Beitzah 27b (כז:) — the Talmud in English

And on the Festival, when he asked him, he would inquire how the incident had occurred.

For sometimes the koen had no time on the eve of the Festival except to see the blemish at that time. On the Festival, when he had free time, he would question the koen and investigate whether this blemish had developed on its own, or whether the koen himself had caused it, in which case he would be penalized.

As in the case of a certain man,

who was a koen,

who brought a firstborn animal before Rava in the late afternoon

in the evening,

just before

the onset of

the Festival.

Rava was sitting and washing

and rubbing

his head.

He raised his eyes,

Rava raised his eyes,

and saw its blemish,

of the firstborn animal.

He said to him,

Rava said to him:

Go now,

go now,

and come

and return

tomorrow.

When he came the next day, he said,

Rava asked him:

“How did the incident occur?”

He said to him: There was barley scattered

there was barley scattered

on this side of the thorn fence,

on one side of a thorn fence,

and it

the firstborn animal

was on the other side,

on the other side of the wooden fence.

When

at the time

it wanted to eat

the barley beyond the thorn fence,

it inserted its head

beyond the fence,

and tore

and ripped

the thorn

the thorn

against its lips,

against the lips of the firstborn animal. And this is a blemish that disqualifies it.

He said to him,

Rava said to him:

Perhaps you caused it

to extend its head toward the thorn fence, since you deliberately placed the barley beyond the thorn fence so that it would become blemished and you would not have to bear the effort of raising it!?

He said to him: No,

I did not cause it.

The Gemara explains:

And from where do you say that indirectly causing

a blemish in a firstborn animal is prohibited?

As it is taught in a beraita:

[Leviticus 22]

“There shall be no blemish in it.”

I have derived only that it may not have a blemish.

From where is it derived that one may not cause it to have

a blemish

through another object,

for example:

that one may not bring dough or a fig cake and place it on its ear, so that a dog will come and take it—

the verse states

[Leviticus 22]

“any blemish.”

It says “blemish,” and it says “any blemish.”

The word “any” comes to include indirect causation.

Mishna:

An animal that died

on the Festival is muktzeh, and therefore

one may not move it from its place.

And an incident occurred, and they asked Rabbi Tarfon about it,

whether an animal that died on the Festival is muktzeh.

And

they likewise asked

about dough that became impure

on the Festival, whether it is muktzeh or not.

And

Rabbi Tarfon

entered the beit-midrash and asked

the Sages what the law was regarding the animal carcass and the impure dough.

And they said to him: One may not move them from their places.

Gemara:

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say that we learned anonymously

in our Mishna

in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon?

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says: One may cut

on Shabbat

the pumpkins before an animal,

and this does not involve exertion.

And

one may likewise cut on Shabbat

the carcass

that became a carcass even on Shabbat

before dogs,

so that they can eat it more easily.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If it was not a carcass from the eve of Shabbat—

it is prohibited,

because of muktzeh.

Whereas our Mishna, which is an anonymous Mishna, follows Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that it is muktzeh, and not Rabbi Shimon.

And we answer:

You may even say

that our Mishna

is Rabbi Shimon’s

opinion.

For

Rabbi Shimon concedes

that although he does not hold of muktzeh,

with regard to living creatures

that were healthy at twilight

which died

on the Festival,

they are prohibited

because of muktzeh.

The Gemara says:

That works according to Mar bar Ameimar in the name of Rava, who said: Rabbi Shimon conceded with regard to living creatures

that were healthy

which died

on Shabbat or the Festival,

that they are prohibited

because of muktzeh.

And what Rabbi Shimon permitted was cutting up an animal that became a carcass on Shabbat or the Festival only when it had been dangerously ill, and he had had it in mind at twilight that it would die and he would give it to the dogs—

it is well;

one can say that our Mishna is Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, and it is speaking of a healthy animal, which is therefore muktzeh even according to Rabbi Shimon.

But according to Mar, the son of Rav Yosef, in the name of Rava, who said: Rabbi Shimon disagreed even with regard to living creatures that died, and that

they too

are permitted—

what is there

to say?

How can our Mishna be interpreted as consistent with Rabbi Shimon’s opinion?

And we answer:

Ze’iri interpreted it

as referring

to a consecrated animal,

a sacrificial animal,

which is not fit for dogs when it becomes a carcass, and therefore one may not move it from its place. But a non-sacred animal that died may be fed to dogs even if it had been healthy during its lifetime, because according to Rabbi Shimon there is no law of muktzeh with regard to something fit for use, unless the person deliberately set it aside.

This is also precise, as it teaches,

in the continuation of the Mishna, that Rabbi Tarfon asked

about it and about the dough that became impure.

And we should compare them:

Just as the dough—

which is consecrated, so too the animal—

which is consecrated.

The Gemara now derives the opposite inference.

Rather, the reason

that the carcass is muktzeh is

that it is consecrated.

This implies that

a carcass

of a non-sacred animal—

is permitted.

That works according to Mar, the son of Rav Yosef, in the name of Rava, who said that Rabbi Shimon disagreed even with regard to living creatures that died, and that they are permitted—

it is well,

the carcass of a non-sacred animal is permitted.

But according to Mar bar Ameimar in the name of Rava, who said: Rabbi Shimon conceded with regard to living creatures

that were healthy

which died, that they are prohibited—

what is there to say?

It follows neither Rabbi Yehuda nor Rabbi Shimon, since Rabbi Shimon too concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that a healthy animal that died is prohibited.

And we answer:

With what are we dealing here—

with

an animal

that was dangerously ill, and it is the opinion of everyone

that applies.

Mishna:

This Mishna discusses buying and selling on the Festival, even when no money is given for the purchase.

a.

People may not join together

several people together

initially with regard to an animal

to purchase it jointly

on the Festival

and set its price, because this involves the prohibition of buying and selling on the Festival.

b.

But they may join together

they may

with regard to it from the eve of the Festival, and a butcher may slaughter it

on the Festival without setting a price, and give it to them. The next day he sets the price for them.

And

they

divide

its meat

among themselves,

without setting a price for each person.

Gemara:

The Gemara asks:

What

is the meaning in the Mishna of

“People may not join together”?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One may not initially set a price for an animal

to purchase it

on the Festival,

because of buying and selling.

The Gemara asks: If the seller does not set its price

how does he act

in order to receive its price the next day?

Rav said: He brings

them on the Festival

two animals, places one beside the other, and says: “This one is like that one.”

They eat one of them, and the next day they assess the value of the second animal, which is equivalent to it in value.

This is also taught in a beraita

in accordance with Shmuel:

A person may not say to his fellow

on the Festival

“I hereby

join

with you

in the animal

for a sela,”

or

“I hereby

join

with you

in the animal

for two sela.”

For it is prohibited to set a price on the Festival.

But he may say to him: “I hereby

join

with you

in this animal

for one-half, one-third, or one-quarter

of its meat, since in this manner no price is set.