Bava Metzia 82a (פב.) — the Talmud in English

And we refuted this:

But in both cases,

the Mishna and the beraita, in both of them,

it teaches: “If he lent him money against the collateral,”

which indicates that in both cases it is speaking of a situation in which he took the collateral at the time of the loan!?

And we answer:

Rather, it is not difficult:

Indeed, both the Mishna and the beraita follow the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

Here,

in the beraita, where Rabbi Eliezer said that he is an unpaid bailee, it is speaking of a case

where he lent him money,

and the lender did not benefit from the loan, since he could have left the money in his own possession.

Here,

in our Mishna, where he is a paid bailee, it is speaking of a case

where he lent him produce,

and the lender benefited from the loan, since had he left the produce in his possession, it would have rotted and spoiled. Therefore, he is a paid bailee with regard to the collateral that he took for the loan of the produce.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

But from the fact that the latter clause teaches

of our Mishna,

“Rabbi Yehuda says: If he lent him money, he is an unpaid bailee; if he lent him produce, he is a paid bailee,” this indicates

that you learn from this

that according to the tanna kamma, there is no distinction

between whether he lent him produce or whether he lent him money; in both cases he holds that he is a paid bailee with regard to the collateral??

And we explain: Our Mishna

in its entirety

follows the opinion of

Rabbi Yehuda, but it is deficient

in wording,

and this is what it teaches

in our Mishna:

If he lent him money against collateral, he is a paid bailee.

When does this apply? When he lent him produce. But if he lent him money,

he is

an unpaid bailee.

Because

Rabbi Yehuda says: If he lent him money, he is an unpaid bailee; if he lent him produce, he is a paid bailee.

Accordingly, our entire Mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who distinguishes between lending money, from which the lender does not benefit, and lending produce, which he lends for his own benefit, so that the produce will not rot in his house.

And Rabbi Eliezer, too, will hold accordingly, as explained.

And we refute this:

If so,

if our Mishna’s statement, “If he lent him money against collateral, he is a paid bailee,” applies specifically when he lent him produce, then

our Mishna is established as not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva

of the beraita, who holds: “If the collateral was lost, his money was lost,” because he took it for collection and is not like an unpaid bailee, who is exempt in a case of loss.

And this is impossible! For an unattributed Mishna reflects the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Meir would teach these statements according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who was Rabbi Meir’s teacher!

Rather, it is clear

that our Mishna, which says that if he lent him money against collateral he is a paid bailee, is

not in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer.

We inquire about this:

Shall we say

that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, who disagree concerning the law of one who lends money to another against collateral and the collateral is lost, are discussing a case

in which the collateral was not worth the amount of the dinars

that he lent him, but rather the collateral was worth less than the amount of the loan

, and they disagree with regard to Shmuel’s ruling

—Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva?

For Shmuel said: In the case of one who lent

another person

one thousand

dinars,

and he placed a sickle handle over them as collateral,

meaning, he gave him as collateral an item of little value, such as a sickle handle, then if

the sickle handle was lost, his one thousand dinars were lost!

The Lehem Mishne [Laws of Renting, chapter 10] understands from the position of the Maggid Mishne that according to Samuel the lender is liable even if it was lost through unavoidable circumstances. He raises the difficulty: How can it be explained that they disagree about Samuel, since our Mishna indicates that he is only a paid bailee and is exempt in cases of unavoidable circumstances? And he answers that according to this possibility the Gemara held that our Mishna follows Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Eliezer agrees that when it is worth the amount of the zuz, he is a paid bailee. The later authorities explained that in the initial assumption the Gemara held that Samuel obligates him as a paid bailee, and only in the conclusion of the Gemara does he obligate him even in cases of unavoidable circumstances. The Even HaAzel there explains that specifically when it is not worth the amount of the zuz he is liable in cases of unavoidable circumstances, since this is akin to a condition stipulated by the borrower in order to be assured of the safekeeping of the collateral. But when it is worth the amount of the zuz, since against the debt he certainly pays him, for he gave it as an item for collection, he suffers no loss and does not stipulate with him that he be liable in cases of unavoidable circumstances.

That is, he is not obligated to pay him the money that he lent him, because Shmuel holds that any collateral given for collection is considered as though the lender agreed to accept that item in exchange for his money.

Therefore, if the lender does not return the collateral to the borrower, it is considered as though he repaid his debt with the collateral.

And the Gemara thought that this is the subject of their disagreement: Rabbi Akiva follows Shmuel, while Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and holds that this collateral is merely given as a record of the matter.

And we refute this: No.

If

it is speaking

of collateral that was not worth

the collateral

the amount of the dinars

that he lent him,

everyone

—both Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer—

does not accept Shmuel’s ruling,

since the collateral is not equal in value to the amount of the loan. He certainly did not intend to take it for collection, but only as a record of the matter; and if the collateral was lost, the lender’s money was not lost.

Here,

it is speaking

of collateral that was worth

the

amount of the dinars.

And they disagree

—Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer—

with regard to Rabbi Yitzḥak’s ruling.

For Rabbi Yitzḥak said: From where is it derived that a creditor “acquires” collateral?

As it is stated: “You shall surely return the pledge to him when the sun sets, and he shall lie down in his garment and bless you,

and it shall be considered charity for you

before the Lord

your God.”

And if he does not acquire

the collateral, the lender

from where does he derive “charity”?

He is merely returning it to him as required by law, since he is returning what belongs to him!?

Rather, from here it is derived that a creditor acquires collateral.

That is, Rabbi Yitzḥak certainly does not mean that the collateral is acquired by the lender entirely; rather, it is acquired for the purpose that he is liable for accidents, and the Gemara thought that Rabbi Akiva’s opinion—“If the collateral was lost, his money was lost”—follows Rabbi Yitzḥak, whereas Rabbi Eliezer does not follow Rabbi Yitzḥak. And we refute this:

Can you really say so?

Can you think that they disagree concerning Rabbi Yitzḥak’s statement? After all,

perhaps when Rabbi Yitzḥak said

that a creditor acquires collateral, he meant specifically

when he took it not at the time of the loan,

since the verse, “and it shall be considered charity for you,” is speaking of this case [as explained below, on page 113].

But when he took it at the time of the loan—who says so?

There is no basis for comparing the cases and saying that even when the collateral was taken at the time of the loan the lender acquires it. For logic dictates that when he took the collateral not at the time of the loan, he certainly gave it for collection, since he had taken the borrower to court and the borrower did not have money with which to pay. But when he took it at the time of the loan, it is possible that he gave it to him at that time only as a record of the matter and not for collection.

Rather, if he took the collateral not at the time of the loan, everyone accepts Rabbi Yitzḥak’s ruling,

and if the collateral was lost, his money was lost.

Here,

it is speaking

of collateral taken at the time of the loan,

and they disagree with regard to the “guardian of a lost article,”

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva.

As it was stated: The guardian of a lost article—

one who finds a lost article, brings it into his home, and waits until he finds its owner—what is his status?

Rabba said:

The finder is considered

an unpaid bailee,

and is liable only if he was negligent in safeguarding it, since he receives no payment for his safeguarding.

Rav Yosef said: He is like a paid bailee,

since he fulfills the mitzva of returning a lost article, and fulfillment of a mitzva is considered payment.

Furthermore, if a poor person comes while he is occupied with the lost article, he is exempt from giving him charity, because one who is occupied with one mitzva is exempt from another mitzva.

If so,

shall we say that Rav Yosef’s

dispute between the tannaim is? Rabbi Eliezer follows Rabba, and Rabbi Akiva follows Rav Yosef, since the lender, too, fulfills a mitzva through his lending.

And we explain:

No! In the case of a guardian of a lost item, everyone accepts Rav Yosef’s opinion.