Chullin 104a (קד.) — the Talmud in English

When a person makes a vow, he intends to vow according to the way people speak. Therefore, a person

who vows

not to eat

meat

is prohibited from all types of meat, whether the meat of a domesticated animal or the meat of a non-domesticated animal or poultry, since people commonly refer to the meat of a non-domesticated animal and poultry as “meat” as well.

But he

is permitted to eat the meat of fish and locusts,

because people do not commonly refer to them as “meat.”

Gemara:

The Gemara initially understood that the statement in the Mishna, “All meat is prohibited to cook with milk,” refers to a prohibition by Torah law. If so, it would follow that

this poultry—

is prohibited by Torah law

from being cooked with milk.

And we said:

In accordance with whom

does the Mishna hold?

It is not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva!

For if it were in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, he said:

The prohibition against cooking the meat of

a non-domesticated animal and poultry

with milk

is not by Torah law,

because poultry is not called “meat.”

But the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Come and hear the latter clause: One who vows “

not to eat meat”

is permitted to eat the meat of fish and locusts!

And we should infer from here:

But

meat of

poultry—

is prohibited

to one who vows not to eat “meat,” because with regard to vows we follow the way people speak, and people call poultry “meat” as well.

And this law

leads us to Rabbi Akiva

specifically,

as he said

with regard to the language of vows:

Every matter

that is said to an agent and is not explicit [that is, it is not included by default in the language of the sender, but it also does not fall outside the meaning of his words], and the practice is

that the agent consults him about it

and asks the sender whether this matter too is included in his words—such language

is outside of it

in

the context of vows.

That is to say, with regard to the laws of vows, the language of the one making the vow includes even those matters that are not entirely explicit in his wording, whereas in the case of an agent, the agent clarifies whether those matters too are included in the sender’s words.

For example, if a person says to his agent, “Buy me meat,” the agent does not understand from the ordinary meaning that he was sent to buy poultry as well. Rather, the agent consults the householder to determine whether he intended his words to include poultry too. Therefore, one who vows not to eat meat is prohibited from eating poultry as well, since if the word “meat” had been said to an agent, the agent would have consulted the sender concerning poultry. This proves that poultry is “of the same kind” as “meat.” For if poultry were not considered at all to be a type of meat, the agent would not need to consult the sender about whether he intended poultry as well.

As it was taught in a beraita: One who vows “

not to eat vegetables”

—is permitted to eat gourds.

But Rabbi Akiva prohibits

gourds.

The Sages said

to

Rabbi Akiva: But

when

a person says to his agent, “

Take vegetables for us,”

and he

finds none to buy except gourds, he does not bring gourds. Rather, he returns and

says

to the sender, “

I found nothing except gourds,”

and consults the sender as to whether he wants gourds. This proves that gourds are not included in the term “vegetables” as people use it. For if gourds were included in the term “vegetables,” the agent would not return to consult him; he would buy them without asking the sender.

He said to them

Rabbi Akiva:

That is indeed the case.

The agent does consult the sender about whether to buy gourds instead of vegetables. But from this very fact I have proof that gourds are “of the same kind” as vegetables and are included in the term, because

does the agent say,

when he does not find vegetables, “

I found nothing except legumes”?

For if he had found no vegetables, but had found only legumes, he would say, “I found no vegetables,” and nothing more, because it is not the agent’s concern to suggest other items to the sender.

Rather,

it is proven from here

that gourds are included

in the term

“vegetables”

but are not entirely explicit within it; therefore, when he does not find vegetables, the agent returns to consult the sender about whether to purchase them.

Therefore, one who vows not to eat vegetables is prohibited from eating gourds as well. But

legumes are not included among vegetables,

and therefore the agent does not return to consult the sender about whether to purchase them; consequently, one who vows not to eat vegetables is permitted to eat legumes.

And now this is difficult: If so,

the first clause,

which states that all meat, including the meat of a non-domesticated animal and poultry, is prohibited by Torah law from being cooked with milk,

is according to the Sages, since Rabbi Akiva holds that the meat of a non-domesticated animal and poultry is not prohibited by Torah law with milk.

since Rabbi Akiva maintains that the meat of a non-domesticated animal and poultry is not prohibited by Torah law with milk.

And

if

the latter clause,

which states that one who vows not to eat meat is permitted only to eat fish and locusts, but not poultry,

is according to Rabbi Akiva, who disagrees with the Sages and maintains that one who vows not to eat meat is prohibited from eating poultry as well, because anything about which an agent would consult the sender is considered to be of the same kind with regard to a vow.

as he disagrees with the Sages and maintains that one who vows not to eat meat is also prohibited from eating poultry, because anything about which an agent consults the sender is considered to belong to that same type with regard to a vow.

Rav Yosef said:

Our Mishna—

it is Rabbi’s formulation, and he adopted its positions in accordance with different tannaim.

That is, Rabbi formulated the Mishna anonymously and did not mention the dispute between the tannaim, because with regard to the first matter he held like one tanna, and with regard to the second matter he held like the other tanna. Therefore, Rabbi formulated the Mishna anonymously and decided each matter according to his own position.

With regard to vows—

Rabbi holds

Rabbi

Akiva’s position.

Although the agent must consult the sender, and the matter is not explicit in the words of the one making the vow, it is nevertheless included in his vow, since if it were not included at all in this expression, the agent would not ask whether to purchase it.

With regard to meat and milk—

he holds the position of the Sages,

who maintain that the meat of a non-domesticated animal and poultry is also prohibited by Torah law from being cooked with milk.

Rav Ashi said: The entire Mishna

the entire Mishna

is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.

And this is what it is saying: All meat is prohibited to cook with milk,

but the prohibition is not the same for all meat. Rather,

Some of it

is prohibited to cook

by Torah law—

namely, the meat of a domesticated animal.

And some of it

is subject to a prohibition against cooking with milk only

by rabbinic law,

namely, the meat of a non-domesticated animal and poultry.

Except for the meat of fish and locusts, which are not

prohibited to cook with milk—

neither by Torah law nor by rabbinic law.

We learned in the Mishna:

And it is prohibited to place

all meat, except for the meat of fish and locusts, together with cheese on the table.

Rav Yosef said: Infer from this

that since it is prohibited to place poultry together with cheese on the table, this is not like Rav Ashi, who established the Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who holds that poultry with milk is prohibited only by rabbinic law. Rather, the tanna of the Mishna holds that

poultry with milk

is subject to a prohibition

by Torah law.

.

If it could enter your mind

that the prohibition

is rabbinic, then

then

the eating itself

of poultry with milk would be

a rabbinic decree, out of concern that one might eat the meat of a domesticated animal.

of the Sages, instituted out of concern that one might eat the meat of a domesticated animal.

And

since

we would institute

a decree prohibiting even

placing

poultry together with cheese on the table

due to eating,

which itself is prohibited only by rabbinic law—would we institute a decree to safeguard another decree!?

And from where do you say that we do not institute a decree to safeguard another decree—

As we learned in a Mishna:

The obligation to separate challah from dough applies only in Eretz Yisrael, and there it is prohibited by Torah law for non-priests to eat it, like teruma; this is derived from the verse, “And no non-priest shall eat that which is sacred.”