Bava Metzia 81a — the Talmud in English

If

he merely says to him

“I have finished it,”]]

the object, he is still

a paid bailee

until he says to him explicitly, “Take what is yours.”

And the Gemara answers:

No,

do not infer this!

Rather, even if he said “I have finished it,” he becomes an unpaid bailee.

And the intention of the Mishna is to say:

If

he said to him

“Bring the money”]]

and afterward

“Take what is yours,”]]

he is still

a paid bailee

of it.

and this is because, since he revealed his intention that he wishes to retain the object as collateral until he pays him his money.

And the Gemara asks: From what is explained, it follows:

But

if he said

“I have finished it,” what then? He is an unpaid bailee,]]

even though he did not explicitly say “Take what is yours.”

If so, rather than teaching

in the Mishna

“And all of them who said, ‘Take what is yours and bring the money,’ are unpaid bailees,”]]

it would have been preferable that it

teach us “I have finished it,” and]]

from this we would know

all the more so, “Take what is yours.”

And why did the Mishna teach its law specifically with regard to “Take what is yours”?

And we answer:

“Take what is yours” was necessary for it,]]

for the tanna of the Mishna to state its law specifically in this case.

For

it might enter your mind to say]]

that in this case

he is not even an unpaid bailee,]]

for he explicitly said to him “Take what is yours” and removed his responsibility for it from himself;

it teaches us]]

that he did not remove from himself the custodianship of an unpaid bailee.

There are those who say: Rav Nahman bar Pappa said,

indeed, if he merely said to the owner of the object “I have finished it,” he is still a paid bailee.

And

we too have learned likewise: “And all of them who said, ‘Take what is yours and bring the money,’ are unpaid bailees.”

What, is it not the same law

if he said

“I have finished it,”]]

that he is an unpaid bailee?

And the Gemara rejects this:

No! “Take what is yours” is different,]]

for he explicitly removed his responsibility for the object. But if he merely said to the owners “I have finished it,” he is still a paid bailee.

Mar bar Huna, son of Marimar,]]

when he was standing

before Ravina, raised]]

with regard to this matter an apparent contradiction between two

Mishnayot, and resolved it]]

[and reconciled the contradiction between the Mishnayot, as will be explained below]:

On the one hand,

we learned,

we learned here:

“And all of them who said, ‘Take what is yours and bring the money,’ are unpaid bailees.”

And it implies:

“And the same law applies to ‘I have finished it’”]]

[like the first formulation].

And he raises a contradiction

from what we learned below [98b] in the Mishna:

“The borrower said

to the lender:

‘Send

your animal to me by this messenger,’

and the lender sent it,

the lender, and

it died

before it came into the possession of the borrower,

the borrower is liable.]]

The borrower.

And likewise when he returns it,]]

as was explained above.

And the Gemara reasoned: When he returns it, this is similar to a craftsman saying to the owners, “I have finished it.” Nevertheless, it was explained that the laws of a borrower, who is liable for accidents, have not departed from him until the animal actually reaches the lender. If so, even if he said to him “I have finished it,” he should be liable as a paid bailee, like the craftsman!?

And he answered,

according to what

Rafram bar Pappa said in the name of Rav Hisda: “They taught”]]

with regard to a borrower who is liable, even if he sent it by a messenger to its owners,

only when he returned it within the days of his borrowing,]]

for he is still a borrower then, since he accepted upon himself liability for accidents until a particular time.

But

after the days of his borrowing, he is exempt.

And therefore, a craftsman who says to the owners “I have finished it” has the status of an unpaid bailee, since “I have finished it” is similar to a borrower returning it after the days of his borrowing.

They raised a dilemma before them:

Does a borrower who returns it after the days of his borrowing

become exempt from]]

the obligations of a

borrower]]

[liability for accidents], and

become liable as a paid bailee]]

[for theft and loss],

or perhaps he does not even become a paid bailee,]]

but only an unpaid bailee, who is liable only if he was negligent in guarding it?

Amemar said: It is reasonable that he is exempt from the borrower’s liability and liable as a paid bailee.

And the reason is:

Since he benefited

from the fact that its owners lent it to the borrower,

he benefits

the owners by accepting upon himself the obligations of a paid bailee [see note 12 1].

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with Amemar: “One who takes,]]

one who purchases

utensils from a craftsman]]

in order

to send them]]

to his father-in-law’s house as sivlonot [gifts] to his betrothed,

and he said to him,]]

to the craftsman:

“If they accept]]

them

from me]]

at my father-in-law’s house

, I will give you their value. And if not, I will give you according to the benefit they provide.”]]

That is, they will assess how much money the groom would be willing to give so that his betrothed would recognize as a favor to him that he wished to give her gifts, and he will give him this money, while he will return the utensils to him,

and the utensils were subject to an accident]]

and broke.

If they were subject to an accident

on the way]]

to his father-in-law’s house,

he is liable]]

to pay their value, since he intended to purchase them completely, unless it becomes clear that they do not wish to take them from him, but as long as this has not become clear, they are considered completely purchased by him.

But

if they broke

upon the return,]]

when it had already become clear that he did not intend to purchase them,

he is exempt, because he is]]

at that time

like a paid bailee]]

[a paid bailee] who is exempt from liability for accidents. Nevertheless, it has been established in accordance with Amemar that he is a paid bailee, and not an unpaid bailee.

There was an incident involving

a certain man who sold a donkey]]

a donkey

to his fellow.

He said to him,]]

the purchaser to the seller:

“I am bringing it]]

I intend to bring the donkey

to a certain place]]

to a certain place in order to sell it there

, if it is sold]]

[if it is sold]

—good;]]

and I will pay you its value,

but if not]]

it is not sold there,

I will return it]]

I will return the donkey to you

to you,]]

because I do not wish to purchase it unless I succeed in selling it there.

He went]]

to that place.

And it was not sold,]]

and he did not sell the donkey.

And as he was coming]]

back to the seller’s place

, it became ill]]

the donkey.

He came before Rav Nahman, and he obligated him]]

the purchaser to pay its value to the seller.

Rabba raised an objection to Rav Nahman:]]

We learned that specifically if they were subject to an accident

on the way, he is liable. But upon the return he is exempt, because]]

it had already become clear that he did not wish to purchase it, and

he]]

was nothing other than

like a paid bailee,]]

who is exempt from liability for accidents.

He said to him: “The return of this one,”]]

that of the man who purchased the donkey in order to sell it, is also included in

the way]]

it is considered [part of the way].

What is the reason? It is logical,]]

for

upon his return, had he found]]

he would have found buyers

to sell it,]]

to sell it to them,

would he not have sold it!?

And therefore, this case differs from the law of one who takes utensils from the craftsman’s house, for there, after they did not accept them from him at his father-in-law’s house, it became clear that he did not wish to purchase them.

We learned in the Mishna: A person who says to his fellow,

“Guard for me]]

my field

and I will guard]]

I

for you]]

your field, he is

a paid bailee.

And the Gemara reasoned that this is speaking when both of them are bailees at the same time.

And the Gemara asks:

But why

is he liable as a paid bailee? Is this not

custodianship with the owner present!]]

And even if he is not together with him, if at that time both of them are each doing something for the other, this too is custodianship with the owner present, and he is exempt from the obligations of custodianship.

Rav Pappa said:]]

Here we are dealing with a case where he

said to him: “Guard for me today, and I will guard for you tomorrow.”]]

And they are not performing the work at the same time; therefore, this is not considered “custodianship with the owner present,” but is merely a paid bailee, since in exchange for his guarding today, his fellow will guard for him tomorrow.

The Sages taught: “He said to him, ‘Guard for me and I will guard for you.’”

“Or lend me]]

your animal

and I will lend you]]

my animal [even in such a case he is not considered a borrower liable for accidents, since in exchange for this animal that he borrowed from him, he must lend him his animal tomorrow; and the law of a borrower applies specifically when all the benefit is his, meaning that he is not obligated to give anything in exchange].

Or

“Guard for me, and I will lend you.”

Or

“Lend me, and I will guard for you.”

All of them become paid bailees for one another.

And the Gemara asks: [as above]

But why

are they paid bailees? Is this not

custodianship with the owner present?

And we answer: [as above]

Rav Pappa said: He said to him, “Guard for me today, and I will guard for you tomorrow,”]]

and they are not performing the work at the same time.

There was an incident involving

those perfume sellers]]

[sellers of a perfume called ohel or ahalot],

for every day one of them would bake it,]]

he would bake bread for them

—one of them]]

each man on his day.

On that day, they said to him,]]

the perfume sellers

to one of them: “Go, bake for us!”]]

Go and bake bread for us today.

He said to them: “Guard my cloak for me,”]]

guard my clothes until I finish baking your bread for you.

By the time he came]]

by the time the baker returned from his work,

they were negligent with it]]

his companions, and did not guard his garment,

and it was stolen.

They came before Rav Pappa]]

for judgment.

He obligated them]]

because they had been negligent in guarding it.

The Sages said to Rav Pappa: “But why]]

did you obligate them? Is it not

negligence with the owner present,]]

for they were performing their work together, since while they were guarding his cloak, he was baking their bread?

Rav Pappa was embarrassed,]]

embarrassed that he had erred in a matter of halakha.

In the end it became clear that at that time]]

when the cloak was stolen

, he was drinking wine,]]

the baker became intoxicated and was not performing their work at that time; therefore, this was not negligence with the owner present, and they were liable to pay its value.

And we examine this:

This works well according to the one who says that in the case of negligence with the owner present one is exempt; for that reason he was embarrassed,]]

since he should have exempted them.

Rather, according to the one who says that negligence when the owner is with him renders one liable,

and it is not similar to the law of guarding when the owner is with him, in which one is exempt [and the reason, see the note].

Why was

Rav Pappa embarrassed, and behold, he made them liable according to the law?

And the Gemara explains:

Rather, that day was not his,

it was not the fixed day on which this seller was obligated to bake everyone’s bread.

And they said to him himself, “Go bake for us”

today, even though this was not his fixed day.

And he said to them, “For that wage with which I am baking for you, guard my cloak,”

and in such a case they become paid guardians over his cloak, for he was not obligated to bake on that day, and his baking is only payment for guarding the cloak.