Chagigah 10b — the Talmud in English

And we explain: the reason for the exemption here [according to both Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda] is that

“thoughtful labor”

is what

the Torah prohibited.

And

it is only a hair’s breadth, since

“thoughtful labor” was not written

concerning Shabbat, but it was written concerning the labor of the Tabernacle; and from the juxtaposition of the section of Shabbat to the labor of the Tabernacle [in the section of Vayakhel], we learn that the Torah prohibited on Shabbat only thoughtful labor. We learned in the Mishna:

the festival offerings

and sacrilege are like mountains suspended by a hair’s breadth:

And we raise a difficulty: The festival offerings

are explicitly written

in the Torah [they are explicitly written in the Torah], as it is stated: “And you shall celebrate it as a festival to the Lord”; and how, then, did we learn that the festival offerings depend on a hair’s breadth?! And we answer:

It is necessary;

therefore they are considered like mountains suspended by a hair’s breadth, because the verse is not compelled to be interpreted as referring to the festival offering.

And

as Rav Pappa said to Abaye: From where

is it derived that “And you shall celebrate it as a festival to the Lord”

means slaughtering,

and comes to teach about the festival offering?

But

perhaps: “Celebrate a festival”

[increase joy and celebration]

is what the Merciful One said?!

And since it is not compelled to interpret the verse as referring to a festival offering, the festival offering is only like something dependent on a “hair’s breadth.”

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning our statement that there is no necessity to interpret the verse as referring to the festival offering [and therefore they are only like mountains suspended by a hair’s breadth]:

But if that is so,

since the expression “and you shall celebrate it” does not necessarily mean an offering, shall we say that what

is written

in Egypt: “And afterward Moses and Aaron came and said to Pharaoh: So said the Lord: Send out My people,”

“that they may celebrate a festival for Me in the wilderness”—also here

should be interpreted as meaning that the intention is not an offering, but rather:

“Celebrate a festival” is it?!

But certainly it is an offering! As he proceeds to explain: just as the expression “festival offering” in Egypt is interpreted as an offering, so it is obvious that the festival offering mentioned on a Festival day is also an offering. And the festival offering does not depend on a hair’s breadth!

And if you would say, “also here”

[indeed, even in Egypt the intention is not an offering but merely celebration],

and it is written:

“And Pharaoh summoned Moses and said: Go, worship the Lord; only your sheep and your cattle shall remain [in Egypt].”

And Moses said

[to Pharaoh]:

“You too shall place in our hands slaughtered offerings

[peace offerings]

and burnt offerings”

[so that we may celebrate in the wilderness, as I said].

And you are compelled to say that the expression “festival offering” about which Moses spoke is interpreted as an offering; and if so, “and you shall celebrate it” stated concerning a Festival also means a festival offering, and it follows that the law of the festival offering is explicit in the Torah and does not depend on a hair’s breadth?!

And we explain: even in Egypt it is not necessarily an offering.

For

perhaps this is what the Merciful One said: Eat and drink, and celebrate a festival before Me

[before Me]!

And the expression “slaughtered offerings” that Moses said to Pharaoh he should place in their hands does not mean peace offerings, but the meat of slaughtered animals, in order to eat it.

And even on a Festival, the expression “and you shall celebrate it” does not necessarily mean an offering, and the law of the offering depends only on a hair’s breadth. And we still raise a difficulty concerning our saying that the offering is not explicit [because it is possible that the Torah said “and you shall celebrate it” to mean celebration and joy]:

It does not enter your mind

to say that the offering is not explicit in the Torah.

For

what

is written: “You shall not leave the fat of My festival offering until morning”

[the fat of “My festival offering,” meaning the sacrificial portions burned on the altar, shall not remain until the following morning; rather, he shall burn the fat on the day of the festival, and if the sacrificial portions “remained,” so that the night passed over them without their being burned on the altar, they are disqualified].

And if it enters your mind

that the festival offering is not explicit in the Torah, and what the Torah said, “and you shall celebrate it,”

is “celebrate a festival”

[in the sense of the festival celebration], and “the fat of My festival offering” likewise means that the fat of the animal slaughtered for joy and celebration shall not remain, and not an offering,

it is impossible to say so.

For: Is it that

fat

[fat]

exists for a festival celebration?!

Is there fat that becomes disqualified through remaining overnight in an animal brought for joy and celebration?!

But “fat” has no meaning except in relation to an offering, to burn it upon the altar.

And necessarily the verse speaks of the fat of the offering, teaching you that it shall not remain until morning, but shall be burned upon the altar before dawn.

And there you have an offering explicit in the Torah, and it does not depend on a hair’s breadth.

And we explain: Indeed, the matter is not explicit in the Torah, and there is no proof from this verse, because:

perhaps this is what the Merciful One said: “The fat that comes during a festival”—

shall not remain!

That is, offerings of vows and freewill offerings that you bring during the festival shall not remain until morning, but shall be burned beforehand. And the verse does not speak of the festival offering; therefore it is not explicit in the Torah.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning our saying that this verse may be interpreted as referring to other offerings brought during the festival [and therefore the festival offering is not explicit but depends on a hair’s breadth]:

But if that is so,

since “you shall not leave the fat of My festival offering” means a prohibition against leaving overnight the fat of vow and freewill offerings brought during the festival, shall we also say, according to this, that only fat

that comes during a festival

[“the fat of My festival offering”]

is what may not remain overnight, but

fat

of the entire rest of the year may remain overnight?!

But this is impossible.

For “It is the burnt offering upon its fire on the altar [the limbs of a burnt offering shall be upon the altar for burning]

the entire night until morning,” is written,

and not after it! It follows that in all offerings leaving the sacrificial portions overnight is prohibited [including the “fat”], and you cannot interpret the prohibition against leaving overnight in the verse “You shall not leave the fat of My festival offering” as applying only to offerings brought on the pilgrimage festival?!

And if so, necessarily the verse speaks of the fat of the festival offering, and it follows that the festival offering is explicit in the Torah and does not depend on a hair’s breadth.

And we explain:

perhaps

the intention of the verse is not the festival offering, but offerings brought during the festival. And as for what is difficult for you—that leaving overnight is prohibited for all offerings at all times, and not only during the pilgrimage festival, from the statement of the verse “the entire night until morning”—this is not a difficulty, because:

From that

verse

I might have said

[the expression “I might have said” is not exact; rather, this is actually so, the plain truth]

that

verse

comes for the

mitzva of

positive commandment,

that they should offer the sacrificial portions of all offerings before the end of the night, and not leave them throughout the entire night.

And therefore

the Merciful One wrote this

verse, “You shall not leave the fat of My festival offering until morning,” in order

to

introduce, for vow and freewill offerings brought during the pilgrimage festival [only!], the prohibition of

a negative commandment,

that they should not delay them until morning.

And this negative-commandment prohibition was introduced only for offerings brought during the festival, whereas for offerings brought during the rest of the days of the year, the prohibition against leaving their sacrificial portions overnight is only a positive commandment.

And we can still say that the festival offering is not explicit in the Torah, but only depends on a hair’s breadth.

And the Gemara rejects this: How is it possible to interpret the verse “You shall not leave the fat of My festival offering” as referring to all offerings of the pilgrimage festival,

for a negative commandment

against leaving them overnight during the festival, in addition to the positive commandment applying to all offerings?!

But the Merciful One already

wrote

a

different verse

for the negative commandment prohibiting leaving overnight with regard to the other offerings, throughout all the days of the year: as it is stated,

“You shall not leave of the meat that you slaughter in the evening until the morning of the first day.”

And it is proven that the verse “You shall not leave the fat of My festival offering” does not come to introduce a new prohibition against leaving overnight for offerings brought during the festival, but speaks of the festival offering; and the festival offering is therefore explicit in the Torah!

And the Gemara argues again:

perhaps

indeed the verse comes to introduce a prohibition against leaving overnight for other offerings brought during the festival, and it does not come to reveal the law of the festival offering, but the verse comes

to transgress concerning it,

with an additional prohibition against leaving overnight, for other offerings brought during the festival,

so that one who delays the burning of the sacrificial portions during the festival transgresses the prohibition against leaving overnight

through two negative commandments and a positive commandment.

And since it has been clarified that the festival offering is not explicit in the Torah, we must explain where it is hinted at in the Torah.

And we explain:

Rather, it is derived

that the festival offering on a Festival is established through a gzera shava,

“wilderness” from “wilderness.”

It is written here,

in Egypt:

“that they may celebrate a festival for Me ‘in the wilderness.’”

And it is written there: “Did you bring slaughtered offerings and a meal offering to Me ‘in the wilderness’?”

Just as there, slaughtered offerings, so here, slaughtered offerings.

The interpretation of the verse “that they may celebrate a festival for Me in the wilderness” is therefore an offering. And consequently, even “and you shall celebrate it,” stated concerning a Festival, means an offering.

And what is “like mountains suspended by a hair’s breadth,”

meaning: Why do we call this learning a “hair’s breadth,” even though it is a gzera shava, like a matter explicit in the Torah?

Because

words of Torah

[“that they may celebrate a festival for Me in the wilderness”]

are not learned from words of tradition

[“Did you bring slaughtered offerings and a meal offering”]

—we do not learn them,

and therefore this gzera shava is not considered a complete source, but only a hair’s breadth, upon which to suspend the source for the fact that “that they may celebrate a festival” stated concerning Egypt refers to an offering, and, following it, to learn the festival offering on a Festival.

We learned in the Mishna: The festival offerings

and sacrilege

are like mountains suspended by a hair’s breadth:

And we raise a difficulty: The law of sacrilege

is explicitly written

in the Torah, and does not depend on a hair’s breadth?!

Rami bar Hama said: It is necessary only for that which we learned

[that is, the law stated in this Mishna, and similar laws, is the one that depends on a hair’s breadth]:

The agent who carried out his agency

that the master of the house sent him. For example: The master of the house had consecrated money, and it became mixed up with his ordinary money, and he said to the agent: Go out and buy me with it a garment or a cloak. The agent went and bought as he had been instructed; then

the master of the house committed sacrilege,

and not the agent, since a person’s agent is like himself.

But if

he did not carry out

the agent

his agency,

but instead went and bought something else with it, which the master of the house had not instructed him to buy, then

the agent committed sacrilege

and not the master of the house. Since with regard to this he is not his agent, the agent is like anyone else who takes consecrated money out for ordinary use; he is the one who commits sacrilege, and not the one who sent him.

And the law stated in the first clause is the one that depends on a hair’s breadth. For one can raise the difficulty and say:

Is it so

that even where the agent

did carry out

the agent

his agency—

why did the master of the house commit sacrilege,

and not the agent?!

Is it so

that it is possible to say that

this

agent

sins,

taking the consecrated money out for ordinary use,

and this

master of the house who sent him

becomes liable

through him?!

But we have an established principle: There is no agent for a transgression, and the sender does not become liable through his agent?!

And

this is—

the innovation that the sender becomes liable—

like mountains suspended by a hair’s breadth.

He said—

he rejected it—

Rava: And what is the difficulty

here?!

Perhaps sacrilege is different,

for we make the sender liable even though ordinarily there is no agent for a transgression, because

it is learned

that sacrilege is established by a gzera shava,

“sin” from “sin,” from the portion of teruma.

It is stated concerning sacrilege: “If a person commits a sacrilege and sins unintentionally against the sacred property of the Lord”; and it is stated concerning teruma: “You shall not bear sin because of it when you raise its best part from it.”

Just as there,

in teruma,

a person’s agent is like himself,

as it is stated: “So shall you also raise the teruma of the Lord”—“also” comes to include your agents,

so too here,

in sacrilege,

a person’s agent is like himself,

even though he is an agent for a transgression.

And since it is learned from a gzera shava, this does not depend on a hair’s breadth, but is like a matter explicit in the Torah?!

Rather, Rava said: It is necessary only for that which we learned

[the law that depends on a hair’s breadth is the one we learned in the beraita]:

The master of the house who unintentionally placed consecrated money in the hand of his agent in order to buy him a garment or a cloak, and

the master of the house remembered

that it was consecrated money before the agent reached the shopkeeper,

but the agent did not remember

that it was consecrated money, and spent it—the

agent committed sacrilege

and not the sender.

And the reason is: Since the sender certainly nullified his agency when he remembered, for he does not want the agent to spend consecrated money, his agency was nullified. Therefore the sender is exempt and the agent is liable, for he took consecrated money out for ordinary use and not in the capacity of an agency [Rashi].

And we have reason to wonder and say:

The poor agent—

what did he do?!

[What did the unfortunate agent do that you make him liable]?!

But he is close to being an unavoidable accident, since he did not know that the money was consecrated; why is he liable [Tosafot]?!

This is like mountains suspended by a hair’s breadth.

Rav Ashi said: What is the difficulty

here?

Perhaps

the agent committed sacrilege

just as

other

people who take consecrated money out for ordinary use do?!

That is, this is not an unavoidable accident but inadvertence, and every liability for sacrilege is through inadvertence?!

Rather, Rav Ashi said: It is necessary only for that which we learned:

One who took

for himself

a consecrated stone or beam has not committed sacrilege

through taking it.

But if

he gave it

the one who took it

to his fellow:

He,

the one who took it,

committed sacrilege

through giving it, for he immediately took it from the domain of consecrated property into ordinary use [Rashi].

But his fellow did not commit sacrilege

when he used it, since through the sacrilege of the giver it had already become ordinary property.

And it depends on a hair’s breadth, for one can raise the difficulty and say:

Once he took it

[the one who took it indeed took it], and if so,

what difference is it to me if he

[what difference is it to me if he left it in his possession],

and what difference is it to me if

he gave it to

his fellow,

in either case the one who took it should commit sacrilege [according to Rashi in tractate Meila]?!

That is, since removing it from the domain of consecrated property is considered sacrilege, what difference is there between removing it from the domain of consecrated property into his own domain and removing it into another’s domain?!

This is like mountains suspended by a hair’s breadth.

And we reject this:

And what is the difficulty

here?

Perhaps, as

Shmuel

explained.