Bekhorot 31b (לא:) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

All disqualified consecrated offerings have their benefit for the Temple treasury.

And we raised a difficulty:

When

does this statement apply?

If you say that it refers to after their redemption,

is it so that

their benefit is for the Temple treasury?

But

their benefit belongs to the owners!

It belongs to the one who redeemed the offering from the Temple treasury, since the animal is his and he profits by selling it at a high price.

Rather,

the Mishna is speaking

before its redemption,

when the proceeds of the sale belong to the Temple treasury.

But it is still difficult with regard to that which it teaches:

“are slaughtered

in a butcher shop.” If, at the time of slaughter, they have not yet been redeemed, he can no longer sell and redeem them,

for they require “standing and valuation”!

A consecrated animal can be redeemed only while alive, as it is written: “He shall have the animal stand before the kohen, and the kohen shall value it”; but after death it cannot be redeemed. What benefit is there in slaughtering them in a butcher shop, since they will remain consecrated?

This works well according to the one who says that consecrated offerings of the altar,

which were consecrated for the altar and then developed a blemish,

were not included in the requirement of “standing and valuation”

—as this law was stated only with regard to consecrated property for Temple maintenance—and it is possible to establish the Mishna as referring to animals slaughtered before their redemption and redeemed after slaughter.

But according to the one who says that consecrated offerings of the altar were included in the requirement of “standing and valuation,” what can be said?

How can he establish the Mishna?

And we answer:

Rather, always

the Mishna is speaking

after redemption.

And what does “their benefit is for the Temple treasury” mean,

since they have already been redeemed and are in the possession of the owners?

It means from the outset!

When the owners initially redeem them, their benefit is for the Temple treasury.

Since the Master permits them to be sold in a butcher shop, slaughtered in a butcher shop, and weighed by the litra,

and through this the owner will receive more money when he sells it, therefore

he redeems it initially for more.

That is, when he comes to redeem the animal from the Temple treasury, he adds to its redemption price because it is worth more to him. The meaning of “their benefit is for the Temple treasury” is that, by our being lenient with him after the redemption, when he comes to sell them, the Temple treasury benefits at the time of the redemption.

We learned in the Mishna:

Except the firstborn animal and the animal tithe, whose benefit is for their owners.

And we raised a difficulty:

Granted, with regard to a firstborn animal,

a blemished one,

it is only in a butcher shop that it may not be sold; but it may be sold at home.

But with regard to the animal tithe,

is it only in a butcher shop that it may not be sold, whereas

it may be sold at home?

But it was taught in a beraita: With regard to a firstborn animal it is stated:

“But the firstborn of an ox, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat,”

“you shall not redeem,”

“they are sacred.” The verse is speaking of the owners, who cannot redeem it.

This indicates that it is specifically redemption that is prohibited, but

it may be sold alive,

as once it comes into the possession of the kohen, the kohen may sell it to others, while it remains in its state of sanctity.

Whereas

with regard to the animal tithe,

the Torah

states: “It shall not be redeemed.”

And we derive from this verse: [below, 32a,]

“And it may not be sold: neither alive nor slaughtered, neither unblemished nor blemished.”

If so, since an animal tithe may not be sold even at home, what does the tanna of the Mishna mean by saying that it may not be sold in a butcher shop, implying that it may be sold at home?

And we say:

This matter was difficult for Rav Sheshet one evening,

at night.

And he resolved it in the morning,

solving it at daybreak,

from a beraita. The Gemara will explain below which beraita this is.

[Below the Gemara explains which beraita this is.]

And this is how he resolved it:

Here,

the Mishna

is dealing with the animal tithe of orphans. And because of the mitzva of restoring lost property

belonging to orphans, who cannot eat all of it,

they addressed the matter

by permitting its sale at home. [The Gemara will explain that the prohibition is only rabbinic, and in the case of orphans they left the matter according to Torah law.]

Rav Idi,

who

was the attendant

of

Rav Sheshet, heard this explanation from him,

the resolution establishing that the Mishna is dealing with the animal tithe of orphans.

Rav Idi went

and

stated it in the study hall, but did not state it in the name

of Rav Sheshet.

Rav Sheshet heard and became angry

because he had not stated it in his name.

He said: “One who stings should be stung by a scorpion.”

One who is sharp-tongued and bites me by failing to state it in my name should be stung by a scorpion. That is, he should be placed under a ban.

And we raise a difficulty:

And what difference does it make to Rav Sheshet

that the matter should be stated in his name?

And we answer:

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: What is the meaning of that which is written, “I shall dwell in Your tent forever”—

is it possible

for

a person to dwell in two worlds,

as “forever” implies two worlds?

Rather,

this is what

David said: “Master of the universe! May people state a teaching in my name in this world.”

For Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai: Any Torah scholar whose teaching is stated in his name in this world, his lips move

and stir

in the grave.

This is a benefit for him, as though he were alive; therefore, he dwells in two worlds.

And Rabbi Yitzhak bar Zeira said, and some say Rabbi Shimon bar Nezira: What is the verse

that supports this?

As it is written: “And your palate is like the best wine, moving smoothly for my beloved, making the lips of those asleep move.”

The Sages were compared to a winepress of grapes:

Just as with a winepress of grapes,

a vessel into which grapes are gathered for seven or eight days so that they will be pressed and ferment,

once a person touches it,

it

moves,

it stirs,

so too, once a person states a teaching in the name of a Torah scholar, his lips move in the grave!

Therefore Rav Sheshet was particular with Rav Idi for not stating his teaching in his name.

And we raise a difficulty:

What beraita?

The one mentioned above, from which Rav Sheshet resolved the difficulty.

And we answer:

For it was taught in a beraita: The animal tithe of orphans may be sold. And an animal tithe that they slaughtered, they incorporate its value into its hide, its fat, its sinews, and its horns.

And we raise a difficulty:

What is it saying?

And we answer:

Abaye said: This is what it is saying: The animal tithe of orphans may be sold. And how may they sell it? They incorporate

the value of the meat

into its hide, its fat, its sinews, and its horns.

Those items may be sold, and they sell them at the price of the entire animal, while giving the meat to the purchaser as a gift.

And we infer:

By inference,

with regard to an animal tithe

of

a

grown

person,

to sell it by incorporation is not

permitted.

And we challenge this:

How is this different from that which we learned in a Mishna: One who purchases a lulav from another during the Sabbatical year,

when it does not have the sanctity of the Sabbatical year because the tree’s blossoming occurred during the sixth year,

the seller gives him

the seller

an etrog as a gift, since he is not permitted to purchase it during the Sabbatical year.

The etrog has the sanctity of the Sabbatical year because its law differs from that of all other trees, as its status follows the time when it was picked, which was during the Sabbatical year. This is speaking of a sale by an unlearned person, from whom it is prohibited to purchase Sabbatical-year produce, because the money assumes the sanctity of the Sabbatical year and he is not careful to safeguard it in accordance with that sanctity.

And we raise a difficulty: If his fellow did not wish

to

give him

the etrog

as a gift, what

can he do?

And Rav Huna said: He incorporates the value of the etrog into the lulav.

He pays him the value of the etrog for the lulav, and receives the etrog as a gift.

What is different there, where it is permitted to sell by incorporation, whereas here, with regard to the animal tithe, they said that only an orphan’s tithe may be sold in this manner, but that of an adult may not?

And we answer:

There,

with regard to the Sabbatical year,

it is not evident

that he incorporated the price of the etrog into the price of the lulav, since the price of the etrog is small.

But

here,

with regard to an animal tithe, where he incorporates the meat into the price of the hide,

it is evident

that he sold the meat, since the hide is worth little.

Rava said: If so,

if the first clause and the latter clause are dealing with the same matter, there is a difficulty: Why did the tanna write

“animal tithe” twice—

why do I need this!?

Rather, Rava said: This is what it is saying: The animal tithe of orphans may be sold in the ordinary manner.

There is no need to incorporate the value of its meat into the value of its hide.

And an animal tithe belonging to an adult that he slaughtered, he incorporates into its hide, its fat, its sinews, and its horns.

Without incorporation, it is prohibited.

Rava said: From where do I say this,

that in the case of an adult it is permitted by incorporation, while in the case of orphans it is permitted without incorporation?

As it is written

with regard to the animal tithe:

“And it and its replacement shall be sacred; it shall not be redeemed.”

And we expound: “Redemption” is analogous to “replacement.”

When

does the Torah say that it

effects a replacement,

meaning that the animal he declared to be the replacement for the tithe assumes sanctity? It is specifically

while the tithe animal is alive

,

as the law of replacement applies only while the animal is alive.

And the same applies here:

When

does the Torah say that an animal tithe

may not be redeemed?

It is specifically

while it is alive. But after slaughter it may be redeemed,

and it is permitted to sell it.

And

only

the Sages

were the ones who

decreed

that it is prohibited to sell an animal tithe even

after slaughter, as a preventive measure lest

one come to sell it

before slaughter.

Therefore, specifically

an item whose value is assessed while alive,

which is sold while alive—that is, the meat, since when an animal is sold alive it is assessed according to the value of its meat, which is the animal’s principal value—

the Sages decreed, after slaughter, as a preventive measure against before slaughter.