Bava Metzia 8a (ח.) — the Talmud in English

Rather, it is possible to say that they divide the garment itself without ruining it, since

it is suitable for

half a garment

for children.

And the Gemara brings another proof, from the case of a garment:

And regarding that which Rava said: “If the garment was gold-embroidered, they divide it,”

would you say that

here too they divide it? But they would ruin it!

This is not difficult, since it is suitable for

half a gold-embroidered garment

for the sons of kings.

And the Gemara brings a proof from another case in the Mishna:

And regarding that which we learned: “If two people were riding on an animal,” etc.,

“they divide it”—would

here too they divide it

the animal itself?

But they would ruin it!

Granted, with regard to a pure animal,

it can be divided after it has been slaughtered, at which point it

is suitable as meat.

But

an

impure animal—how can they divide it?

animal, how can they divide it?

They would ruin it!

Rather,

the Mishna must necessarily mean division

in terms of its monetary value; here too,

with regard to a promissory note, the division means

in terms of its monetary value,

the value for which the note can be sold, and not the debt written in the note itself.

And now the Gemara discusses what was explained in the Mishna: When two people lifted a found object together, they both acquired it, since each lifted it with the intention that his fellow acquire half through him.

Rami bar Ḥama said: This indicates

[and below the Gemara will explain where this is stated in the Mishna]: A person who

lifts a found object

with the intention of acquiring it through this lifting

for his fellow, his fellow acquires it.

The novelty is that a person can acquire a found object for his fellow even when this causes a loss to other people, who can then no longer acquire it [but if it were not a found object, and he came to seize something in a manner that actually caused a loss to another person, Rami bar Ḥama concedes that his acquisition is ineffective when it causes a loss to another].

For if it enters your mind

that one who lifts a found object for his fellow

does not cause his fellow to acquire it,

how did they both acquire it when they lifted it together, one from one side and the other from the other side?

After all, each of them lifted only one side of it, and did not lift the other side from the ground. If so,

let this

the other side of the garment, which he did not lift but which his fellow lifted, be considered with regard to him

as though it were lying on the ground, and

likewise with regard to his fellow,

this,

the side of the garment lifted by the first, should be considered with regard to the second

as though it were lying on the ground,

since each of them lifted only one side of the garment, and if he lifted it only for himself, the lifting does not apply to his fellow.

And

since neither of them lifted the entire garment, and its other side is considered with regard to him as lying on the ground,

neither one should acquire it!

Rather, is it not so that one who lifts a found object for his fellow causes his fellow to acquire it.

Therefore they both acquired it, since each lifted it for both of them, and the joint lifting was effective for both.

Rava said: I could always tell you that one who lifts a found object for his fellow does not cause his fellow to acquire it,

since a person cannot acquire something for his fellow when this causes a loss to other people [and here he causes them a loss by preventing them from acquiring the found object].

And here, this is the reason

that they both acquired it [despite the fact that if only one of them lifted it for his fellow, the latter would not acquire it]: Since each of them is also lifting it for himself, there is no deficiency of causing a loss to others when he acquires it for this fellow, because

since he acquires

each of them through his lifting

for himself, he also acquires it for his fellow.

That is, the deficiency that a person cannot acquire something for his fellow where he causes a loss to others does not apply when, through the same act of acquisition, he also acquires it for himself. Here, each of them lifted it also for himself, and therefore his lifting was effective with regard to his fellow as well. The half of the garment that he lifted is not considered to be lying on the ground with regard to his fellow; rather, it is considered lifted from the ground for his fellow as well.

Rava proves his statement: Even if you say that one who lifts a found object only for his fellow does not cause him to acquire it, nevertheless, where he lifts it also for himself, his fellow acquires it based on the principle that since he acquires it for himself, he also acquires it for his fellow:

Know

that this is so:

If

a person

said to his agent, “Go and steal for me,” and the agent stole

for him,

, the sender is exempt

since there is no agent for a transgression.

And

if

partners stole,

for example, a person sent his fellow to steal for him, and the agent stole for both of them,

they are liable,

both of them.

What is the reason

that the sender is liable, when there is no agent for a transgression?

Is it not because we say: Since he acquires it for himself, he also acquires it for his fellow?

Therefore here too, since the thief performed the acts of theft-acquisition with regard to the stolen object for both of them, once he performed the act of theft-acquisition also for himself, he can perform it for his fellow as well, despite the fact that there is no agent for a transgression.

And we conclude: Indeed,

this proves it.

Rava said: Now that we say that we apply the principle of migo,

meaning that, according to Rava, we say: Since he acquires it for himself, he also acquires it for his fellow:

We should say that

if a deaf-mute and a mentally competent person lifted a found object, since the deaf-mute acquired it, the mentally competent person acquired it.

If a deaf-mute and a mentally competent person lifted a found object, although the deaf-mute’s lifting is not an acquisition for him by Torah law, and the Sages instituted that his lifting effect an acquisition for the sake of the ways of peace, nevertheless, if the deaf-mute and the mentally competent person lifted a found object together, the deaf-mute acquires it with a complete acquisition, because of “since he acquires it for himself.” That is, the mentally competent person’s lifting is effective both for himself and for the deaf-mute: Through what the mentally competent person lifted, his lifting is effective for the deaf-mute as well, so that he too acquires it. And once the deaf-mute acquired it, the mentally competent person acquired it as well.

And the Gemara discusses this:

Granted, the deaf-mute acquired it,

because

a person of understanding lifted it for him.

But how did the mentally competent person acquire it?

Why did both of them acquire it? Granted, the deaf-mute acquired it, since with regard to him there was lifting of the entire object: The mentally competent person, through what he held, also lifted the other half for the deaf-mute, and the deaf-mute himself acquires what he lifted because of the ways of peace. But with regard to the mentally competent person, the deaf-mute’s lifting is not effective, since the Sages instituted that his lifting be effective only with regard to the deaf-mute’s own acquisition, for the sake of the ways of peace; his lifting is not effective for others. If so, how can the mentally competent person acquire it? He did not lift the entire garment, and the lifting of the other side by the deaf-mute is not considered a lifting with regard to him; rather, that side of the garment is considered with regard to him as lying on the ground!

Rather,

necessarily,

say

that we should state as follows:

The deaf-mute acquired it; the mentally competent person did not acquire it.

And

if you would say: If so,

what is the “since”?

According to this, there is a difficulty: How did the deaf-mute acquire it? Once the mentally competent person did not acquire it, one can no longer say that his lifting was effective for the deaf-mute based on “since he acquires it for himself,” because the mentally competent person does not acquire it for himself. If so, there is no “since he acquires it for himself, he also acquires it for his fellow.” Why, then, did the deaf-mute acquire it?

The answer is:

Since two deaf-mutes ordinarily acquire it, this one also acquires it.

Just as we say, “Since he acquires it for himself, he also acquires it for his fellow,” so too we say an additional migo: Since two deaf-mutes ordinarily acquire it—that is, if two deaf-mutes lifted a garment, they would both acquire it through “since he acquires it for himself”—therefore, since two deaf-mutes who lift it acquire it, likewise, when a deaf-mute and a mentally competent person lift it, the deaf-mute acquires it.

But the Gemara raises an objection:

What is this!?

After all, even

if you should conclude that “one who lifts a found object for his fellow causes his fellow to acquire it,” this applies

only in a case

, where he lifts it with the intention of his fellow,

that is, specifically when he lifted it for his fellow, so that the latter would acquire it. But

this

deaf-mute who lifts it together with a mentally competent person—the mentally competent person

lifts it with the intention of himself.

And if

he does not acquire it

for himself through this lifting, is he going to

acquire it for another!?

That is, when a deaf-mute and a mentally competent person lift it together, the mentally competent person primarily lifts it for himself and not for his fellow. If so, why did the deaf-mute acquire it? He will not acquire it either by virtue of “one who lifts a found object for his fellow,” since the mentally competent person did not lift it only for the deaf-mute; nor by virtue of “since he acquires it for himself,” since here the mentally competent person does not acquire it for himself. If so, the mentally competent person’s lifting is not a lifting, and the found object is like something lying on the ground. Consequently, the deaf-mute’s lifting is also not a lifting, since he lifted only one side of the garment. Why, then, did the deaf-mute acquire it?

Rather,

necessarily,

say

that Rava’s statement must be understood as follows:

Since the mentally competent person did not acquire it, the deaf-mute did not acquire it.

The Gemara’s conclusion is that when a deaf-mute and a mentally competent person lift a found object together, neither of them acquires it.

And if you would say: What is the difference between this and two deaf-mutes?

If you come to ask why two deaf-mutes who lifted a found object both acquired it, when there too there was no lifting for his fellow, and consequently there was not lifting of the entire object for himself either?

You should answer and distinguish:

There, the Sages instituted it for him

so that

they would not come to quarrel.

But

here,

the deaf-mute says: If

the mentally competent person does not acquire it,

why should

I acquire it

for myself?

When two deaf-mutes lift an object, they acquire it because of the Sages’ enactment, so that they will not come to quarrel if a third person comes and snatches it from them; therefore, the Sages instituted that both of them acquire it. But when there is a deaf-mute and a mentally competent person, and the mentally competent person’s lifting is not effective for himself, he does not intend to acquire it even for his fellow. There will be no quarrel over the object, since there is no lifting at all; therefore, here the Sages did not institute that the deaf-mute acquire it.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Adda, said to Rav Ashi: From where is Rami bar Ḥama’s inference?

Rami bar Ḥama, who inferred from our Mishna,

“This indicates

that one who lifts a found object for his fellow causes his fellow to acquire it,”—from where did he infer and learn his novel ruling that one who lifts a found object for his fellow causes his fellow to acquire it?

If you say, from the first clause,

perhaps you will say that he learned it from what is stated in the first clause,

“Two people are holding a garment,

they divide it,” which proves that his lifting is effective for his fellow as well, so that the latter acquires the other half. For otherwise, if they both lifted it, neither of them would acquire it.

This cannot be said. For

there,

in the words of the Mishna, the case is one in which

this one,

the first,

said, “It is all mine, and I lifted all of it.” And this one,

the second,

said, “It is all mine, and I lifted all of it.”

Thus, according to their claims, neither of them lifted it for his fellow. On the contrary, each claims that it all belongs to him, because he lifted the entire garment for himself.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that Rami bar Ḥama learned this

from that which is taught

later in the Mishna:

“This one says, ‘It is all mine,’ and this one says, ‘It is all mine.’”

And he inferred:

Why do I need this also!?

That is, he learned it from the apparently superfluous wording in the Mishna: It first teaches, “This one says, ‘I found it,’” and afterward the Mishna adds that he also claims, “And it is all mine.”

After all, it is obvious that one who claims, “I found it,” claims that it all belongs to him. Rather, from here one can learn that they divide it because perhaps they both lifted it together, and each lifted it also for his fellow.

For if it were said that each lifted it only for himself, and that they divide it under the law of uncertainty as to who preceded the other, this was already indicated by the first claim, “This one says, ‘I found it.’” Why, then, did the tanna continue and say, “And it is all mine”?

This cannot be said. For

we established the first clause as referring to a found object, and the latter clause as referring to a purchase and sale.

It has already been explained that this is not superfluous wording, because the first clause [“This one says, ‘I found it’”] speaks of two people who lifted a found object, whereas later in the Mishna, in the claim “And it is all mine,” the case concerns a purchase and sale, in which two people were disputing who purchased the object. Here too, our Mishna comes to teach that they divide it. Thus, there is no superfluous wording in the Mishna.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that Rami bar Ḥama learned his ruling

from

the apparently superfluous wording of the Mishna in

the latter clause,

as we learned there:

“This one says, ‘It is all mine,’ and this one says, ‘Half is mine,’”

the former takes three-quarters, and the latter takes one-quarter.

And this is how Rami bar Ḥama inferred:

Why do I need this also!?

The law that they divide the money disputed between them was already stated in the first clause, and here too they divide the half of the garment about which they are arguing.

Rather, from a superfluous Mishna, this proves it,

Rami bar Ḥama inferred that they divide the disputed half because the case is one in which each lifted that half for himself and for the other.

But the Gemara challenges this inference:

And from where do you know that

the latter clause speaks

of a found object?

Perhaps

this section of the Mishna deals

with

claims of

purchase and sale!?

That is, from where do we know at all that the latter clause speaks of a case in which they lifted a found object? Perhaps the latter clause concerns two people disputing the purchase of half the garment, with the dispute revolving around the question of which of them the seller sold the garment to. This has no connection at all to the matter of one who lifts a found object for his fellow.

And if you would say,

perhaps you will answer that the Mishna cannot be interpreted in this way, because

if it concerns a purchase and sale, what is it teaching us!?

If it concerns a purchase and sale, what does the additional Mishna come to teach us? This is not a sufficient answer, because

it was necessary;

there was a need for these words of the Mishna in order to teach us an additional novelty...

It might enter your mind to say that this one who says, “Half is mine,” should be considered like one who returns a lost object, and should be exempt

from the oath.

That is, there is a novelty in the latter clause, because one might have said that they divide the half without an oath: The second person could have said, “It is all mine,” but he said only, “Half is mine,” and he is therefore like one who returns a lost object. That is, he has a migo supporting his claim, and we might say that he should be exempt from the oath.

Therefore,

it teaches us this: This one is employing a ruse to withhold it.

The Mishna comes to teach that they divide the half with an oath, and that he does not have the credibility of a migo, because perhaps his claim, “Half is mine,” is a form of deception. He

thought: If I say, “It is all mine,” I will have to take an oath,

and therefore

I will say this, that it is like “one who returns a lost object,” and I will be exempt.

That is, perhaps he deliberately intends to say, “Half is mine,” knowing that if he says, “It is all mine,” he will have to take an oath. Therefore, he says, “Half is mine,” so that he will appear like one who returns a lost object and will have the credibility of a migo. The Mishna therefore teaches us that they divide the half of the garment with an oath.

Rather, from this: “If two people were riding on an animal.”

Why do I need this also!?

That is, the apparently superfluous element is that the Mishna repeats the law of two people who were riding on an animal: They divide it. This seems to be a superfluous law.

Rather, from a superfluous Mishna this proves it,

that

one who lifts a found object for his fellow causes his fellow to acquire it.

The Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps this teaches us that a rider also acquires.

Perhaps our Mishna is not superfluous; rather, it comes to teach us that riding is also an act of acquisition, and one acquires through it even though there is no pulling. Even when the animal does not move from its place, he nevertheless acquires it through the act of acquisition of riding.

Rather, from the latter clause

of the Mishna Rami bar Ḥama learned his ruling, since it is seemingly superfluous:

As we learned there:

“When they admit, or when they have witnesses, they divide without an oath.”

With regard to what? If it concerns a purchase and sale, is it necessary to say so!?

It is obvious that if both of them admit that they purchased the garment together, they divide it without an oath.

Rather, is it not referring to a found object.

It must necessarily be referring to a found object, where both admit that they lifted it together for both of them,

and this proves

that the Mishna comes to teach us Rami bar Ḥama’s novel ruling: They acquired the garment because

one who lifts a found object for his fellow causes his fellow to acquire it.

And Rava could say to you: Since he acquires it for himself, he also acquires it for his fellow.

That is, indeed, Rami bar Ḥama derived the law of one who lifts a found object from this Mishna. But Rava disagrees with him and maintains that the fellow acquires it only when the one who lifts it intended to acquire it also for himself; then, since he acquires it for himself, he also acquires it for his fellow. For him to acquire the garment himself, his lifting must also be for his fellow, because otherwise, since each one lifts only half of it, there is no lifting of the entire garment.

And since each intended to acquire it also for his fellow, they both acquired it, by virtue of “since he acquires it for himself, he also acquires it for his fellow,” and they divide it.

We learned in the Mishna:

“If two people were riding”:

Rav Yosef said: Rav Yehuda said to me: