Bava Metzia 90b — the Talmud in English

These oxen ![](pamud.bmp "

exact location on the page")

that gentiles “steal,”

these oxen that gentiles “steal” [merely for appearances] from their Jewish owners,

and castrate them,

and castrate them for the Jewish owner [because a Jew is forbidden to castrate an animal]. The gentiles know that these are Jewish acquaintances, since a Jew is forbidden to castrate, and they do this for the benefit of the Jewish owner, because a castrated ox is better suited for plowing.

What is the ruling?

Is the Jew guilty of violating the prohibition against castration, since the gentile does this because he knows that the Jew wants it, while the “theft” is merely for appearances? Should the Jew be penalized for this or not?

They sent them this reply: A deceptive arrangement was carried out through them

the Jew pretended not to see the gentile stealing his ox and allowed the gentile to castrate it.

Therefore,

let them be penalized for their deception and let them sell the oxen!

We too will penalize the one who uses this deception: he will have to sell his ox and will not benefit from the transgression.

If, however, with regard to a prohibition stated as a negative commandment, there is no prohibition against telling a gentile to perform the act, then it should even be permitted to instruct a gentile to castrate the animal. What prohibition did the one who used this deception violate? It must therefore be that it is forbidden to instruct a gentile even concerning a prohibition stated as a negative commandment. And these people who used this deception concerning this prohibition were penalized.

The Gemara rejects this:

Rav Pappa said:

It is possible that it is always permitted to tell a gentile to perform an act that is prohibited to a Jew by a negative commandment. As for

the people of the West,

who sent a question to Shmuel’s father about the status of those who used deception and allowed their animals to be castrated,

they follow the opinion of Rabbi Ḥidka, who says: The descendants of Noah are commanded concerning castration, and they transgress

these people who used deception and allowed their animals to be castrated

because of the prohibition, “You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind,”

and it was because of this prohibition that they were penalized, so that they would not benefit from the transgression.

The Gemara now discusses the nature of the penalty imposed on those who used deception to have their animals castrated.

Rava thought to say:

Since the castration was performed in order to make the ox better suited for plowing,

they should sell it for slaughter,

at a lower price than the value of an ox used for plowing. Thus, the owner would not benefit by receiving the higher price of a plowing ox whose value was increased through the prohibited castration.

Abaye said to him: Is it enough that you penalized them by requiring them to sell it?

This penalty alone is sufficient to prevent such deception, because the gentile will not take the trouble to castrate the ox if its owner cannot use it.

The Gemara explains to whom the person who used deception must sell his castrated ox, so that he will not benefit from it.

It is obvious: He may sell it to his adult son —

because he is considered like another person.

The one who used deception may sell the ox to him, and by doing so he fulfills the penalty imposed upon him.

If he sells it to his minor son —

what is the ruling?

Rav Aḥai prohibited it,

since in the end the father uses his minor son’s property, and it follows that he benefits from the castration.

And Rav Ashi permitted it,

because the penalty was fulfilled through the sale, even though ultimately he will benefit from the castration.

Mareimar and Mar Zutra—and some say, those two pious men—

when gentiles who knew them castrated their animals, even when they had done so without any deception and did not know at all that the gentile had stolen their animals in order to castrate them, nevertheless they were strict with themselves, imposed a penalty upon themselves, and

exchanged them with one another

they exchanged their oxen with each other.

Rami bar Ḥama raised a question: If one placed a thorn in its mouth

and it threshed with it,

what is the ruling?

Does this involve a violation of the prohibition against muzzling an animal while it threshes?

The Gemara challenges this: If he

placed it

the thorn in its mouth himself,

it is a complete muzzling

a proper muzzling

and it is

certainly prohibited!

Rather, if a thorn became lodged in its mouth

the thorn entered its mouth by itself,

what is the ruling?

Is it forbidden to have it thresh in this situation, since in the end it is muzzled at that time, and if he wishes to have it thresh, he is obligated to remove the thorn from its mouth? Or perhaps, since the prevention of its eating occurred on its own and not because of him, it is permitted to have it thresh, and he is not obligated to remove the thorn from its mouth? Tosafot answered that the question concerns a case in which the thorn became lodged in the cow’s mouth by itself. The question is whether this is comparable to a sick cow that is unable to eat, which is not considered muzzled, and with which it is permitted to thresh. Although it does not eat, that is because of its physical condition and because it does not wish to eat. Similarly, here, when the thorn became lodged in its mouth by itself, the Gemara questions whether this is like an animal that became ill and is in a condition in which it cannot eat, rather than an animal that was muzzled. The wording of Rambam is: Whether one muzzles it while it is working, or muzzles it beforehand and then works it while it is muzzled, he receives lashes. The Even HaAzel inferred that, according to Rambam, the prohibition discussed later in the Gemara against threshing with a muzzled animal applies specifically when he himself muzzled it beforehand. Otherwise, why did Rambam not teach the greater case as well—that even if another person muzzled it and he threshed with it, he would be liable? According to Rambam, there is therefore a difficulty: What is the question concerning a thorn that became lodged in its mouth? In that case, he never performed an act of muzzling the animal. Because of this difficulty, he innovated that the Gemara’s question concerns precisely this issue: Is the prohibition against threshing with a muzzled cow a prohibition against the act of threshing that he performs with the cow while it is muzzled? Or is the only prohibition to muzzle it beforehand and then thresh with it, so that the prohibition always concerns the act of muzzling? If the thorn became lodged in its mouth by itself, there is no trace of a prohibition. The Even HaAzel nevertheless raised a difficulty with this explanation. Rambam explains the later Gemara, which establishes that threshing with a muzzled animal is forbidden, as referring specifically to one who muzzled it by hand beforehand. But when it became muzzled by itself, that is not the subject of the later Gemara; rather, it is the subject of the question here, concerning a thorn that became lodged in its mouth. If so, how did the Gemara prove from the law of priests who drank wine that the prohibition applies even when the animal was muzzled before threshing, just as priests who drank wine are forbidden to drink even before entering the Temple? With regard to priests who drank wine, there is no prohibition against the act of drinking itself. The prohibition is only that the priest must not be intoxicated when he enters the Temple. The same should therefore apply to muzzling: there should be no prohibition against muzzling itself, but only against threshing with a muzzled cow, even if someone else muzzled it. He answered that the law of priests who drank wine contains two distinct elements. One is the law of intoxication, whose primary requirement is that a priest must not be intoxicated when he enters the Temple. But there is another law, the law concerning those who have drunk wine, for which there is a punishment of death at the hands of Heaven, and such a priest desecrates the Temple service. With regard to this law, the priest must actually drink wine; it makes no difference whether he drinks inside the Temple or outside before entering, but an act of drinking is required. From this the Gemara learned the prohibition of muzzling: this prohibition too includes a prohibition against performing an act of muzzling even before one begins threshing. But if he did not muzzle it at all and merely threshed with it while it happened to be muzzled, that is the subject of the Gemara’s question concerning a thorn that became lodged in its mouth: Can this prohibition also be derived from the law of priests who drank wine? [unclear: the source text ends with a truncated word.]

He further raised a question:

If one stationed a lion outside it, what is the ruling?

Because of fear of the lion, it restrains itself from eating. May one have it thresh, or not?

The Gemara is astonished: If he

stationed it

the lion himself,

it is a complete muzzling,

and it is certainly forbidden!

Rather, if a lion crouched outside it

and came there on its own,

what is the ruling?

Is this considered the prohibited muzzling, so that it is forbidden to have the animal thresh at that time? Or not, since this is not a physical muzzling of the animal?

And if you say that even when he does not muzzle the animal physically it is forbidden to have it thresh,

if he stationed its young outside it,

and because it longs for its young it does not eat,

what is the ruling?

Is this a violation of the prohibition against muzzling, or not, since the animal is not completely prevented from eating by this? If it becomes very hungry, it will eat despite its longing for its young.

If it was thirsty for water, what is the ruling?

Is there a prohibition against muzzling in this case, even though he did not muzzle it at all and it is simply in a condition in which it does not eat?

If he spread a tanned hide

a processed hide

over the threshing floor,

so that it cannot eat from the grain being threshed,

what is the ruling?

Does he violate the prohibition against muzzling in this case? After all, the animal is now not treading directly on the grain, and this is not the threshing concerning which the Torah says, “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing.” Or is it prohibited nevertheless?

The Gemara says:

Resolve one of these

all of the uncertainties,

one:

the uncertainty concerning whether it is permitted to spread a hide over the threshing floor.

As it was taught in a beraita: The owner of a cow,

the person who rents out his cow to thresh for others,

may starve his cow

before giving it to the renter,

so that it will eat a great deal from the threshing floor.

This is permitted even though, because of its hunger, it eats more than it ordinarily would.

And the owner of the house may untie a bundle

the binding of

fodder,

a bundle of the stalks of grain,

, before

the animal,

so that it spreads the stalks over the grain being threshed and the animal fills its belly with the stalks

, so that it will not eat a great deal from the threshing floor

of grain

itself.

Although the animal cannot eat from the grain being threshed, since it is treading on the stalks rather than on the grain, there is no prohibition in doing this.

From here it follows that it is permitted to spread a hide over the threshing floor, even though this prevents the animal from eating from the grain, since it is not threshing on the grain.

The Gemara rejects this:

There it is different,

in the case of placing fodder on the threshing floor,

because it does eat

some of the grain even after the fodder has been placed there. This is not comparable to spreading a hide, which prevents it entirely from eating the grain.

Alternatively,

the proof may be rejected because when the beraita says

“the owner of the house may untie a bundle of fodder before the animal,”

it is referring to a person who places fodder before it

from the outset,

before threshing, so that it first eats from the fodder,

so that it will not eat

afterward

a great deal from the threshing floor,

because it will be full and will not eat of its own will.

This is not the same as spreading a hide over the grain, since the animal cannot eat from the threshing floor even if it wishes to do so.

Rabbi Yonatan asked Rabbi Simai: If one muzzled it outside

before bringing it in to thresh,

what is the ruling?

Is the prohibition,

“You shall not muzzle an ox ‘while it is threshing,’” the Torah said,

and what is forbidden is performing the act of muzzling during threshing?

But this

the one who muzzled it before the time of threshing

is not ‘while it is threshing,’

and it should be permitted to muzzle it outside.

Or perhaps,

the prohibition is that

“You shall not thresh with a muzzled animal,” the Torah said,

and even one who muzzles it outside is threshing with it while it is unable to eat.

He said to him: From the law concerning your father’s household,

from the prohibition stated concerning your forefathers, the priests,

you can learn:

It is stated concerning them:

“Do not drink wine or any other intoxicating drink, you and your sons with you, when you enter

the Tent of Meeting.”

Is it specifically

“when you enter,”

after they have entered the Tent of Meeting,

that it is forbidden

to drink wine?

Is drinking,

before they enter the Tent of Meeting, and

entering

afterward

permitted!?

After all,

“to distinguish between the sacred and the profane,” the Torah said.

The purpose of the prohibition against drinking is that the priest must be able to distinguish between valid and invalid Temple service, and when he becomes intoxicated he cannot distinguish between them. Therefore, even if he drinks wine before entering, he will be unable to distinguish properly during the service.

Rather,

necessarily,

just as there,

the statement “Do not drink wine or any other intoxicating drink when you enter” means that

at the time of entering

the Temple,

the entry must not be

in a state of

intoxication,

whether the intoxication resulted from drinking before entering or from drinking after entering.

So too here,

with regard to the prohibition, “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing,” the meaning is that

at the time of threshing the animal must not be

in a state of

muzzling,

whether it was muzzled before threshing or after it began threshing. It is therefore forbidden to muzzle it even before the time of threshing. This is a great innovation of Tosafot Rid, since we learned that only the person who threshes violates the prohibition, meaning that the command not to muzzle was given only to the person threshing. How, then, can a Jew who muzzles the cow and afterward has a gentile thresh with it be liable, when the Jew did not thresh and was not commanded not to muzzle except as the one who threshes? See below, note 24, in the name of the Koveitz Shiurim, who says that during threshing the rule is not that only the person threshing is forbidden to muzzle. Even another person who muzzles the cow while it is threshing violates “You shall not muzzle.” This requires further examination.]

The Sages taught: One who muzzles the cow

while another person threshes with it,

and one who yokes animals of different species,

who ties an ox and a donkey to one wagon while another person drives them together,

is exempt

the first person.

And only the person who threshes or drives receives lashes,

not the one who causes the subsequent threshing or driving to take place in a prohibited manner.

It was stated: If he muzzled it through his voice,

when it bent down to eat, he shouted at it, and thereby violated “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing.”

And if he drove them through his voice,

when an ox and a donkey were under one yoke, and he led them by shouting at them, he violated the prohibition, “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together.”

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable

to lashes.

Reish Lakish said: He is exempt

from lashes, even though he performed a prohibited act.

The Gemara explains the basis of their dispute:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said that he is liable,

even though lashes are imposed only when a person performs an act, because

the movement of his mouth,

when he shouted, thereby preventing the animal from eating or caused an ox and a donkey to move together,

is considered an act. Tosafot answered that, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, movement of the lips is considered an act only when the speech produces a practical result, as here, where the cow becomes muzzled because of the shouting. By contrast, in the case of one who swears, nothing results from his speech. Therefore, the Gemara later challenges Rabbi Yoḥanan from the law of one who exchanges a consecrated animal, since an act results from his speech: the additional animal also becomes consecrated for sacrifice. Rabbi Ḥayyim raised the following difficulty: The Gemara explains that the prohibition against exchanging a consecrated animal is a prohibition that is remedied by a positive commandment. This means that there is a positive commandment that repairs the transgression caused by the exchange: the additional animal also becomes sacred. If so, the act that resulted from the speech in the exchange—the consecration of the additional animal—repairs the prohibition and is not part of the prohibition itself. Why, then, is the person who made the exchange considered to have performed an act merely because his speech produced the consecration of an additional animal? On the contrary, that additional consecration is not part of the prohibition but its remedy; no act was performed as part of the prohibition, only speech. The Maggid Mishne answered Tosafot’s difficulty as follows: Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the rule that one does not receive lashes for a negative commandment that does not involve an act refers to a prohibition that is intrinsically of a lighter nature, one that cannot be violated through an act—for example, swearing falsely, whose form is always speech alone. Such a negative commandment is therefore considered light and does not carry lashes. The prohibition against muzzling, however, can be violated through an act, when a person muzzles his cow by hand. Rabbi Yoḥanan therefore holds that this is a severe prohibition, and even when a person violates it without a physical act, he receives lashes. Thus, there are two explanations for why one does not receive lashes for a negative commandment that does not involve an act. Tosafot’s approach is that an offense committed without an act is not severe enough to warrant lashes. The Maggid Mishne’s approach is that a prohibition that cannot be violated through an action is itself a light prohibition whose punishment is not severe enough to include lashes.]

Reish Lakish said that he is exempt

from lashes, since he did not perform an act, because

a voice,

by which he moved his lips and shouted at the animal,

is not considered an act

for which lashes are imposed.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish,

who holds that moving one’s lips for speech is not an act for which lashes are imposed, from what we learned at the beginning of tractate Temura [2a]: Because of this difficulty, he innovated that the prohibition applies to the person who muzzles only when he muzzles the animal before threshing. But one who muzzles it while the animal is threshing is forbidden to muzzle it even if he is not the one threshing. The dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish concerns a case in which another person is threshing and, during the threshing, he prevents the animal from eating through his voice. It is possible, however, to reject this and establish that our passage concerns a case in which he both drives the animal during threshing and muzzles it through his voice. If another person threshes and he muzzles it through his voice, it would indeed be permitted, since only the person who threshes was commanded not to muzzle. See above, where we cited Rambam’s view that there is no prohibition against threshing with a muzzled cow unless he himself muzzled it by hand beforehand. According to Rambam, there is no basis for the difficulty that one who muzzles it through his voice should receive lashes because he threshes with a muzzled animal, since the prohibition against threshing with a muzzled animal applies only when he muzzled it before threshing, and here the muzzling was not performed through an act.]