Bava Metzia 8a — the Talmud in English

Rather, it is possible to say that they divide the garment itself without impairing it, since

it is suitable for

half a garment

for children.

And the Gemara brings another proof, from the case of a garment:

“And this is what Rava said: ‘If the garment was golden, they divide it,’”

would you say that

here too they divide it? It has been impaired!

This is not difficult, for it is suitable for

half a golden garment

for the sons of kings.

And the Gemara brings a proof from another case in the Mishna:

“And this is what we learned: ‘If two were riding upon an animal,’ etc.,”

they divide it; would

here too they divide it

the animal itself!?

It has been impaired!

Granted, a pure animal:

it can be divided after they slaughter it, for then it is

suitable for meat.

But

an animal

that is impure,

how will they divide it?

They have impaired it!

Rather,

necessarily, the intention of the Mishna is division

of its value; here too,

with a debt document, the intention of the division is

of its value,

the value of the document when sold, and not the debt written in the document itself.

And now the Gemara comes to discuss what was explained in the Mishna: that when two lifted a lost object together, they both acquired it, since each lifted it with the intention that his fellow acquire half through him.

Rami bar Hama said: This indicates

[and later the Gemara will explain where this is indicated in the Mishna]: a person

who lifts a lost object

with the intention of acquiring it through this lifting

for his fellow, his fellow acquires it.

And the novelty is that a person can acquire a lost object for his fellow even when by doing so he causes a loss to other people, who will then no longer be able to acquire it [but if this was not a lost object, but he came to seize an object that would actually cause a loss to another fellow, Rami bar Hama concedes that his acquisition is ineffective when he thereby causes a loss to another].

For if it enters your mind

that one who lifts a lost object for his fellow

does not cause his fellow to acquire it,

how did both of them acquire it when they lifted it together, one from its one side and the other from its other side?

For each of them lifted only its one side, and did not lift its other side from the ground. If so,

let this be made

regarded, with respect to him, as the other side of the garment, which he did not lift, but which his fellow lifted,

as though it were lying upon the ground, and

likewise with respect to his fellow, let

this,

the side of the garment that the first one lifted, be regarded with respect to the second

as though it were lying upon the ground,

for each of them lifted only one side of the garment, and if he lifts it only for himself, the lifting does not apply to his fellow.

And

since neither of them lifted the entire garment, and its other side is regarded with respect to him as lying upon the ground,

neither this one nor that one should acquire it!

Rather, is it not so? Learn from it: one who lifts a lost object for his fellow causes his fellow to acquire it.

And therefore both acquired it, since each of them lifted it for both of them, and the shared lifting was effective for both of them.

Rava said: I will always say to you that one who lifts a lost object for his fellow does not cause his fellow to acquire it,

since a person cannot acquire something for his fellow when by doing so he causes a loss to other people [and here he causes them a loss by preventing them from acquiring the lost object].

And here, this is the reason

that both of them acquired it [despite the fact that if only one of them had lifted it for his fellow, he would not acquire it]: since each of them is also performing a lifting here for himself, and then there is no deficiency of his causing a loss to others when he acquires it for this fellow, because

since he acquires

through his lifting

for himself, he also acquires for his fellow.

That is, the deficiency that a person cannot acquire for his fellow where he causes a loss to others does not apply if, through that same act of acquisition, he also acquires for himself. Here, each of them indeed lifted it also for himself, and therefore his lifting was effective with regard to his fellow as well. The half of the garment that he lifts is not regarded, with respect to his fellow, as lying upon the ground; rather, it is regarded as lifted above the ground also for his fellow.

And Rava proves his words: even if you say that one who lifts a lost object only for his fellow does not cause him to acquire it, nevertheless, where he lifts it also for himself, he causes his fellow to acquire it, on the basis of the principle that since he acquires for himself, he also acquires for his fellow:

Know

that this is so:

for if

a person

said to his agent, “Go and steal for me,” and the agent stole

for him,

the sender is exempt,

since there is no agent for a transgression.

And

if

partners stole,

for example, a person sent his fellow to steal for him, and the agent stole for both of them,

both are liable

[for it].

What is the reason

that the sender is liable, for there is no agent for a transgression?

Is it not because we say: Since he acquires for himself, he also acquires for his fellow?

And therefore here too, since the thief performed acts of acquisition through theft with regard to the stolen object for both of them, once he performed the act of acquisition through theft also for himself, he can perform it also for his fellow, despite the fact that there is no agent for a transgression.

And we conclude: indeed,

learn from it.

Rava said: Now that I have said that we say “since,”

that is, Rava holds that we say, “Since he acquires for himself, he also acquires for his fellow”:

We should say that

when a deaf-mute and a competent person lifted a lost object, since the deaf-mute acquired it, the competent person acquired it.

If a deaf-mute and a competent person lifted a lost object, even though the lifting of the deaf-mute does not acquire it for him according to the essential law, and the Sages instituted acquisition through his lifting only for the sake of the ways of peace, nevertheless, if the deaf-mute and the competent person lifted a lost object together, the deaf-mute acquires it with a complete acquisition, because of “since he acquires for himself.” That is, the lifting of the competent person is effective both for himself and for the deaf-mute! For through what the competent person lifted, his lifting is effective for the deaf-mute, so that he too acquires it. And now, since the deaf-mute acquired it, the competent person acquired it as well.

And the Gemara discusses:

Granted, the deaf-mute acquired it,

because

a person of understanding lifts it for him.

But through what did the competent person acquire it?

Why did both acquire it? Granted, the deaf-mute acquired it, since with respect to him there is a lifting of the entire object. For through what the competent person holds, he also lifts the other half for the deaf-mute, and the deaf-mute himself acquires what he lifts because of the ways of peace. But with regard to the competent person, the deaf-mute’s lifting is not effective, since the Sages instituted that his lifting be effective only with regard to the deaf-mute’s own acquisition, because of the ways of peace; but his lifting is not effective with regard to others. If so, how will the competent person acquire it? He does not lift the entire garment, and the lifting of its other side by the deaf-mute is not regarded as a lifting with respect to him; rather, that side of the garment is regarded with respect to him as lying upon the ground!

Rather,

necessarily,

say

that this is what we should say:

the deaf-mute acquired it; the competent person did not acquire it.

And

if you should say, if so,

what is the “since,”

for according to this it is difficult: through what did the deaf-mute acquire it? If the competent person did not acquire it, one can no longer say that his lifting is effective for the deaf-mute on the basis of “since he acquires for himself,” for the competent person does not acquire it for himself. If so, there is no “since he acquires for himself, he also acquires for his fellow.” Why, then, did the deaf-mute acquire it?

Your answer is:

Since two deaf-mutes ordinarily acquire it, this one too acquires it.

For just as we say, “Since he acquires for himself, he also acquires for his fellow,” so too we say an additional “since”: since two deaf-mutes ordinarily acquire it—that is, if two deaf-mutes had lifted the garment, they would both acquire it on the basis of “since he acquires for himself”—therefore, since two deaf-mutes who lift it acquire it, likewise, when a deaf-mute and a competent person lift it, the deaf-mute acquires it.

But the Gemara is astonished:

What is this!?

For even

if you should find it stated, “one who lifts a lost object for his fellow causes his fellow to acquire it,” these words

apply only

where he lifts it with the intention of his fellow,

that is, specifically when he lifted it for his fellow, so that he would acquire it. But

this one,

the deaf-mute who lifts it together with a competent person—the competent person

lifts it with his own intention.

And if

he does not acquire it

through this lifting for himself, is he going to

transfer it to another!?

That is, when a deaf-mute and a competent person lift it together, the competent person lifts it primarily for himself and not for his fellow. If so, why did the deaf-mute acquire it? He will not acquire it either under the principle of “one who lifts a lost object for his fellow,” since the competent person does not lift it only for the deaf-mute; nor under the principle of “since he acquires for himself,” since here the competent person does not acquire it for himself. If so, the competent person’s lifting is not a lifting, and the lost object is as though it were lying upon the ground. Consequently, the deaf-mute’s lifting is also not a lifting, since he lifts only one side of the garment. Why, then, did the deaf-mute acquire it?

Rather,

necessarily,

say

that this is how Rava’s statement is to be established:

Since the competent person did not acquire it, the deaf-mute did not acquire it.

And according to the Gemara’s conclusion, when a deaf-mute and a competent person lifted a lost object together, neither of them acquired it.

And if you would say: What is different from two deaf-mutes?

If you come to ask why, when two deaf-mutes lifted a lost object, both acquired it, for there too there is no lifting for the sake of his fellow, and consequently there is also no lifting of the entire object for himself?

You have to answer and distinguish:

There, the Sages instituted it for him,

so that

he would not come to quarrel.

But

here, he says

the deaf-mute: If

the competent person does not acquire it,

will

I acquire it

for myself?

With two deaf-mutes who lifted it, they acquire it because of the Sages’ enactment, so that they would not come to quarrel if a third person came and snatched it from them; therefore, the Sages instituted that both of them acquire it. But when there is a deaf-mute and a competent person, whose lifting is not effective for himself, and he therefore does not intend to acquire it even for his fellow, there will be no quarrel over the lost object, since there is no lifting here at all. Therefore, here the Sages did not institute that the deaf-mute acquire it.

Rav Aha, son of Rav Adda, said to Rav Ashi: Rami bar Hama’s inference—from where is it!?

Rami bar Hama, who inferred from our Mishna

“This indicates

that one who lifts a lost object for his fellow causes his fellow to acquire it”—from where did he infer and learn this novelty, that one who lifts a lost object for his fellow causes his fellow to acquire it?

Shall we say, from the beginning,

that perhaps you will say he learned it from what is stated at the beginning:

“Two are holding a garment,

they divide it,” and it is proven that his lifting is effective also for his fellow, so that he acquires the other half, for otherwise, if they both lifted it, neither of them would acquire it.

It is impossible to say this. For

there,

in the words of the Mishna, it is speaking of a case in which

this one,

this person,

said, “It is all mine, and I lifted all of it.” And this one,

the other person,

said, “It is all mine, and I lifted all of it.”

It follows that according to their claims, neither of them lifted it for his fellow; on the contrary, each came with the claim that it all belonged to him, because he lifted the entire garment for himself.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that Rami bar Hama learned it

from that which is taught

later in the Mishna:

“This one says, ‘It is all mine,’ and this one says, ‘It is all mine.’”

And he inferred:

Why do I need this further statement!?

That is, he learned it from the surplus wording in the Mishna, which first teaches, “This one says, ‘I found it,’” and afterward the Mishna adds that he also claims, “And it is all mine.”

For it is obvious that one who claims, “I found it,” claims that it is all his. Rather, from here one should learn that they divide it because perhaps they both lifted it together, and each lifted it also for his fellow.

For if we say that each lifted it only for himself, and that they divide it under the law of uncertainty as to which one preceded the other, then we have already learned this from the first claim, “This one says, ‘I found it.’” For what purpose did the tan­ the Mishna then continue and say, “And it is all mine”?

It is impossible to say this. For

we established the beginning as referring to a lost object, and the latter part as referring to a purchase and sale.

It has already been explained that this is not surplus wording, because the beginning, “This one says, ‘I found it,’” speaks of two who lifted a lost object, whereas later in the Mishna, in the claim “And it is all mine,” it speaks of a purchase and sale, where two people were disputing which of them purchased the object. And in this case too, our Mishna comes to teach that they divide it. It follows that there is no surplus wording in the Mishna’s statement.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that Rami bar Hama learned his ruling

from

the surplus wording of the Mishna’s statement in

the latter part,

as we learned there:

“This one says, ‘It is all mine,’ and this one says, ‘Half of it is mine,’

this one takes three quarters, and the other takes one quarter.”

And Rami bar Hama inferred as follows:

Why do I need this further statement!?

The law that they divide the money under dispute between them was already stated at the beginning, and here too they divide the half of the garment concerning which they are disputing.

Rather, from a superfluous Mishna, learn from it,

Rami bar Hama inferred that they divide the half under dispute because the case is one in which each lifted the half for himself and for the other.

But the Gemara is astonished at the inference:

And from where

does the latter part speak

of a lost object?

Perhaps

this part of the Mishna deals

with

claims of

purchase and sale!?

That is, from where do we know at all that the latter part speaks of a case in which they lifted a lost object? Perhaps the latter part speaks of a case in which the two of them were disputing the purchase of half the garment, and the dispute concerns the question of to whom the seller sold the garment. This has no connection at all to the matter of one who lifts a lost object for his fellow.

And if you would say,

perhaps you will answer that it is impossible to establish the Mishna’s statement in this way, because

if it concerns a purchase and sale, what does it come to teach!?

If it concerns a purchase and sale, what does the additional Mishna come to teach us? This is not an answer, because

it was necessary;

there is a need for these words of the Mishna in order to teach us an additional novelty ...

It might enter your mind to say: This one who says, “Half of it is mine,” should be like one who returns a lost object, and should be exempt

from the oath.

That is, there is a novelty in the latter part, because one might have said that they divide the half without an oath, since the second person could have said, “It is all mine,” but he said only, “Half of it is mine,” and he is therefore like one who returns a lost object. That is, he has a migo to substantiate his claim, and we would say that we exempt him from the oath.

Therefore,

it teaches us that this one is employing a ruse to withhold.

The Mishna comes to teach that they divide the half with an oath, and he does not have the credibility of a migo, for perhaps his claim, “Half of it is mine,” is a ruse, as

he reasoned: “If I say, ‘It is all mine,’ I will have to take an oath,”

and therefore

“I will say this, that I should be like one who returns a lost object, and I will be exempt.”

That is, perhaps he deliberately intends to say, “Half of it is mine,” knowing that if he says, “It is all mine,” he will have to swear; therefore, he says, “Half of it is mine,” so that he will appear like one who returns a lost object and will have the credibility of a migo. Therefore, the Mishna teaches us that they divide the half of the garment with an oath.

Rather, from this: “Two were riding upon an animal.”

Why do I need this further statement!?

That is, the surplus is that the Mishna repeated the law of two who were riding upon an animal—that they divide it—which seemingly is a redundant law.

Rather, from a superfluous Mishna learn from it

that

one who lifts a lost object for his fellow causes his fellow to acquire it.

And the Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps this teaches us that a rider also acquires it.

Perhaps our Mishna is not redundant; rather, it comes to teach us that riding is also an act of acquisition, and he acquires through it even though there is no drawing. Rather, even when the animal does not move from its place, he nevertheless acquires it through the act of acquisition of riding.

Rather, Rami bar Hama learned his ruling from the latter part

of the Mishna, which seemingly is redundant:

For we learned there:

“When they admit, or when they have witnesses, they divide without an oath.”

In what case? If it concerns a purchase and sale, is it necessary to say so!?

It is obvious that if both admit that they purchased the garment together, they divide it without an oath.

Rather, is it not in the case of a lost object.

Necessarily, it speaks here of a lost object, where both admit that they lifted it together for both of them,

and learn from it,

that the Mishna comes to teach us Rami bar Hama’s novelty: they acquired the garment because

one who lifts a lost object for his fellow causes his fellow to acquire it.

And Rava could say to you: Since he acquires for himself, he also acquires for his fellow.

That is, indeed, Rami bar Hama innovated the law of one who lifts it from this Mishna. But Rava disagrees with him and holds that he acquires it only if the one who lifts it intended to acquire it also for himself; then, since he acquires for himself, he also acquires for his fellow. For in order for he himself to acquire the garment, it must be that his lifting was also for his fellow, because otherwise, since each one lifts only half of it, there is no lifting of the entire garment.

And since each intended to acquire it also for his fellow, both acquired it, on the basis of “since he acquires for himself, he also acquires for his fellow,” and they divide it.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Two were riding”:

Rav Yosef said: Rav Yehuda said to me: