Bekhorot 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

Does this not refer to the animal

about which they said that they penalize him, and the reason is that he accepted it—that is, he gave him the animal so that he would care for it and acquire half of its offspring? It follows that even selling an animal together with its offspring is prohibited.

And we reject this:

No.

It is speaking not of a case where he gave him an animal that was not pregnant so that he would acquire its offspring, but of a case where he gave him a pregnant animal so that he would acquire half the fetus, and

it is for the fetus

that he sold to a gentile that we penalize him.

This is also precise

according to this explanation, from the fact that it teaches:

“It is taught”

“They penalize him up to ten times its value,”

in the masculine, indicating the value of the offspring, and not the animal, which is feminine.

Learn from this

that this explanation is correct.

Since the beraita of Rabbi Yehuda was brought, the Gemara adds an explanation:

It supports

the beraita in which we learned, “They penalize him up to ten times its value,” because of the sale of a large animal to a gentile—

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish! For Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said:

One who sells a large animal to a gentile is penalized up to ten times its value.

The Gemara raises a question: “Ten times its value”—is this

specifically

the limit, and no more,

or is it not specifically

the limit, so that even if the gentile demands a hundred times its value in exchange, he must pay?

Come and hear: For Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: One who sells his slave to a gentile

—and thereby removes him from the mitzvot—

is penalized

for this

up to one hundred times his value.

Since Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said “ten times its value,” whereas Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said “one hundred times his value,” it follows that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish specifically meant ten.

And we answer: In truth, I can say that one who sells an animal is penalized up to ten times its value and no more, but

a slave is different,

as they imposed a more severe penalty upon him, up to one hundred times his value, because

every single day he removes him

—the master removes his slave, by selling him to a gentile—

from the mitzvot.

Some say: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: One who sells a large animal to a gentile is penalized up to one hundred times its value.

We challenge this from that which

we learned

[as it was taught

in a beraita]:

“And one who gives it to him through a kabbalanut arrangement, although he is not permitted, is penalized up to ten times its value,”

which implies: But he is not required to pay one hundred times its value!?

And we answer:

“A sale severed it from him”

[it is absolute, and it is no longer entirely his], and therefore they penalized him up to one hundred times its value. But

a kabbalanut arrangement does not sever it from him,

and therefore they penalized him only up to ten times its value.

The Gemara considers Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish’s statement: Did he

specifically

say “up to one hundred times its value,”

or is it not specifically

so, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish merely stated an exaggeration? In truth, he is not required to pay so much, and he is not required to pay more than ten times its value?

Come and hear: For Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: One who sells his slave to a gentile is penalized up to ten times his value,

and no more. This is so even though he removes him every day from the mitzvot; all the more so in the case of an animal, where he is not penalized more than ten times its value. Necessarily, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish’s statement that he is penalized one hundred times its value was not specific.

And we reject this:

A slave is different, for he does not return to him

[he does not again become his slave], but is lost to him, since when a master sells his slave to a gentile, the slave goes free, as explained in the Mishna in Gittin 43b. Therefore, they do not require him to redeem the slave for more than ten times his value, since he has also lost the slave. But in the case of an animal, which returns to the redeemer through the redemption, one may say that they penalize him even up to one hundred times its value.

The Gemara is astonished at this rejection:

Why is an animal different?

You say that one should be more stringent in its case

because it returns to him

[because it returns to the redeemer]. But for this very reason,

should we not penalize him

only

one more

[should we not penalize him by adding only another amount equal to the value of the animal that returns to him], and no more? What reason is there to say that because an animal worth ten zuz returns to him, he must add another nine hundred zuz to its redemption price!?

Rather,

the Gemara rejects the proof from the slave, for whom the penalty is only up to ten times his value, in another manner:

The matter of a slave is uncommon

[it is not usual] for a person to sell his slave to a gentile,

and the Sages did not institute a decree concerning anything uncommon;

therefore, they imposed a penalty only up to ten times his value.

We learned in a beraita concerning Rabbi Yehuda’s statement, which obligates one who gives an animal to a gentile through a kabbalanut arrangement, and one who receives it from him, with regard to the firstborn:

And the Sages say: As long as the gentile’s hand

is involved, the animal is exempt from the firstborn obligation:

Rabbi Yohanan said

to explain their dispute concerning whether a gentile’s partnership exempts an animal from the firstborn obligation:

And both of them

—Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages—

expounded one verse:

As it is written: “Sanctify to Me

every firstborn,

the first issue of every womb among the Children of Israel”—

For

the Sages hold: “

Firstborn” alone—and not “every firstborn”—

even

implies a part of a firstborn,

that is, even in a case of a gentile’s partnership, where his share is not sanctified with firstborn sanctity. But

the Torah stated “

every”

to teach us that it is not sanctified

until there is the whole of it,

and not merely part of a firstborn; this exempts a gentile’s partnership in a firstborn.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds

the opposite: “

Firstborn”

alone

implies an entire firstborn,

and not part of one. Therefore,

the Torah stated “

every”

to teach us

even any amount,

and to obligate the animal when an Israelite owns only a share in the firstborn and is a partner in it with a gentile.

Alternatively,

the dispute may be explained differently:

Everyone

holds that “

firstborn”

alone

implies a majority

of the firstborn

is meant,

namely, that the majority of the firstborn must belong to an Israelite. Their dispute concerns what “every firstborn” comes to teach:

One

—the Sages—

holds: “

Every”

comes to add,

so that it is sanctified only when it is entirely his.

And the other—

Rabbi Yehuda—

holds: “

Every”

comes to subtract,

so that even part of it is sanctified.

The Gemara further explains:

And how large must the gentile’s partnership be

for it to be exempt from the firstborn obligation?

Rav Huna said: Even

if

its ear

alone belonged to a gentile, the firstborn is exempt from the firstborn obligation according to the Sages.

Rav Naḥman challenged him: Could he not say to him, “Take your ear and go”

[the Israelite could say to the gentile: Take your ear and go]!?

It was stated: a dispute between amoraim concerning the measure of a gentile’s partnership that exempts an animal from the firstborn obligation, since both hold in accordance with Rav Naḥman, who can say to him, “Take your ear and go”:

Rav Ḥisda said:

A gentile’s partnership does not exempt the animal until the gentile’s share is

something that would make it

a carcass

if it were removed, for in such a case he cannot say to him, “Take your share and go,” since the animal would be dead.

And Rava said:

Even

something that would make it tereifa

if it were removed.

And we explain:

With regard to what do they disagree?

Everyone agrees that the partnership must be in something whose removal would cause the animal to die. Rather, Rav Ḥisda and Rava disagree

with regard to a tereifa,

whether it

can live

:

According to the one who says

that even

something that would make it tereifa, he holds: A tereifa cannot live.

And according to the one who says

that only

something that would make it a carcass,

he holds:

But a tereifa can live.

The Sages said before Rav Pappa,

that is, the students explained to Rav Pappa:

This statement of Rav Huna,

who exempts the animal even when the gentile is a partner in its ear, which is something whose removal would make it neither a carcass nor even a tereifa,

and Rav Ḥisda and Rava,

who hold that the partnership does not exempt unless it is in something whose removal would cause the animal not to live—

do not disagree,

because:

That which Rav Huna said, “even its ear,” refers to a partnership that the gentile had

in it

[in the firstborn itself].

Whereas

that

which Rav Ḥisda and Rava said, that we require something whose removal would prevent it from living, refers to a partnership that the gentile had

in its mother,

and not in the firstborn itself. In that case, a partnership in its ear is insufficient; rather, the partnership must be in something whose removal would cause her to die.

Rav Pappa said to them: It is impossible to explain it this way, because: What is different about [the partnership] in it

that even a partnership in its ear exempts? It is because

we require “

every firstborn”

to belong to an Israelite,

and there is not such a situation here.

With regard to its mother as well, we require “

All your livestock

[that is, the mother]

shall be remembered,”

and

when the gentile is a partner in her ear, there is

not “all your livestock.”

Rather, there is no difference,

and Rav Huna, who exempted the animal even in the case of its ear, was referring also to its mother; while Rav Ḥisda and Rava, who required something whose removal would cause her to die, required this also in the firstborn itself.

Mar bar Rav Ashi challenged

Rav Ḥisda and Rava:

What is the difference between a firstborn in which the Jew does not possess all of its life-sustaining parts, because the gentile owns a part that, if removed, it would not live,

a firstborn in which Israel does not have all its vitality, because a gentile owns a portion such that, if it were taken, it would not live,

and miscarriages, which, although they are not capable of living

[they cannot live], nevertheless

are sanctified

with firstborn status,

for

it is

as the Master said

regarding the verse (Exodus 13:12), “And every

first issue of the womb of an animal

that you have, the males, shall be the Lord’s”: that is, a fetus

that issues

[the shin is vocalized with a segol, and the gimel with a kamatz]

in

the womb of the

animal?

The same law should apply: the Jew’s share should be subject to firstborn status, even though that share alone cannot sustain the firstborn!?

And we answer:

There,

with regard to miscarriages,

since unconsecrated matter was not mixed into them

[there is no part of the firstborn that is unconsecrated],

we apply to them the verse

“Every firstborn”.

But

here—

with regard to a firstborn in which the gentile owns a share—

since unconsecrated matter was mixed into them,

as the gentile’s share is not subject to firstborn status,

we do not apply to them the verse

“Every firstborn.”

Rabbi Elazar did not enter the house of study. He found Rabbi Asi and said to him: What did the Sages say in the house of study?

[Rabbi Elazar did not come to the house of study, and he met Rabbi Asi—who had been in the house of study—and asked him: What did the Sages say in the house of study?]

He said to him,

Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Elazar: This is what they said in the house of study: