Bava Metzia 95b (צה:) — the Talmud in English

Rather

necessarily, this is what you must say:

The tanna

only

the matter

that is explicitly written he teaches; that which is derived through exposition he does not teach [The tanna of our Mishna teaches only a matter written explicitly in the Torah, and does not teach a matter derived through exposition], because the tanna did not come to teach us here which bailee is exempt and which bailee is liable when the owners are with him; rather, he came to teach at what time the owner must be engaged in his work in order for the bailee to be exempt.

[the tanna of our Mishna teaches only something written explicitly in the Torah, and does not teach something learned through exposition], because the tanna did not come here to teach us which bailee is exempt and which bailee is liable when the owner is working for him. Rather, he came to teach when the owner must be working for him in order for him to be exempt.

And the Gemara raises an objection from a beraita against the one who exempts:

Come and hear

from what we learned:

If one borrowed [if he borrowed the cow],

and its owner was with it,

or he rented it and its owner was with it,

or

he borrowed it and rented its owner with it,

or

he rented it and borrowed its owner with it.

In all these cases—

even though the owners were performing work

for the borrower or renter

in another place

and not together with the animal,

and it died

while in the borrower’s possession, or was stolen while in the renter’s possession

—

he is exempt.

he is exempt.

Now the Gemara brings a dispute between tannaim concerning the law of a renter, in order to determine in accordance with whose opinion this beraita was taught.

The Torah states at the end of the passage concerning a borrower [Exodus 22:14]: “If it is a hired animal, it came for its hire.” The meaning of the verse is: If he did not borrow the animal, but instead paid for its use, he does not have the status of a borrower, and is not liable for accidents.

However, the Torah did not explain whether the law of a renter is that of an unpaid bailee or that of a paid bailee. Therefore, the tannaim disputed this matter.

Rabbi Meir says: A renter has the status of an unpaid bailee, since he does not receive payment for guarding the animal.

Rabbi Yehuda says: A renter has the status of a paid bailee, since he derives benefit from the object.

And concerning this beraita,

they had assumed

[this interpretation]:

Who is the tanna of this beraita? It is Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A renter

has the status

of a paid bailee, and therefore the law of an unpaid bailee was not mentioned in the beraita.

And we raise an objection:

But this tanna teaches a matter derived through exposition

[and yet this tanna teaches a matter derived through exposition], and not only what is written explicitly in the Torah, as does the tanna of our Mishna. For he teaches that the law of a renter is that of a paid bailee, and the law of a paid bailee is derived through exposition,

whereas an unpaid bailee

he does not teach!

This implies that there is no exemption when the owners are with him, since his only liability is for negligence, and negligence when the owners are with him entails liability!

And we answer:

Who is the tanna of this beraita? It is Rabbi Meir, who says: A renter is like an unpaid bailee,

and he is liable only for negligence, and nevertheless he is exempt when the owners are with him.

And the tanna teaches the case of an unpaid bailee,

who, even though his only liability is for negligence, is exempt when the owners are with him,

and the same applies to a paid bailee,

who is exempt from all liabilities.

Alternatively,

it is possible to establish this beraita in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, whose opinion is followed everywhere in his disputes with Rabbi Meir,

and as Rabba bar Avuha reverses it and teaches,

Rabba bar Avuha had an opposite version of the beraita, and he taught it as follows:

Rabba bar Avuha had the opposite version of the beraita, and he taught it as follows:

How does a renter pay?

Rabbi Meir says: like a paid bailee.

Rabbi Yehuda says: like an unpaid bailee.

Rav Hamnuna said:

There are two conditions for the exemption when the owner is with him:

a.

He is always

[the borrower]

liable

for accidents, and is not exempt

until

the animal and the owner are engaged in the same work for the borrower’s needs, such as

a cow with which he is plowing,

or

a donkey with its owner driving behind it

[directing it]. This is because the verse “if its owner is with it” may be understood according to its plain meaning: that the owner is working together with the animal.

b.

And

the borrower is not exempt

until the owners are with him

in the work

from the time of the borrowing until the time it is injured or dies.

And the Gemara infers:

Apparently, Rav Hamnuna holds

that the wording of the verse

“its owner is with it” applies to the entire matter

[to everything stated in the passage], both to “when one borrows” and to “and it is injured or dies”; in all these cases, the exemption “if its owner is with it” applies.

Rav Hamnuna is thereby introducing a matter not stated in the Mishna. The Mishna states only that if the owner was with him at the time of the accident, but was not with him at the time of the borrowing, he is not exempt. However, the Mishna does not explain the law if the owner was with him only at the time of the borrowing and not at the time of the accident. It is possible that the owner need be with him only at the time of the borrowing, and it is possible that he must be with him also at the time of the accident.

Rav Hamnuna holds that the owner must be with him both at the time of the borrowing and at the time of the accident in order for the borrower to be exempt.

Rava, as he will now explain, disagrees with both of these laws.

At first Rava challenges the first law, and afterward he challenges the second law.

Rava raised an objection

from what we learned:

If he borrowed it and borrowed its owner with it, if he rented it and rented its owner with it, if he rented it and borrowed its owner with it, even though the owners were performing work in another place, and it died—

he is exempt.

And Rava infers:

Is it not so

[apparently] that “in another place” means

at another task,

and not as Rav Hamnuna said, that the owners must be engaged in the same task as the animal? And we answer:

No,

the case is one in which the owner was occupied

with the same task.

Rather, what does “in another place” mean?

That he was loosening the soil and proceeding before it,

the lender was digging in the ground before the animal in order to facilitate its plowing, but he was not actually in its place.

And we raise an objection:

But from the latter clause, which says “on its back,” it follows

that the latter clause of this beraita is speaking of a case in which the lender is performing work on the animal. This implies that the

first clause

is speaking of a case in which he performs

another task,

as will be explained.

As the latter clause teaches: If he borrowed it and afterward borrowed its owner, or rented it and afterward rented its owner with it, even though the owner was plowing on its back, and it died—

he is liable.

There is no exemption when the owners are with him, because they were not with him at the time he borrowed or rented the cow.

Thus, the latter clause of the beraita teaches that even though the owner was literally with him, this does not result in an exemption, since he was not with him at the time of the borrowing. It follows that the first clause correspondingly teaches that even though the owner performed a different task, this does result in an exemption, since he was with him at the time of the borrowing.

And we answer:

They said: The first clause and the latter clause concern the same task,

for if they were engaged in different tasks, this is not considered a case in which the owner is with him.

And

nevertheless,

the first clause teaches us a novel point

[a novelty]

it teaches us

that he is exempt,

and the latter clause teaches us a novel point

that he is liable. One must find a novel point in both the first and latter clauses even when they concern the same task.

The first clause teaches us a novel point: Even though he is not actually on its back,

but

rather

before it, nevertheless only when he is engaged in

the same task, since the owner was present at the time of the borrowing—

he is exempt.

And the latter clause teaches us a novel point: Even though he is on its back, since the owner was not present at the time of the borrowing—

he is liable.

And we are astonished:

What is this? Granted, if you say that the first clause concerns a different task and the latter clause concerns the same task,

as Rava understood it, it is indeed understandable in the first and latter clauses that

this is the novelty

they teach.

But if you say that the first and latter clauses concern the same task,

as we sought to answer in accordance with Rav Hamnuna,

what is the novelty?

For

both cases

[this and that]

concern the same task,

and there is no conceptual difference between the owner being on its back or before it.

With this, Rava rejected Rav Hamnuna’s first law. Now Rava comes to reject his second law as well.

And furthermore, it was taught

that it is not necessary for the owner to be with him both at the time of the borrowing and at the time of the accident.

As it was taught:

From the implication of what is stated

in the Torah,

“If its owner is with it, he shall not pay,”

is it possible that

I do not know

how to infer from this

that if its owner is not with it, he shall surely pay?!

Rather, what is the meaning of

[what does the verse teach by stating]

“its owner is not with it,

he shall surely pay”?

It is to tell you

that if

he was with him

the owner

at the time of the borrowing, he need not be with him at the time it is injured or dies,

and nevertheless he is considered to be in a case where its owner is with him. But if

he was with him at the time it was injured or died, he must be with him at the time of the borrowing.

Thus, the beraita says that everything follows the time of the borrowing, contrary to Rav Hamnuna’s opinion.

And later the Gemara will explain how the beraita derives its law from the verses.

And another beraita was taught,

there is another beraita that states the same matters in a different style and expounds the same exposition with a slight variation.

As it was taught:

From the implication of what is stated

“If its owner is not with it, he shall surely pay,”

is it possible that

he does not know

from this

that if its owner is with it, he shall not pay? Rather, what is the meaning of “if its owner is with it”?

It is to tell you: Once it has left

the borrowed cow

the lender’s possession for even one moment while the owner was with it, and it died—

he is exempt,

because the time of the borrowing is determinative.

And we conclude:

A refutation of Rav Hamnuna; a refutation,

and both of his laws have been rejected.

Now the Gemara comes to explain how the beraitot derived the laws they teach from the verses, and there are two approaches to this.

Abaye follows the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiyya,

mentioned above [page 94b], who holds that wherever the Torah writes two things joined by the conjunction “and,” both must be present with regard to the matter under discussion.

And Abaye answers

the verses

in accordance with Rabbi Yoshiyya

which state: “And when one borrows … and it is injured or dies … its owner is not with it … if its owner is with it.”

in accordance with Rabbi Yoshiyya.