the flesh of fish and grasshoppers!

And we have to infer from here:

but the

flesh of

a bird—

is forbidden

to one who vows not to eat “of the flesh.” And this is because with regard to vows one follows the speech of people, who also call the flesh of a bird “flesh.”

And this law

comes to [the view of] Rabbi Akiva

specifically,

who says

with regard to the language of vows:

Every matter

that is said to an agent and is not explicit [that is, it is not presumed to be included in the language of the sender, but it is also not outside the meaning of his language], and the practice is

that the agent consults him about it,

and asks the sender whether this matter too is included in his words—such language, “

apart from it,”

is

in the laws of vows.

That is, with regard to the laws of vows, those matters that are not entirely explicit in the language of the one making the vow are also included in his language; but in the case of an agent, the agent clarifies whether they too are included in the language of the sender.

For example, here, if a person says to his agent, “Buy me ‘flesh,’” it is not understood from the ordinary language that he is sending him to buy even the flesh of a bird; rather, the agent consults the householder to know whether he intends to include the flesh of a bird in his language as well. Therefore, one who vows concerning the flesh is also forbidden the flesh of a bird, since if the expression “flesh” had been said to an agent, the agent would consult him concerning a bird, and it is proven from this that bird flesh is “apart from it” of “flesh.” For if bird flesh were not considered at all to be of the kind of flesh, the agent would not need to consult the sender whether his intention was also to include bird flesh.

For it was taught in a beraita: One who vows “

of the vegetable”—

is permitted [to eat] gourds.

And Rabbi Akiva forbids

gourds.

They said to him,

the Sages,

to Rabbi Akiva: But

when

a person says to his agent, “

Take vegetables for us,”

and he

finds nothing to buy except gourds, he does not bring gourds; rather, he returns and

says

to the sender, “

I found only gourds,”

and consults the sender whether he wants gourds. And it is proven that gourds are not included in the language of vegetable in the speech of people. For if gourds were included in the language of vegetable, the agent would not come to consult him; rather, he would buy them without asking the sender.

He said to them,

Rabbi Akiva:

That is indeed the matter:

indeed, the agent consults the sender whether to buy gourds in place of vegetables. But from this very fact I have proof that gourds are “apart from it” of vegetable, and that they too are included in his language, because

does the agent merely say,

when he did not find vegetables, “

I found only legumes”?

For if he had found no vegetables but only legumes, he would say, “I did not find vegetables,” and no more, because it is not the concern of the agent to offer his sender other things.

Rather,

it is proven from here

that gourds are included

in the language of

vegetable,

but they are not entirely explicit; and because of this the agent returns to consult him whether to buy them when he does not find vegetables.

Therefore, one who vows concerning vegetable is forbidden even gourds. But,

and legumes are not included in vegetable,

and therefore the agent does not return and consult him whether to buy them, and therefore one who vows concerning vegetable is permitted legumes.

And now it is difficult: if so,

the first clause,

which says that all the flesh, including the flesh of a wild animal and a bird, is forbidden by Torah law to cook with milk, is

the Rabbis, since Rabbi Akiva held that the flesh of a wild animal and a bird is not forbidden by Torah law with milk.

since Rabbi Akiva maintains that the meat of a non-domesticated animal and poultry is not prohibited by Torah law with milk.

And

if

the latter clause,

which says that one who vows concerning the flesh is permitted only fish and grasshoppers, and not bird flesh, is

Rabbi Akiva, who disputes the Sages and holds that one who vows concerning flesh is forbidden bird flesh as well, because every matter about which an agent consults is considered of the same kind with regard to a vow.

as he disagrees with the Sages and maintains that one who vows not to eat meat is also prohibited from eating poultry, because anything about which an agent consults the sender is considered to belong to that same type with regard to a vow.

Rav Yosef said:

Our Mishna—

it is Rabbi, and he adopts it according to the views of different tannaim.

That is, Rabbi stated the Mishna anonymously and did not mention a dispute of tannaim, because he held like one tanna with regard to the first matter, and like the other tanna with regard to the second matter. Therefore, Rabbi stated the Mishna anonymously and decided each matter according to his view.

With regard to vows—

he held

Rabbi

like Rabbi Akiva,

for although the agent has to consult his sender, and the matter is not explicit in the words of the one making the vow, nevertheless it is included in his vow, since if it were not included at all in this language, the agent would not ask whether to purchase it.

With regard to meat with milk—

he held like the Sages,

that the flesh of a wild animal and a bird is also forbidden by Torah law to cook with milk.

Rav Ashi said: The entire [Mishna],

the entire Mishna,

is Rabbi Akiva.

And this is what it says: All the flesh is forbidden to cook with milk,

but the prohibition is not equal in all flesh. Rather,

Some of them

are forbidden to cook

by Torah law,

namely, the flesh of a domesticated animal.

And some of them

whose prohibition of cooking them with milk is only

by rabbinic enactment,

namely, the flesh of a wild animal and the flesh of a bird.

Except for the flesh of fish and grasshoppers, which are not

forbidden to cook with milk—

neither by Torah law nor by rabbinic enactment.

We learned in the Mishna:

And it is forbidden to place

with cheese on the table all flesh except the flesh of fish and grasshoppers.

Rav Yosef said: Infer from this

from the fact that it is forbidden to place bird flesh with cheese on the table, that it is not like Rav Ashi, who established the Mishna according to Rabbi Akiva, who holds that bird flesh with milk is forbidden only by rabbinic enactment. Rather, the tanna of the Mishna holds that

bird flesh with milk

is a prohibition

by Torah law

.

If it enters your mind that the prohibition

is

rabbinic, then

then

the eating itself

of bird flesh with milk

is an enactment

by rabbinic enactment, out of concern for eating the flesh of a domesticated animal.

And

because

we should enact

an enactment upon an enactment, and forbid even

placing

bird flesh with cheese on the table

because of eating,

which is forbidden only by rabbinic enactment!?

And from where do you say that we do not enact an enactment upon an enactment—

For we learned:

The obligation to separate challa from dough applies only in the Land, and there it is forbidden for non-kohanim to eat by Torah law, like teruma, and this is learned from “And no outsider shall eat what is holy.”