Bava Metzia 88b — the Talmud in English

who would say:

they expound the verse

“You shall surely tithe

all the produce of your seed, etc., and

you shall eat,”

as follows:

Since Scripture juxtaposed the obligation of tithing with “and you shall eat,” it comes to say: only one who completes the work of his produce and brings it into his house in order to eat it—only he is obligated to tithe,

but not a seller,

for if the owner of the house completed the work of his produce with the intention of selling it, he is exempt from tithing it .

Likewise, they expounded the verse “You shall surely tithe all

the produce of your seed,”

that only one whose produce was sown in his field is obligated to tithe,

but not a purchaser,

one who buys detached produce, and the produce did not grow in his domain, who is exempt from tithing. If so, why was it necessary for the Torah to exempt the laborer from tithing? After all, the produce did not grow in his domain!

Rather,

necessarily, the beraita that comes to exempt the laborer from tithing is

rabbinic,

from the obligation of the Sages, who obligated even a purchaser whose produce did not grow in his domain to tithe.

And

if

the verse

that the beraita cites

is merely an asmachta,

for the Sages attached the exemption of a laborer, even from a rabbinic obligation, to the verse.

Therefore, it is not difficult for Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yohanan why a verse is needed to exempt a laborer who eats in the field, since without bringing the produce into the house there is no obligation to tithe. All this applies by Torah law; but by the words of the Sages, a purchaser is obligated to tithe even before he brings it into his house, whereas concerning a laborer, the beraita innovated that he is not like a purchaser.

But now it is possible to raise a difficulty: since we said that the exposition from the verse to exempt a laborer from tithing is merely an asmachta, because by Torah law even an ordinary purchaser is exempt,

Rather,

if so,

“according to your appetite”—for what purpose did it come?

With regard to what did the Torah need to compare the eating of a laborer to that of the owner of the house?

The Gemara answers:

as it was taught: “According to your appetite”—just as your appetite: if you muzzled yourself, you are exempt,

for the owner of the house is permitted to prevent himself from eating during his work in the field,

so too a laborer: if you muzzled him, you are exempt.

A laborer whom the owner of the house prevented from eating during his work, from the thing with which he is occupied—whether he prevented him by force, or whether he hired the laborer on the condition that he would not eat from the produce but would receive payment in exchange — the owner of the house does not transgress the prohibition of “You shall not muzzle an ox during its threshing.” And Scripture came to teach that one should not learn concerning muzzling a laborer by a kal va-chomer from muzzling an ox during its threshing, as will be explained in the Gemara below.

Mar Zutra raises an objection

to the words of Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yohanan, who said that untithed produce does not become obligated in tithing until it sees the face of the house or the courtyard, each according to his position—

For we learned in a Mishna in tractate Maaserot [1:5]:

What is the “threshing floor”

of produce

for tithes?

When is the completion of the collection of produce, called a “threshing floor,” at which point it becomes obligated to be tithed?

With regard to cucumbers and pumpkins, once they are sheyifaksu.

That is the completion of their work, and from then onward it is forbidden to eat from them without separating terumot and tithes.

And Rabbi Asi said

to explain what “sheyifaksu,” which the Mishna stated, means:

once their piks is removed.

Once he finishes gathering them and removes from them the blossom at the head of the fruit.

And Mar Zutra proves:

Is it not

the intention of the Mishna to say that immediately

once they are sheyifaksu,

by removing the blossom at the head of the fruit, they become obligated in tithing? And this is

even in the field,

before he brings them into the house, because their work has already been completed with regard to tithing. And this is difficult for Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yohanan, who said that the completion of the work of the produce does not obligate it in tithing until he brings it into the house or courtyard?

The Gemara answers:

No.

The Mishna is speaking of a case in which he brought them into his house before removing the blossom, and only

once they are sheyifaksu [

once the blossom at their heads has been removed]

in the house,

after the bringing in, do they become obligated to be tithed, since the fruit still requires an additional correction, namely, removing the blossom at its head .

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

If so,

if according to the words of the answerer the Mishna exempted the produce from being tithed even after it was brought into the house, until the blossom at its head was removed, one should wonder: why did the Mishna use the expression

“once they are sheyifaksu,”

whose meaning is that he is obligated to tithe once they are sheyifaksu?

After all, according to the answerer, he is not obligated to tithe after the removal of the blossom unless he brings them into his house, and according to his words

it should have been necessary for our Mishna to say “until they are sheyifaksu”

and to express an exemption: that bringing them into the house does not itself obligate them until they also undergo removal of the blossom!?

The difficulty has thus returned against Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yohanan, who hold that without bringing the produce into the house or courtyard, it does not become obligated through any other completion, whereas this Mishna says that “once they are sheyifaksu,” they immediately must be tithed.

The Gemara answers: indeed, this Mishna is speaking after bringing them into the house, and removal of the blossom is still required in order to become obligated in tithing. And the reason the tanna used the expression “once they are sheyifaksu,” and did not say “until they are sheyifaksu,” is that

if he had taught [

if he had stated] that they become obligated to be tithed only

until they are sheyifaksu,

even if he had brought them into the house,

I would have thought

that “until they are sheyifaksu” means

until he completes their piks,

to finish and remove the blossoms from the heads of all the fruits, and only then do they become obligated in tithing.

Therefore,

it teaches us

the tanna, by saying

“once they are sheyifaksu,”

that it is not necessary to complete the removal of the blossoms from all the fruits, but

from the moment their piks begins

with each and every fruit, once he removes from it the blossom at its head, immediately it is forbidden for him to eat it without tithing, even if he still has other fruits from which to remove the blossom.

Mar Zutra son of Rav Nahman raises an objection

from what we learned in a beraita:

For it was taught:

Its threshing floor,

its collection and completion of the work of the fruit

for tithes, to make one liable for

lashes for eating from it without tithing

because of

the prohibition against eating

untithed produce—

It is

from

the time

that their work is completed,

the work of cultivating the field with regard to the produce.

And what is the completion of their work,

from which point they are already obligated in tithe? —

The work of bringing them in!

And Mar Zutra derives a precision from the words of the beraita:

Is it not

the meaning

of “bringing them in”

that it is in the sense of gathering them and collecting them into a pile, and this is

even in the field,

without bringing them into the house, but the gathering of the pile in the field by itself obligates one to tithe? And this is difficult for Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yohanan, who say that one is obligated in tithe only after bringing them into the house or into the courtyard.

And the Gemara answers:

No,

the beraita said this, rather it said as follows:

Bringing them into the house —

this is the completion of their work,

to become obligated in tithe; and this is what the beraita intended by saying “the work of bringing them in.”

And if you wish, say: When Rabbi Yannai said

that the completion of the work with produce obligates one in tithe only after bringing it into the house, this is only

with olives and grapes,

since

they are not subject to a threshing floor,

for it is not the manner to gather them into a pile in the field. Therefore, there is no other matter that can establish them for tithing by Torah law besides bringing them into the house, since the obligation of terumot and tithes from their oil and wine is an obligation by Torah law.

But wheat and barley: “threshing floor”

—a pile—as though

it is explicitly written concerning it

to obligate them in tithe, since it is the manner to gather them into a pile in the field.

And likewise cucumbers and gourds become obligated immediately once they are mefaks, [once the flower at their tops is removed], in the field, without bringing them into the house, since their manner too is to be gathered into a pile in the field, and this is considered the completion of their work.

And now, after the Gemara has explained what the completion of work is with regard to the obligation of tithes, the Gemara returns to explain the halakha of a laborer’s eating:

We have found

in the verse

a person

when he is a laborer

with attached produce

to the ground, that he has the right to eat, as it is stated: “When you enter your fellow’s standing grain, and you pluck.” And standing grain is attached to the ground.

And

likewise

an ox,

we find in the verse that it eats

detached produce

at the time of its work with it, as it is stated: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing.” And threshing is performed on grain when it has already been reaped.

But

a person,

a laborer who works

with detached produce, from where

do we know that he has the right to eat from it at the time of his work? And what is the source of the statement of the Mishna that said that a person eats detached produce until its work is completed?

And the Gemara answers: We learn this by means of a

kal va-chomer, from an ox:

And if an ox,

which is the lenient case—and what is its leniency?—

that it does not eat attached produce,

for it was not stated explicitly in the Torah that an ox working with attached produce may not be prevented from eating, but only with detached produce [at the time of threshing], even so it

eats detached produce,

for the Torah said that it is forbidden to prevent it from eating when it works with detached produce, as it is stated: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing.”

A person,

concerning whom the Torah was more stringent than with an ox, since it specified concerning him

that

he

eats attached produce, is it not logical that

he should

eat

also

detached produce!

For it is a kal va-chomer that the law of a person should not be less than that of an ox. And since an ox eats when it works with detached produce, a laborer who works with detached produce likewise eats.

And the Gemara rejects this:

What is so about an ox

that the Torah was more stringent with it than with a person who is a laborer?

For you are commanded concerning its muzzling,

as the Torah warned with a prohibition not to prevent it from eating at the time of its work, as it is stated: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing.”

Can you say the same concerning a person, concerning whose muzzling you are not commanded?

For there is neither a prohibition nor a prohibition-warning against a householder who prevents the laborer from eating from the fruit of his work while he is working with it.

And if so, here we have a stringency with which the Torah was more stringent concerning an ox than concerning a laborer. Therefore, even with regard to eating detached produce, it is possible that this is a special stringency concerning an ox, and it is impossible to derive from it a law concerning a laborer.

But now the Gemara comes to argue against the rejection, saying that even the stringency of the prohibition of the negative commandment “You shall not muzzle” [which we said is an excess in the ox over the person] can be learned by a kal va-chomer, so that it applies also to a person.

And according to this, a person will always be the more stringent case. And again it will be possible to derive from an ox’s eating detached produce the eating of a person [who is more stringent than it], so that he will certainly be entitled to eat also while he is working with detached produce:

And a person shall be one concerning whose muzzling you are commanded,

that is, the householder who hired him to be his laborer shall be warned

concerning his muzzling,

not to prevent him from eating,

by a kal va-chomer from an ox:

And if an ox,

which is the lenient case—and what is its leniency?—

that you are not commanded to sustain it,

for the Torah did not obligate one to concern himself with its life, nevertheless

you are commanded concerning its muzzling

at the time of work, so as not to cause it distress and muzzle it.

A person,

who is more stringent than an ox,

concerning whom you are commanded to sustain him,

to take care to save his life, as it is stated: “And your brother shall live with you,”

is it not logical

—all the more so—

that you are commanded concerning his muzzling

through the prohibition “You shall not muzzle,” so as not to cause him distress in his work?

But the Gemara rejects this claim, for

the verse says: “And you shall eat [you, the laborer engaged in the work of the field’s owner] grapes

as your soul desires,”

“as your soul” —

as the soul of a laborer!

The verse teaches that the laborer’s eating is like the eating of the owner of the field or vineyard.

Just as

the soul of the householder,

if you muzzle him,

meaning that he prevented himself from eating,

he is exempt.

For the prohibition “You shall not muzzle” does not apply to a person muzzling himself,

so too a laborer, if you muzzle him, is exempt

from the prohibition “You shall not muzzle.”

And if so, once again we find that an ox is more stringent than a person with regard to the negative commandment of muzzling. And if so, it is impossible to learn by a kal va-chomer that the laws of the ox should also exist with regard to a person. And if so, it is still difficult:

Rather, a person,

a laborer, who eats

detached produce, from where

do we know it?

And the Gemara answers:

The verse says “standing grain”

“standing grain”

twice.

The verse says: “When you enter

the standing grain of

your fellow and pluck ears with your hand” in order to eat.

And the verse continues and says: “And you shall not wield a sickle over

the standing grain of

your fellow.” For the sake of your eating, do not wield a sickle to reap and eat; rather, pluck with your hand and eat.

And why did the Torah need to repeat and say twice that the laborer eats?

If it is not needed

—if the repetition does not come to teach us—

for a person with attached produce,

since it was already stated explicitly: “When you enter the standing grain of your fellow and pluck ears” in order to eat,

apply it

—learn from it—

to a person with detached produce.

Rabbi Ami said: A person with detached produce does not require a verse

special to teach us that he eats. Rather, we learn this from the verses stated concerning a laborer’s eating:

It is written: “When you enter the vineyard of your fellow,”

and the Torah left it unspecified and did not explain for what type of entry and work he comes.

Are we not dealing with a case where he hired him to carry,

to carry the grapes,

and the Merciful One said: Let him eat!

But the work of carrying the grapes is performed with detached produce, and concerning this too it was said that a laborer eats.

The Gemara now discusses:

With regard to an ox with attached produce, from where

do we know that it is forbidden to muzzle it?

And the Gemara explains:

A kal va-chomer from a person.

And if a person

—a laborer—whom the Torah treated leniently,

in that he does not eat detached produce,

for the Torah did not specify explicitly concerning him that he must be allowed to eat detached produce,

eats attached produce,

for the Torah obligated the householder to allow him to eat when he is engaged with attached produce.

An ox,

with which the Torah was more stringent,

in that it eats detached produce,

for the Torah specified concerning it that when it works with detached produce it is forbidden to muzzle it, as it is stated: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing,” and threshing is with detached produce,

is it not logical that it eats attached produce!

And certainly the ox will not be less than the person; and if a laborer eats when he is engaged with attached produce, certainly an ox does so as well.

But the Gemara rejects this, since we find with regard to other laws that the Torah was more stringent concerning a person than concerning an ox. And it is possible that even with regard to eating attached produce, a person is more stringent than an ox:

What is so about a person, for you are commanded to sustain him; can you say the same concerning an ox, concerning which you are not commanded to sustain it?

But the Gemara challenges the rejection: From where do you know that there is no mitzva to concern oneself with the life of an ox? For even concerning the obligation to concern oneself with the life of an ox, it can be learned by a kal va-chomer:

And an ox shall be one concerning whose sustenance you are commanded, by a kal va-chomer:

And if a person,

who is the lenient case—and what is his leniency?—

that you are not commanded concerning his muzzling

through the prohibition “You shall not muzzle,” and nevertheless

you are commanded to sustain him.

An ox,

whose law is stringent,

in that you are commanded concerning its muzzling

through the prohibition “You shall not muzzle,”

is it not logical that you are commanded to sustain it.

And the Gemara answers:

The verse says

in the laws of rescue,

“And your brother shall live

with you.”

Only the life of

your brother

are you commanded to save,

but not

the life of

an ox!

And if so, since a person is more stringent in his law than an ox with regard to sustaining him, it is impossible to derive from a laborer’s eating attached produce that an ox does so;

rather, with regard to an ox with attached produce, from where

do we know it?

And the Gemara answers:

The verse says “your fellow, your fellow” twice.

It is stated: “When you enter the standing grain of

your fellow,

and you pluck ears with your hand, and you shall not wield a sickle over the standing grain of

your fellow.”

But the Torah did not need to emphasize a second time that it is referring to “your fellow,” who is a laborer entering his fellow’s vineyard. Rather, from the superfluous emphasis we learn an additional right of eating:

If it is not needed

—there is no need to teach us—

for the law of

a person

with attached produce,

since we already learned from the beginning of the verse that he eats,

apply it

—learn from it—

to an ox

with attached produce,

which eats.