Bekhorot 13a (יג.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Sheshet said to resolve in another manner the contradiction between what we learned in the first beraita: “The redemption of a firstborn donkey is immediately,” and what we learned in the second beraita: “With regard to a firstborn donkey, there is no obligation before thirty days”:

What the tanna teaches: “With regard to a firstborn donkey, there is no obligation before thirty days,” does not mean that the mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey is not to be performed before thirty days. Rather, the mitzva of redemption is indeed immediately, as we learned in the first beraita. Rather,

When the tanna—a sage of the Mishnaic period—teaches, “There is no period of less than thirty days with regard to a firstborn donkey,” he is not saying that the mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey does not apply before thirty days. Rather, the mitzva of redemption is always to be performed immediately, as we learned in the first beraita. Rather,

it is to say that

if one did not redeem it,

he does not transgress on its account

until thirty days; and from that point onward he transgresses. Nevertheless, one may even initially fulfill the mitzva of redemption immediately, as we learned: “The redemption of a firstborn donkey is immediately.”

Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection to Rav Sheshet, who maintains that the mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey is immediately, from what we learned in a beraita:

to Rav Sheshet, who maintains that the mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey applies immediately, from what we learned in a beraita:

Its mitzva

of a firstborn donkey

is throughout the thirty days

and it proceeds to explain this:

From that point onward, either he redeems it or he decapitates it.

Is it not

the intention of what we learned, “Its mitzva is throughout the thirty days,” to say that

it is a mitzva to leave it for the entire thirty days

? And this would be a difficulty for Rav Sheshet, who says that the time of the mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey is immediately, and that one merely does not transgress on its account until thirty days!?

And we answer:

No,

not as you explained what we learned, “Its mitzva is throughout the thirty days.” Rather, this is what it means:

It is a mitzva to redeem it throughout the thirty days

—that is, the time of its mitzva is immediately and extends until thirty days; and if he delayed beyond this time, he transgresses.

And we challenge this:

If so,

what is the meaning of what we learned,

“From that point onward, either he redeems it or he decapitates it”?

But this is also its law before thirty days. According to you, it should have said: “From that point onward,

he transgresses on its account”

it should have been stated, since that is the principal law that the beraita comes to teach.

Rather, Rava said:

The statement we learned, “Its mitzva is throughout the thirty days,” indeed means that it is a mitzva to leave it for that period, as the wording of the beraita demonstrates. This is also the meaning of what we learned, “With regard to a firstborn donkey, there is no obligation before thirty days,” and not in accordance with Rav Sheshet. Nevertheless,

it is not difficult

from the beraita in which we learned, “The redemption of a firstborn donkey is immediately”:

This

that we learned, “With regard to a firstborn donkey, there is no obligation before thirty days,” and likewise what we learned, “Its mitzva is throughout the thirty days,” is the opinion of

Rabbi Eliezer

which is the Mishna’s opinion,

as he derives

[by analogy]

the firstborn of an impure animal from the firstborn of a human being; and the same applies with regard to the time of redemption, which is likewise derived by analogy.

This

the beraita in which we learned, “The redemption of a firstborn donkey is immediately,” is the opinion of

the Rabbis,

who

do not derive

the firstborn of an impure animal from the firstborn of a human being.

Mishna:

If he did not wish to redeem it

—the firstborn donkey—

he decapitates it from behind—

for the Torah states, “And if you will not redeem it, you shall decapitate it”—

and he buries it,

for it is forbidden to derive benefit from it.

The mitzva of redemption

of a firstborn donkey

takes precedence over the mitzva of decapitation, as it is stated:

“And if you will not redeem it, you shall decapitate it.”

The mitzva

of

designation

—by which the master designates his Hebrew maidservant as a wife, either for himself or for his son—

takes precedence over the mitzva of redemption

by which the Hebrew maidservant is redeemed through payment of the value of the remaining years [“the deduction of money”],

as it is stated

in the passage concerning the Hebrew maidservant [Exodus 21:8]:

“Who did not designate her, then he shall let her be redeemed,”

which implies: But if he designated her, that is preferable.

The mitzva of levirate marriage of the wife of one’s brother who died without children

takes precedence over the mitzva of halitza,

by which the wife of his brother removes his shoe.

And the mitzva of levirate marriage takes precedence only

at first, when the levirs intended

—those performing levirate marriage—

for the sake of the mitzva

—

But

if

nowadays, when they do not intend for the sake of the mitzva

but rather for the sake of intercourse,

the Sages said:

The mitzva of halitza takes precedence over the mitzva of levirate marriage.

The mitzva of redemption

of an animal that one consecrated for Temple maintenance is

with the master

[the one who consecrated it], who redeems it from the consecrated property. This teaches that

he

[the one who consecrated it]

takes precedence over every other person, as it is stated

[Leviticus 27:27]: “And if it is an impure animal [and a person consecrates an impure animal for Temple maintenance], he shall redeem it according to your valuation [according to the valuation assigned to it by the koen], and he shall add its fifth to it [the owner adds a fifth when redeeming his consecrated property].

And if he does not redeem it

[through the owner],

then it shall be sold

[to others]

according to your valuation.”

We have returned to you, the chapter “One Who Purchases the Fetus of His Donkey”

We shall return to you, chapter “One Who Purchases the Fetus of His Donkey.”

The previous chapter dealt with the firstborn donkey and explained its laws; this chapter and the chapters that follow deal with the firstborn of a kosher animal. The laws of this Mishna, until the words “the priests and the Levites,” concern the firstborn of a kosher animal, just as the laws of the first Mishna of the previous chapter concern the firstborn donkey.

Mishna:

One who purchases the fetus of his cow

that is about to give birth to its first offspring

from a gentile, or one who sells it to him

the fetus of his cow that is about to give birth to its first offspring,

even though he is not permitted

to sell him the fetus of his cow, since one may not sell a large animal to a gentile—

or enters into a partnership with him

[with the gentile,] whether with regard to the mother or with regard to the firstborn.

Or one who receives it from him,

where the gentile gives him the mother to care for, and in return for this care he gives him a right to half of the offspring of the animal. Consequently, the animal itself belongs to the gentile, while the Israelite has a right to half of its offspring, and they are partners with regard to the firstborn.

Or one who gives it to him under a receiving arrangement,

with the result that the animal itself belongs to the Israelite, while the gentile has a right to half of its offspring, and they are partners with regard to the firstborn.

In all these cases:

the animal is exempt from the law of the firstborn, as it is stated

[Numbers 3]: “

I have consecrated to Myself every firstborn in Israel,” and we learned from this that the firstborn must be

in Israel, but not among others,

that is, among gentiles. From here it follows that if the firstborn belongs to a gentile, it is not subject to the law of the firstborn.

The priests and the Levites—

whom we learned in the previous chapter [3b] are exempt with regard to the firstborn donkey—

are obligated

with regard to the firstborn of a kosher animal.

The priests and the Levites were not exempt

from

the firstborn of a kosher animal; rather, they were exempt from the redemption of a firstborn son and from the firstborn donkey.

Gemara:

The first chapter, which begins with “One who purchases the fetus of his gentile’s donkey,” deals with the laws of the firstborn donkey, whereas this chapter—which begins with “One who purchases the fetus of his gentile’s cow”—and the chapters that follow deal with the laws of the firstborn of a kosher animal. And we ask:

Why is it specifically the case that he taught “

one who purchases

the fetus of his donkey”

[and all the other laws of the previous chapter dealing with the firstborn donkey]

first

[at the beginning],

and afterward he taught “

one who purchases

the fetus of his cow”

[and all the other laws of the firstborn of a kosher animal taught in several of the chapters that follow]? In other words, why were the laws of the firstborn donkey taught before the laws of the firstborn of a kosher animal?

Let him teach first “

one who purchases

the fetus of his cow,”

and all the laws of the firstborn of a kosher animal,

as

the firstborn of a kosher animal

possesses intrinsic sanctity, and afterward let him teach “

one who purchases

the fetus of his donkey”

[and all its other laws],

as

the firstborn donkey

possesses sanctity of monetary value

alone

and

its sanctity is removed through redemption.

In the West, they said,

they offered two explanations in Eretz Yisrael:

If you wish, say: Since it is dear to him

[because it is dear to the tanna],

in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina,

who asked [above, 5b]: Why did the firstborn donkeys become sacred, unlike the firstborn of horses and camels, which do not become sacred? Rabbi Elazar answered him: Because they assisted Israel at the time of their departure from Egypt, for there was not a single Israelite who did not have ninety Libyan donkeys with him, laden with the silver and gold of Egypt. Therefore, the tanna placed their laws first.

And if you wish, say:

Since the laws of an impure animal are few

[since the laws of the firstborn donkey are fewer than those of the firstborn of a kosher animal], as only one chapter deals with it, whereas several chapters in this tractate deal with the firstborn of a kosher animal, therefore

he concluded them and cast them aside,

that is, the tanna preferred to finish those laws first.

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani said that Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya:

a. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disputed in Bava Metzia 47b concerning the sale of movable property from one Israelite to another. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s view is that, by Torah law, money effects the acquisition of movable property and not pulling, and that it is only by rabbinic decree that the purchaser acquires it only when he pulls it [even if he has not given money], because of a decree, as explained there.

Reish Lakish maintains that, by Torah law, money does not effect the acquisition of movable property; rather, pulling effects the acquisition.

b. The present sugya discusses the law governing the sale of movable property from an Israelite to a gentile, or from a gentile to an Israelite: whether the acquisition is effected by money or by pulling.

c. Our sugya maintains that an Israelite acquires movable property from another Israelite through pulling and not through money.

An Israelite who gave money to a gentile for his animal

that is about to give birth to its first offspring:

According to their laws,

we judge him according to the laws of the gentiles, whose acquisition is effected by money, [as he proceeds to explain]! Therefore:

even though he did not pull it,

nevertheless

he acquired

the animal through the money he gave,

and it is subject to the law of the firstborn.

And

likewise,

a gentile who gave money to an Israelite for his animal

that is about to give birth to its first offspring:

according to their laws

we judge him, since their acquisition is effected by money!

And even though he did not pull it,

he acquired

the animal through the money he gave,

and it is exempt from the law of the firstborn.

The Master said: An Israelite who gave money to a gentile for his animal, according to their laws!

And

even though he did not pull it,

he acquired it, and it is subject to the law of the firstborn.

And we explain:

What is the meaning of “according to their laws”?

If you say:

that we judge the acquisition of the gentile’s animal—that is, his movable property—

according to their laws concerning his person

[the laws governing the acquisition by an Israelite of a gentile as a slave]—

And because

it follows

that the acquisition of movable property follows the acquisition of his person,

by means of a kal va-chomer:

If an Israelite acquires his person through money, as it is written

[Leviticus 25:46]: “And you shall take them as an inheritance”—that is, your Canaanite slaves—“for your children after you

to inherit as a possession.””

the verse compared him—

The verse compared him

—a gentile slave acquired by an Israelite—

to a possession

[land], in order to teach:

Just as land is acquired through money, a document, and possession, so too a Canaanite slave

by an Israelite

is acquired through money

[as well as through a document and possession]—

His property should certainly be acquired through money;

this cannot be said, for:

If so

—if we derive the acquisition of a gentile’s movable property from the acquisition of his person—

he should acquire it even through a document and possession,

just as he acquires his person through these forms of acquisition.

Furthermore,

this kal va-chomer is subject to the following objection:

An Israelite

who purchases movable property

from an Israelite proves otherwise, for

his

person he acquires through money,

but nevertheless

his property

he acquires

through pulling

and not through money.

Rather, Abaye said

to explain what they said, “according to their laws”:

According to the laws that the Torah established for them,

[for the gentiles,]

the Torah,

as it is stated [Leviticus 25:14, in the passage concerning exploitation]: “When you sell something to your fellow,

or acquire something from the hand of your fellow,”

which indicates that when you acquire from your fellow, “from hand to hand”—that is, through pulling—the Torah excluded:

“from the hand of your fellow”

the Israelite

is the one whom

you acquire

through pulling; but from the hand of a gentile

you acquire

through money.

And we ask:

And perhaps

the exclusion in the verse, “from the hand of your fellow,” comes to exclude

“from the hand of a gentile—not at all,”

that is, an Israelite does not acquire from a gentile either through money or through pulling, until the object enters his domain.

The Sages said

of the academy:

This cannot enter your mind,

for

it follows by means of a kal va-chomer: If one acquires his person, should one not certainly acquire his property?

“from the hand of your fellow” means by pulling and not with money, whereas from the hand of a gentile it is

a-fortiori inference