Bekhorot 28b — the Talmud in English

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

The Mishna also precisely indicates

that they disagree concerning bodily blemishes that do not change.

As it teaches: Rabbi Meir says: Since it was slaughtered not according to an expert’s instruction, it is forbidden.

And it follows that the reason for Rabbi Meir’s forbidding it is only because it was slaughtered not according to the instruction of a Sage. And if their dispute were concerning blemishes in the eye that change, it should have taught: Rabbi Meir forbids it, since they change.

Conclude from it: Rabbi Meir imposes a penalty.

And we conclude:

Conclude from it.

They raised a dilemma before them:

regarding that which we say that we decree concerning bodily blemishes

because of

blemishes

that change,

do we say—

and all of them change! And this is to say,

do all blemishes in the eye change?

Or perhaps: there are

blemishes in the eye

that change, and there are those that do not change.

What is the practical difference?

In any event, it is forbidden, since perhaps they changed.

And we explain:

To refute witnesses.

If witnesses came and testified before us that a blemish found in the eye did not change after slaughter from what it had been before it.

If you say that all of them change,

these witnesses

are liars.

And if you say that there are

blemishes

that change, and there are

blemishes

that do not change—

we rely upon them.

And the practical difference is according to Rabbi Yehuda, for he does not impose a penalty upon him because he did not show it before slaughter to a Sage; rather, he is only concerned lest the blemish changed after slaughter. Therefore, in a case where witnesses testify that it did not change, it will be permitted.

What

was concluded about it?

Come and hear: For Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Yoshiya of Usha told me: Come and I will show you

blemishes

in the eye

of the animal

that change.

And we infer:

From the fact that he said to him, “Come and I will show you,” it follows that there are

blemishes in the eye

that change, and there are those that do not change.

And he wished to show him that sometimes it changes.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who is not an expert and saw the firstborn, and it was slaughtered on his say—

it must be buried.

And we establish: From the fact that it teaches “it must be buried,” it follows that even if it has a permanent blemish.

Shall we say that we learned an anonymous Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Meir,

who says that in every case we impose a penalty upon him?

And we reject this:

Perhaps it is speaking

of a blemish that is

in the eye, and everyone agrees

that it must be buried, since we are concerned lest it changed.

We learned in the Mishna:

And he shall pay from his own house.

The tanna taught: When he pays

to the priest, he does not pay the value of the entire animal. Rather,

he pays a quarter of

an ordinary animal

and half of

a large animal

.

For perhaps, had he shown the blemish to a Sage, he would have said that it did not contain a permanent blemish. And perhaps it would never have developed a blemish. Therefore, because of the doubt, he pays half. [See Tosafot, s.v. “a quarter”].

And we examine this:

What is the reason

that he pays a quarter for an ordinary animal and half for a large animal?

Rav Pappa said: This,

in a large animal,

is a substantial loss. And this,

in an ordinary animal,

is a minor loss,

since it is not worth much.

And we challenge this:

If so—

let him pay according to the loss!?

For in every case he should pay half—half of the greater amount for this one, and half of the lesser amount for that one; and why should he pay “a quarter”?

Rav Huna bar Manoaḥ said in the name of Rav Aḥa bar Ika: The decree concerning raisers of ordinary animals is involved here.

Since raising an ordinary animal entails much toil, and this one, by permitting it to be slaughtered, prevented the priest from this toil—for perhaps, had he shown it to another Sage, he would not have permitted it, and he would have had much toil continuing to care for it—therefore he pays only a quarter.

Mishna:

A judge who

judged the case,

and erred, and

acquitted the liable.

Or—

obligated the one entitled.

And likewise a Sage whom they came to ask concerning pure things, whether they were impure, and he

declared the pure impure,

or—

declared the impure pure,

and after he issued his ruling they mixed them with pure things that had certainly been pure.

What he did—

is done. And he shall pay

what he caused to be lost

from his own house.

And if

the judge who erred

was an expert of the court,

he is

exempt from paying.

For he acted according to the law in what he ruled according to his opinion, unlike one who is not an expert, for he should not have issued a ruling.

Gemara:

And we examine this: From the fact that it teaches “and he shall pay from his own house”—

shall we say that we learned an anonymous Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who rules the law of dina de-garmi? "

Gerama in damages"—according to everyone, he is exempt under human law from paying, but liable under the laws of Heaven.

One who causes damage through "garmi"—Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree whether he is liable to pay or not. "Gerama in damages" is, for example: one who opens the door of his fellow’s courtyard and thereby his cow is lost. [Bava Kamma 25b]. "

Garmi" is, for example: one who burns his fellow’s promissory note, which did not damage fully realized property belonging to him, for the document is only a means for collecting the debt. [Bava Kamma 98b].

Regarding the foundation of the difference between "gerama," for which everyone is exempt from paying, and "garmi," for which Rabbi Meir obligates him to pay, the early authorities offered several explanations:

a. In garmi, he causes the damage

with his hand.

b. In garmi, the damage comes at the time of the action

immediately.

c. There are early authorities who hold that the foundation of the law of garmi is a penalty imposed by the Sages, and therefore they imposed a penalty only in a usual and common case. [Tosafot, Bava Batra 22b].

And here, in the Mishna, in the case of a judge who erred and obligated the one entitled, he damaged him only through "garmi," yet it teaches that he is liable to pay. If so, shall we say that the Mishna is Rabbi Meir?

And we reject this:

Rav Ilaa said that Rav said:

The Mishna is speaking of one who causes damage with his hands.

For example, he took and gave with his hand.

The judge took the money from the one whom he thought was liable and gave it to the other. Thus, he damaged him with his hands, and his liability is not based on the law of dina de-garmi.

And we challenge this:

Granted,

that which it teaches

“he obligated the one entitled,”

it can be established

as, for example, he took and gave with his hand.

But

that which it teaches

“he acquitted the liable one”—what are the circumstances?

For example, he said to him: You are exempt

from paying.

But

in such a case

he did not take and give with his hand,

but it was speech alone, and he is not truly one who causes damage, but rather it is garmi?

And we answer:

Ravina said:

The Mishna is speaking in this manner:

The case of “he acquitted the liable” is speaking of

for example, he had

the creditor

a pledge of the debtor

from which he could collect. And after he ruled that he was exempt from paying—[“he acquitted the liable”],

and he took

the pledge

from him,

and this is an action with the hands, not garmi.

“He declared the pure impure”

is speaking in a case

where the Sage touched them with

a creeping creature

.

And he rendered them impure.

“He declared the impure pure”

is speaking in a case

where he mixed them with his produce.

The person came to ask the Sage about produce, whether it was pure or not, and the Sage took the produce about which he had been asked and mixed it with produce that was certainly pure; thus it was found that he damaged with his hands by rendering his produce impure.

Mishna:

And there was an incident involving a cow from which the womb—

the house of the womb

belonging to it—

had been removed. And they asked Rabbi Tarfon whether it was a tereifa?

Rabbi Tarfon ruled that it was a tereifa.

And Rabbi Tarfon fed it to dogs.

For on the basis of his ruling, its owners fed it to dogs.

And the incident came before the Sages

who were

in Yavne. And they permitted it.

The physician Theodosius said: No cow or sow leaves Alexandria in Egypt without its womb being cut out so that it will not give birth.

And they did this because the Egyptian cows were superior to those of other places and were sold at a high price. And so that they would not conceive outside their country, they would remove their “womb.” And although they did this, the cow remained alive. And it is proven that the animal does not become a tereifa through removal of the “womb.”

Rabbi Tarfon said:

“Your donkey, Tarfon, has gone!”

And he said this about himself, that because he had issued a ruling not in accordance with the halakha, his donkey had gone and had been lost. For he now had to pay the owners for the damage caused to them.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: Rabbi Tarfon, you are an expert of the court. And everyone who is an expert of the court is exempt from paying

even though he erred.

Gemara:

And we challenge this: What is the reason Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Tarfon that he was exempt from paying because he was an expert?

But let it emerge that he erred concerning a matter of Mishna, and one who errs concerning a matter of Mishna retracts

from what he ruled.

And here too, he erred concerning a matter of Mishna, for we learned in the Mishna in tractate Ḥullin: “If the womb was removed, it is fit” .

And if the cow had still existed, he could have retracted and declared it fit. And although the owners had already fed it to dogs on the basis of Rabbi Tarfon’s ruling, nevertheless, it is impossible to obligate Rabbi Tarfon to pay for this.

And we answer: “

‘One thing, and furthermore,’ he said to him.”

He said an additional reason to him.

One thing: You erred concerning a matter of Mishna.

And therefore you can retract.

And furthermore, even if you erred in a matter of judgment

and you cannot retract, nevertheless, you need not pay, for

you are an expert of the court, and everyone who is an expert of the court

who errs

is exempt from paying.

Mishna:

A Sage

who takes payment to inspect the firstborns—

the firstborns may not be slaughtered

firstborns

on his say,

since we are concerned lest, because he took payment, he permitted it.