Beitzah 30b — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

One may not take wood from the sukkah

on a Festival, since by doing so one dismantles part of the sukkah, and it is prohibited to dismantle a structure on a Festival.

Rather,

one may take wood only

from

the wood

that

is located

near it,

and the Gemara will explain what this wood is.

The Mishna is speaking of the Festival of Passover or Shavuot, when the prohibition is only due to dismantling the sukkah; therefore, it is permitted to take wood from that which is near it.

But on Sukkot, all the wood of the sukkah is prohibited for use or benefit, except for the use required to fulfill the mitzva of sukkah.

Gemara:

The Gemara now assumes that the entire Mishna is speaking of wooden poles placed on top of the sukkah as roofing. And the wooden poles “from that which is near it” are the poles placed above the sukkah’s roofing in order to thicken the roofing with them.

We raised a difficulty:

What is the difference

between the wood that is

“from the sukkah,” which is not

taken—which is because

it dismantles a shelter,

as taking it involves the labor of dismantling a shelter, which is a derivative of the labor of dismantling a structure.

If so, the following difficulty arises: Why may one take wood

from that which is near it?

After all, when one takes wood from that which is near it—that is, the wood placed on the roofing in order to thicken it—

it also dismantles a shelter,

since that wood is subordinate to the roofing and is considered like it, and taking it involves dismantling a shelter!

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

Our Mishna is not speaking of wood on top of the roofing, which is indeed subordinate to it and considered like it. Rather,

what is meant by “near it”

is

near the walls.

The reference is to wooden poles set upright near the walls of the sukkah. There is a substantial difference between these poles and the walls of the sukkah.

The poles in the walls of the sukkah are woven together with threads to form a single wall, whereas the poles standing around the walls are not woven together with them. Therefore, taking them does not involve dismantling the walls of the sukkah.

This is not the case with the poles of the roofing, which are not woven together into the roofing. Therefore, the wood above and the wood below are equivalent: all of it is considered the roofing of the sukkah, and it is prohibited to take any one of them, whether from the upper poles or from the lower poles.

Rav Menashya said: Even if you say

that the entire Mishna speaks exclusively

of

poles

that are not

standing upright

“near the walls,”

but are all located above the roofing, the Mishna can also be reconciled:

When that was taught,

when we learned in the Mishna that one may take wood “from that which is near it,” the reference is

to a bundle,

to poles that were bound together in a bundle, and whose bundle was not untied when they were placed on the roof. This indicates that they were placed there only temporarily and did not become subordinate to the roofing of the sukkah; therefore, one may take them.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef taught

a beraita

before Rabbi Yohanan: One may not take wood from the sukkah, but only from that which is near it.

And Rabbi Shimon permits

taking wood even from the roofing itself.

And all agree

в отношении

with regard to the

law of

“the sukkah of the Festival” during the Festival

of Sukkot,

that it is prohibited

to use the entire sukkah except for a use involving a mitzva. This prohibition applies even during the intermediate days of the Festival, because of the sanctity that takes effect upon the sukkah.

And if he stipulated concerning it

before the Festival [a stipulation that will be explained below]—

everything is according to his stipulation!

We raised a difficulty:

And

if

Rabbi Shimon permits

taking wood even from the roofing, is that possible? After all,

does he not dismantle a shelter?

And we answer:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Here

we are dealing with a sukkah that collapsed

on the Festival,

we are dealing

with a case in which, after its collapse, there is no prohibition of dismantling a shelter, and the dispute concerns the matter of muktzeh.

And Rabbi Shimon,

who permits taking all the wood on the Festival, is

consistent with his own reasoning, as he does not hold of muktzeh

based on a person’s intention regarding an item fit for use. Therefore, since this wood too is fit for use on the Festival [for example, as fuel], one may take it in order to use it.

The Gemara cites the beraita in which Rabbi Shimon’s position is explained, that “he does not hold of muktzeh.” [See the Introduction!]

As it was taught: The remaining oil in a lamp or in a bowl,

the oil that remains from the oil lit in honor of Shabbat, is

prohibited

to move or eat on Shabbat, since it was set aside at twilight for the Shabbat lamp. And since it was set aside at twilight, it was set aside for the entire day.

When a person sets aside the oil at the onset of Shabbat, he sets it aside intentionally and does not expect the lamp to go out while oil remains. Since he intended to set it aside, it is prohibited even if the lamp ultimately goes out before all the oil is consumed and oil remains.

And Rabbi Shimon permits

the oil, because the person did not set it aside absolutely, as he expects the lamp to go out and oil to remain. Therefore, he did not set it aside beyond the period during which the lamp is burning.

However, if oil drips while the lamp is burning, Rabbi Shimon concedes that this oil is muktzeh until the lamp goes out, because once he set aside this oil for the mitzva of lighting the lamp, its setting aside takes effect for the mitzva. At that point Rabbi Shimon concedes that such setting aside prohibits the oil even from being moved, for the duration of the setting aside.

This proves that Rabbi Shimon does not hold of muktzeh with regard to an item fit for use when a person sets it aside only in a nonabsolute manner. The same applies to the wood of a sukkah, which according to Rabbi Shimon is not muktzeh after the sukkah falls.

The Gemara objects:

Are they comparable

—are the wood of a sukkah and the remaining oil comparable?!

After all,

there,

with regard to oil that remains after the lamp goes out,

a person “sits and anticipates,”

because he knows that the lamp may go out, and he anticipates that this will indeed happen; therefore, he does not set the oil aside absolutely.

But here,

with regard to a sukkah that collapses, would

a person sit and anticipate when his sukkah will fall!?

After all, since the sukkah is not expected to fall on the Festival, he sets its wood aside absolutely—and Rabbi Shimon concedes that such setting aside is effective [as was explained above with regard to oil dripping from the lamp while it is being lit, and likewise with regard to oil remaining in a large lamp that is not expected to go out on Shabbat].

And we answer:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Here,

in Rabbi Shimon’s statement concerning a sukkah,

we are dealing with a dilapidated sukkah,

which a person should anticipate might collapse during the Festival. Therefore, he does not set it aside absolutely, since

from the previous day,

from the eve of the Festival,

his mind was on it

[on the sukkah], as it might collapse and he would be able to use its wood.

The Gemara now explains what is stated in the beraita:

And all agree,

all of them, and they did not dispute the matter,

with regard to the sukkah of the Festival during the Festival

of Sukkot—

that it is prohibited.

And if he stipulated concerning it

that he does not set it aside,

everything is according to his stipulation!

We raised a difficulty:

And is a stipulation effective with regard to it

so that he may use it?!

But Rav Sheshet said in the name of Rabbi Akiva: From where

is it derived that the wood of a sukkah is prohibited for benefit

throughout the seven

days of the Festival of Sukkot?

As it is stated

[Leviticus 23:34]:

“The Festival of Sukkot, seven days, for the Lord.”

The verse teaches that the sukkah must be designated for the Lord throughout all seven days, like an offering consecrated to the Temple.

If so, how can a person stipulate concerning it that he may use it? After all, this matter does not depend on whether he sets it aside or does not set it aside.

And

further,

it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: From where is it derived that just as the Divine Name rests upon

the offering

of the Festival,

which is sacred to the Lord and from which it is prohibited to derive benefit,

so the Divine Name rests upon the sukkah?

The Torah states: “The Festival of Sukkot, seven days

for the Lord.”

The verse teaches, by stating “the Festival of Sukkot for the Lord,” that the sukkah is like the offering of the Festival: both are sacred to the Lord, and one may not make ordinary use of them.

Just as “the Festival,”

like the offering of the Festival, is

for the Lord,

so too the sukkah

is sacred

to the Lord

throughout all seven days mentioned in that verse.

And since it is established that the sanctity of the sukkah is from the Torah and is not dependent on a person’s setting it aside, how can one stipulate concerning it?!

And we answer:

Rav Menashya, son of Rava, said: The final clause

of the beraita, which states that everything is according to his stipulation, is not speaking of the sukkah of the Festival. Rather,

we have come

to teach

about an ordinary sukkah,

one outside the Festival of Sukkot. He can stipulate on the eve of the Festival that he is not setting it aside, and his stipulation is effective in the event that the sukkah falls on the Festival, in which case it is not prohibited because of the labor of dismantling.

But a sukkah

[during the Festival of Sukkot]

that is for a mitzva—

a stipulation is not effective with regard to it

to permit its prohibition from the Torah.

We raised a difficulty:

And

if, with regard to

a sukkah for a mitzva, it is not

possible to stipulate concerning it—

But was it not taught: If he

обложил

roofed it

for a sukkah used for a mitzva

in accordance with its halakhic requirements, and he adorned

при помощи

it

to beautify it

with colored garments

[colored clothing]

and with sheets

of white linen

that are decorated,

and

likewise if he

hung nuts, almonds, peaches, and pomegranates, and clusters of

branches with bunches of

grapes,

or glass bottles containing

wines, oils, and fine flour

for decoration,

and

likewise

crowns,

crowns made from

ears of grain—

in all these cases,

it is prohibited to make use of them until the conclusion of the final Festival day

[Shemini Atzeret], because they are subordinate to the sukkah and are considered part of it.

Throughout the seven days of Sukkot they are prohibited because they were set aside for the mitzva for which they were designated, and on Shemini Atzeret they are prohibited because of the muktzeh of the Festival, since they had been set aside from use at twilight at the onset of Shemini Atzeret.

The beraita continues and states:

And if he stipulated concerning them

that he does not set them aside for the entire Festival, but will use them during the Festival whenever he wishes—

everything is according to his stipulation!

This proves that one can stipulate even with regard to the sukkah itself!

And we answer:

Abaye and Rava both said,

in their explanation: The stipulation that is effective with regard to a sukkah can be effective only with regard to the sukkah’s decorations, and not with regard to the roofing and the walls. The beraita is speaking

of

a case in which he

says

before the Festival begins:

“I do not refrain from using them”,

referring to the sukkah’s decorations,

throughout the entire twilight period!

The sanctity of the sukkah results from a person’s setting it aside. When he sets it aside for the mitzva of sukkah, the Divine Name rests upon it by virtue of his setting it aside for the mitzva of sukkah.

But if he does not set it aside for the mitzva of sukkah, but merely fulfills the mitzva of dwelling in the sukkah without agreeing to set it aside for its mitzva, the Divine Name does not rest upon it!

This statement applies only to the sukkah’s decorations, with regard to which he can say, “I do not refrain from using them,” since his words have significance: he could take the decorations during the twilight period and use them then. Therefore, even when he does not take them, he can say that he does not refrain from using them.

And since the sukkah’s decorations were not set aside at the beginning of the Festival, the Divine Name did not rest upon these decorations, even when they later sit in the sukkah and fulfill the mitzva of sukkah there!

For, as stated, the taking effect of the sanctity depends on a person’s setting aside the sukkah for the mitzva.

But if, with regard to the sukkah’s walls and roofing, he says before the Festival begins, “I do not refrain from using them throughout the entire twilight period,” his statement has no significance. After all, he cannot take them then because of the prohibition against dismantling a shelter.

And since what he says—“I do not refrain from using them”—has no practical significance, the walls and roofing were set aside for the mitzva of sukkah. For he did designate them for the mitzva of sukkah; he merely wished to stipulate that he did not refrain from using them, so that if he wished he could take them, despite having made them part of the mitzva of sukkah. But a stipulation has no significance when he cannot perform any action to give it practical effect.

And since the sanctity took effect during twilight, it takes effect for all seven days, because once the sanctity has taken effect, it cannot be divided.

Nevertheless, a difficulty remains:

What is the difference,

in what way does the wood of the sukkah differ

from that which was stated

with regard to setting aside an etrog? With regard to an etrog, we do not say that once it was set aside for its mitzva during the twilight at the onset of Sukkot, it was set aside for all seven days. Rather, a stipulation is effective to have it set aside for only one day.

As we learned:

One who

separated seven etrogim for the seven days

of Sukkot, one etrog for each day—

Rav said: Each and every one

of the etrogim

fulfills the obligation with it

on the day designated for it,

and

he may

eat it immediately,

immediately after fulfilling the mitzva, since the etrog is set aside only for the time of fulfilling the mitzva and not for the time afterward.

And

whereas

Rav Asi said: Each one

of the etrogim

fulfills the obligation with it

on the day designated for it, but

he may eat it only

можно только

the following day,

since the etrog was set aside for the entire day.

According to everyone, the etrog is not set aside for all seven days; rather, his stipulation is effective to have it set aside for no more than one day.

If so, why is it impossible to stipulate with regard to a sukkah that its sanctity should take effect for only one day?!

And we answer:

There,

with regard to the mitzva of the etrog,

because the nights interrupt the days—

there is no mitzva to take the etrog at night—therefore,

each individual day

is a mitzva in its own right.

It is therefore impossible to say that the etrog was set aside for the entire Festival.

Here,

with regard to the mitzva of sukkah,

because the nights do not interrupt the days,

since the mitzva of sukkah applies both during the day and at night, therefore

all

seven

days

are considered one long day.

And since the sukkah was set aside at twilight on the first day, it was set aside for the entire Festival, and it is impossible to stipulate concerning it.