Bekhorot 51a — the Talmud in English

It would have been

to Hanan the wicked

a worn coin [that had lost its image]

whose image had been worn away]

along with it, which did not go out

in expenditure and was not accepted in commerce.

He struck it

Hanan the wicked gave that man

another time,

and became liable to him for another half-zuz,

and gave it to him

all of it.

We learned in the Mishna:

Thirty for a slave, fifty for rape and seduction,

and one hundred for one who disseminates an evil name—all in the sacred shekel, in Tyrian maneh.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

This

that it teaches

also

“all in the sacred shekel,”

why do I need it? It already taught it at the beginning

and had already specified them all.

And we answer: It was necessary

for rape and one who disseminates an evil name

for the tanna to state “all.” For

it might enter your mind to say,

granted, all the others have shekalim written explicitly concerning them. With regard to the redemption of the firstborn, it is written: “five shekalim per head”; and with regard to a slave it is written: “he shall give thirty shekalim to his master”; and with regard to seduction it is written: “he shall weigh out money,” [which is an expression of shekalim]. But with regard to rape and one who disseminates an evil name, concerning which it is written “fifty silver” and “one hundred silver,” let us say that

since “shekalim” is not written concerning them, say that they need to give ordinary coins

And from the beginning we would have learned only that they are liable to give Tyrian silver. But it would still be possible that they are Tyrian zuzim.

It teaches us

the end, “all in the sacred shekel,” namely, a Tyrian sela. Since

they learn from one another!

For every fixed sum of money is in the sacred shekel.

We learned in the Mishna:

Except for the shekalim—

for one brings only a coin of a half-shekel, and not its monetary equivalent in other property.

The tanna teaches:

Except for the shekalim, and second tithe

—

and

the two silver coins of

the appearance-offering

with which to purchase the appearance-offering burnt-offering—for with regard to these we require actual money and not its monetary equivalent in other property.

And we explain:

The shekalim,

as

we learned: The shekalim are combined

of all the inhabitants of the city who send their shekalim to Jerusalem, and they exchange them

for gold coins [

gold coins]

because of the burden of the journey!

For it is burdensome to take many shekalim up to Jerusalem. And specifically gold coins, but unminted gold, and likewise any monetary equivalent in other property—not. This is because we are concerned lest its price fall, and the consecrated property be found to suffer a loss. But the value of a coin does not fall.

Second tithe

is not redeemed with its monetary equivalent in other property, because

it is written: “And you shall bind up the money in your hand”!

Money that has the form of a coin, specifically.

And

the two coins of

the appearance-offering

are brought only in coin, as

Rav Yosef taught: That one may not bring a silver ingot [

a mass of silver]

to the Temple courtyard!

Rather, a silver coin.

Mishna:

Even though one redeems the firstborn with its monetary equivalent in other property, as explained in the preceding Mishna, nevertheless:

One does not redeem

the firstborn

neither with slaves nor with promissory notes

that the father of the child has against others,

nor with land,

and the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

Nor with consecrated property,

the Gemara explains it as follows: Even consecrated property is not redeemed with any of these.

And if

the father wrote

to the

kohen that he owes him five selaim,

and with this writing he wishes to redeem his son:

It is obvious that he is not redeemed by this writing, but

he is liable

to

give it to him, and

nevertheless

his son is not redeemed

by rabbinic law, even if he gave it to him. And it will be explained in the Gemara that although according to Torah law the son is redeemed once he gives it, nevertheless the Sages decreed that the son should not be redeemed, because of a decree lest people say that one redeems with promissory notes.

Therefore, if the kohen wishes—

so that the father should not lose the five selaim—

to give it to him as a gift [

to return the five selaim to him]

he is permitted.

One who sets aside

five selaim for

the redemption of his son, and they are lost,

behold, the father

is liable for them, as it is stated:

in the passage concerning the gifts of the kohanim [Numbers 18]: “And the Lord spoke to Aaron: Every first issue of the womb, of all flesh, which they offer to the Lord, of man and beast,

shall be yours; but you shall redeem the firstborn of man,” and we expound: When the redemption money “shall be yours” [in your hand], then the firstborn will be redeemed.

the firstborn of man. And we derive: Only when the redemption money “shall be yours”—that is, in your possession—is the firstborn redeemed.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One does not redeem with slaves, nor with promissory notes, nor with land:

The Gemara explains that

the Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi,

and

for

behold,

it is taught:

Rabbi says: With everything—

money and its monetary equivalent in other property, even with slaves and land—

one redeems a human firstborn, except for promissory notes.

The Gemara asks:

What is Rabbi’s reason?

He

expounds the verses in the passage of the redemption of the firstborn, as it is stated: “And his redeemed one, from a month old, you shall redeem according to your valuation, silver, five shekalim,” by the interpretive method of

“multiplications and exclusions”:

Rashi in Shevuot 4b, s.v. “For he expounds,” explains the distinction between an exposition by way of multiplication and exclusion and an exposition by way of generalization and specification. The discussion there concerns what the Torah says with regard to an oath of utterance [Leviticus 5]: “When a person takes an oath, expressing with his lips to do harm or to do good, whatever a person expresses in an oath.” Here there is a multiplication and generalization, “When a person takes an oath, expressing with his lips”; an exclusion and specification, “to do harm or to do good”; and again a multiplication and generalization, “whatever a person expresses in an oath.” And this is how he explained it:

He expounds by way of multiplications and exclusions: He did not expound the Torah according to the meaning of generalizations and specifications, but according to the meaning of multiplications and exclusions. And with regard to oaths he expounds as follows: “When a person takes an oath” multiplies all oaths; “to do harm or to do good” excludes from the multiplication and teaches that he is liable only for something similar to the exclusion, namely, that the oath concerns the future, like it. He does not expound it according to the meaning of “generalization and specification [without an additional generalization],” so that we would say: “to do harm or to do good” is the explanation of the generalization, and you have only to include in it that alone, [namely] harm and good, and not other matters, and not even the future, [since] it is not harm or good—

For everyone who expounds the Torah by generalization and specification holds [when the verse did not return and generalize]: “The generalization contains only what is in the specification.” And when another generalization then comes after the specification—as here, where it is written afterward, “whatever a person expresses”—it is enough for you if you add to the specification, through the final generalization, matters that do not involve harm or good but are similar to the specification with regard to the future; but you do not [multiply oaths concerning] the past, which is not at all similar to the specification. For this is the purpose of the first generalization: to exclude. And this is what is meant by saying, “A generalization, specification, and generalization—you may expound only in accordance with the nature of the specification”: You may expound to add to the specification through the final generalization, but you may not expound to add anything to it except what is similar to it—

But one who expounds by multiplication and exclusion does not regard the specification as the explanation of the generalization [when there is no multiplication after it]; rather, it partially excludes it. That is, the first multiplication did not multiply everything, but this and the like. And even without a later multiplication, this and the like are understood by it. Therefore, when another multiplication comes afterward, it comes to multiply, even something unlike the specification; and the exclusion excluded only one thing that was more fit to be excluded from this generalization than everything else.

And this is how he expounds:

“And his redeemed one, from a month old”

multiplies

all types of redemption— “

According to your valuation, silver”—

behold, it

excludes— “

You shall redeem”—

which is written before the exclusion—

multiplies

all types of redemption—

Thus it is

a multiplication, exclusion, and multiplication, and we learn:

And he expounds:

It multiplies everything; what does it multiply?

Rabbi: It multiplies every matter! And what does it exclude?

It excludes

only one thing, namely,

promissory notes.

And the Rabbis expound

these verses by the interpretive method of

“generalization and specification,”

and this is how they expound: “

And his redeemed one, from a month old”—

behold,

a generalization. “

According to your valuation, silver”—

behold,

a specification. “

You shall redeem”—

stated before the specification—

returned and generalized.

And behold,

“a generalization, specification, and generalization—you may expound only in accordance with the nature of the specification,”

and therefore we expound as follows:

Just as the specification explicitly refers to something movable and whose substance is money, so too everything that is movable and whose substance is money; land, which is not movable, is excluded; slaves, who were equated with land, are excluded,

as it is stated concerning slaves: “And you shall hold them as an inheritance for your children after you, to inherit as a possession.”

Promissory notes are excluded, although they are movable,

nevertheless

their substance is not money,

and therefore one does not redeem with them.

The Gemara had thought that throughout the Torah Rabbi does not expound by means of generalizations and particulars, but by means of enlargements and restrictions, and therefore we raise an objection:

He said

he objected

to Marimar, Ravina: And

if

Rabbi

by means of

enlargements and restrictions expounds, yet Rabbi

by

generalizations and particulars expounds concerning the awl

of a Hebrew slave, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 15]: “For your brother the Hebrew shall be sold to you, and he shall serve you six years, and in the seventh year you shall send him away free from you. And it shall be, when he says to you, ‘I shall not go out from you,’ then you shall take the awl and place it in his ear and in the door, and he shall be your slave forever”:

As it was taught: “

An awl.”

I have only

that he pierces his ear with an

awl—

From where to include

piercing

with a sole

(a splinter whose head is sharp)

and a thorn

(a spike)

and a needle and a drill

and a stylus

(an iron pen with which they were accustomed to engrave in wax tablets)?

The verse therefore says “

and you shall take,”

to include every object that is taken in the hand,

and for this reason the Torah said “an awl,” in order to exclude one thing, namely piercing with a drug, as it explains below,

the words of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi says: “

An awl,”

just as an awl is specifically of metal, so too everything must be of metal,

and this excludes the sole and the thorn, which are of wood.

And we said

[and explained]

With what do they disagree?

Rabbi expounds

the verses by means of the principle of

generalizations and particulars,

and since Scripture said “and you shall take,” that is a generalization, and it said “the awl,” that is a particular, and when it again said “and you shall place it in his ear and in the door,” that is a second generalization; and a generalization, a particular, and a generalization—you expound only according to what is similar to the particular, which is of metal.

But

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda expounds

them by means of the principle of

enlargements and restrictions.

And when Scripture enlarged, restricted, and enlarged, everything is included, except for a drug.

It is thus explained that Rabbi expounds the Torah by means of generalizations and particulars, and not by means of enlargements and restrictions!?

And we answer:

Yes, generally Rabbi expounds by means of generalizations and particulars,

indeed, everywhere Rabbi expounds by means of the principle of generalizations and particulars,

but

nevertheless

here,

with regard to the redemption of the firstborn son, where the order of the verse is not “a generalization, a particular, and a generalization,” but rather two adjacent generalizations followed by a particular—that is different, and

as the tanna

of the academy of Rabbi Ishmael taught!

The tanna of the academy of Rabbi Ishmael taught

concerning the verse [Leviticus 11:9]: “These you may eat from all that is in the waters; everything that has fin and scale in the waters, in the seas and in the streams, them you may eat”:

“In the waters”

“in the waters”

twice,

which are two adjacent generalizations, to teach that among every creeping creature of the waters, the Torah permitted only one that has a fin and a scale. And it is a particular, requiring a fin and a scale only “in the seas and in the streams”:

This is not a generalization and a particular.

That is to say, the verse is not expounded by means of the principle of “a generalization, a particular, and a generalization.”

Rather, it is

an enlargement and a restriction

that it is.

And

whereas

the Rabbis say:

even so, we expound them by means of generalizations and particulars,

as they say in the West

[in the Land of Israel]:

Every place where you find two adjacent generalizations, place a particular between them and judge them as a generalization and a particular.

We learned in the Mishna: One may not redeem with slaves, nor with promissory notes, nor with land,

nor with consecrated property:

The Gemara had thought to interpret the Mishna according to its plain meaning, that he may not redeem his son with consecrated property in his possession, and therefore the Gemara raises an objection:

But

it is obvious

that he may not redeem his son with them, for the consecrated property

does not belong to him

[it is not his]!? And therefore the Gemara explains the Mishna,

say instead: