Bava Metzia 81a (פא.) — the Talmud in English

If he merely says to him

“I have finished”

the item

, he is still

a paid bailee

until he explicitly says to him, “Take what is yours.”

The Gemara answers:

No

,

do not infer this.

Rather, even if he said, “I have finished,” he becomes an unpaid bailee.

The

intention of the Mishna is to say:

If he said to him, “Bring the money”

and afterward

“Take what is yours,”

he is still

a paid bailee

.

The reason is that since he revealed his intention that he wishes to retain the item as collateral until the owner pays him his money.

The Gemara asks: From what has been explained, it follows that

but

if he said,

“I have finished,” what is his status? He is an unpaid bailee,

even though he did not explicitly say, “Take what is yours.”

If so, instead of teaching

in the Mishna

“And all of them who said, ‘Take what is yours and bring the money,’ are unpaid bailees,”

it would have been preferable that it

teach us, “I have finished,” and

we would know by extension that

all the more so, “Take what is yours.”

Why, then, did the Mishna teach this law specifically with regard to “Take what is yours”?

We answer:

“Take what is yours” was necessary for him,

for the tanna of the Mishna to teach its law specifically in this case.

For

it might have entered your mind

that in this case

he does not even become an unpaid bailee,

since he explicitly said to him, “Take what is yours,” and removed his responsibility for it.

It teaches us

that he did not remove from himself the guardianship of an unpaid bailee.

There are those who say: Rav Naḥman bar Pappa said,

indeed, if he merely said to the owner of the item, “I have finished,” he is still a paid bailee.

And

we too have learned likewise: “And all of them who said, ‘Take what is yours and bring the money,’ are unpaid bailees.”

Is it not the case

that if he said

“I have finished,”

he is an unpaid bailee?

The Gemara rejects this:

No! “Take what is yours” is different,

since he explicitly removed his responsibility for the item. But if he merely said to the owners, “I have finished,” he is still a paid bailee.

Huna Mar, son of Marimar,

when he was standing

before Ravina, raised

in this matter an apparent contradiction between two

Mishnayot, and resolved it

[he reconciled the contradiction between the Mishnayot, as will be explained below]:

On the one hand,

we learned

here:

“And all of them who said, ‘Take what is yours and bring the money,’ are unpaid bailees.”

And it implies:

“And the same is true if he said, ‘I have finished’

[as in the first formulation].

And we raise a contradiction

from what we learned below [98b] in a Mishna:

The borrower said

to the lender:

“Send

your animal to me by this agent,”

and he sent it,

the lender,

and it died

before it came into the borrower’s possession,

, the borrower is liable.

The borrower

is likewise liable when he returns it,

as was explained above.

The Gemara reasoned that when he returns it, this is analogous to a craftsman who says to the owners, “I have finished.” Nevertheless, it was explained that the laws of a borrower, who is liable for accidents, do not leave him until the animal actually reaches the lender. If so, even if he said to him, “I have finished,” he should be liable as a paid bailee, as is the law with regard to a craftsman!?

And he answers

according to what

Rafram bar Pappa said in the name of Rav Ḥisda: “They taught”

with regard to a liable borrower, even when he sent the animal to its owner by an agent,

only when he returned it during the period of his borrowing,

for he was still a borrower at that time, since he had accepted liability for accidents until a particular time.

But

after the period of his borrowing, he is exempt.

Therefore, a craftsman who says to the owners, “I have finished,” has the status of an unpaid bailee, since “I have finished” is analogous to a borrower returning the item after the period of his borrowing.

They raised a dilemma:

Does a borrower who returns an item after the period of his borrowing

become exempt from

the obligations of a

borrower

[liability for accidents],

and become liable as a paid bailee

[for theft and loss],

or perhaps he does not even become a paid bailee,

but only an unpaid bailee, who is liable only if he was negligent in guarding it?

Ameimar said: It is reasonable that he is exempt from the obligations of a borrower and liable as a paid bailee.

The reason is that

since he benefited

from the fact that the owner lent the item to him,

he provides benefit

to the owner by accepting upon himself the obligations of a paid bailee [see note 12 1].

A beraita was taught in accordance with Ameimar’s opinion: “One who purchases

buys

utensils from a craftsman

in order

to send them,

to send them to his father-in-law’s house as gifts to his betrothed,

and said to him

the craftsman:

“If they accept

them

from me

at my father-in-law’s house

, I will give you their value. And if not, I will give you their value according to the benefit they contain.”

That is, they assess how much money the groom would be willing to pay so that his betrothed would recognize his favor for having wished to give her gifts, and he gives him that amount, while returning the utensils to him,

and the utensils were subject to an accident

and broke.

If they were subject to an accident

on the way

to his father-in-law’s house,

he is liable

to pay their value, since he intended to purchase them completely, unless it becomes clear that they do not wish to take them from him, but as long as this has not become clear, they are considered completely purchased by him.

But

if they broke

while returning them,

when it had already become clear that he did not intend to purchase them,

he is exempt, because he is

at that time

like a paid carrier

[a paid bailee], who is exempt from accidents. Nevertheless, it was established in accordance with Ameimar that he is a paid bailee, not an unpaid bailee.

There was an incident involving

a certain man who sold an animal

a donkey

to his fellow.

He said to him,

the purchaser said to the seller:

“I am taking it

I intend to bring the donkey

to a certain place

in order to sell it there

, if it is sold

[if it is sold]

it is good,

and I will pay you its value,

but if not

it is not sold there,

I will return it

I will return the donkey to you

to you,

for I do not wish to purchase it unless I succeed in selling it there.

He went

to that place.

And it was not sold,

and he did not sell the donkey.

And as he was returning

to the seller’s location

, it died,

the donkey.

He came before Rav Naḥman, and he obligated him

the purchaser to pay its value to the seller.

Rabba challenged Rav Naḥman:

But we learned that only if they were subject to an accident

on the way is he liable. But upon returning he is exempt, because

it had already become clear that he did not wish to purchase it, and he

is

nothing but

like a paid carrier,

who is exempt from accidents.

He said to him: The return journey in this case,

that of the man who took the donkey in order to sell it, is also included in

the outward journey;

it is considered so.

What is the reason? It is logical,

for

on his return, had he found

buyers

to sell it to,

to sell it to them,

would he not have sold it!?

Therefore, this case differs from the law of one who takes utensils from the craftsman’s house, since there, after they did not accept them from him at his father-in-law’s house, it became clear that he did not wish to purchase them.

We learned in the Mishna: A person who says to his fellow,

“Guard

my field

and I will guard

your field

for you,”

he is

a paid bailee.

The Gemara reasoned that this refers to a case in which both are guarding the items at the same time.

The Gemara asks:

And why

is he liable as a paid bailee? Is this not

guarding with the owner?

[Even if he is not physically together with him, if at that time each of them is performing a task for the other, this too is guarding with the owner, and he is exempt from the obligations of guarding.]

Rav Pappa said:

Here we are dealing with a case in which

he said to him: “Guard for me today, and I will guard for you tomorrow.”

They are not performing the task at the same time; therefore, this is not considered “guarding with the owner,” but he is merely a paid bailee, since in exchange for guarding his fellow’s item today, his fellow will guard his item tomorrow.

The Sages taught: If he said to him, “Guard for me and I will guard for you.”

“Or lend me

your animal

and I will lend you

my animal [even in such a case, he is not considered a borrower liable for accidents, since in exchange for the animal he borrowed from him, he must lend him his animal tomorrow; the law of a borrower applies specifically when all the benefit is his, meaning that he is not obligated to give anything in return].”

Or

“Guard for me, and I will lend you.”

Or

“Lend me, and I will guard for you.”

All of them become paid bailees for one another.

The Gemara asks: [as above]

And why

are they paid bailees? Is this not

guarding with the owner?

We answer: [as above]

Rav Pappa said: He said to him, “Guard for me today, and I will guard for you tomorrow,”

and they are not performing the task at the same time.

There was an incident involving

those perfume merchants

[sellers of a perfume called ohel or ahalot],

for every day one of them would bake for them,

he would bake bread for them,

one of them

—each man on his assigned day.

On that day, they said to him,

the perfume merchants

to one of them: “Go, bake for us!”

Go and bake bread for us today.

He said to them: “Guard my cloak,”

guard my clothing until I finish baking your bread.

By the time he came

until the baker returned from his work,

they were negligent with it

his companions and did not guard his cloak,

and it was stolen.

They came before Rav Pappa

for judgment.

He obligated them,

because they had been negligent in guarding it.

The Sages said to Rav Pappa: “Why”

did you obligate them? Is this not

negligence with the owner,

since they were engaged in their work together, as at the time they guarded his cloak, he was baking their bread?

Rav Pappa was embarrassed,

because he was ashamed that he had erred in a matter of halakha.

In the end, it became clear that at that time

when the cloak was stolen

, he was drinking wine,

the baker had become intoxicated and was not performing their work at that time; therefore, this was not negligence with the owner, and they were liable to pay its value.

And we examine this matter:

This works well according to the one who says that one is exempt for negligence with the owner; for that reason he was embarrassed,

since he should have exempted them.

Rather, according to the one who says that negligence in a case where the owner is working with the bailee entails liability,

it is not comparable to the law of custodianship where the owner is working with the bailee, in which case he is exempt [and see the note for the reason].

Why, then, did Rav Pappa become embarrassed,

when he had obligated them according to the law?

And the Gemara explains:

Rather, that day was not his,

it was not the fixed day on which this baker was obligated to bake bread for everyone.

And they said to him personally: Go bake for us

today, even though it was not his fixed day.

And he said to them: For the wages that I am baking for you, guard my cloak,

and in such a case they become paid bailees with regard to his cloak, since he was not obligated to bake on that day, and his baking was only payment for guarding the cloak.