Bava Metzia 90b (צ:) — the Talmud in English

These oxen

that gentiles “steal,”

these oxen that the gentiles “steal” [for appearance’s sake] from their Jewish owners,

and castrate them,

and castrate them on behalf of the Jew [because a Jew is forbidden to castrate an animal]. The gentiles know that these are Jewish acquaintances, since a Jew is forbidden to castrate, and they do this for the Jew’s benefit, because a castrated ox is better for plowing,

what

is the ruling? Is there a transgression on the part of the Jew because of the prohibition against castration, since the gentile does this because he knows that the Jew wants it, and the “theft” is only for appearance’s sake? Should he be penalized for this or not?

He sent them a reply: An artifice was performed with regard to them [

the prohibition was violated through an artifice: the Jew pretended not to see the gentile stealing his ox and allowed the gentile to castrate it].

Therefore,

they should be imposed upon, and they should be sold!

We too shall penalize the one who uses an artifice, requiring him to sell his ox, so that he will not benefit from the transgression,

And if, with regard to a prohibition whose violation is punishable by a lav, there is no prohibition against instructing a gentile, then it would even be permitted to instruct a gentile to castrate the animal. What prohibition did the one who used an artifice violate? Inevitably, it must be forbidden to instruct a gentile even with regard to a prohibition whose violation is punishable by a lav. And these people who used an artifice to circumvent this prohibition were penalized.

The Gemara rejects this:

Rav Pappa said:

It is possible that it is always permitted to tell a gentile to perform an act on one’s behalf that is prohibited by a lav. But

the people of the West,

who sent a question to Shmuel’s father asking what the law is concerning those who use artifice and allow their animals to be castrated,

held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥidka, who said: The descendants of Noah are commanded with regard to castration, and they transgress

these people who use artifice and allow their animals to be castrated

because of: “And before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block,”

and because of this prohibition they were penalized, so that they would not benefit from the transgression.

The Gemara proceeds to discuss the nature of the penalty imposed upon those who use artifice to have their animals castrated.

Rava thought to say:

Since the castration is performed in order to make the ox better for plowing,

they should sell it for slaughter,

as its price is lower than the value of an ox for plowing, and he should not benefit by receiving the higher price of an ox for plowing, whose value was increased through the prohibited castration.

Abaye said to him: Is it enough that you have penalized them with a sale?

This penalty alone suffices to prevent artifice, because the gentile will not make the effort to castrate the ox if the owners cannot use it.

The Gemara now explains to whom the one who used artifice to have his animal castrated must sell the ox, so that he will not benefit from it.

It is obvious: to his adult son—

for he is considered another person.

The one who used artifice may sell the ox to him, thereby fulfilling the penalty imposed upon him.

To his minor son—

what is the ruling?

Rav Aḥai prohibited it,

since ultimately he uses the property of his minor son, and it follows that he benefits from the castration.

And Rav Ashi permitted it,

as the penalty is fulfilled through the sale, even though ultimately he will benefit from the castration.

Mirmar and Mar Zutra—and some say, those two pious men—

when gentiles who were their acquaintances castrated their animals, even though they had done so without artifice and had no knowledge whatsoever that the gentile had stolen their animals in order to castrate them, nevertheless they were stringent with themselves and penalized themselves, and they would

exchange them with one another [

they would exchange their oxen with one another].

Rami bar Ḥama raised a dilemma: If a thorn became lodged in its mouth,

and it threshed with it,

what is the ruling?

Is there in this a violation of the prohibition: “You shall not muzzle”?

And we challenge this: But if

he lodged it in its mouth

himself,

it is an excellent muzzling [

a superior form of muzzling]

and

it is certainly prohibited!

Rather, if a thorn became lodged in its mouth,

so that the thorn entered its mouth on its own,

what is the ruling?

Is it prohibited to thresh with it in this state, since ultimately it is muzzled at that time, and if he wishes to thresh with it he is obligated to remove the thorn from its mouth? Or perhaps, since the prevention of eating occurred on its own and not because of him, it is permitted to thresh with it, and he is not commanded to remove the thorn from its mouth?

And he further raised a dilemma:

If he stationed a lion outside it, what is the ruling?

Because of fear of the lion, it refrains from eating. May he thresh with it or not?

The Gemara wonders: But if

he stationed it

himself,

it is an excellent muzzling,

and it is certainly prohibited!

Rather, if a lion crouched outside it [

and came on its own]

what is the ruling?

Is this considered prohibited muzzling, so that it is prohibited to thresh with it at that time, or not, since this is not muzzling of its body?

And if you say that even when he does not muzzle its body it is prohibited to thresh with it,

if he stationed its young outside,

and because of its longing for it she does not eat,

what is the ruling?

Is there a prohibition of muzzling in this case or not, since she is not prevented from eating to such an extent because of this? If she becomes very hungry, she will eat despite her longing for her young.

If it was thirsty for water, what is the ruling?

Is there a prohibition of muzzling in this case, even though he does not muzzle it at all, but it is in a state in which it does not eat?

If he spread a katbelia,

a tanned hide,

over the threshing floor,

so that it cannot eat from the grain being threshed,

what is the ruling?

Does he violate the prohibition of muzzling in this case? For now it is not actually treading upon the grain, and this is not the threshing concerning which it is stated: “You shall not muzzle an ox when it threshes”—or not?

The Gemara says:

Resolve from this [

from all these dilemmas]

one

of them: the dilemma of whether it is permitted to spread a hide over the threshing floor.

As it is taught in a beraita: The owner of a cow,

who rents out his cow to thresh for others,

is permitted to starve his cow

before he gives it to the renter,

so that it will eat a great deal from the threshing floor.

Although because of its hunger it will eat more.

And the homeowner is permitted to untie a bundle,

the knot of

sheaves,

a bundle of the stalks of grain,

before

the animal,

to spread the stalks over the grain being threshed, so that the animal will fill its belly with the stalks,

so that it will not eat a great deal from the threshing floor

of the grain

itself.

And although it cannot eat from the threshing floor, since it is not threshing upon the grain but upon the stalks, there is no prohibition in this.

From here it follows that it is permitted to spread a hide over the threshing floor, even though because of this the animal is prevented from eating from the threshing floor, since it is not threshing upon the grain.

The Gemara rejects this:

There it is different,

where one places stalks upon the threshing floor,

as it eats

some of the grain even after the stalks have been placed there. This is not comparable to spreading a hide, which prevents it entirely from accessing the grain.

Alternatively,

the proof may be rejected, because when we learned:

“The homeowner is permitted to untie a bundle of stalks before the animal,”

it is referring to one who places stalks before it

at the outset,

before threshing, and it eats from the stalks first,

so that it will not eat

afterward

a great deal from the threshing floor,

since it will be satiated and will not eat of its own will.

That is not the case with spreading a hide over the grain: It cannot eat from the threshing floor even if it wishes to.

Rabbi Yonatan asked Rabbi Simai: If he muzzled it outside

before bringing it in to thresh,

what is the ruling?

Is the prohibition “You shall not muzzle” limited to an

ox “when it threshes,” as the Merciful One stated,

so that performing an act of muzzling at the time of threshing is what is prohibited,

and this,

when he muzzled it before the time of threshing,

is not “when it threshes,”

and it is permitted to muzzle it outside?

Or perhaps,

the prohibition is:

“You shall not thresh while muzzled,” as the Merciful One stated,

and even one who muzzled it outside is threshing with it in a state in which it cannot eat.

He said to him: From the house of your father,

from the prohibition stated concerning your priestly forefathers,

you can learn:

It is stated concerning them: “

Wine and strong drink you shall not drink, neither you nor your sons with you, when you enter

the Tent of Meeting.”

But is it specifically

when you enter,

after they have entered the Tent of Meeting,

that it is prohibited

to drink wine?

Is drinking,

before they enter the Tent of Meeting,

and entering [

and then entering]

permitted!?

After all,

“To distinguish between the sacred and the profane,” the Merciful One stated.

The purpose of the prohibition against drinking is to ensure that the priest can distinguish between valid and invalid service; when he becomes intoxicated, he cannot distinguish. If so, drinking wine before entering also prevents him from distinguishing between valid and invalid service.

Rather,

inevitably,

just as there,

the statement “Wine and strong drink you shall not drink when you enter” means that

at the time of entering

the Temple,

you shall not be

entering in a state of

intoxication,

whether the intoxication resulted from drinking before entering or from drinking after entering.

Here too,

with regard to the prohibition “You shall not muzzle an ox when it threshes,” the meaning is that

at the time of threshing the animal shall not be

in a state of

muzzling,

whether it was muzzled before threshing or after it began threshing. And it is prohibited to muzzle it even before the time of threshing.

The Sages taught: One who muzzles the cow,

and his fellow threshes with it,

and one who pairs animals of diverse kinds,

who ties an ox and a donkey to a wagon, while his fellow drives them together,

is exempt

the first person.

And only the one who threshes or drives receives lashes,

but not the one who causes the subsequent threshing or driving to take place in violation.

It was stated: If he muzzled it by means of his voice,

when it bent down to eat, he scolded it and thereby violated “You shall not muzzle.”

And if he drove them by means of his voice,

when an ox and a donkey were under one yoke, he led them by shouting at them and thereby violated the prohibition: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together.”

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable

to lashes.

Reish Lakish said: He is exempt

from lashes, although he performed a prohibited act.

The Gemara explains the basis of their dispute:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable,

although the punishment of lashes applies only when one performs an act, because

the movement of his mouth,

when he shouted, and as a result it refrained from eating or he drove the ox and donkey,

is considered an act.

Reish Lakish said: He is exempt

from lashes, since he performed no act, because

a voice,

with which he moved his lips and scolded the animal,

is not considered an act

for which he can be liable for lashes.

Rabbi Yoḥanan challenged Reish Lakish,

who holds that moving one’s mouth for speech is not an act for which one receives lashes, from what we learned at the beginning of tractate Temura [2a]: