Bekhorot 3b (ג:) — the Talmud in English

This is what Rabbi Yohanan said [

Rabbi Yohanan said the following two statements]:

a.

Even

if the gentile’s share is a limb such that, if it were removed, the animal would have

a minor blemish,

for example, if he was a partner in its ear, this exempts it from the law of the firstborn.

b.

And we learned

below, on 16b:

A ewe

that is a firstborn

and gives birth to a kid, and a goat

that is a firstborn

and gives birth to a lamb, is exempt

from the law of the firstborn; but if it has [

in the offspring]

some of the identifying features

by which it resembles its mother, it is

liable

under the law of the firstborn. And Rabbi Yohanan said concerning this that “liable” means that it must be given to a koen, but it may not be offered on the altar. Since it has changed into a different species from its mother, this is

a permanent blemish, permitting the firstborn to be slaughtered outside

the Temple courtyard. And we raise a difficulty:

Granted, regarding Rabbi Yohanan’s statement that “even a

Rabbi Yohanan’s statement that

minor blemish,”

he teaches us the ruling of Rav Huna,

who exempted the animal from the law of the firstborn even when only the firstborn’s ear belongs to the gentile,

and to exclude the view of Rav Ḥisda and Rava,

who required a partnership in something whose removal would not cause the animal’s vitality to cease.

Rather, if part of a goat born to a ewe is

a goat offspring of an ewe with some of the ewe’s features is

a permanent blemish, what does he teach us!?

Since it has changed [

into a different species,]

it is a blemish [

it is a blemish]!? But

we already learned

this in the Mishna below, 40a:

And its mouth

of the lamb

resembles that of a pig …

this is a blemish.

And if you would say that there,

with regard to its mouth resembling that of a pig,

it changed into something whose species is not subject to the sanctity of the firstborn [

for a pig is not subject to the sanctity of the firstborn], but

here,

with regard to a ewe that gave birth to something resembling a goat, it

changed into something whose species is subject to the sanctity of the firstborn, and such a change has not yet been taught to us, so Rabbi Yohanan had to teach us that one may slaughter a firstborn outside the Temple courtyard on account of it; this cannot be the resolution, because

this—a change into something whose species is subject to the firstborn requirement—was also

that—a change into something whose species is subject to the sanctity of the firstborn—is also

taught:

already taught,

as we learned below, 40b, among the blemishes for which one may slaughter a firstborn:

One of its eyes

of the lamb

is large,

while the other is of ordinary size,

and one [

or: one]

is small,

while the other is of ordinary size.

And the tanna

in a beraita explained:

“Large”

means that the lamb’s eye is

as large as a calf’s, and “

small”

means that the lamb’s eye is

as small as a goose’s;

and yet:

Granted,

“as small as a goose’s”

it is understandable that this is a blemish, because it changed into something

whose species is not subject to the sanctity of the firstborn,

as birds are not subject to the law of the firstborn.

But

“as large as a calf’s”—

it is a case where

its species is subject to the sanctity of the firstborn; why, then, is it considered a change permitting slaughter outside the Temple courtyard!?

so why is it considered a change on account of which one slaughters it outside!?

Rather, is it not because we say: Since it has changed

into a different species,

it is a blemish,

and not only when it changed into something whose species is not subject to the sanctity of the firstborn? If so, why do we need Rabbi Yohanan’s novel teaching!?

It is written [Leviticus 21:18]: “For any man who has a blemish shall not approach, a blind man, or a lame man, or one with a sunken nose, or one with mismatched limbs”; and the meaning of sarua is that one of his limbs is larger than the other, such as one eye being large and the other eye being small.

And we answer:

No,

not as you explained the Mishna—that because of the change the animal is exempt from the law of the firstborn. Rather, it may indeed be said that a change into something whose species is subject to the sanctity of the firstborn is not a blemish [unless Rabbi Yohanan taught us this novel point]. The reason that one eye being as large as a calf’s is considered a blemish is

because it is

“sarua,”

meaning that one eye—or one of the other paired limbs—is larger than its counterpart.

This too is evidently the correct interpretation,

as is indicated by

what we learned

below, 43a, at the beginning of the chapter “These are the blemishes”:

These are the blemishes—

that were mentioned with regard to an animal firstborn in the chapter “Concerning These Blemishes,” including one eye being large and one eye being small—

whether

they were

permanent, whether

they were

temporary, they

are

disqualify [

a person]

the koen from performing the Temple service.

A person has an additional disqualification

who is disqualified even when

both his eyes are large

than is usual in a person, or when his eyes are

both small

than is usual. This implies:

With regard to a person, it is

that these blemishes disqualify him, because

it is written [

Leviticus 22:4]:

“Any man of the descendants of Aaron,”

and we learn from this

that we require a man who is commensurate with the descendants of Aaron,

who resembles ordinary human beings.

But

with regard to an

animal, when

both are large

both are large

or

both are small as well,

it is not a blemish. If so:

What is the reason that one is large and one is small

is a blemish?

If it is because of a change,

then

even if both are large

like a calf’s, or

both are small

like a goose’s,

as well

it should be a blemish.

Rather, is it not because it is

“sarua”?

The Gemara rejects the inference that a large or small eye is a blemish because it is “sarua”:

No,

not as you explained; rather,

I can say to you always that

that

it is because of a change that it

it

is a blemish when one eye is as large as a calf’s or one eye is as small as a goose’s.

when one eye is as large as a calf’s or one eye is as small as a goose’s.

And what is difficult for you is: If so,

If so,

even if both are large or

or

both are small, it should be a blemish. I can answer you that when both are large or both are small, this is not considered a change, because both are large on account of excessive vigor, and both are small on account of excessive emaciation—

whereas

there, when one eye is large or one eye is small,

you cannot say this, for

if it is due to excessive vigor—

the one eye grew large—

both of them should have grown [

if the reason that one eye became large were increased vigor, both eyes should have been large]; and

if

one eye is small

due to excessive emaciation, both should

have become emaciated [

and if the eye became small because of excessive emaciation, both eyes should have become small]. Consequently, it is a change, and therefore it is a blemish.

There was a certain female convert to whom her brothers would entrust animals for fattening [

There was an incident involving a female convert whose gentile brothers would give her animals on consignment to fatten them];

she came before Rava [

she came before Rava] to ask whether the firstborn animals born to her, in which she had a share, were liable under the law of the firstborn.

He said to her,

Rava:

There is no one who is concerned [

there is no one who is concerned]

about this statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: A gentile partnership is liable under the law of the firstborn

and one who receives an animal from a gentile on consignment is liable under the law of the firstborn. Rather, we hold that it is exempt from the law of the firstborn.

Rav Mari bar Raḥel had a certain animal, and he would transfer ownership of their ears to a gentile [

Rav Mari bar Raḥel had animals, and he would transfer the ears of the firstborns to a gentile], yet he would apply the laws of the firstborn to them:

He prohibited them from shearing and labor, and gave them to the kohanim, and

even so,

the animals of Rav Mari bar Raḥel all died [

despite the fact that he had transferred ownership of the animals’ ears to a gentile, and applied to the firstborns the prohibitions against shearing and labor and gave them to the kohanim, nevertheless all his animals died]—and the Gemara proceeds to explain this.

And we raise a difficulty:

But once he prohibited them

Rav Mari

from shearing and labor and

also

gave them to the kohanim,

it is evident that he applied the laws of the firstborn to them; if so,

why

did he transfer ownership of their ears to a gentile [

why did he transfer ownership of the animals’ ears to a gentile]!?

And we answer: It was because he was concerned

lest they come to a mishap [

lest they come to a mishap through shearing and labor. Therefore, he transferred ownership of the firstborns’ ears to a gentile in order to remove their firstborn sanctity].

And we raise a difficulty:

If so—

that Rav Mari’s intention in removing their firstborn sanctity was only for their benefit, so that people would not stumble through them—

why did all of Rav Mari’s animals die [

why did all his animals die]!?

And we answer:

Because he removed them from their sanctity [

because ultimately, through his transfer of ownership, their firstborn sanctity ceased, and the practice of treating them as firstborns was merely like treating unconsecrated animals].

And we raise a difficulty against this:

But Rav Yehuda said: It is permitted for a person to inflict a blemish on a firstborn before it emerges into the air of the world,

and the Gemara assumes that it is likewise permitted to transfer ownership of the fetus’s ear; if so, why did all his animals die!?

And we answer:

There,

when he himself inflicts a blemish on the firstborn,

from the sanctity of the altar

he indeed

removes it,

but

he does not remove it from the sanctity of the koen,

since a blemished animal is given to the koen.

Here,

however, when he transferred ownership of the firstborn’s ear to a gentile, -

he

even removes it from the sanctity of the koen, since a firstborn in which a gentile has a partnership has no law of the firstborn at all.

because a firstborn in which a gentile has a partnership is not subject to the firstborn laws at all.

And if you wish, say that this is why all Rav Mari’s animals died:

A gentile acquires only through money and not through pulling. One who transfers ownership of an ear to a gentile must receive money from the gentile; through pulling alone, the gentile does not acquire ownership of the animal’s ear.

For

Rav Mari bar Raḥel knew how to transfer ownership

of the firstborn’s ear

with a complete acquisition,

that is, he received money from them,

but

nevertheless there is concern that

another person might see him and go and do the same, thinking: Rav Mari merely performed an act [

perhaps another person would see his act without knowing that he had received money from the gentile, and would assume that he transferred ownership through a verbal declaration alone]

and come to a mishap through it [

and a mishap would result: another person would transfer ownership of his firstborn to a gentile without receiving payment, and would treat the firstborn—which had not been removed from its firstborn sanctity—as an unconsecrated animal]. Therefore, all his animals died.

In any event, neither the lamb with which the firstborn donkeys were redeemed nor the animal that redeemed the firstborn kosher animals was subjected to any further act; both remained the property of the Levites.