Beitzah 30a (ל.) — the Talmud in English

And one may begin

with the pile of straw

to take straw from it for fuel. That is, on a Festival it is permitted to begin taking straw from a pile even though he had not designated it for this purpose before the Festival, and was not accustomed to use it for fuel; there is no concern of muktzeh.

But one may not

begin taking

wood from the muktzeh.

The area behind the house is called “muktzeh.” It is a place that people do not enter and leave regularly, and wood and anything else that a person does not intend to take except after a long time are placed there.

One may not take wood from there, because it is prohibited to move it on account of the prohibition of muktzeh. The Gemara explains the distinction between the pile of straw mentioned in the first clause and the wood in the muktzeh mentioned in the latter clause.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who brings jars of wine from one place to another may not bring them in a basket or a large hamper:

And concerning this,

the tanna

stated in a beraita:

If it is impossible to make a change,

for example, if he invited many guests and must bring many jars together,

it is permitted

to bring them in a basket or hamper, even though this is his weekday practice.

Rava instituted in Mehoza,

Rava established in his city of Mehoza procedures for deviating from the ordinary manner of carrying burdens on a Festival. This is what he instituted:

The general principle is that one should not increase the exertion through the change; rather, he should lighten his burden or change the manner in a way that does not involve additional exertion, even if it does not lessen the exertion. A burden

that they carry with difficulty,

a burden that a person carries on his shoulder with difficulty on a weekday—if he comes to carry it on a Festival,

they should carry it with a pitchfork,

he should carry it on a Festival with a pitchfork in order to make a change. This change makes carrying it easier for him and does not involve additional exertion, and it is an appropriate change.

A burden

that they carry with a pitchfork,

a burden that is customarily carried with a pitchfork even on a weekday—

they should carry it with a pole

on a Festival as a change, carrying it by means of two people with a pole on their shoulders, which is easier than carrying it with a pitchfork. But one person may not carry it alone on his shoulder, since doing so makes it more burdensome.

That they carry with a pole,

a burden that is customarily carried on a pole on the shoulders even on a weekday—

they should carry it with a carrying frame,

they should carry it on a Festival with a pole held in their hands, in order to change from the weekday manner; but they should not carry it with a pitchfork, since that involves greater exertion.

That they carry with a carrying frame,

a burden that is customarily carried by two people with a pole held in their hands—

they should spread a cloth over it,

on a Festival they should spread a cloth [which is light and does not make the burden heavier] over the burden. Although this is not a change in the burden itself but merely concealment, it is nevertheless a change.

And if it is not possible

to make any change without increasing the exertion, for example, if he does not even have a cloth—

it is permitted

even without a change.

For

it is

the master said,

in the beraita above:

If it is impossible to make a change—

it is permitted

without a change.

He said

he challenged

Rav Hanan bar Rava to Rav Ashi:

But

the Sages said: Whenever it is possible to make a change—

we make a change on a Festival.

Whenever it is possible to perform a change, we change the manner of carrying burdens on a Festival.

But these women fill their jugs with water on a Festival

[the women fill their jugs with water on a Festival and bring them home],

and they do not make a change

[they do not deviate from the ordinary manner at all],

and

nevertheless

we say nothing to them

[we do not call their attention to it]. Yet a change is required; why do we not admonish them for this?!

He said

he answered

him,

Rav Ashi answered Rav Hanan bar Rava:

Because it is impossible

to make a change, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

We have learned: If it is impossible to make a change, it is permitted even without a change.

And why is it impossible to make a change?

What could they do

[to make a change]?

You might say:

If one normally fills a large jug, she should fill a small jug

[a woman who is accustomed to fill a large jug should fill a small jug on a Festival]?

It is impossible! For this would involve additional exertion, since

she would increase the walking

[she would walk more], as she would have to walk many more times because of the small jug; one may not make a change by adding exertion.

You might say: A woman

who normally fills a small jug should fill a large jug

[who is accustomed to fill a small jug should fill a large jug]?

It is impossible! For this too involves additional exertion, since

she would increase the burden

[she would add to and make her burden heavier].

You might say:

She should cover it with a wooden lid

[she should cover the jug with a wooden cover designated for jugs], as was explained above, that even such a change is considered a change?

It is impossible! For there is concern that

sometimes it breaks, and she will come to carry it.

At times this cover will break, and she will come to move the fragments, which are prohibited to move.

You might say: She should cover it and

tie it

[tie it] to the jug so that it will not fall?

It is impossible! For there is concern that

sometimes it will snap

and she will come to tie it

[at times the cord will snap and she will come to tie it on the Festival], and a knot intended to remain is an av melakha [Rashi, based on the Rashash].

You might say:

She should spread a cloth over it

[she should spread a cloth over the jug]?

It is impossible! For there is concern that

sometimes it will become soaked in water

[at times the cover will become soaked in water]

and she will come to wring it,

she will come to wring it out, which is prohibited on a Festival.

Therefore, it is not possible

to make a change. Since this is so, it is permitted even without a change.

He said

he challenged

Rava bar Rav Ḥanin to Abaye:

But

we learned: One may not clap

[palm against palm],

and one may not slap

[palm against thigh],

and one may not dance

on a Festival, because of the concern that one might repair a musical instrument.

And

yet

nowadays, when we see that they do this, and we do not

say anything to them

[we see nowadays that they do this, and we do not call their attention to it]?!

He said to him,

Abaye said to Rava bar Rav Ḥanin:

By your reasoning,

as you maintain that it would be proper to admonish them, you can also challenge yourself with the following:

That which Rava said,

that is, Rava said:

A person should not sit at the entrance of the side-post

[a person should not sit on Shabbat at the head of an alley adjacent to the public domain, where the side-post is placed in order to permit carrying in the alley]—

because

perhaps an object will roll away from him and he will come to bring it back

[perhaps the object will roll from his hand into the adjacent public domain, and he will come to return it to the alley, which is a private domain], because, since the alley is not roofed, people do not recognize it as a private domain, and he will thereby violate the melakha of “carrying out.”

And you can challenge yourself:

But these women, who take their jugs,

go and sit at the entrance of the alley

[the women take their jugs and sit at the head of the alley],

and we say nothing to them

[we do not call their attention to it]?!

Rather,

you must say that the reason we do not admonish them is:

Leave the Jewish people alone

to do something to which they have become accustomed out of ignorance; it should be assumed that they will not change their ways because of our admonition.

For

it is preferable that they be unwitting

and violate the prohibition out of ignorance

and not be

as a result of our admonition

deliberate sinners!

For even if we admonish them, they will not change their ways, and we will have worsened matters rather than corrected them.

Since this is so,

here,

with regard to clapping and dancing,

as well,

we likewise do not admonish them, because

leave the Jewish people alone; it is preferable that they be unwitting and not deliberate sinners.

The Gemara qualifies this principle:

And this applies

when we refrain from admonishing them—

with regard to

a prohibition

of rabbinic origin.

But with regard to a Torah prohibition,

if we see people violating a Torah prohibition—

no!

We do not refrain from admonishing them, even when it is reasonable to assume that they will not change their ways as a result of our admonition.

But the Gemara concludes otherwise:

That is not so!

Rather,

it makes no difference whether it is a Torah prohibition or a rabbinic prohibition;

whenever it may be assumed that they will not change their ways—

we say nothing to them.

The proof is that even with regard to a Torah prohibition, one does not admonish those who are known not to change their ways:

For the addition to Yom Kippur,

the obligation to add time and begin fasting before Yom Kippur begins, whose obligation

is of Torah origin,

is derived from the verse: “And you shall afflict your souls on the ninth day of the month in the evening.”

And

in practice, the women do not do this, but they

eat and drink until it grows dark.

And

nevertheless,

we say nothing to them,

because of the principle: Leave the Jewish people alone; it is preferable that they be unwitting and not deliberate sinners.

From here you learn that this principle applies even to a Torah prohibition.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one may begin with the pile of straw:

Rav Kahana said: This indicates

that from this law in the Mishna, which permits using a pile of straw for fuel because straw is presumably stored for an animal and is therefore prepared for use on a Festival, we may learn that according to our Mishna one may

begin

to use

a storehouse

[items stored for a long time]

for the first time

on a Festival, and there is no concern about the prohibition of muktzeh.

If so,

whose view is it

that is expressed in the Mishna? It must be

Rabbi Shimon’s, who does not hold

of the prohibition of

muktzeh

with regard to an item that is fit for use but that a person sets aside in his mind.

But now this is difficult:

say the latter clause

of our Mishna:

But one may not

use for fuel

the wood in

the

muktzeh,

since it is prohibited on account of muktzeh.

This law in the latter clause must be

referring

only

to

the view of

Rabbi Yehuda, who holds of muktzeh

with regard to an item that is fit for use but that a person sets aside in his mind.

But then the first clause contradicts the latter clause?!

And we answer: Actually, our Mishna is Rabbi Shimon’s. Nevertheless, he agrees with the law stated in the latter clause, that one may not use wood from the muktzeh.

For

here,

in the latter clause, where we learned that one may not use the wood in the muktzeh—

we are dealing with cedar and fir trees

[male cedar trees and female cedar trees],

we are dealing

with wood that people do not use as fuel, since it is intended for construction,

for

these

are muktzeh because of monetary loss,

since they are expensive.

And even Rabbi Shimon,

who does not acknowledge ordinary muktzeh that a person sets aside in his mind, because he does not set it aside absolutely, but retains the possibility that he may be able to use it,

agrees

with regard to muktzeh because of monetary loss, which is prohibited, since a person sets it aside completely.

There are those who teach it

as Rav Kahana’s statement

with regard to the latter clause

of our Mishna, where we learned:

But not the wood in the muktzeh:

And concerning this,

Rav Kahana said: This indicates: One may not begin with a storehouse for the first time!

The Gemara infers: It must be that

whose view is it

that is expressed in our Mishna?

It is Rabbi Yehuda’s, who holds of muktzeh.

But now this is difficult:

say the first clause

of our Mishna:

One may begin with the pile of straw.

This law must necessarily

refer

only

to

the view of

Rabbi Shimon, who does not hold of muktzeh.

But then the first clause contradicts the latter clause?!

And we answer: Actually, our Mishna is Rabbi Yehuda’s. Nevertheless, it is permitted to begin with the pile of straw; one may not infer from here that one may also begin with a storehouse.

For

there,

in the first clause of our Mishna, where we learned “one may begin with the pile of straw,” the discussion is

of rotten straw

[rotten and foul-smelling straw], which is unfit for animal fodder and is ordinarily intended for fuel; therefore it is not subject to the prohibition of muktzeh.

We challenge this: How can you say that our Mishna is dealing with

rotten straw

and that it is not muktzeh?

But

it is fit for plaster

[it is fit for making clay, from which bricks can be formed], and if so, it should be muktzeh?!

And we answer: The first clause of our Mishna is dealing with rotten straw

that contains thorns

[it contains thorns], and one cannot knead it with his hands and feet into clay; therefore it is not muktzeh.