Bava Metzia 96a — the Talmud in English

And whereas

Rava held like Rabbi Yonatan

who disagrees with Rabbi Yashya and holds that when the Torah wrote two things with the conjunctive letter vav between them, it is not necessary that both of them be together.

And he explains the verses

these

like Rabbi Yonatan.

And the Gemara explains:

Abaye held like Rabbi Yashya, and explains the verses like Rabbi Yashya.

It is written in the Torah: “And if a man borrows from his fellow, and it is broken or dies”—thus the borrowing and the accident are joined by the conjunctive letter vav of the word “and it is broken.” And according to Rabbi Yashya, what is said concerning them is said concerning both of them together.

And it is written afterward

“Its owner not being with it, he shall surely pay”,

and this should be understood as follows:

the reason is that he is absent from both of them,

the Torah obligates specifically when its owner is not with him, neither at the time of the borrowing nor at the time of the accident.

But if he is present

with one and absent from one,

but if he was with him during one of them and was not with him during the second—

he is exempt.

And

on the other hand, afterward

it is written

“If its owner is with it, he shall not pay”,

and this verse too refers to the borrowing and the accident together, and it should be understood as follows:

the reason is that he is present with both of them,

the Torah exempts specifically if he was with him during both of them.

But if he is present with one and absent from one,

if he was with him during one of them,

he is liable.

And this is how they resolve the contradiction:

to tell you,

sometimes, when he was with him during one of them, he is liable, and sometimes he is exempt.

If he was with him at the time of the borrowing, he need not be with him at the time of the breaking and death

and he is exempt;

if he was with him at the time of the breaking and death,

he is liable, and

he must be with him at the time of the borrowing

and then he is exempt.

Below, the Gemara explains what is the reason for establishing the time of the borrowing as the time of exemption.

Rava held like Rabbi Yonatan, and explains the verses like Rabbi Yonatan.

It is written in the Torah: “And if a man borrows … and it is broken or dies,” and according to Rabbi Yonatan, what is subsequently said concerning this can be interpreted either concerning the borrowing or concerning the accident.

And it is written

“If its owner is with it, he shall not pay”,

it implies that he is present with both of them

[it implies that he was with him during both of them] and the Torah exempts him,

and it also implies that when he is present with one and absent from one—

he is exempt,

for the implication of the verse is that even if he was with him during one of them, he is exempt.

And

on the other hand

it is written

“Its owner not being with it, he shall surely pay”,

it implies that he is absent from both of them, and it also implies that when he is present with one and absent from one—

he is liable,

for the implication of the verse is that even if he was absent during one of them, he is liable.

And this is how they resolve the contradiction:

to tell you, if he was with him at the time of the borrowing, he need not be with him at the time of the breaking and death.

If he was with him at the time of the breaking and death, he must be with him at the time of the borrowing.

It follows that both according to Abaye and according to Rava, the same contradiction exists, and they resolve it with the same resolution. However, according to Abaye, from the verse in which liability is written it implies exemption when he was with him during one of them, and from the verse that exempts it implies liability when he was with him during one of them. But according to Rava, the verse that obligates obligates when he was with him during one of them, and the verse that exempts exempts when he was with him during one of them.

The Gemara asks according to both of them:

Can I reverse it?

From where do we know that the time of the borrowing is the determining time for exemption, and not the time of the accident?

The Gemara answers:

It is reasonable that the borrowing is preferable

to be considered the determining time,

because he brings it into his domain [because he brings it into his domain] and accepts responsibility for it. And it is fitting to follow the time that obligates him.

And we challenge this:

On the contrary, the breaking and death are preferable, since he is liable for accidents!

And this is the time that obligates him.

And we answer:

If there were no borrowing

and he became obligated in its responsibility,

what would the breaking and death do [what does it do]? For he becomes liable for accidents only because he borrowed it and accepted responsibility for it.

But it may still be challenged:

And if there were no breaking and death

which cause him to become actually liable,

what would the borrowing do?

For the borrowing does not cause him to become liable in practice, and without the accident there is no significance to accepting the responsibility.

And we answer:

Even so, the borrowing is preferable, since

from the time of the borrowing

the borrower is liable

for the sustenance of the animal ,

and since at that time he becomes actually obligated in its sustenance, in addition to becoming obligated in its responsibility, it must be decided that the time of the borrowing is the determining time.

for the animal’s

sustenance .

Since at that point he becomes practically liable for its sustenance, in addition to becoming responsible for it, we must determine that the time of the borrowing is the decisive time.

The Gemara brings another answer to the question: from where do we know that the time of the borrowing is the determining time? According to this answer, the matter was decided by a derasha from the verse and not by reasoning.

Rav Ashi said:

The verse says

“And if a man borrows from his fellow”,

and it does not say, “And if a man borrows from his fellow.” The Torah emphasized “from his fellow,” to teach that because he borrowed what belongs to his fellow

and his fellow is not with him,

therefore

“he shall surely pay.”

But if his fellow is with him, he is exempt.

We see that the time of the borrowing is what exempts.

And we challenge this:

If so,

“its owner not being with it,”

“and if its owner is with it,”

which the Torah stated,

why do I need them?

For it is possible to derive the law of the owner being with him from the wording “from his fellow.”

And we answer:

If not for these

verses in which the law of the owner is stated explicitly, we would not have been able to derive this novelty from the wording “from his fellow.” For

I would have said: this is the way of the verse [I would have said: this is the way of the Torah’s wording].

And now the Gemara brings uncertainties about which the amoraim were uncertain in the laws of borrowing. Some of them remain unresolved, and some are resolved.

Rami bar Hama inquired

six inquiries. The first four do not discuss borrowing with the owners.

six issues. The first four do not concern borrowing with the owner employed by the borrower .

1.

He borrowed it in order to mate with it—what is the law?

One who borrows an animal in order that he himself mate with it , and the animal dies, what is the law? And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do

we require it to be as people borrow ]

[the borrowing must be in accordance with the practice of people]

and therefore people do not borrow

[and therefore people do not borrow], and concerning such a case the Torah did not say, “And if a man borrows,” and he is exempt from accidents.

Or perhaps, what is the reason [for what reason]

the Torah obligated the borrower for accidents?

Because of the benefit

that he has.

And this one too—he indeed has benefit [and this one too, behold he has benefit], and he should be liable.

2.

He borrowed it in order to be seen with it—what is the law?

One who borrows a cow in order to appear wealthy, so that people will not refrain from selling to him on credit, what is the law?

And the sides of the uncertainty are: in order for the borrower to be liable for accidents,

do we require property,

that the borrower receive property from the lender,

and there is

property, and he is liable.

Or perhaps,

it is not enough that he receives property from him, but

property that belongs to him

the borrower

must have benefit from it

on its own

we require

in order to make him liable for accidents,

and there is none,

for he did not benefit from the body of the cow, but benefited from it only indirectly, and such benefit is not significant enough to make him liable for accidents.

since he does not benefit from the cow itself; he benefits from it only indirectly, and such benefit is not significant enough to make him liable for accidents.

3.

He borrowed

in order

to perform with it

work worth

less than a peruta—what is the law?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we require property,

is all that is required that he borrow property from him,

and there is

property, for the cow is worth a peruta. Therefore he is liable for accidents.

Or perhaps

we follow the benefit that he has from it, and it is not property, for

anything less than a peruta is nothing,

and he is exempt .

4. This inquiry is asked according to the side that, in the preceding inquiry, the borrower is exempt because he did not benefit by a peruta’s worth.

He borrowed two cows in order to perform a peruta’s worth of work,

and with each one he will perform work worth less than a peruta, and one of them died

what is the law?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say: go after the borrower and lender, and there is

[do we say: go after the borrower and lender, and there is] a peruta’s worth of benefit to the borrower; therefore he is liable.

Or perhaps: go after the cows, and each one and one has no property

[go after the cows, and each one and one has no property], since it does not perform a peruta’s worth of work, and he is exempt from accidents .

5.

He borrowed from partners, and one of them became borrowed to him—what is the law?

He borrowed their jointly owned animal from the partners, and one of the partners was with him in his work, and the animal died. Is he exempt because of borrowing with the owners in this case?

And the sides of the uncertainty are: shall we say that for the exemption of the owners

we require all of its owners, and there is not,

for one of the partners was not with him. Therefore the borrower must pay the value of the cow to both partners.

Or perhaps,

it is not necessary that all the owners be engaged in his work, and therefore

from that person’s half at least he is exempt [from the share of the partner who was with him he is exempt], and he must pay only the partner who was not with him, his share .

he is exempt with regard to the portion belonging to the partner who was with him, and must pay only the portion of the partner who was not with him .

And likewise

partners who borrowed, and one of them became borrowed to him—what is the law?

Partners in a field who borrowed a cow in order to plow with it, and the lender works in the private field of one of the partners. What is the law?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Shall we say that for the exemption of the owners

the entire

borrower is required, and there is not,

for here the lender does not perform the work of every side of the borrower, since there are two borrowers and he performs the work of only one of them; therefore even the one whose work he performs is not exempt.

Or perhaps,

it is not necessary that he be engaged in the work of every side of the borrower, and in this case

with regard to that half which they borrowed, at least, he is exempt [with regard to that half which was borrowed with the owners, he is exempt], and the second partner, who does not have the exemption of the owners, shall pay half to the lender .

with regard to the half borrowed with the owner, he is exempt—and the second partner, who does not have the owner’s exemption, must pay half to the lender .

6. This inquiry concerns the borrowing of nichsei melog: a married woman whose property came to her through inheritance—these are nichsei melog. The law of the property is that the body belongs to her, while the husband consumes the produce.

For example: a married woman who inherited a cow from her father—the husband has the right to receive its milk, and likewise to plow his fields with it. But he may not slaughter the cow without the woman’s consent, because the body belongs to her.

And even though the husband may use the cow by rabbinic enactment, he may not lend the cow to others without her permission, because the Sages granted him the right to consume the produce specifically when there will thereby be profit in the household.

And Rami bar Hama was uncertain:

he borrowed from the woman

a cow belonging to nichsei melog, which the borrower requires her permission to borrow and the husband’s permission.

And her husband became borrowed to him

for his work, and the cow died. Is the borrower exempt because the husband was engaged in his work, or is he not exempt because the woman was not engaged in his work?

And so

a woman who borrowed

a cow in order to plow land of melog assets,

and

the owner of the cow

was borrowed by the husband

for the work of her husband’s field, and the cow died,

what is the law?

Is the woman obligated in payments, and there is no exemption of “owners,” since the borrower did not perform the work of the lender, or is she exempt, because she borrowed it for the purpose of work on a field in which the husband has the right to consume the produce, and the lender performed the husband’s work?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Whether

the acquisition of produce is considered like acquisition of the body,

the right that the husband has in the woman’s assets considers him a complete owner of the assets. Therefore, one who borrows a cow belonging to melog assets is like one who borrows the husband’s cow , and if the husband performs his work, this is borrowing with owners. And likewise, a woman who borrowed a cow in order to plow land of melog assets is considered to have borrowed the cow in order to plow her husband’s field, and if the lender performs the husband’s work, this is borrowing with owners.

Or not,

the husband is not considered a complete owner of melog assets. Therefore, one who borrows a cow belonging to melog assets is like one who borrows the woman’s cow, and if the husband performs his work, this is not borrowing with owners. And likewise, a woman who borrowed a cow in order to plow land of melog assets is considered to have borrowed a cow in order to plow her field, and if the lender performs the husband’s work, this is not borrowing with owners.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi another uncertainty:

If one says to his agent, “Go and be borrowed for me together with my cow,” what is the law?

Reuven sent Shimon to lend Reuven’s cow to Levi, and said to Shimon, “You too perform Levi’s work as my agent,” and the cow died in Levi’s possession—is Levi liable?

And the sides of the uncertainty are: whether

we require the owner himself

in the borrower’s work,

and there is none

here except an agent.

Or perhaps,

as throughout the Torah,

“a person’s agent is like himself,” and

here

there is

an agent, and this is borrowing with owners?

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi:

The last two problems depend on a dispute between tannaim or amoraim who disagreed concerning other matters.

The husband

about whom Rami bar Ḥama was uncertain—this is

the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish.

The agent

about whom Ravina was uncertain—this is

the dispute between Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Yashya.

The husband—

the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish:

For it was stated: One who sells his field for its produce,

one who sold his field for a number of years, and during those years the purchaser will consume the produce of the field.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He brings

the purchaser brings first fruits from the field,

and recites

the passage of the first fruits, from “An Aramean sought to destroy my father” until “Behold, I have brought the first of the fruit of the ground that You have given me, O Lord.”

Reish Lakish says: He brings

first fruits

but does not recite

the passage.

And the reason for their dispute is:

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He brings and recites,

since in his view

the acquisition of produce is considered like acquisition of the body,

and since the land is considered as belonging to the purchaser, the purchaser can recite and acknowledge concerning “the first of the fruit of the ground that You have given me.”

Reish Lakish says: He brings but does not recite,

since in his view

the acquisition of produce is not considered like acquisition of the body,

and he cannot recite and say, “the ground that You have given me.”

It follows that the basis of Rami bar Ḥama’s uncertainty—whether the acquisition of produce is considered like acquisition of the body or not—is disputed by Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish .

And now the Gemara continues and explains what Rav Aḥa said,

“The agent—the dispute between Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Yashya.”

As it was taught in a beraita: One who says to a steward,

whom he appoints over the needs of his household before going to an overseas country:

“All vows that my wife will vow from now

[from this time]

until I return from such-and-such a place, annul them for her”

on my agency! And the woman vowed vows,

and he annulled them

the steward.

Can

[they]

be annulled?

The verse says

[therefore it is written] in the Torah [Numbers 30:14] the expression “her husband” twice,

“Her husband may uphold it, and her husband may annul it,”

to say that another person may not annul in his place, even a steward,

the words of Rabbi Yashya.

Rabbi Yonatan says: We find everywhere that a person’s agent is like himself,

and even with regard to the annulment of vows, the agent can annul.

Thus the tannaim disputed, where “her husband” is written twice, whether the agent is to be excluded. And regarding the law of borrowing with owners, “its owner” is written twice in the Torah, and therefore here too there is this dispute: whether the verse came to exclude the agent or not .

Rav Ilai said to Rava:

There is an uncertainty similar to the previous uncertainty concerning an agent, namely:

One who says to his slave

the Canaanite slave,

“Go and be borrowed together with my cow; what is the law?”

Is a person’s slave like himself with regard to borrowing with owners?

And the Gemara explains why Rav Ilai’s uncertainty is not the same as Ravina’s uncertainty concerning an agent, and does not depend on the dispute between Rabbi Yashya and Rabbi Yonatan.

Let it be asked

[let there be an uncertainty] concerning this

according to the one who says,

“A person’s agent is like himself”

also with regard to borrowing with owners, so that the lender’s agent is considered like him. And the problem is because there is a rationale that a slave is inferior to an agent, as will be explained immediately.

And likewise,

let it be asked according to the one who says,

“A person’s agent

is not like himself”

with regard to borrowing with owners, because there is a rationale that his slave is superior to his agent.

And the Gemara explains:

Let it be asked according to the one who says: “A person’s agent is like himself”—this applies to an agent

a free man,

who is a person subject to mitzvot

that depends on monetary matters,

but a slave, who is not a person subject to mitzvot,

for everything a slave acquires, his master acquires, and he has no property and is not included in the law of lender and borrower,

is not

considered like him, for the Torah introduced the law of agency only concerning an agent who belongs to the legal category of that matter, and thereby resembles the sender. And a slave cannot serve as an agent for bills of divorce and betrothals, because he does not belong to that matter; and the same law applies that he cannot serve as an agent in our matter .

Or perhaps, even according to the one who says: “A person’s agent is not like himself”—this applies to an agent

for in this law there is no agency,

but a slave,

since he is his master’s property, it is possible to say concerning him

“the hand of a slave is considered like the hand of his master,”

and it is as though his master’s very hand performed the borrower’s work.

He said to him,

Rava,

“It is reasonable that the hand of a slave is considered like the hand of his master,”

and it is considered as though his master performed the borrower’s work .

The following discussion concerns melog assets. It was explained above that the husband consumes the produce of the woman’s assets.

The Sages instituted for the husband the right to consume the produce in exchange for the obligation that they instituted, that the husband is obligated to redeem the woman if she is taken captive. On this basis the following question is asked.