Beitzah 8a — the Talmud in English

Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: ![](pamud.bmp "

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with loose earth,

which is soft earth that does not need to be crushed.

But it is still difficult:

But he is making a cavity.

For when he removes the pointed stake together with the earth, a cavity is formed in its place, and one who makes a cavity in his house or courtyard and thereby repairs his house is liable for such an act on account of the labor of “building,” because every repair in a house is considered the labor of building .

Likewise, this is perplexing according to Rashi’s interpretation below that loose earth is considered already dug. For here the Gemara has already established the case as involving loose earth, so that the labor of crushing should not apply to it; if so, the prohibition of digging does not apply to it see Tosafot . And seemingly, on the contrary, it follows that the Gemara’s entire question is only after it became clear that the allowance of an inserted stake applies to loose earth. For it did not raise the question about making a cavity until after the establishment that the case is one of loose earth, and it did not first raise this question before the question about crushing. Whereas, according to the order of performing the labors, it would have been appropriate to put the question about making a cavity before crushing the earth. This implies that the prohibition of making a cavity applies more to loose earth than to a clod of earth, which is perplexing. And in order to resolve all these difficulties, it is necessary to distinguish, in the laws of one who digs in a house, between the form of digging in loose earth and digging in a clod of earth. For digging a clod of earth applies through the very insertion of the stake, which detaches it from its connection and causes it to be considered as lying in a cavity; and this digging does not exist with loose earth. Conversely, one is liable for removing earth from a cavity only with loose earth; but with a clod that stands on its own, removing it from the ground is not considered digging. And the explanation of the course of the sugya is as follows: Rav Yehuda said that an inserted stake is considered already dug. Necessarily, the case is one of a clod of earth, which the stake detaches from its connection; therefore making a cavity does not apply to it. And we ask only that crushing is nevertheless performed in it. Once we answer that the case is one of loose earth, we again ask: if so, making a cavity applies to it. And we answer that it is damage. And this is not the making of damage within the labor of building; rather, it is not a labor at all, as explained above and below. Accordingly, the reason Rabbi Yehuda required an inserted stake is “because of a hint of digging,” as Rashi explained . His intention is that with loose earth this is not an act of digging; rather, since this act with a clod of earth is considered digging, they prohibited it even with loose earth and required an inserted stake in order to permit it. This is likewise implied by the wording of the Bach, namely, that it is a prohibition on account of appearance. See the notes on Tosafot, where we brought the words of the Penei Yehoshua. b. Maimonides was precise and wrote : “One who had an inserted stake from the eve of the Festival, and detached it on the Festival and raised earth—if the earth was loose, he covers with it.” We explained above that his intention is to a case in which he causes damage through his digging. However, the Maggid משנה inferred from what Maimonides wrote that if one does not have prepared earth or furnace ash, he should not slaughter, which implies that an inserted stake is not effective ab initio, and he was astonished at him. The Taz questioned that Maimonides there wrote that he should not cover even after the fact, whereas an inserted stake certainly is effective after the fact; see below, note 2b. Therefore the Taz explained that Maimonides held that with an inserted stake there is no prohibition of muktzeh concerning the prepared earth, but there is a prohibition of digging a cavity if he takes a great deal of earth. Beit Hillel permitted making this cavity after the fact, in accordance with Rabbi Abba, who held that there is no liability to death for it. Therefore he distinguished between one who detached it, in which case there is no longer a prohibition of making a cavity and he may slaughter ab initio, and one who inserted it but did not detach it, who does not slaughter ab initio because of making a cavity. And after the fact they permitted him to do so. But in chapter 3 he included an inserted stake within the category of prepared earth, meaning in a case where he detached it. However, if he does not have earth fit to be moved—that is, the stake was not inserted at all—even after the fact he does not cover. See below, 8b, note 14. And we answer: Making the cavity is not considered a labor here, because he has no need for it. Even Rabbi Yehuda, who holds one liable for a labor not needed for its own purpose, here, when he has no need for the cavity, does not consider the matter a repair of the house .

]According to Rashi, their reasoning is understandable, since the issue is on account of the prohibition of labor, and they decreed lest he perform crushing, as he explained below . And the fact that an inserted stake is needed to permit the digging, even though it too is not needed for its own purpose, is because it is considered a labor, and his exemption is only on account of damage. For the labor is the very act of digging, and the stake is effective so that there will be no labor, because the earth has already been detached. But “building” exists only in making a cavity for the repair of the house, and it does not depend upon detaching the earth; therefore an inserted stake is not effective with regard to it. Rather, if he needs only its earth, he has performed no labor at all . And Tosafot held that an inserted stake is needed as preparation so that it should not be prohibited on account of muktzeh. Beit Shammai permitted slaughtering ab initio for the sake of the joy of the Festival, even though as a result he would have to make a cavity for the earth of the covering; and Beit Hillel disagreed with them and permitted it only after the fact. For it is only for the sake of the mitzva of covering, which takes effect after he has slaughtered. And the reason for the distinction between the mitzvot—that this one overrides a prohibition and that one does not—is that slaughtering is the beginning of the mitzva and is not imposed upon him as an obligation. Before he began the mitzva, they did not permit him to perform it and override a prohibition. ]But after he began it and the obligation of covering took effect upon him, they permitted him to complete the covering, which is part of the mitzva, as explained above, 7b, note 7. And see the responsa of the Rashba part I, 297, brought in the Darכי Moshe Orah Hayyim 655. And the Rashba wrote that Beit Hillel holds that an inserted stake is not considered complete preparation upon which one may rely to permit slaughtering ab initio. Only after he has slaughtered do they rely upon it after the fact, because it is considered somewhat prepared. And the Sha’ar HaMelekh was astonished: why did he not state that they prohibited one from violating ab initio the prohibition of making a cavity, as Tosafot wrote? And he explained that the Rashba too held that according to everyone the joy of the Festival overrides only one prohibition and not two. Rather, he explained that their dispute itself concerns whether there is here one prohibition, that of making a cavity, or two prohibitions, because the preparation is not complete. But according to the plain meaning, it appears that the Rashba interpreted the matter in accordance with the implication of the Mishna: that the permission and prohibition depend upon whether the earth or the stake was “prepared during the day,” meaning solely on account of muktzeh. And from the words of the Rashba it appears that his view is to be more stringent with muktzeh than with the prohibition of making a cavity. For after the fact it is permitted to dig in the place of an inserted stake, even though he makes a cavity, whereas without an inserted stake it is prohibited. For a labor not needed for its own purpose was prohibited only as a preventive measure because of a labor needed for its own purpose, whereas muktzeh, although it too is a rabbinic prohibition, is an intrinsic prohibition. But the Sha’ar HaMelekh brought the words of the Rashba in Avodat HaKodesh section 2: that after the fact, if he slaughtered and has an inserted stake and furnace ash, he covers with the ash and does not cover with the earth in which the stake is inserted. It is explicit in his words that the prohibition of muktzeh is lighter than the prohibition of making a cavity. One may reject this by saying that this law was innovated only with regard to muktzeh of a newly created object, which the covering overrides, as explained by Tosafot in the name of the Jerusalem Talmud. But ordinary muktzeh earth is more stringent than a labor not needed for its own purpose, even when there is an inserted stake. See further concerning this matter in notes 2–4 on Tosafot, below on page b, note 2, and note 12 on Tosafot. And Tosafot RiD explained their dispute as concerning whether earth in his courtyard is considered prepared. That is, according to everyone, with muktzeh earth it is prohibited to slaughter and cover. They disputed only whether the earth is considered muktzeh or prepared. This will be explained below. In accordance with Rabbi Abba.

For Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a cavity on Shabbat and needs only its earth—

is exempt concerning it,

both according to Rabbi Yehuda and according to Rabbi Shimon, since digging a cavity in a house, when the owner of the house has no need for it, is considered damage and not repair of the house.

And here there is no need for the cavity, neither for repairing the house nor for sowing in it; it is merely damage . Therefore it is not prohibited here even rabbinically, because of the mitzva of covering [or because of the joy of the Festival—Tosafot] . And the Ritba there, and Merkhevet HaMishna at the beginning of the laws of Shabbat, distinguished that one who digs a cavity does not need the labor itself, which is the result of making the cavity; whereas with one who kindles and one who wounds, his labor is for the sake of the purpose that he needs, and therefore he is not causing damage. And the Meiri wrote there in Shabbat that blood and ashes cannot be obtained except through wounding and kindling, whereas earth is available in other places without making a cavity; therefore making it is considered damage. It is possible to add that blood and ashes stand for use for the needed purpose, whereas earth in a house does not stand for covering, since other earth can be obtained anywhere. And see Tosafot RiD there, who says that the repair must be in that same labor, and he repairs nothing in the house. In the notes on Tosafot we will clarify whether the reference in our sugya is specifically to earth in a house or also to earth in a field. And the Shita Mekubetzet explained that his intention is that he is exempt and entirely permitted. This is the implication of his words below , that an inserted stake has no aspect of prohibition. And the Penei Yehoshua and the Korban Netanel explained that his reason is like the words of Tosafot in Ketubot : that if a labor contains two grounds for permission—damage and a labor not needed for its own purpose—it is permitted even on Shabbat. And permission on account of the joy of the Festival is not needed. And the need for an inserted stake is only on account of appearance, as the Bach explained in Rashi’s words below ; see there. According to them, it follows that according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds one liable for a labor not needed for its own purpose, it is truly prohibited to dig a cavity. If so, Maimonides’ omission of the permission of an inserted stake is resolved, because he ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who holds one liable for a labor not needed for its own purpose, and there are not two grounds for permission. But the view of the Rashba is as above: they were lenient only because of the mitzva of the joy of the Festival; without this, there would be a rabbinic prohibition in digging the cavity even though it is not needed for its own purpose. See note 4 on Tosafot, where it appears that they too hold this way.

We learned in the Mishna, at its conclusion:

that furnace ash is prepared.

And the meaning of the matter is that these words are a reason for the law that the Mishna mentioned earlier.

And we raise a difficulty concerning it:

“furnace ash”—

Who mentioned it?!

Where was furnace ash mentioned above, such that now the Mishna explains its reason, that it is prepared?!

Rabba said: This is what

the tanna

and

in another matter Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree , that

furnace ash

is prepared,

and is not muktzeh, for the reason that will be explained below.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: They taught

that furnace ash is considered prepared and is not muktzeh

only

with regard to ash that comes from the wood of a furnace

which was kindled

already

from the eve of the Festival,

and the wood became ash from the eve of the Festival, and the person had the ash in mind, to use it for every use appropriate to it, including covering the blood; and the ash is prepared for covering.

But

if

the furnace was kindled

the furnace

on the Festival,

so that the person had not had it in mind from the previous day,

it is prohibited

to use the ash on the Festival, because it was not among the things prepared from the previous day. And the ash is considered a newly created object, which is prohibited according to everyone on the Festival, even according to Rabbi Shimon, since it is an entirely new thing .

And if

the ash was hot, containing hot embers to the point

that it is fit to roast with it,

through the heat of the embers,

an egg,

the ash is still fit for use and is not muktzeh, since it is permitted to turn over the hot ash in order to cause the egg to roast .

And this ash is a direct continuation of the wood that was prepared from the previous day for kindling and roasting. It follows that as long as it is hot, it continues its “preparedness” from the previous day, when these embers were wood designated for kindling].

Therefore, it is also permitted to take and move this prepared ash in order to cover the blood with it. Although with regard to covering the blood with earth, the ash was not “prepared” from the previous day, since while it was kindling wood it was not fit for covering the blood . And since it is fit to turn it over for roasting an egg, he takes it and places it upon the blood. And the Raavan wrote that the permission results from the fact that since it was permitted to move the ash for the sake of roasting the egg, it was permitted to move it in order to cover earth with it. And see in the Magen Avraham who prohibited moving glowing coals in order to cover with them. And in Netiv Hayyim was astonished at him: after all, with coals too one should permit it on the basis of mitokh, just as with hot ash. And Maimonides wrote: “As long as it is hot enough to roast an egg with it, it is permitted to move it, for it is still fire.” And the Lehem Mishneh raised a difficulty from the versions brought by Maimonides that permit kindling with nut shells that he ate on the Festival, because they were prepared along with the food and are not newly created. If so, let us say the same and permit the ash after it has cooled. And he distinguished between fire in which the form of the wood has changed into ash, and a shell that has merely separated from the food and remains in its original state of permission. According to his words, it must be said that Maimonides intended to permit hot ash even though it has changed, because it performs its first labor. Just as they permitted broken vessels that still perform a labor. Except that with wood, which is not a vessel, no labor is effective except its first labor, namely, that the wood is designated for kindling and cooking. But the fact that the ash is fit for covering the blood is not considered being fit for its labor, since it became designated for that only after it changed. This is likewise implied by the Rashba, who wrote here that ash resembles broken vessels, which are fit for no labor. Now below we say that one may not support a pot with a log, because wood was given only for kindling. ]And Maimonides ruled likewise . If so, it is possible that if the ash is treated as wood, it is prohibited to move it. Therefore Maimonides had to say that the ash is considered fire, because fire may be moved on the Festival as an object whose use is permitted. But Rashi ruled below in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, that muktzeh is permitted on the Festival, and wood too is permitted for every purpose. If so, as long as the ash is fit for cooking, it is not muktzeh. And the Rashba below there, raised a difficulty from our sugya, where they permitted covering the blood with hot ash because it is fit to roast an egg with it. Why should we not permit moving and using wood because it is fit for kindling? And he answered that in our sugya he can move the ash and roast an egg with it in the place where the blood is found; therefore it is permitted to cover with it. But with a log, if he kindles it in the place of the door, the door will burn, and it follows that he cannot move it in order to kindle it in that place. And the explanation of his intention is to distinguish between uses that contradict the possibility of kindling, for which the wood is not designated, and uses that can be performed at the time of kindling, from which he did not set the wood aside. And the reason for his distinction is explained by the Ran there: that wood is considered muktzeh for other labors because it does not have the status of a vessel. But with things that have the status of a vessel, it is permitted to use them even for a labor for which they are not designated. That is, the use of wood for kindling does not give it the status of a vessel, because it is a use that consumes it. Therefore it is prohibited for other labors. But every labor that can be performed along with kindling, the wood is prepared for it. For it is permitted to use wood designated for kindling, and only a use that contradicts kindling is prohibited. Since in this use they are considered mere wood, which is prohibited because it does not have the status of a vessel. And the reason for muktzeh with wood, even though it is fit for kindling, depends upon the dispute of Rashi and Tosafot in Shabbat 126b. Rashi’s view is to prohibit using an object that is not fit for another use. Tosafot require designating the object for a use, and one use is sufficient to permit it. And in the book Meorei Esh he maintained that a use gives an object the name of a vessel only if it remains intact after its use. Whereas wood is consumed in its use for kindling; therefore it is muktzeh for other uses. And see Shemirat Shabbat Kehilkhata chapter 21, note 20. And it is explained from the words of the Rashba that the wood is not prepared for covering, since it is not yet ash. Only because he can move it and use it permissibly to cook in the place of the blood can he cover with it incidentally. As explained by Tosafot , that his knowledge that he is going to kindle these pieces of wood does not remove from them the prohibition of a newly created object. Therefore preparation for covering is not effective with regard to them. And the use of covering does not render them fit for their labor. It is further proven from his words that covering is not considered a use. For his reasoning for permitting is that it is fit to be moved and kindled in the place of the ash; this is effective only for moving it and not for an additional use in its place. See further in the notes on Tosafot . However, the Hazon Ish maintained that the permission to move continues also to use. And he brought the words of Tosefet Shabbat, who prohibits use because it is considered new moving. And he wrote that its source is the words of the Rashba in Shabbat 29a, who prohibited using muktzeh even without moving it. Accordingly, the Rashba’s method here is understandable: he permitted only use. And see in the glosses of Rabbi Akiva Eiger , who raised the Rashba’s difficulty. And he added that the ash should be considered a newly created object, because when it was wood it was fit only for kindling. Whereas the Kehillat Yaakov maintained that as long as it is fit for its first labor, it is not a newly created object. And they disputed whether the prohibition of a newly created object is because a new aspect was added to the object, or because the preparation from the previous day was nullified. And see the Hatam Sofer in our sugya, and Yeshuat David Orah Hayyim 18.

It was taught likewise

according to Rav’s words: for it was taught:

When they said that the ash of a stove is prepared —

they said this only when

the oven was kindled

on the eve of the Festival, but

if

the oven was kindled

on the oven

on the Festival —

it is forbidden

to use its ash, since it is not among that which was prepared.

And if

the ash

is fit to roast

in its heat

an egg —

it is permitted

to use it and to cover blood with it.

And the beraita continues and adds:

And if

a person brought in

a large quantity of

earth

on the eve of the Festival

for

the purpose of

his garden and for

the purpose of

his ruin,

to scatter it over the ground, in order to create a smooth surface in it, and it was loose earth [which does not require digging and does not require crushing, and the entire issue concerning it is whether it is considered “prepared”].

The rule of this earth, so long as it is gathered in one place, in a large quantity, and he has not yet scattered it as a surface, is that it is considered as though he had it in mind to do all his needs with it, and therefore

it is permitted

also

to cover with it

the blood.

But if he had already scattered the earth as a surface, the scattered earth in every place was nullified to the ground [since it is like the soil of the garden], and the “preparedness” of the earth for use was nullified, and he may no longer cover with it.

And the Gemara brings the opinion of an amora who holds that not only is a large quantity of earth not nullified with respect to the ground, and it is permitted to use the earth, but even a small quantity.

And Rav Yehuda said: A person may bring a full basket of earth

and place the earth in one place, without specifying anything, and he need not state that he designates it for use in order for it to be permitted to use it,

and he does with it

with the earth

that is gathered all that he needs,

for so long as it is gathered in one place, it remains in its state of preparedness from the eve of the Festival, and the small amount of earth is not nullified to the ground of the house.

But since Rav Yehuda’s novelty was stated concerning a small quantity of earth, which fits into only one basket, there is a limitation to this preparedness:

And as he further added and

Mar Zutra taught in the name of Mar Zutra the great

[the elder], that Rav Yehuda’s words do not apply in every case, but rather —

and this is when he designated for it,

for the earth that he brought in the basket, a special place in

a corner,

and likewise he did not spread out the earth, for only then is it evident that this earth is intended for all his needs and is prepared for this.

It was objected

the Gemara raises an objection against Rav Yehuda’s words, that even a basket of earth which he brought into the house without specification is prepared for use, and the small amount of earth is not nullified to the ground of the house, from the Mishna in tractate Chullin [83b].

For we learned:

a koy

an animal that is in doubt whether it is a wild animal or domesticated animal —

one may not slaughter it on the Festival

because perhaps it is a wild animal and requires the blood-covering mitzva, but it is impossible to cover its blood on the Festival, since we must be concerned with the other possibility, that perhaps it is a domesticated animal, whose blood is not subject to covering, and it is forbidden to move earth for the purpose of covering the blood of a domesticated animal, since there is no mitzva to cover it.

And if they slaughtered

the koy —

they do not cover its blood!

For, as stated, it is possible that it is a domesticated animal, with which the mitzva of covering the blood does not apply, and it is forbidden to move the earth for the purpose of covering its blood.

And from this the Gemara raises a difficulty:

And if it is so,

if it is possible to bring a small amount of earth in a basket, according to Rav Yehuda, and use it for all needs, why do they not slaughter a koy on the Festival, and why, if they slaughtered it, do they not cover its blood?

After all, it is possible

to cover it according to Rav Yehuda,

if he brought a small amount of earth in a basket.

The Gemara rejects the difficulty with a counter-question:

But according to your reasoning,

that you asked according to Rav Yehuda why they do not cover the blood of a koy with a small amount of earth, you will still have this difficulty:

let him cover it

the blood of the koy

with the ash of a stove or with a

stuck

spade, which is explicitly stated in our Mishna to be prepared, and why do you raise the difficulty only against Rav Yehuda?

Rather,

necessarily you will explain that this which we learned—that one does not slaughter a koy on the Festival—is when he

does not have,

when no ash of a stove or stuck spade is available to him. If so,

here too

we shall explain according to Rav Yehuda that one does not slaughter a koy in a case

where he does not have

prepared earth, because he did not bring even a small amount of earth in a basket!

And we challenge:

If so,

since the Gemara’s answer established that the prohibition against slaughtering a koy on the Festival is because he has no possibility of covering its blood,

why specifically

did the Mishna establish the prohibition of covering with regard to a koy that is

a doubt

whether its blood is subject to covering?

After all, if he has no possibility of covering

even a certain

wild animal, whose blood must be covered,

also not

should he slaughter it, and if he slaughtered it, he should not cover it, for the halakha is according to Beit Hillel, that one should neither slaughter nor cover if there is no stuck spade. [And according to Tosafot below, 9b, Beit Shammai also require a stuck spade in order to cover.]

And we answer: The tanna in the Mishna in Chullin

said: “It goes without saying!”

And this means:

“It goes without saying,”

there is no doubt that an animal whose obligation of covering the blood is

certain,

one should not slaughter it

since he will not be able to cover its blood,

but

a koy, which is

a doubt, say: because of the joy of Yom Tov, one should slaughter it, but not cover it,

and it should be permitted to nullify, because of the doubt, the mitzva of covering the blood through inaction, for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva of the joy of Yom Tov,

it teaches us

that the tanna in the Mishna—even a doubtful nullification of the mitzva of covering the blood is not pushed aside because of the joy of Yom Tov; therefore, one does not slaughter a koy .