Chagigah 16b — the Talmud in English

The first

mentioned in our Mishna from each of the pairs [Yosef ben Yo'ezer, Yehoshua ben Perahya, Yehuda ben Tabbai, Shemaya, Hillel]

were presidents.

And their counterparts [the second member of each pair: Yosef ben Yohanan, Nittai the Arbelite, Shimon ben Shetah, Avtalion, Menachem, and Shammai] were

the second members of each pair: Yosef ben Yohanan, Nittai the Arbelite, Shimon ben Shetah, Avtalion, Menachem, and Shammai—were

heads of the court.

Gemara: The Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna,

the three

sages

of

the three

first pairs, who said that one may not lay hands on the offering [Yosef ben Yo'ezer, Yehoshua ben Perahya, and Yehuda ben Tabbai],

Yosef ben Yo'ezer, Yehoshua ben Perahya, and Yehuda ben Tabbai,

and two of the later pairs, who said that one may lay hands on the offering [Shemaya and Hillel],

Shemaya and Hillel,

were presidents. And their counterparts [those who disagreed with them]

those who disagreed with them—were

were heads of the court; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, it follows that, of the pair consisting of Yehuda ben Tabbai and Shimon ben Shetah, Yehuda ben Tabbai was the president, and Shimon ben Shetah was the head of the court. For Yehuda ben Tabbai belonged to the three first pairs, and he said that one may not lay hands on the offering [and this is also the opinion of the tanna, a sage of the Mishnaic era, of our Mishna].

It follows, according to Rabbi Meir, that among the pair of scholars Yehuda ben Tabbai and Shimon ben Shetah, Yehuda ben Tabbai was the Nasi, and Shimon ben Shetah was the head of the court. For Yehuda ben Tabbai was one of the three first pairs, and he said that one should not lay hands—and this is also the opinion of the tanna of our Mishna.

But the Sages say

that this is not so. Rather,

Yehuda ben Tabbai was the head of the court, and Shimon ben Shetah was the president.

And we raise a question about this:

Who is the tanna [who taught this, Rabbi Meir or the Sages]

who taught this—Rabbi Meir or the Sages—

of the following source taught by the Sages?

Yehuda ben Tabbai said: “May I see consolation” [as though he had said: “May I not see consolation”; the Gemara transformed the expression into a blessing, Rashi, Tractate Makkot],

as though he had said: “I shall not see consolation”; and the Gemara transformed it into a blessing, Rashi, Tractate Makkot,

“if I did not kill a

single

conspiring witness,”

who had testified falsely together with another witness against a person, and they had plotted to have him executed, and the court had sentenced that person to death, although he had not yet been executed; then witnesses came and established that one of the witnesses had been elsewhere at the time, but no witnesses were found to establish that his fellow witness had been elsewhere. The Torah states: “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his brother.”

For the Torah said: “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his brother.”

Therefore I killed him, even though he was only a

conspiring witness, and the defendant had not yet been executed,

in order to refute the position of the Sadducees, who would say: “Conspiring witnesses are not executed until the defendant has been executed.” But according to our view, a conspiring witness is executed only before the defendant has been executed; once the defendant has been executed, the witness is not liable to the death penalty.

But according to our view, on the contrary, a conspiring witness is killed only before the accused has been killed; once he has been killed, the witness is not liable to death.

Shimon ben Shetah said

to Yehuda ben Tabbai:

“May I see

I

consolation, if you did not shed innocent blood!”

For the Sages said: Conspiring witnesses are not executed until both of them have been established as conspirators.

In that incident, however, only that one witness had been established as a conspirator, because witnesses testified against him, “You were with us elsewhere,” while they had no information regarding the second witness.

Yehuda ben Tabbai immediately accepted upon himself that he would issue a halakhic ruling only in the presence of Shimon ben Shetah

so that, if he erred in his ruling, Shimon ben Shetah could teach him.

Throughout all the days of Yehuda ben Tabbai, he would prostrate himself on the grave of that

witness

who had been killed, and his voice

when he wept

could be heard.

The people thought

that

the people [when they heard his voice at night, or during the day when they did not see him, Rashi, Makkot]

when they heard his voice at night, or during the day when they did not see him, Rashi, Makkot

were saying: “It is the voice of the murdered man.”

He said to them,

Yehuda ben Tabbai:

“It is my voice!”

And

you should know

that this is so,

for

indeed

tomorrow he will be [he referred to himself in the third person]

he referred to himself in the third person

dead, and

again

his voice will not be heard; therefore, it is my voice.

значит, это мой голос.

Rabbi Aha, son of Rava, said

in astonishment

to Rav Ashi:

What proof is this that it is Yehuda ben Tabbai’s voice, based on the fact that the voice was no longer heard after Yehuda ben Tabbai died?

For

indeed:

Perhaps Yehuda ben Tabbai appeased

that witness when he ascended to Heaven.

Or

perhaps

he summoned him to judgment,

meaning that the witness summoned Yehuda ben Tabbai before the heavenly court, and therefore he no longer cries out here.

And

who is the author of this

baraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna, from which it appears that Yehuda ben Tabbai initially issued a halakhic ruling in the presence of Shimon ben Shetah, until he accepted upon himself not to do so: is it Rabbi Meir or the Sages?

If you say that it is Rabbi Meir,

then

who said: “Shimon ben Shetah was the head of the court

and

Yehuda ben Tabbai was the president”—

this is what is meant by “he issued a ruling”—

—

to issue a halakhic ruling in the presence of Shimon ben Shetah.

But if you say that it is the Sages,

then

who say: “Yehuda ben Tabbai was the head of the court,

and

Shimon ben Shetah was the president,”

this is difficult for you:

Does the head of the court issue a ruling in the presence of the president—

who may issue a halakhic ruling?!

How, then, could Yehuda ben Tabbai have initially issued a halakhic ruling in the presence of Shimon ben Shetah?!

And we reject this:

No,

not as you said, that he accepted upon himself not to issue halakhic rulings in the presence of Shimon ben Shetah. One can say that he was the head of the court and that even initially he did not issue rulings in the presence of Shimon ben Shetah; indeed, he would not have needed to accept upon himself to refrain from doing so.

And

what does “he accepted upon himself,” as he said

Yehuda ben Tabbai,

mean? It means

to join with others in issuing a halakhic ruling,

for “even joining with them I will not join

unless Shimon ben Shetah also sits with them.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Menachem departed; Shammai entered.”

And we raise a question about this:

Where did

Menachem

depart to? Abaye said: He adopted an evil culture.

Rava said: He departed to serve the king.

This is also taught

in accordance with Rava:

“Menachem departed to serve the king, and eighty pairs of students dressed in royal garments departed with him

[royal attire].”

Rav Shaman bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

“One should never regard a rabbinic restriction

[prohibitions that the Sages enacted on Shabbat and festivals]

as a minor matter in your eyes! For laying hands on an offering

on a festival

is not

forbidden

except as a rabbinic restriction, and the greatest sages of the generation disagreed about it.”

And we are puzzled:

“Is that obvious?!”

And we answer:

A rabbinic restriction involving a mitzva

[a matter that is a mitzva but which the Sages prohibited as a rabbinic restriction]

was necessary for him

to teach, since laying hands on the offering is a mitzva.

And we are puzzled:

“This too is obvious,”

for we learned in the Mishna in Tractate Beitza: There are rabbinic restrictions that the Sages prohibited even when performing the act involves a mitzva; Rabbi Yohanan therefore need not have taught us this [Rashi].

And we answer: Rabbi Yohanan needed to teach us a statement implying that the subject of our Mishna is the rabbinic prohibition involved in laying hands on an offering,

to exclude

the view

of one who says—

in explaining the disagreement of the great sages in our Mishna—

that it is the act of laying hands itself

that they

disagree about,

whether laying hands is a mitzva in obligatory peace offerings. The one who says that one may not lay hands does not say this because of a rabbinic restriction. Rather, he holds that obligatory peace offerings do not require laying hands at all, since the Torah mentions laying hands with regard to peace offerings only in the case of voluntary peace offerings. Since there is no mitzva of laying hands on obligatory peace offerings, it is forbidden to lay hands on them, because by doing so one is using a consecrated animal.

And since there is no mitzva of laying hands with obligatory peace offerings, it is forbidden to lay hands upon them, since he is making use of consecrated property.

And

this teaches us

Rabbi Yohanan’s point:

They disagree about a rabbinic restriction,

whether the Sages enacted a restriction that would nullify the act of laying hands. But everyone agrees that laying hands is required even for obligatory peace offerings.

Rami bar Hama said: “Learn from this”

from Rabbi Yohanan’s words, who explained that the reason for the opinion that one may not lay hands is the rabbinic restriction against using an animal, that

laying hands with all one’s strength is required

for offerings.

For if it enters your mind that it is not required

to lean

with all one’s strength—

what would one be doing [what prohibition would there be in leaning without force on a festival]?! One could

what prohibition is there in laying hands without force on a Festival?!

For he could

lean

even on a festival, since one would not be using the animal?!

They raise an objection from

a source that teaches: It is written:

“Speak to the children of Israel

and say to them: When a person brings an offering from among you to the Lord …

he shall lean

his hand upon the head of the burnt offering.” We learn from here that only

We learn from here that only

the children of Israel

males

lay hands,

since the entire passage was said to “the children of Israel,”

and the daughters of Israel do not lay hands.

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon

[the Gra]

say: “The daughters of Israel do lay hands; it is optional.”

Rabbi Yosei said: “A sage named

a sage whose name was

Abba Elazar

once told me:”

“Once we had a calf that was a peace offering, and we brought it to the Women’s Court, and women laid hands on it,

and

not

did we do so

because

we hold that there is a mitzva of

laying hands for women, but in order to give the women satisfaction.”

“And if it enters your mind that ‘laying hands with all one’s strength’ is required,

would

we perform an act of sacrificial service with consecrated animals merely to give the women satisfaction?!

For when one leans with all one’s strength, one uses a consecrated animal?!

Rather, is it not that we may learn from this that it is not required

to lean

with all one’s strength—and this contradicts Rami bar Hama?!

And we answer:

And we answer:

I will always say to you: It is required

to lean

with all one’s strength. Abba Elazar did not tell them to perform a complete act of laying hands that would constitute sacrificial service with a consecrated animal. Rather,

And Abba Elazar did not tell them to perform a complete laying on of hands, which would constitute an act of Temple service with consecrated property. Rather,

he said to them,

Abba Elazar said to those women:

“Relax your hands

[lighten them, and do not press down with them], and do not lean with all your strength, so that you will not use consecrated property.”

And we challenge this:

“If so,

since this was not a valid act of laying hands, because it was not done with all one’s strength, how could the baraita say:

‘Not because laying hands is practiced by women,’

which implies that if the law of laying hands did apply to women, it would be possible to explain that he told them to lay hands in order to fulfill the mitzva of laying hands?

But

it follows that the laying of hands is not

valid

at all,

since they did not press down with all their strength?!

Rabbi Ami said,

offering a resolution:

“He said: ‘One point, and another point!’”

One point: There is no laying of hands at all.

And another point: It was in order to give the women satisfaction.

Rav Pappa said: “Learn from this”

from Rabbi Yohanan, who explains that the reason for the prohibition against laying hands is the rabbinic restriction: Even

Even the

the sides

of an animal

are forbidden

as a rabbinic restriction!

That is, although the primary rabbinic restriction is not to ride on an animal [because of a decree lest one cut a branch to guide it], nevertheless, all uses of an animal are forbidden, even in a place that is not intended for use, such as the animal’s sides.

For if it enters your mind that the sides are permitted, let us lean on its head

[Bach], since the head is no more than one of its sides?!

Rather, must we not conclude from this:

even

the sides are forbidden.