Beitzah 6a — the Talmud in English

Rava said

if one died,

the deceased is lying there and requires burial ,

On the first day of the Festival —

they shall attend to him

only for his burial needs

by gentiles —

non-Jews, and not Jews .

On the second day of the Festival —

the Sages were lenient concerning it for the honor of the deceased, so that

Jews shall attend to him

for his burial and for performing labors, such as digging the grave.

And

this permission to attend to the burial of the deceased on the second day of the Festival applies

even on

the second day of

the two days of Rosh Hashana,

for they were lenient concerning burial of a deceased person on it, as on the other second days of Festivals observed outside the Land of Israel.

This is not so with regard to an egg,

for we were not lenient concerning it on the second day of Rosh Hashana as we were lenient concerning it on the other second days of the Festivals; rather, it is forbidden, since the two days of Rosh Hashana are one extended sanctity.

But

the Nehardeans say: even with regard to an egg

we were lenient on the second day of Rosh Hashana: if it was laid on the first day of the Festival, it is permitted on the second day of the Festival.

And the reason for the matter is: for

what is your view,

for what reason should the egg be forbidden on the second day for those people who are distant from the court and do not know when the court sanctified the month?

For if the court sanctifies the thirtieth day, only one day becomes sanctified, and because of the uncertainty as to which day became sanctified, those distant from the court are not required to observe two days as one extended sanctity.

And the reason that they must be concerned to observe two days as one extended sanctity is only the concern

perhaps

it happened that at the place where the court sat, witnesses did not come on the thirtieth day until the time of the afternoon offering. And

they would intercalate it,

the court would extend

the

month of

Elul,

and make it thirty days .

And then, according to the original enactment, at the place of the court they would observe an extended sanctity on both days, whereas the court would perform the sanctification of the month, from which the Festivals of the year would be counted, on the following day.

Therefore, all the places that were distant would also have to observe two days of extended sanctity, as at the place where the court sat.

And since it was only because of this concern that they enacted observing two days as one extended sanctity, and on account of the single sanctity they prohibited the egg laid on the first day, so as not to eat it on the second, we have no need to be concerned about this enactment once it became clear that such a thing had never occurred at the place where the court sat.

For

Rabbi Ḥinnana bar Kahana said in the name of Rav: From the days of Ezra onward —

we have never found an intercalated Elul,

but the witnesses always arrived on the thirtieth day of the month of Elul before the afternoon offering, and they sanctified the month on the basis of their testimony on that day; since then they did not observe two days as one sanctity.

Only once did it happen that they came after the afternoon offering, and they accepted them, and the Levites became confused in the song. At that time they enacted that witnesses should not be accepted from the afternoon offering onward. This enactment was never put into use, for the witnesses always arrived on the thirtieth day before the time of the afternoon offering; therefore the enactment was annulled retroactively. And when they began to establish the calendar according to calculation, they did not make two days, since it had become clear that the enactment had never taken effect .

Mar Zutra said: We said

above, in Rava’s words, that if one died on the second day, he is buried by means of Jews ,

only

if it happened

that he remained unburied,

that the deceased remained unburied and there is concern that he will decompose .

But

if

he has not remained unburied —

we leave him unburied

until after the Festival .

Rav Ashi said: Even though he has not remained unburied —

we likewise do not leave him unburied.

What is the reason? —

With regard to a deceased person, the Sages made the second day of the Festival

like

an ordinary

weekday,

and it is permitted

even to cut a garment for him,

to cut fabric for him and make it into a garment,

and to cut for him

and even to cut, for his honor,

myrtle

from that which is attached, although these things are not necessary.

to the deceased; it is permitted to prepare them on the second day of a Festival for his honor .

Ravina said: But nowadays, when there are “ḥavrei,”

meaning members of a wicked nation who force Jews to work for them, while on a Festival they exempt them from that labor,

we are concerned

that those wicked people may see Jews burying their dead on the second day of a Festival and force them to work for them. Therefore, people no longer bury the dead on the second day of a Festival.

Ravina was sitting before Rav Ashi on the two Festival days of Rosh HaShana,

which occurred on Thursday and Friday.

He saw

Ravina saw Rav Ashi

being sad.

He said to him,

Ravina

“Why is the Master sad?”

He said to him,

Rav Ashi

“Because I did not establish

I regret that I did not establish

a joining of cooked foods,

and I cannot cook today for Shabbat. A joining of cooked foods can be established only on the eve of the Festival.

He said to him,

Ravina

“Then let

the Master establish

it

a joining of cooked foods

now,

today, on the first day of Rosh HaShana.

For

did

not

Rava say:

If the two Festival days occur on Thursday and Friday,

a person establishes

a joining of cooked foods from the first Festival day

(Thursday

for the other one,

the second Festival day, Friday),

and makes a stipulation:

“If today is the Festival by Torah law and tomorrow is an ordinary weekday, I do not need a joining of cooked foods. But if tomorrow is the Festival by Torah law and today is an ordinary weekday, I am now, on the eve of the Festival, establishing my joining of cooked foods.”

He said to him,

Rav Ashi to Ravina:

“You may say that Rava said

that it is possible to establish a joining and make such a stipulation only

on the two Festival days observed in the Diaspora,

since each day is prohibited because of uncertainty.

But

with regard to the two Festival days of Rosh HaShana,

which have one extended sanctity,

who said

that Rava permits establishing it on the first day and making such a stipulation? After all, the eve of the one extended sanctity is only the preceding Wednesday”!

Ravina challenged Rav Ashi’s statement:

“But the sages of Nehardea say: Even an egg

that was laid on the first Festival day of Rosh HaShana

is permitted

on the second Festival day of Rosh HaShana, just as on the two Festival days observed in the Diaspora, because the two days do not have one sanctity.

He said

he answered

to him, Rav Mordekhai,

Rav Ashi’s student, replied to Ravina and answered his question:

“The Master explicitly

said to me

Rav Ashi

that he does not accept this statement of the sages of Nehardea.” Therefore, he does not establish a joining of cooked foods on the first Festival day of Rosh HaShana, since the two days have one sanctity.

And in Shekel HaKodesh in its explanation of the halakha [Sanctification of the New Moon 5:3], it was demonstrated from this that the reading should be “Rav Asi”; see there. A similar difficulty was raised from the other direction by Ramban against Rabbeinu Efraim, who wrote that when the calendar is fixed according to calculation only one day is observed [as above, 5b, note 10]. If so, it is astonishing that Rav Ashi, who lived when the calendar was fixed according to calculation, prohibited this. He should have observed only one day, and in his time there should have been no place for a stipulation. See Avnei Nezer [395:12], who was astonished by this: Rav Ashi was in Babylonia, where two days had to be observed. Nevertheless, Ravina’s words show that he understood Rava to hold that one could make a stipulation even regarding the two days of Rosh HaShana. It must therefore be that Rava’s reason for prohibiting an egg on both days was not that they have one extended sanctity. Rather, the first Festival day is certainly required by Torah law, while the second day is a custom, and the egg is prohibited because the first day prepared it. If so, with regard to a joining of cooked foods the Sages were necessarily lenient, treating each day as though it alone were the Festival by Torah law, so that one could make a stipulation from one day to the next. Ravina therefore brought proof from what Rava had said for their own time. Rav Ashi, however, understood that Rava prohibited the egg because of the one extended sanctity. Since custom does not prohibit an egg, as explained in Rambam’s position [and at length above, 4b, note 15], in Rava’s time a stipulation was made only for the two Festival days observed in the Diaspora, which involve uncertainty concerning the day. But today, when two days are observed because of custom, a stipulation does not help for a joining of cooked foods, and their status is like that of the two Festival days of Rosh HaShana.

It was stated: An offspring of a bird that was born on a Festival—

Rav said: It is prohibited

to eat it, for the reason that will be explained.

And Shmuel—and some say Rabbi Yohanan—said: It is permitted

to eat it.

The Gemara explains their reasons:

Rav said: It is prohibited,

because the chick

is set-aside.

The day became sanctified before it was born, and at that time it was not fit for eating, because a chick that had not yet been born could not be eaten. Therefore, the prohibition of set-aside applied to it for the entire day.

In their second resolution, Tosafot wrote that a chick is prohibited even according to Rabbi Shimon, because since it is not fit for any purpose, it is like dried figs and raisins. This is also the ruling of Mishna Berura [513:36]. It seemingly follows from this resolution that we apply the principle “since it was set aside, it remains set aside” even when a person is waiting for the item to become fit when it is born, since it was actively rejected at the beginning of the day. See the introduction. It may, however, be rejected that a person is not waiting for the chick’s eyes to open, since it is not usual for its eyes to open on the day it is born. It would be difficult to say that it is considered like dried figs and raisins that are in the process of drying on Shabbat, which are set aside even according to Rabbi Shimon because they were actively rejected and one is not waiting for them. Dried figs and raisins are not like a chick, whose time of birth is fixed. See note 12 on Tosafot. Rashba further explained that, while the chick is inside its shell, there is concern that it may spoil, so it is considered set aside because of financial loss, a category that even Rabbi Shimon agrees is prohibited. See Tosafot Yeshanim, Shabbat 45b. Even after the reason of financial loss has disappeared, once the chick has been born and there is no longer concern for it, the principle “since it was set aside, it remains set aside” applies, as explained above [2b] concerning a stack of beams. His words indicate that he follows the approach of Magen Avraham [308:19], who likewise holds that a utensil that broke remains prohibited. According to Rabbi Akiva Eiger [there and above, 2b], however, “since it was set aside, it remains set aside” does not apply when one is waiting for the utensil to break. Even Ḥazon Ish [Mikvaot 21] agrees that a defective utensil is permitted, and all the more so a chick that is destined to emerge from its egg that day. Rashba is following his own approach [Ḥullin 15b], that even according to Rabbi Shimon advance preparation is required, except that he holds that anything that will become permitted on Shabbat is considered prepared for that purpose from before Shabbat, whereas preparation does not take effect when there is financial loss. See the notes on page 2. And in the Shita Mekubetzet it is written that the chick is not prohibited because of a lack of preparation, since its birth is its preparation, and a Festival prepares for itself. According to Rashi above [2b], however, who holds that a Festival does not prepare for itself, it must be said that Rabbi Yohanan’s reason—“it permits itself through slaughter”—also suffices to remove the prohibition of preparation. See the next note, note 15, and note 11 on Tosafot. And Penei Yehoshua explained that Rabbi Shimon agrees that a chick is prohibited because it is a newly created entity, and this is also apparent from Rashi in his commentary on “for dogs.” This is according to Rabbi Yohanan, who does not distinguish between Shabbat and a Festival and holds that one who does not accept the category of set-aside does accept the category of a newly created entity. He follows the plain meaning of the passage in Shabbat 156b, unlike Rashba and Ramban. Tosafot, however, did not explain it this way. They wrote [below, 7b] that there is no category of a newly created entity with regard to living creatures, or because of their position [above, 2a] that there is no such category when the object already existed. See the next note. And Shmuel—and some say Rabbi Yohanan—said: It is permitted.

The chick—

since it permits itself

when it enters the world

through slaughter.

That is, the chick undergoes a fundamental change when it is born: from that point onward, its consumption can be permitted through slaughter. As a result, its status with regard to set-aside also changes; from that point onward it is not set aside but is permitted for eating.

The entire nature of the prohibition of set-aside is that an item remains in its status of having been set aside. The Sages prohibited moving or using anything that had been set aside from being moved or used, in accordance with the status to which it had been assigned.

The chick, however, was set aside only while it had the status of a chick, because it was prohibited to eat. But as soon as it emerged into the air of the world and became permitted through slaughter, its status changed from that of a prohibited “chick” to that of a permitted “bird.” One cannot continue to apply to the bird the prohibition of set-aside that applied to the “chick,” since it now has an entirely different status—that of a “bird,” which is permitted through slaughter. If it is now prohibited by the law of set-aside, this is not a continuation of its earlier status of having been set aside.

And Or Sameaḥ [Festival Offerings 2:3] innovated that only an object that existed on the eve of Shabbat must be fit and prepared from before Shabbat. A chick created on Shabbat has no lack of preparation, and it is not possible to set it aside, since at the moment it was created it was immediately prepared. He explained “it permits itself through slaughter” to mean that it becomes a living creature for which slaughter is effective in permitting it, and it has no connection to the inanimate object that had been inside the egg; the egg’s status of being set aside does not continue in it. This is similar to the explanation given in the main text: it changes from a “chick” into a “bird.” This explanation, however, does not apply to the statement of the Jerusalem Talmud, which permitted a calf based on this reasoning. Indeed, in the Jerusalem Talmud we raise the difficulty: If so, a deer trapped on Shabbat should be permitted, because it permits itself through slaughter. Rashba wrote that the Babylonian Talmud understood that a deer is different: it was permitted to be slaughtered in the wilderness, and it was set aside only when it entered a settled area through a person’s intention; whereas a chick had no slaughter at all before this. Or Sameaḥ explained that Rashba intended his own explanation, and that is why the Babylonian Talmud did not use this permission with regard to a calf. Nevertheless, his words remain difficult in light of the Gemara’s conclusion, which says that a calf permits itself through slaughter, since Rav was challenged from a calf born from a tereifa, which is permitted on a Festival. See note 16. Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, in the memorial volume Mevakshei Torah [9:5], explained that the concept of set-aside is that the object is not considered significant, while a newly created entity is even more deficient, because it did not exist when Shabbat began and is therefore even further removed from being prepared. A chick, however, becomes significant and fit for slaughter at birth, and this preparation is sufficient to release it from the status of set-aside even in the middle of Shabbat. And Rashash compared this permission to the well-known principle “once one matter has been permitted, another matter is permitted,” meaning that one permission brings about another. The intention is not, as Penei Yehoshua understood, that once the prohibition against eating the chick has been removed, the prohibition of set-aside is automatically removed as well. Rather, the permission from the prohibition of set-aside results from the first permission bringing it along. See Meiri in the next note. It is nevertheless necessary to understand how this permission also helps with regard to moving the chick, since the principle that one prohibition has been permitted and another follows permits two prohibitions that were part of one act, whereas here the permission comes through two different acts. It is even more puzzling, since here there is no new permission granted to the chick; from the moment of its birth it is simply not a creeping creature and is fit for slaughter. This is a change in its physical nature, not a newly granted permission in its previous status. The book HaMikhtam maintains that “it permits itself through slaughter” is considered preparation. The preparation required at twilight is necessary only because a person directs his attention only to an object that exists when Shabbat begins. But with this chick, since a permission is newly created through the act of slaughter, a person automatically directs his attention to it. This requires further investigation. Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav

who had prohibited the newly born chick because it was set aside:

“What

difference is there

between

this chick

itself,

which was born on a Festival and which you prohibit because of set-aside,

and a calf born on a Festival,

which is permitted according to everyone? It must be that it is not prohibited as a newly created entity, since it ‘permits itself through slaughter’”!?

He said to them:

The calf is permitted because

it was prepared

for eating on the Festival

along with its mother, through slaughter.

Had its mother been slaughtered while the calf was still in her womb, the slaughter of its mother would also have permitted the calf for eating. Thus, the calf was fit and “prepared” for eating at all times. It was therefore never set aside and does not require the reason that it “permits itself through slaughter.” Regarding the Rosh’s statement that preparation applies only to something that improves in its new state, we raised a difficulty above [4b] from his words [section 2] concerning wood that fell from a palm tree on Shabbat, which may not be burned on the following day, a Festival, because of preparation. Seemingly, this is difficult, since the wood did not improve. We explained that any benefit that comes into existence through the object’s becoming new is considered preparation. Therefore, a calf that could be eaten before Shabbat through the slaughter of its mother does not undergo preparation through birth. Wood, however, which could not have been detached on a Festival before it fell, is like an egg, which could not have produced chicks before it was laid. See Yam Shel Shlomo, Korban Netanel, and Afikei Yam [there], which discuss this at length. The Tur also cited the view of

But before the chick hatched and emerged from the eggshell, it had had no permission at all, and therefore it was then muktzeh and “not prepared.” Therefore, it continues and remains in its status of muktzeh even after it is born .

And Rav Kahana and Rav Asi further questioned Rav: Why did he prohibit a chick that was born:

And what is the difference between

a chick

this

that you prohibited

and a calf born from

the tereifa,

for if he had slaughtered its tereifa mother while the calf was still in her womb, the slaughter of its mother would not have been effective for it, and at that time it would have been muktzeh and not prepared by virtue of being together with its mother. Nevertheless, if the calf was born on a Festival, he is permitted to slaughter it and eat it. Necessarily, it “renders itself permitted through slaughter,” and if so, the chick too should be permitted to slaughter and eat on the Festival.

Rav was silent,

because he had no answer to their question from a calf born from a tereifa.

Rabbah said, and some say Rav Yosef: What is the reason Rav was silent?

Let him say to them:

It is not muktzeh while it is in its mother's womb,

since

it

is prepared

at that time

together with its mother for

what they throw with her, for the eating of

dogs; and by virtue of its being prepared in its mother's womb for dogs, it is also prepared for human consumption after it is born .

This is not so with a chick, which, while it is inside the eggshell, is not fit even for animal consumption, and therefore it is prohibited because of “born.”