Bava Metzia 95b — the Talmud in English

Rather

you necessarily have to say this:

The tanna,

only

a matter ![](pamud.bmp "

Precise page location")

that is explicitly written teaches; one that comes from a derivation he does not teach

[The tanna of our Mishna teaches only something written explicitly in the Torah, and does not teach something derived by exegesis], for the tanna did not come here to inform us which bailee is exempt and which bailee is liable when the owners are with him, but at what time the owner will be engaged in his work and he will be exempt.

The Gemara raises an objection from a beraita against the one who exempts:

Come and hear

from what we learned:

He borrowed

[He borrowed the cow],

and borrowed its owner with it,

or

he rented it and rented its owner with it,

or

he borrowed it and rented its owner with it,

or

he rented it and borrowed its owner with it.

In all these circumstances—

even though the owners are performing work

for the borrower or the renter

in another place

and not together with the animal,

and it died

the animal while with the borrower, or was stolen while with the renter —

he is exempt.

Now the Gemara brings a dispute among tannaim concerning the law of a renter, in order to discuss this beraita: according to whose view does it proceed?

It is written in the Torah at the end of the section of the borrower [Exodus 22:14]: “If he is a hired man, it came with his hire.” The meaning of the verse is: if he did not borrow the animal, but paid for its use, he does not have the status of a borrower, to become liable for accidents.

But the Torah did not explain whether the law of a renter is like that of an unpaid bailee or like that of a paid bailee; therefore the tannaim disagreed concerning it.

Rabbi Meir says: a renter’s law is like that of an unpaid bailee, because he does not receive payment for his guarding .

Rabbi Judah says: a renter’s law is like that of a paid bailee, because he has benefit from the object .

And this beraita,

they thought

[they were thinking concerning it]:

Who is its author? It is Rabbi Judah, who says: a renter

has the law

of a paid bailee,

and therefore the law of an unpaid bailee was not mentioned in the beraita.

And we object:

But this tanna teaches a matter that comes from a derivation

[and this tanna teaches something that comes from a derivation], and not only what is written explicitly in the Torah, like the tanna of our Mishna; for he teaches that the law of a renter is like the law of a paid bailee, and a paid bailee is learned by derivation,

whereas an unpaid bailee

he does not teach!

And it follows that there is no exemption when the owner is with him, because all his liability is only for negligence, and negligence when the owner is with him entails liability!

And we answer:

Who is its author? It is Rabbi Meir, who says: a renter is equivalent to an unpaid bailee,

and he is liable only for negligence, and nevertheless he is exempt when the owner is with him.

And the tanna [mentions] an unpaid bailee,

who, even though his liability is only for negligence, is exempt when the owner is with him,

and the same applies to a paid bailee,

who is exempt from all liabilities.

If you wish, say:

it is possible to establish this beraita according to Rabbi Judah, whose view is the halakha everywhere in his dispute with Rabbi Meir ,

and as Rabba bar Avuha exchanged it and taught,

Rabba bar Avuha had an opposite version of the beraita, and this is how he taught it:

How does a renter pay?

Rabbi Meir says: like a paid bailee.

Rabbi Judah says: like an unpaid bailee.

Rav Hamnuna said:

there are two conditions for the exemption of “its owner with it”:

1.

He is always

[the borrower]

liable

for accidents, and is not exempt

until

the animal and the owner are engaged in one work for the borrower’s sake, such as

a cow, and he plows with it,

or

a donkey, and he drives it from behind

[leads it], because the verse “if its owner is with it” should be interpreted according to its plain meaning: that the owner is working with the animal.

2.

And

the borrower is not exempt

until the owners are with him

in the work

from the time of borrowing until the time it is broken or dies.

And the Gemara infers:

Apparently, he holds

Rav Hamnuna that the wording of the verse

“its owner with it” applies to the entire matter

[to everything stated in the section], both to “when he borrows” and to “and it is broken or dies”; in all of them the exemption of “if its owner is with it” is stated.

[Rav Hamnuna thereby introduces a matter not stated in the Mishna, for the Mishna states only that if the owner was with him at the time of the accident but was not with him at the time of the borrowing, he is not exempt. But the Mishna does not explain the law if the owner was with him only at the time of borrowing and was not with him at the time of the accident. For it is possible that he need be with him only at the time of borrowing, and it is possible that he must be with him also at the time of the accident.

Rav Hamnuna holds that they must be with him both at the time of borrowing and at the time of the accident in order for the borrower to be exempt.

Rava, as he will explain now, disagrees with both of these laws.]

At first Rava raises an objection against the first law, and afterward raises an objection against the second law.

Rava objected

from what we learned:

He borrowed it and borrowed its owner with it; he rented it and rented its owner with it; he rented it and borrowed its owner with it—even though the owners are performing work in another place—and it died—

he is exempt.

And Rava infers:

Is it not so

[apparently] that “in another place” means

in another work,

and not as Rav Hamnuna said, that the owners must be with the animal in the same work? And we answer:

No,

it is speaking of a case in which the owner is engaged

in the same work.

Rather, what is “another place”?—

that he loosens and proceeds before it,

the lender digs in the ground before it, to make its plowing easier, but is not actually in its place.

And we object:

But since the latter clause says “on its back,” it follows

that the latter clause of this beraita speaks when the lender is performing work on the animal. It follows that the

first clause

speaks of his performing

another work,

as will be explained.

For the latter clause teaches: He borrowed it and afterward borrowed its owner; he rented it and afterward rented its owner with it, even though the owners are plowing on its back, and it died—

he is liable.

There is no exemption when the owner is with him, because he was not with him at the time of borrowing or renting the cow.

Thus the beraita introduces in its latter clause that even though the owner was literally with him, it does not help to exempt him, since he was not with him at the time of borrowing; and it follows that the first clause similarly introduces that even though the owner performed another work, it helps to exempt him, since he was with him at the time of borrowing.

And we answer:

They say: The first clause and the latter clause concern the same work,

for if they were engaged in another work, this is not “its owner with it.”

And

nevertheless,

the first clause has a novelty

[a new point]

it informs us

that he is exempt,

and the latter clause has a novelty and informs us

that he is liable. A novelty can be found in both the first clause and the latter clause even when they concern the same work.

The first clause has a novelty and informs us that even though it is not on its back

literally,

but

before it, nevertheless specifically

in the same work, since the owners were present at the time of borrowing—

he is exempt.

And the latter clause has a novelty and informs us that even though he is on its back, since the owners were not present at the time of borrowing—

he is liable.

And we are astonished:

What is this?! Granted, if you say that the first clause concerns another work and the latter clause concerns the same work,

as Rava understood, it is indeed understandable in the first clause and the latter clause that

this is the novelty

they contain.

But if you say that the first clause and the latter clause concern the same work,

as we sought to answer according to Rav Hamnuna,

what is the novelty?!

For

both this and that

[both of them]

are in the same work,

and there is no conceptual difference between whether he is on its back or before it.

With this Rava rejected the first law of Rav Hamnuna. Now Rava also comes to reject the second law .

And furthermore it was taught,

that it is not necessary for the owner to be with him both at the time of borrowing and at the time of the accident.

For it was taught:

From the implication of what is stated

in the Torah,

“If its owner is with it, he shall not pay,”

and is it so that

I do not know

how to infer from this

that if its owner is not with it, he shall surely pay?!

Rather, what does the verse come to teach

[what does the verse make known]

“its owner is not with it,

he shall surely pay”?

To tell you:

if

he was with him

his owner

at the time of borrowing, he need not be with him at the time it is broken or dies,

and nevertheless he is considered as having its owner with him. But if

he was with him at the time it was broken or died, he must be with him at the time of borrowing.

Thus the beraita says that everything follows the time of borrowing, contrary to Rav Hamnuna’s view.

And later the Gemara will explain how the beraita derives its law from the verses.

And another beraita was taught,

there is another beraita that says the same things in a different style and expounds the same derivation with a slight change .

For it was taught:

From the implication of what is stated

“its owner is not with it, he shall surely pay,”

and is it so that

he does not know

from this

that if its owner is with it, he shall not pay? Rather, what does “if its owner is with it” come to teach?

To tell you: once it went out

the borrowed cow

from the lender’s possession for one hour while the owner was with it, and it died—

he is exempt,

because the time of borrowing is determinative.

And we conclude:

A refutation of Rav Hamnuna is a refutation,

and both of his laws have been rejected.

Now the Gemara comes to explain how the beraitot derived the law being taught from the verses, and there are two approaches to this.

Abaye holds in accordance with Rabbi Josiah

mentioned above [94b], who holds that where the Torah writes two things with the conjunction “and” between them, both must be present together with regard to the matter stated concerning them.

And Abaye explains

the

verses

that state, “When he borrows ... and it is broken or dies ... its owner is not with it ... if its owner is with it,”

in accordance with Rabbi Josiah.