Chagigah 10a (י.) — the Talmud in English

who had intercourse with her

under duress

on the part of the woman—for the wife of a Jewish man does not become forbidden to her husband when she was raped. Therefore, he has a remedy if she did not give birth to a mamzer.

Here—

where they said: Even if she did not give birth to a mamzer, he has no remedy—this is when he had intercourse with her

willingly

on the part of the woman, since she became forbidden to her husband.

And if you wish, say instead: Both this and that case involve rape, and it is not difficult:

Here it is referring to the wife of a priest,

who becomes forbidden to her husband even when raped.

Here it is referring to the wife of an Israelite,

who does not become forbidden to her husband when she was raped.

It is written:

“There is no peace for him who goes out and for him who comes in.”

Rav said: Once a person departs from a matter of halakha

[the Mishnayot], and comes

to study Scripture,

from which one may not derive a ruling,

he no longer has peace

with regard to issuing rulings.

And Shmuel said: This refers to one who separates from the Talmud

[which consists of the words of the Sages, who carefully explain the contradictory Mishnayot and find the reason for exemption and liability, prohibition and permission]

for the Mishna

[the wording of the Mishnayot as it appears before us].

For if he leaves the Talmud and devotes his attention to the wording of the Mishnayot, he no longer has peace with regard to issuing rulings, since a correct ruling cannot be given on the basis of the Mishna alone. For there are many Mishnayot whose words are not properly aligned, and the Sages resolved them by saying, for example, “Something is missing here, and this is what it teaches,” or, “Whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of a particular Rabbi,” whose ruling is not the halakha.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even

one who separates

from the

[Talmud of the] Jerusalem

Talmud

of Babylonia has no peace with regard to matters of halakha. Since it is profound, he cannot derive a clear halakhic ruling from it. And as we say in tractate Sanhedrin [24a]: “He has made me dwell in dark places, like those who are eternally dead”—this is the Babylonian Talmud.

MISHNA:

One who takes a vow and finds an “opening” through which to regret his vow goes to a Sage and details his vow and his opening, or says to the Sage that he regrets the vow; and the Sage dissolves his vow for him.

The dissolution of vows

that the Sages spoke of—

they hover

above

in the air!

That is to say: There is only a slight allusion to this in Scripture,

and they have no

explicit scriptural verse in the Torah

upon which to rely,

but this matter was transmitted to the Sages as part of the Oral Torah. But some of

the halakhot of Shabbat,

as well as the halakhot of

the Festival offerings

on the pilgrimage festivals,

and

some of the laws of

sacrilege

in consecrated property—

these are like “mountains hanging by a hair”

[like one who suspends a mountain by hairs of the head]—

Since

there is a brief scriptural basis and many halakhot.

These halakhot depend upon an allusion in a brief scriptural passage [Rashi].

But

civil laws

[laws concerning monetary disputes],

the Temple rites

in the Temple,

matters of ritual purity and impurity, and

the laws of

forbidden sexual relations—

they have substantial bases upon which to rely!

That is to say: They have extensive scriptural support [although they are not explicitly stated].

And these are themselves the fundamental principles of Torah,

as the Gemara explains.

GEMARA:

It was taught:

The tannaim disagreed concerning the Mishna that says that the dissolution of vows hovers in the air and has nothing upon which to rely. They maintain that it does have a basis upon which to rely, but they disagree as to where the dissolution is written in the Torah:

Rabbi Eliezer says: They have

the dissolution of vows

a basis upon which to rely.

As it is stated

in the passage concerning valuations:

“When a person clearly articulates

a vow according to your valuation,” and it is stated in the passage concerning the nazirite:

“When a person clearly articulates

a vow, the vow of a nazirite, to consecrate himself to the Lord.” Thus, the Torah states

twice

the expression of clear articulation:

One clear articulation

[its meaning] is

for prohibition,

when he specifies his vow.

And one clear articulation

[its meaning] is

for dissolution,

when he explains before the Sage and says: “This is what I vowed, and I vowed only with this understanding. But with another understanding—I did not vow!” so that the Sage may dissolve his vow for him.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: They have a basis upon which to rely.

As it is stated: “That I swore in My anger

that they would not enter [the generation of the wilderness] into My resting place [in the World to Come, Tosafot].”

And why did Scripture say:

“That I swore ‘in My anger’”?

It would have sufficed to say only, “That I swore,” to teach you:

“In My anger”

[in My wrath]

I swore, and

afterward

I regretted

my oath!

That is to say: I can have the oath annulled, since I swore it because of my anger and not with a settled mind [Rashi; see Sefat Emet].

Rabbi Yitzhak says: They have a basis upon which to rely.

As it is stated

in connection with the contributions for the Tabernacle brought by the Israelites:

“Every generous-hearted person

shall bring it as the contribution of the Lord.” You have learned from this: If his heart still impels him to give, then he shall bring it; but if his heart is no longer with him, because he regrets his vow and his donation, he shall not bring it, since the Sage will dissolve it for him.

Hanania, son of the brother of Rabbi Yehoshua, says: They have a basis upon which to rely.

As it is stated: “I swore and I will fulfill” to keep the laws of Your righteousness.

It should have said only: “I swore to keep the laws of Your righteousness.” And why did it say, “And I will fulfill”? To teach you: If I wish, I will fulfill it; and if I do not, I will go to a Sage, and he will dissolve my oath for me.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Had I been there, I would have said to them

[Had I been there, I would have said to these tannaim]:

My proof is preferable to yours

[my support is superior to yours]:

As it is stated: “He shall not profane his word!” He

himself

does not absolve

[the expression denotes profanation] his word,

but others

[a Sage]

may absolve him,

[according to the version found in the Ya'avetz and in Berakhot 32a].

Rava said: All of them

[all the supports brought by the tannaim]

have a refutation

[one can respond to them],

except for that of Shmuel, which has no refutation

[unlike the support brought by Shmuel, nothing can be said against it]! For:

If you derive it from Rabbi Eliezer,

who based the dissolution of vows on “when a person clearly articulates, when a person clearly articulates,” one can respond:

Perhaps

the repetition of the expression of clear articulation comes to teach

in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who said in the name of Rabbi Tarfon.

As it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Tarfon:

Two people were sitting, and one person passed before them. One of them said: “I am a nazirite if this passerby is a nazirite” [that is, if he is not a nazirite, I am a nazirite], and the second said: “I am a nazirite if this passerby is not a nazirite.” Ultimately, the matter was found to be as one of them had said; nevertheless,

not

even

one of them is a nazirite.

Because naziriteship was established only through clear articulation,

a vow of naziriteship does not obligate the one who makes it if he accepted naziriteship conditionally and doubtfully; rather, naziriteship must be clearly and explicitly stated [with certainty].

And

if you derive it from Rabbi Yehoshua,

who based the dissolution of vows on “That I swore in My anger,” one can respond:

Perhaps this is what it says: I swore in My anger, and I did not regret it.

And

if you derive it from Rabbi Yitzhak,

who based the dissolution of vows on “Every generous-hearted person,” one can respond:

Perhaps

that is why Scripture said “his heart,” in order

to exclude Shmuel’s ruling.

For Shmuel said: If one resolved

to make a vow

in his heart,

he must articulate it with his lips.

And this teaches us that even though he did not articulate it with his lips,

his vow is a vow [see the additional explanation in the notes]. And

if you derive it from Hanania, son of the brother of Rabbi Yehoshua,

who based the dissolution of vows on “I swore and I will fulfill, to keep the laws of Your righteousness,” one can respond:

Perhaps

the verse comes to teach

in accordance with what Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav.

For Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: From where is it derived that one may swear “to fulfill” a mitzva,

that is, that it is proper for a person to swear to fulfill a mitzva, so that he will hurry and exert himself to fulfill it [Rashi]?

As it is stated: “I swore and I will fulfill” to keep the laws of Your righteousness.

Rather, Shmuel’s proof,

who based the dissolution of vows on “He shall not profane”

has no refutation.

Rava said, and some say Rav Naḥman bar Yitzhak

said this concerning Shmuel’s statement in relation to the statements of the other tannaim:

This is what people say: One sharp peppercorn is better than a full basket of pumpkins.

One kernel of hot pepper is better than a basket full of cucumbers.

We learned in the Mishna:

The halakhot of Shabbat

are like mountains hanging by a hair:

And we raise an objection: The halakhot of Shabbat

are explicitly written

in the Torah, and are not merely “hanging by a hair”?!

And we answer:

No, it is necessary only for the teaching of Rabbi Abba,

for the novel aspect of Rabbi Abba’s ruling, and similar cases [Rashi], which are not explicit in the Torah but are like something “hanging by a hair.”

For Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat

in his house or courtyard [for if he needed the hole itself, he would violate the labor of building],

and does not need

the hole,

but

digs it only

for its soil,

because he requires the soil and therefore digs—he is

exempt for it,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain the reason; and this law has only an allusion in Scripture, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

And the Gemara explains:

In accordance with whom

did Rabbi Abba state his ruling that he is exempt?

Perhaps it is specifically

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who said

[with regard to one who carries out a corpse on a bier on Shabbat in order to bury it]:

A labor that one does not need for its own purpose

[which he would not have performed willingly, and had no need for, Rashi]—he is

exempt for it

if he performed it on Shabbat.

This person, too, who digs on Shabbat for the sake of the soil and does not need the construction effected by digging the hole, is exempt for it according to Rabbi Shimon.

And not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who disagrees with him and maintains that one is liable for a labor that one does not need for its own purpose?

This is not correct.

Rather, when Rabbi Abba said that one who digs a hole and needs only its soil is exempt for it,

you may even say that it is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who disagrees with regard to carrying out the corpse and holds one liable for it even when the labor is not needed for its own purpose. He nevertheless concedes that one who digs a hole is exempt, because:

There,

with regard to carrying out the corpse, he is

improving

the situation, but

here,

with regard to one who digs a hole and needs only its soil,

he is damaging

his courtyard, and even according to Rabbi Yehuda he is exempt.

And

what is the meaning of “mountains hanging by a hair”

[Upon what allusion does this law rely, such that it is no more than a hair]?