Bekhorot 13b — the Talmud in English

Just as

to

your fellow through one, so

to

a gentile also through one.

And

we ask against

Ameimar, who said

in tractate Avodah Zarah 71b:

Pulling with a gentile

whether an Israelite from a gentile, or a gentile from an Israelite

acquires [and not like Reish Lakish in the name of Rabbi Oshaya], this is difficult:

Let it be satisfactory if

it is acceptable, if

Ameimar

holds like Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: By Torah law

in Israel

money acquires,

and

whereas

pulling does not acquire—

It is therefore satisfactory, for

the derivation

“

to your fellow”

that distinguishes between an Israelite and a gentile is effective in order to teach:

To your fellow

you sell

with money,

whereas

to a gentile through pulling.

But if he holds

Ameimar

like Reish Lakish, who said: Pulling

in Israel

is explicit from the Torah—

as it is stated, “from the hand of your fellow,” which implies pulling—and an Israelite also sells and acquires through pulling, it follows: both

to your fellow through pulling, and to a gentile through pulling—

And if so, “

to your fellow”—

which implies a distinction between an Israelite and a gentile—

why do I need it!?

They said

the members of the academy, to explain according to Ameimar:

The fact that the verse excluded “to your fellow” did not come to exclude the gentile from the methods of acquisition of a sale, but to exclude him from the fundamental law of that section, which is the section of overreaching, and to teach:

To your fellow you return overreaching, but you do not return overreaching to a gentile.

And we ask: Yet

to a gentile

to whom you do not return overreaching,

from “

Do not wrong one another”

and not the gentile

is derived, so why do I need “to your fellow”!?

And we answer:

One

one

of these exclusions

for a gentile

to exclude him from overreaching,

and one for consecrated property

to exclude it from overreaching; and therefore both “to your fellow” and “one another” were necessary.

And both are necessary,

the two verses:

For had the Merciful One written

only verse

one, I would say: It is a gentile who has no overreaching, but consecrated property does have overreaching—

It teaches us

the second verse that consecrated property too has no overreaching.

And we still ask concerning the interpretation according to Ameimar, that “to your fellow” did not come to exclude the gentile from the methods of acquisition of a sale, but to exclude him from overreaching:

This is satisfactory according to the one who says that

:

his robbery

of a gentile

is forbidden; this is why a verse was needed to permit overreaching

to a gentile.

But if he holds

Ameimar

like the one who says that the robbery of a gentile is permitted,

then

overreaching—need it be said

that it is permitted? Why do I need a verse to permit overreaching to a gentile!?

They said

the members of the academy, to explain: Indeed,

if he holds

Ameimar

like the one who says that robbery is permitted, it is necessarily

that Ameimar

holds like Rabbi Yoḥanan

that an Israelite acquires with money, and the exclusion “to your fellow” does not refer to overreaching, but teaches that a gentile acquires through pulling, unlike an Israelite.

It raises an objection

against Reish Lakish in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, who holds that money acquires with a gentile and pulling is also not required, from that which was taught:

One who purchases scrap metal

fragments of silver

from a gentile and finds idolatry among it.

If, before he gave money,

he pulled it,

then

he shall return it

he may return it to the gentile so that he will nullify it, and afterward, if he wishes, he may purchase it from him; for although he pulled it, we do not say that it is the idolatry of an Israelite, which cannot be nullified, because pulling from a gentile does not acquire.

And if, after he gave money,

then

he pulled it,

he can no longer return it to the gentile so that he will nullify it, because the Israelite has already acquired it, and the idolatry of an Israelite can never be nullified; therefore

he shall lead

the idolatry

to the Salt Sea.

And we ask from the latter clause against Reish Lakish in the name of Rabbi Oshaya:

And if you say that money

alone

acquires

from a gentile, and pulling together with it is not required, then he acquired it as soon as he gave the money, and

pulling

in addition to the money—and as is explained in the beraita: “And if, after he gave money, he pulled it”—

why do I need it!?

And we answer:

What are we dealing with here?

In a case such as

where

he accepted upon himself

the gentile

to be judged according to the laws of Israel, and with an Israelite money does not acquire, but pulling does;

and he explains it further.

And we question this: Yet

if so, why do I need money,

that is, in the latter clause of the beraita it is explained that both acts of acquisition are required; and what does it help us that he accepted upon himself to be judged according to the laws of Israel? For if so, pulling alone should acquire, and why did the beraita require two acts of acquisition!?

And we answer: The intention of the latter clause of the beraita is not to require two acts of acquisition, but

this is what it says: Even though he gave money, if he pulls, yes; and if not

no,

because he accepted upon himself to be judged according to the laws of Israel, according to which pulling is what acquires.

And we ask:

If so,

according to your words, that pulling acquires for this gentile [because this is what he accepted upon himself],

the first clause is difficult,

for it states in it: “If, before he gave money, he pulled it, he shall return it,” proving that pulling alone does not acquire; and once again it is necessarily necessary to say that neither pulling alone acquires, as is explained in the first clause, nor money alone acquires, as is explained in the latter clause, and this is unlike Reish Lakish, who holds that money alone acquires!?

He said

he answered

Abaye:

The reason for

the first clause,

that if he pulled it without giving money he shall return it, is

because there is a mistaken purchase,

for he did not know that there was idolatry in it, and therefore he shall return it.

He said

he challenged

Rava

to Abaye:

And is it

the first clause

that

there is a mistaken purchase,

but

in the latter clause there is no mistaken purchase!?

That is, if, as you say, there is a mistaken purchase here, then why is it different that in the latter clause, when he pulled it after giving the money, you said that he should not return it? In the end, there is a mistaken purchase here!?

Rather, Rava said:

The first clause and the latter clause are a mistaken purchase,

but nevertheless, because of this alone he should not return it [unlike Abaye], because by returning it he appears to be selling idolatry to an Israelite; and in this decree there is a distinction between pulling after giving money and pulling without giving money:

In the first clause, where he did not give money, he does not appear to have idolatry in the hand of an Israelite,

that is, since he did not give money, when he returns it to the gentile he is not receiving his money from him, and this does not appear as a sale to the gentile—whereas

in the latter clause, where he gave money,

and when he returns it to the gentile he takes payment from him,

it appears as idolatry in the hand of an Israelite,

that is, as an Israelite selling idolatry to a gentile.

And Abaye could say to you

to explain his words: in the first clause, when he pulled without giving money, he returns it because it is a mistaken transaction, whereas in the latter clause, when he pulled after giving the money, he is not permitted to return it—and in the end, it is a mistaken transaction:

The first clause

indeed

is a mistaken transaction,

and because

he did not know

what was in the scrap metal—

for he did not give him money [

because he had not yet given money] and he was not required to inspect what was in the scrap metal, for an ordinary merchant does not inspect until the time of giving money -

But

the latter clause is not a mistaken transaction, for once he gave money, when he pulls he should have inspected and then pulled [since he gave money, he should have checked before the pulling what they were selling him, and only afterward should he pull], and if he did not do so, he certainly waived his claim.

[поскольку после передачи денег ему следовало до перемещения проверить, что ему продают, и только затем переместить товар], а если он этого не сделал, то, несомненно, отказался от претензии.

Rav Ashi said

to resolve the essential difficulty against Resh Lakish from the beraita in another manner:

Not as you explained the latter clause—that pulling acquires it, because he accepted upon himself to be judged according to the laws of Israel; rather,

from the first clause [from what we hear from the first clause] that

of

pulling does not acquire

for a gentile,

the latter clause also: pulling does not acquire,

and if it is difficult for you: since it is money that acquires it, why do I need pulling in the latter clause? I can say to you:

And since the first clause taught “he pulled,” it also taught

in the

latter clause “he pulled”,

and the essential intention of the beraita is to say that specifically money is required.

Ravina said

on the contrary,

from

what is proven from the

latter clause,

that

pulling acquires,

and this is a case in which he accepted upon himself to be judged according to the laws of Israel,

the first clause also: pulling acquires,

that is, even in the first clause we are compelled to explain it in a manner in which pulling alone is effective. And if it is difficult for you: but in the first clause it is explicitly stated, “If he pulled before he gave money, he returns it,” which shows that pulling does not acquire it; I can say to you:

And the first clause means this: if he neither gave nor pulled, he returns -

and

what

“returns,”

and yet no return is required at all, since he did nothing whatsoever!? This is its meaning:

he returns by words,

that is, he can retract his verbal agreement with the gentile to purchase it.

And if it is difficult for you: it is obvious that he returns, since there was no acquisition whatsoever; I can say to you:

He holds

that this tanna

words have the status of those lacking trust [there is a lack of trustworthiness in one who retracts his words], and if it were a case like this involving an Israelite, it would not be proper to retract,

and

it teaches us in the beraita:

this applies to an Israelite with an Israelite

that he should not retract his word, because

they uphold

their word,

Israelites

by their word [they stand by their word], and you too should stand by your word to them;

but an Israelite with a gentile,

since

they

the gentiles

do not stand by their word -

he does not

need also to stand by his word to them.

uphold his verbal commitment to them.