Bekhorot 13a — the Talmud in English

Rav Sheshet said to reconcile the contradiction between what we learned in the first beraita, “And the redemption of a firstborn donkey is immediately,” and what we learned in the second beraita, “There is no [obligation] concerning a firstborn donkey before thirty [days]”:

to resolve the contradiction between what we learned in the first beraita—a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna—“The redemption of a firstborn donkey is performed immediately,” and what we learned in the second beraita, “There is no period of less than thirty days with regard to a firstborn donkey”:

That which it teaches, “There is no [obligation] concerning a firstborn donkey before thirty [days],” the tanna did not come to say that the mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey is not before thirty days. Rather, in fact, the mitzva of redemption is immediately, as we learned in the first beraita, but

to say that

if he did not redeem it,

he does not transgress concerning it

until thirty [days], and from then onward he transgresses; but nevertheless, even ab initio he may fulfill the mitzva of redemption immediately, as we learned: “And the redemption of a firstborn donkey is immediately.”

Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection

to Rav Sheshet, who holds that the mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey is immediately, from what we learned in a beraita:

Its mitzva

of a firstborn donkey

is all thirty days

and it proceeds to explain it:

From then onward, he either redeems it or breaks its neck.

Is it not

the intention of what we learned, “Its mitzva is all thirty days,” to say that

it is a mitzva to keep it for all thirty days,

and this would be a difficulty for Rav Sheshet, who says that the time of the mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey is immediately, only that he does not transgress concerning it until thirty days!?

And we answer:

No,

not as you interpreted what we learned, “Its mitzva is all thirty days,” but this is what it says:

It is a mitzva to redeem it throughout the thirty days,

meaning, the time of its mitzva is immediately and until thirty days, and if he delayed this time, he transgresses.

And we raise a difficulty against this:

If so,

what is the meaning of what we learned,

“From then onward, he either redeems it or breaks its neck,”

when before thirty [days] its law is also so? And according to your words: “From then onward,

he transgresses concerning it”

it should have said,

for this is the principal law that the beraita comes to state.

Written according to the emendation of the Chazon Ish, Bekhorot 17:10. But Rabbeinu Gershom versions it: “Either he breaks its neck or he transgresses concerning it, it should have said.” [It is clear from Rabbeinu Gershom’s words that “or he redeems it” is difficult for the Gemara, but “or he breaks its neck” is not difficult for the Gemara. The apparent explanation is that the mitzva of breaking its neck applies only when he was required to redeem it and did not redeem it, as the verse says, “And if you do not redeem it, you shall break its neck” (as also appears from the words of the Chazon Ish in note 1). But if he may ab initio wait with the redemption, he is not obligated to break its neck. If so, what we learned, “or he breaks its neck,” is not difficult, for it is only from then onward—after thirty [days]—that he is obligated to break its neck.] Rather, Rava said:

In fact, what we learned, “Its mitzva is all thirty days,” means that it is a mitzva to keep it, as is demonstrated by the language of the beraita, and this is also what we learned, “There is no [obligation] concerning a firstborn donkey before thirty [days],” and not in accordance with Rav Sheshet; nevertheless,

there is no difficulty

from the beraita in which we learned, “The redemption of a firstborn donkey is immediately”:

This

that we learned, “There is no [obligation] concerning a firstborn donkey before thirty [days],” and likewise what we learned, “Its mitzva is all thirty days,”

is Rabbi Eliezer,

whose Mishna this is,

for he derives by analogy

the firstborn of an impure animal from the firstborn of a person, and the same applies with regard to the time of redemption: we derive it by analogy.

This

beraita in which we learned, “The redemption of a firstborn donkey is immediately,”

is the Rabbis,

it is,

for they do not derive

the firstborn of an impure animal from the firstborn of a person.

Mishna:

If he did not wish to redeem it,

the firstborn donkey, then

he breaks its neck from behind—

for the Torah said, “And if you do not redeem it, you shall break its neck”—

and he buries it,

for it is forbidden to derive benefit from it.

The mitzva of redemption

of a firstborn donkey

precedes the mitzva of breaking its neck, as it is stated,

“And if you do not redeem it, you shall break its neck.”

The mitzva

of

designation

by which the master designates his Hebrew maidservant as a wife—for himself or for his son—

precedes the mitzva of redemption,

by which the Hebrew maidservant is redeemed by paying the value of the remaining years [“deduction of money”],

as it is stated

in the passage concerning the Hebrew maidservant [Exodus 21:8]:

“Whom he did not designate, and he shall redeem her,”

and it implies: but if he designated her, that is preferable.

The mitzva of yibbum

of the wife of his brother who died and left no children

precedes the mitzva of ḥalitza,

by which the wife of his brother removes his shoe for him.

And the mitzva of yibbum takes precedence only

at first, when they intended

the brothers performing yibbum

for the sake of the mitzva—

but

if

now they do not intend for the sake of the mitzva,

but rather for the sake of intercourse,

the Sages said,

the Sages:

The mitzva of ḥalitza precedes the mitzva of yibbum.

The mitzva of redemption

of an animal that he consecrated for the Temple treasury—is

with the master [the consecrator],

that the consecrator should redeem it from the consecration, teaching that

he [the consecrator]

is

first before every person, as it is stated

[Leviticus 27:27]: “And if it is an impure animal [and a person consecrates an impure animal for the Temple treasury], then he shall redeem it according to your valuation [according to the valuation that the koen assigns to it], and he shall add its fifth to it [the owners add a fifth when they redeem their consecrated property],

and if he does not redeem it [through the owners],

[through the owner,]

then it shall be sold [to others]

[to others]

according to your valuation.”

We shall return to you, chapter “One Who Purchases the Embryo of His Donkey.”

The previous chapter dealt with the firstborn of a donkey and explained its laws; and this chapter and the chapters following it deal with the firstborn of a kosher animal; and the laws of this Mishna—until “the priests and the Levites”—concern the firstborn of a kosher animal, just as the laws of the first Mishna in the previous chapter concern the firstborn of a donkey.

Mishna:

One who purchases the fetus of his cow

that is about to give birth

from a gentile, and one who sells to him

the fetus of his cow that is about to give birth,

even though he is not permitted

to sell him the fetus of his cow, since one may not sell a large animal to a gentile—

and one who enters into a partnership with him

[with the gentile] whether concerning the mother or concerning the firstborn.

And one who receives it from him,

where the gentile gives him the mother to care for, and in payment for this he gives him a right in the animal to half its offspring, with the result that the body of the animal belongs to the gentile, while an Israelite has a right in the animal to half its offspring, and they are partners in the firstborn.

And one who gives it to him in a receiving arrangement,

with the result that the body of the animal belongs to an Israelite, while the gentile has a right in the animal to half its offspring, and they are partners in the firstborn.

In all these cases:

he is exempt from the firstborn status; as it is stated

[Numbers 3]: “

I have consecrated to Me every firstborn in Israel,” and we learned: the firstborn shall be

in Israel, but not among others

that is, among a gentile; and from here, that if the firstborn belongs to a gentile, it is not subject to the firstborn obligation.

The priests and the Levites—

whom we learned in the previous chapter [3b], concerning the firstborn of a donkey, that they are exempt—

are obligated

in the firstborn of a kosher animal.

They were not exempt

the priests and the Levites

from the firstborn of a kosher animal, but only from the redemption of the son and from the firstborn of a donkey.

Gemara:

Behold, the first chapter, which begins with “one who purchases the fetus of his donkey from a gentile,” deals with the laws of the firstborn of a donkey, and this chapter—which begins with “one who purchases the fetus of his cow from a gentile”—and the chapters following it deal with the laws of the firstborn of a kosher animal; and we ask:

What is the reason that he taught “

one who purchases

the fetus of his donkey”

[and all the other laws of the previous chapter dealing with the firstborn of a donkey]

at the beginning

[first],

and afterward taught “

one who purchases

the fetus of his cow”

[and all its other laws concerning the firstborn of a kosher animal, which are taught in several chapters before us]? That is, why were the laws of the firstborn of a donkey taught first, before the laws of the firstborn of a kosher animal—

Let him teach first “

one who purchases

the fetus of his cow,”

and all the laws of the firstborn of a kosher animal,

for

behold, the firstborn of a kosher animal

has bodily sanctity, and afterward let him teach “

one who purchases

the fetus of his donkey”

[and all its other laws],

for

behold, the firstborn of a donkey has

sanctity of value

only;

it

is so, since one redeems it and its sanctity departs.

They said in the West,

they answered in the Land of Israel in two ways:

If you wish, say: Since it is beloved to him

[because it is beloved to the tanna], the firstborn of a donkey,

in accordance with Rabbi Hanina,

who asked [above, 5b]: Why did the firstborns of donkeys differ, in that they are sacred, from the firstborns of horses and camels, which are not sacred? And Rabbi Elazar answered him: Because they assisted Israel at the time of their departure from Egypt, for there was not a single Israelite who did not have with him ninety Libyan donkeys loaded with the silver and gold of Egypt; and therefore he placed them first.

And if you wish, say:

Since its matters concerning an impure animal are few

[since the general laws of the firstborn of a donkey are fewer than the laws of the firstborn of a kosher animal], for only one chapter deals with it, whereas concerning the firstborn of a kosher animal we learned several chapters in this tractate, therefore

he cut it off and put it aside,

that is, the tanna preferred to finish them first.

Rabbi Yitzhak bar Nahmani said that Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya:

a. Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagreed in Bava Metzia 47b concerning the law of the sale of movable property from one Israelite to another Israelite. Rabbi Yohanan’s view is: by Torah law, movable property is acquired with money and not by pulling, and only by rabbinic enactment is it acquired only when he pulls it [even if he did not give money], because of a decree, as explained there.

And Reish Lakish holds: by Torah law, money does not acquire movable property; rather, pulling is what acquires it.

b. The discussion before us deals with the law of the sale of movable property by an Israelite to a gentile or by a gentile to an Israelite, whether the acquisition is effected by money or by pulling.

c. Our discussion holds that an Israelite acquires movable property from an Israelite by pulling and not with money.

An Israelite who gave money to a gentile for his animal

that is about to give birth:

According to their laws

we judge him according to the laws of the gentiles, whose acquisition is with money, [and he proceeds to explain it]! And therefore:

even though he did not pull it,

nevertheless

he acquired

the animal with the money he gave,

and it is subject to the firstborn obligation.

And

likewise,

a gentile who gave money to an Israelite for his animal

that is about to give birth:

according to their laws

we judge him, for their acquisition is with money! And

even though he did not pull it—

the gentile acquired

the animal with the money he gave,

and it is exempt from the firstborn obligation.

The Master said: An Israelite who gave money to a gentile for his animal, according to their laws!

And

even though he did not pull it—

he acquired it, and it is subject to the firstborn obligation.

And we explain:

What is meant by “according to their laws”?

If we say:

we judge the acquisition of the gentile’s animal—that is, his movable property—

according to their laws concerning his person

[according to the laws of acquisition by which an Israelite acquires a gentile as a slave]—

And because

it follows

that the acquisition of movable property follows the acquisition of his person,

by a kal va-chomer:

If his person is acquired by an Israelite with money, as it is written

[Leviticus 25:46]: “And you shall take them as an inheritance”—your Canaanite slaves—“for your sons after you,”

as an inherited possession,”

the verse compared him—

the verse compared him

—a gentile slave acquired by an Israelite—

to an inherited possession

[land], in order to teach:

Just as land is acquired with money, with a document, and by possession, so too a Canaanite slave

by an Israelite

is acquired with money

[and with a document and by possession]—

His property, is it not all the more so

that it should be acquired with money? This cannot be said, for:

If so—if we derive the acquisition of the gentile’s movable property from the acquisition of his person—

even

with a document and by possession also

the Israelite would acquire the gentile’s movable property, just as he acquires his person through these acquisitions.

And furthermore,

this kal va-chomer is difficult:

An Israelite

who purchases movable property

from an Israelite proves it, for

his

person he acquires with money,

but nevertheless

his property

he acquires

by pulling

and not with money.

Rather, Abaye said,

to explain what they said, “according to their laws”:

According to the laws that the Torah established for them,

[for the gentiles],

the

Torah, as it is stated [Leviticus 25:14, in the passage concerning exploitation]: “When you sell a sale to your fellow

or acquire from the hand of your fellow,”

and this implies that you acquire from your fellow “hand to hand,” that is, by pulling; and the Torah excluded:

“from the hand of your fellow”

the Israelite

is the one that

you acquire

by pulling; but from the hand of a gentile,

you acquire

with money.

And we ask:

And perhaps

we should explain the exclusion in the verse, “from the hand of your fellow,” as coming to exclude:

from the hand of a gentile, not at all,

that is, an Israelite does not acquire from a gentile either with money or by pulling, until the object enters his domain.

They said,

the members of the academy:

It cannot enter your mind,

for

it is a kal va-chomer: if he acquires his person, is it not all the more so that he acquires his property.

And

we still ask:

say

the verse “from the hand of your fellow” came to teach:

from the hand of a gentile, until there are two

until both are present: money and pulling!?

They said: Is this not a kal va-chomer

that the Israelite should acquire the movable property of the gentile through one act of acquisition!? And would it be said that

his person

the Israelite acquires from the gentile

through one

whereas

his property through two!?

And

we still ask: From where is it to interpret that the Israelite acquires from the gentile specifically through money and not through pulling? For perhaps

say “from the hand of your fellow” means through pulling and not through money, whereas from the hand of a gentile

either through this or through that

either through this or through that

either through money or through pulling!?

And we answer: The gentile is understood

as analogous to your fellow:

Just as

from the hand of

your fellow through one

he acquires through only one act of acquisition,

so

from

a gentile also through one

he acquires through one act of acquisition; and necessarily, the verse came to say that from an Israelite he acquires specifically through pulling, and from a gentile specifically through money.

The master said:

And a gentile who gave money to an Israelite for his animal, according to their laws!

And

even though he did not pull it, he acquired it and is exempt from the firstborn.

The Gemara asks:

What is

“according to their laws”?

If we say, according to their laws concerning his person

according to the law by which a gentile acquires the person of an Israelite as a slave, and

because there comes

the gentile’s acquisition of the movable property of an Israelite

through a kal va-chomer

from the gentile’s acquisition of the person of an Israelite:

If the person of an Israelite he acquires with money, as it is written

in connection with an Israelite sold to a gentile as a slave: “He shall calculate the price of his redemption

from the money of his purchase,”

and we learned that he is acquired by him through money,

his property

of an Israelite

all the more so

that the gentile should acquire with money—so it is impossible to interpret it this way, for:

An Israelite from an Israelite proves it, for

the

person

of an Israelite

another Israelite acquires

from an Israelite

with money, whereas

his

property

an Israelite acquires from an Israelite only

through pulling.

Rather, Abaye said: According to their laws that the Torah established for them,

as it is stated in the section of overreaching:

“When you sell a sale to your fellow

or buy from the hand of your fellow, do not wrong one another”; and therefore the verse said “to your fellow” in order to teach:

To your fellow

you sell your movable property

through pulling; but to a gentile

you sell

with money.

And we ask:

And perhaps

the verse came to say: To your fellow you sell through pulling, whereas

to a gentile, not at all

and he cannot sell to a gentile even with money.

They said

the members of the academy, to resolve it:

And is this

not a kal va-chomer: if the person

of the Israelite

the gentile acquired,

the gentile,

the property

of an Israelite

all the more so

that the gentile should acquire it.

And we still ask:

Say, perhaps the verse came to say: When you sell a sale

to a gentile,

until there are two

money and pulling, but money alone does not acquire.

And we answer: Is this

not

a-fortiori inference

a kal va-chomer

that one act of acquisition should suffice for a gentile? For if

the person

of an Israelite the gentile acquires

through

one act of acquisition,

one,

would we say that

his property

is acquired only

through two?

And we still ask:

And perhaps

the verse came to say: When you sell a sale to a gentile, sell it to him

either through this or through that

either through money or through pulling, and it is not necessary that he acquire specifically through money.

And we answer: A sale to a gentile is

analogous

to a sale

to your fellow: