Bekhorot 51a (נא.) — the Talmud in English

It would turn out that

Hanan the wicked had

a worn coin [that had lost its design]

along with it, so that it did not circulate

in commerce and was not accepted as legal tender.

and was not accepted in commerce.

Hanan the wicked

stuck it to that man

a second time,

and became liable to him for another half-dinar,

and gave it to him

in its entirety.

We learned in the Mishna:

Thirty [sela] for a slave, fifty for rape and seduction,

and one hundred for one who brings an evil name upon his wife—all are in sacred shekels, in Tyrian manehs.

And we raised the following difficulty:

The

one who teaches

again

“all are in sacred shekels,”

why do I need this? It was already taught at the beginning

and all of them were already specified.

And we answer: The tanna

needed to state this with regard to rape and one who brings an evil name

in order to say “all.” For

it might enter your mind to say:

Granted, all the others are explicitly written in terms of shekels. With regard to redemption of the firstborn, it is written: “Five shekels per person”; with regard to a slave, it is written: “He shall give thirty shekels to his master”; and with regard to seduction, it is written: “He shall weigh out money,” which is an expression referring to shekels. But with regard to rape and one who brings an evil name, for which “fifty kesef” and “one hundred kesef” are written, let us say that

since “shekels” is not written with regard to them, one might say that he is required to give ordinary dinars

It follows from the first clause only that they are liable to pay Tyrian money. But it would still be possible to say that they may pay Tyrian dinars.

The tanna therefore teaches us

the latter clause, “all are in sacred shekels,” meaning a Tyrian sela. This is because

they derive one from the other!

Every fixed monetary payment is in sacred shekels.

We learned in the Mishna:

Except for the shekels—

for which one may bring only a coin worth half a shekel, and not an article of monetary value.

A tanna

taught: Except for the shekels and the

second tithe,

and

the two silver coins for

the appearance-offering

with which to purchase the burnt-offering of appearance—for with regard to these, actual money is required, and not an article of monetary value.

And we explain:

Shekels,

as

we learned: The shekels are combined

The shekels of all the residents of the city who send their shekels to Jerusalem are exchanged

for darikons [

gold coins]

because of the burden of the journey!

It is burdensome to transport many shekels to Jerusalem. This applies specifically to darikons, but unminted gold, and likewise any article of monetary value, may not be used. This is because we are concerned that its value may decline, resulting in a loss to the consecrated property. But the value of a coin does not decline.

The

second tithe may not be redeemed with an article of monetary value, because

it is written: “And you shall bind up the money in your hand”!

This means money bearing the form of a coin specifically.

And

the two coins for

the appearance-offering

may be brought only as coins, as

Rav Yosef taught: One may not bring a silver ingot [

a block of silver]

to the Temple courtyard!

Rather, one must bring a silver coin.

Mishna:

Although one redeems a firstborn with an article of monetary value, as explained in the previous Mishna, nevertheless:

One may not redeem

the firstborn

with slaves or with promissory notes

that the father of the child holds against other people,

nor with land,

and the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

Nor with consecrated property,

The Gemara explains that this means: Consecrated property, too, may not be redeemed with any of these items.

And if

the father writes

to

the priest that he owes him five sela

and wishes to redeem his son with this document:

It is obvious that he is not redeemed by this document, but

he is obligated

to

give it to him, and

nevertheless

his son is not redeemed

by rabbinic law, even if he gives it to him. The Gemara will explain that although according to Torah law the son is redeemed once he gives it, nevertheless the Sages decreed that the son should not be redeemed, due to a decree lest people say that one may redeem with promissory notes.

Therefore, if the priest wishes—

so that the father will not lose the five sela—

to give it to him as a gift [

to return the five sela to him],

he may do so.

If one sets aside

five sela for

the redemption of his son, and they are lost,

the father

is liable for them, as it is stated:

in the section concerning gifts to the priests [Numbers 18]: “And the Lord spoke to Aaron: Every first issue of the womb, of all flesh, which they offer to the Lord, of man and of beast,

shall be yours; nevertheless, you shall redeem” the firstborn of man. And we derive: When the redemption money is “yours”—that is, in your possession—then the firstborn is redeemed.

the firstborn of man. And we derive: Only when the redemption money “shall be yours”—that is, in your possession—is the firstborn redeemed.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One may not redeem with slaves, promissory notes, or land:

The Gemara explains that

the Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi,

and

as

there is

a baraita that teaches:

Rabbi says: With anything—

money or an article of monetary value, even slaves and land—

one may redeem a human firstborn, except for promissory notes.

The Gemara asks:

What is Rabbi’s reason?

He

derives the verses in the section concerning redemption of the firstborn, as it is stated: “And its redemption, from one month old, you shall redeem according to your valuation, five shekels of silver,” by means of the hermeneutical method of

multiplicative and restrictive expressions:

Rashi, in Shevuot 4b, s.v. dedarish, explains the distinction between exposition by means of multiplicative and restrictive expressions and exposition by means of a generalization and a specification. The discussion there concerns the verse stated with regard to an oath of utterance [Leviticus 5]: “When a person takes an oath, expressing it with his lips, to do harm or to do good, whatever a person may utter in an oath.” Here there is a multiplicative expression and a generalization, “When a person takes an oath, expressing it with his lips”; a restrictive expression and a specification, “to do harm or to do good”; and then another multiplicative expression and generalization, “whatever a person may utter in an oath.” And this is how he explains it:

He expounds multiplicative and restrictive expressions as follows: He did not expound the Torah according to the meaning of generalizations and specifications, but according to the meaning of multiplicative and restrictive expressions. With regard to oaths, he expounds it this way: “When a person takes an oath” includes all oaths; “to do harm or to do good” restricts the inclusion and teaches that he is liable only for something similar to the restriction—an oath concerning the future like this one. He does not expound it according to the meaning of “a generalization and a specification [without a further generalization],” so that one would say: “to do harm or to do good” explains the generalization, and one may include only this alone, namely, doing harm or good, but no other matter, even concerning the future, if it is not doing harm or good—

for anyone who expounds the Torah by means of a generalization and a specification holds [when the verse did not return and generalize]: “The generalization includes only what is specified.” And when another generalization comes after the specification—as here, where “whatever a person may utter” is written after it—it is enough for one to add to the specification, by means of the final generalization, matters that do not involve doing harm or good but are similar to the specification in that they concern the future; but one may not include matters concerning the past, which are not at all similar to the specification. This is the purpose of the first generalization’s restrictive effect. This is the meaning of the statement: “A generalization, a specification, and a generalization—you may expound only what is similar to the specification.” That is, one may add to the specification by means of the final generalization, but one may add only what is similar to it—

But one who expounds by means of a multiplicative and a restrictive expression does not regard the specification as an explanation of the generalization [when no further multiplicative expression follows it]. Rather, it restricts it somewhat: The first multiplicative expression did not include absolutely everything, but this and what is similar to it. Even without a later multiplicative expression, this and what is similar to it are implied. Therefore, when another multiplicative expression comes afterward, it comes to include even things unlike the specification; the restrictive expression excluded only one matter that would otherwise be especially appropriate to exclude from this generalization.

And this is how he expounds it:

“And its redemption, from one month old”

includes

all types of redemption— “

According to your valuation, silver”

is

restrictive— “

You shall redeem”—

which is written before the restrictive expression—

includes

all types of redemption—

Thus it is

a multiplicative expression, a restrictive expression, and a multiplicative expression,

and we derive:

It includes everything; what does it include?

Rabbi includes every item! And what does it restrict?

It restricts

only one matter, namely

promissory notes.

And the Rabbis expound

these verses by means of the hermeneutical method of

a generalization and a specification,

as follows: “

And its redemption, from one month old”

is

a generalization. “

According to your valuation, silver”

is

a specification. “

You shall redeem”—

stated before the specification—

returns and generalizes.

And this is

a generalization, a specification, and a generalization; you may expound only what is similar to the specification,

and therefore we expound as follows:

Just as the specification explicitly refers to an item that is movable and itself constitutes money, so too, anything that is movable and itself constitutes money. This excludes land, which is not movable; it excludes slaves, which are compared to land,

as it is stated concerning slaves: “And you shall hold them as an inheritance for your children after you, to inherit as a possession.”

This excludes promissory notes, which, although they are movable,

nevertheless

do not themselves constitute money,

and therefore one may not redeem with them.

The Gemara had assumed that, throughout the Torah, Rabbi does not expound by means of generalizations and specifications, but by means of amplifications and limitations, and therefore asks:

He said

and challenged

Rabina to Marimar: And

is it the case that

Rabbi

expounds by means of

amplifications and limitations, whereas Rabbi

expounds by means of

generalizations and specifications with regard to the awl

used for the Hebrew slave, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 15]: “When your brother, a Hebrew man, is sold to you, he shall serve you six years, and in the seventh year you shall send him free from you. And it shall be, if he says to you, ‘I will not go out from you,’ then you shall take the awl and put it through his ear and into the door, and he shall be your servant forever”:

As it is taught: “

Awl.”

I have only

that he pierces his ear with an

awl—

From where is it derived to include

piercing

with a sharp splinter [

a sliver whose end is pointed] ,

and a thorn [

a thorn],

and a needle and a drill

and a stylus [

an iron pen customarily used for engraving in wax tablets] ?

The verse states: “

And you shall take,”

to include anything that can be taken in the hand;

and for this reason the Torah said “awl,” in order to exclude one item, namely piercing with a drug, as it will explain below,

the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi says: “

Awl”:

Just as an awl is specifically made of metal, so too, anything used must be made of metal;

this excludes a splinter and a thorn, which are made of wood.

And we said [

and explained]:

With regard to what do they disagree?

Rabbi expounds

the verses by means of the hermeneutical principle of

generalizations and specifications:

since the verse says “and you shall take,” this is a generalization; and it says “the awl,” this is a specification; and when it subsequently says “and you shall put it through his ear and into the door,” this is a second generalization. In a generalization, specification, and generalization, one derives only something similar to the specification, which is made of metal.

But

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, expounds

them by means of the hermeneutical principle of

amplifications and limitations.

When the verse amplifies, limits, and amplifies, everything is included except for a drug.

Thus it is clear that Rabbi expounds the Torah by means of generalizations and specifications, and not by means of amplifications and limitations!?

And we answer:

In general, Rabbi does expound by means of generalizations and specifications;

indeed, everywhere Rabbi expounds by means of the principle of generalizations and specifications.

But

nevertheless,

here

with regard to the redemption of the firstborn, where the order of the verse is not “generalization, specification, and generalization,” but rather two adjacent generalizations followed by a specification—this case is different,

and it is as the tanna

of the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught!

The tanna of the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught

with regard to the verse [Leviticus 11:9]: “These you may eat of all that are in the waters: whatever has fins and scales in the waters, in the seas and in the streams, them you may eat”:

“In the waters”

“in the waters”

appears twice;

these are two adjacent generalizations, teaching that among all aquatic creatures the Torah permitted only those that have fins and scales. And the specification requires fins and scales only “in the seas and in the streams”:

This is not a generalization and specification.

That is, the verse is not expounded by means of “generalization, specification, and generalization.”

Rather, it is

an amplification and a limitation

.

. And

whereas

the Sages say:

even so, we expound them by means of generalizations and specifications,

as they say in the West [

in Eretz Yisrael]:

Whenever you find two adjacent generalizations, insert the specification between them and expound them as a generalization and specification.

We learned in the Mishna: One may not redeem the firstborn with slaves, nor with promissory notes, nor with land,

nor with consecrated property:

The Gemara had assumed that the Mishna should be understood literally, that one may not redeem his son with consecrated property in his possession, and therefore the Gemara asks:

But

is it not obvious

that he may not redeem his son with them, since consecrated property

does not belong to him [

it is not his]!? And therefore the Gemara interprets the Mishna:

Say: