Bava Metzia 79a (עט.) — the Talmud in English

The statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

As Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar would say: If it was taken while traveling along its route, the lessor says to him, “Here is your property before you.

And if not, he is obligated to provide him with another donkey.”

And we challenge this: According to what has been explained, that the entire beraita is the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, this is difficult:

But can you establish for us

the first clause of the beraita as the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar?

But it teaches in the first clause

of the beraita:

“One who rents a donkey and it becomes blind or goes mad, says to him

the renter,

‘Here is your property before you.’”

Whereas

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said

elsewhere:

“One who rents a donkey to ride upon it, and it becomes blind or goes mad, the lessor is obligated

to provide

him with another donkey.”

And if so, it is impossible to explain that the entire beraita is the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, since he himself said that if it becomes blind, he provides him with another donkey, unlike what is stated in the beraita.

And we answer:

Rabba bar Rav Huna said:

There is no comparison between the beraita and this statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, since when Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar states his ruling, “He is obligated to provide him with another donkey,” it applies specifically when he rented the donkey

to ride upon it.

And this

is different,

because it is impossible to ride a blind donkey. But the beraita is discussing a case in which he rented it for carrying a load, and he can lead it along the roads even if it is blind.

Rav Pappa said: And

even if he rented it for carrying a load, if he rented it in order to carry upon it

glassware

that is liable to break,

it is considered like riding upon it.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: One who rents a donkey

in order

to ride upon it, and it dies

the donkey when it was

halfway along the route,

in the middle of the road leading to the place he intended to reach,

gives him

the renter to the lessor

the fee for half the route,

that is, the fee for the distance he rode until it died.

And he has no claim

the renter

against him,

against the lessor,

, other than a grievance

because he rented him a weak donkey.

And we consider the matter:

What are the circumstances?

If it is common

in the place where the animal died for other donkeys

to rent,

to rent, then

what is the basis for a grievance?

He does not even have grounds to complain to him; rather, he should rent another donkey and continue on his way.

If it is not common

in that place

to rent

other donkeys, then he has not only a grievance against him, but even

the fee,

the fee for half the route,

he should

give him!

For this donkey was of no benefit to him, since he did not wish to reach this place.

And we explain:

Actually,

it is indeed discussing a case in which it died in a place

where it is not common to rent

another donkey. And the reason he must pay him the fee for half the route is

because he,

the lessor, says to the renter:

“If you had wanted from the outset to come as far as here,

would

you not have wanted to pay a fee?”

If so, you gained somewhat, in that at least you came closer to your destination.

And we consider the matter:

What are the circumstances

in which he has only a grievance against the lessor, and the lessor is not obligated to rent him another donkey?

If he said to him

at the time he rented him the donkey, “I am renting you a donkey

without specification,”

meaning that he did not obligate himself regarding a specific donkey, then

he is obligated to provide him with another donkey!

Since he did not rent him a specific donkey, the rental did not apply specifically to this donkey, and the rental did not become void even after it died.

And therefore,

if there is enough of its value

from the carcass

to purchase,

to buy another donkey with it,

he should purchase one,

and continue with it on his way; so why does he have only a grievance against him? And the Gemara explains:

It is necessary

indeed, the case is

where there is not enough of its value

from the carcass

to purchase

another donkey.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Even if there is not enough of its value to purchase another,

if there is enough of its value

from the carcass

to rent

another donkey,

he should rent one,

and continue with it on his way.

And we answer:

Rav follows his own reasoning.

As Rav said:

Although the lessor is obligated to provide him with another, nevertheless,

we do not consume the principal.

That is, he is obligated to do so specifically if he can purchase another with the value of the carcass. But he is not obligated to rent another for him, since if he rents one, his money will be consumed by the rental fee, and he did not obligate himself to this.

For it was stated: One who rents a donkey and it dies halfway along the route,

as explained above,

Rav said: If there is enough of its value

from the carcass

to purchase

another donkey,

he should purchase one.

But if there is enough of its value only

to rent one, he should not rent one.

And Shmuel said: Even

if there is enough of the carcass’s value only

to rent one, he should rent one.

And we explain:

With regard to what do

Rav and Shmuel disagree?

Rav holds: We do not consume the principal,

since he did not obligate himself to consume his money.

And Shmuel holds: We do consume the principal,

as he obligated himself to this as well.

In the chapter Eizehu Neshekh [67b], a situation was explained in which a borrower mortgages his field to the lender, and the arrangement serves as repayment of the debt. This is when the borrower grants the lender the right to take the produce of the field for several years in exchange for the debt, and after those years the field returns to its owners, and he is exempt from repaying his debt.

The Gemara now discusses what is to be done if the tree dries up during those years and produces no fruit.

Meytivi

to Rav, who said that we do not consume the principal, from what we learned:

If the tree dried up

during those years

, or was cut down

and produces no fruit,

both of them,

the borrower and the lender,

are prohibited from using it,

to chop wood from it for their own fuel.

For if the borrower chops wood from it, the lender will suffer a loss, since he will no longer be able to collect his debt from it.

And if the lender chops wood from it, the borrower will suffer a loss, since it will not return to him at the end of the mortgage years.

What should he do? It should be purchased with it,

the lender should chop down the tree, sell the wood, and use the proceeds of the wood to purchase

land.

And he,

the lender,

eats its produce,

until the value of the debt is recovered.

And from here the Gemara raises a difficulty against Rav:

But here,

if he purchases land with its value,

since when

the year of the

Yovel arrives, it returns,

that

land to its owner,

in accordance with the law that land returns to its owners at the Yovel,

the principal is consumed!

For when the Yovel arrives, the borrower will be left without the land and without its wood!?

And we answer:

What are we dealing with here? With a case where he sold it

the lender sells that land which he purchased with the proceeds of the wood

for sixty years,

for sixty years. Since he sold it for a fixed period, and that period ends only after the Yovel, the land does not return to its owners at the Yovel, and the principal is not consumed.

As Rav Ḥisda said that Rav Ketina said: From where is it derived that one who sells his field for sixty years does not have it return

at the Yovel?

As it is stated

[as the reason for the return of land to its owners]

“And the land shall not be sold in perpetuity”

forever.

That is, the law of Yovel applies to

one who

if

there is no Yovel, it would be permanently alienated.

And if so, here too the case is one in which he sells it for sixty years, and therefore it does not return at the Yovel.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: What does it help to purchase it for sixty years?

Ultimately, when sixty years arrive, the land returns to its owner,

since he purchased it only for sixty years,

and the principal is consumed—

after sixty years he will be left without his wood and without the land!?

And we answer:

Rather, what are we dealing with here?

This that we learned, “It should be purchased with them,” is

when the Yovel is not in force.

Therefore, the land will remain in the borrower’s possession forever. And the Gemara adds and says:

Here too, it is reasonable,

in accordance with Rav’s statement, that we do not consume the land.

If it enters your mind

that the case is indeed

when the Yovel is in force, and we do consume the principal

[when he purchases land and it returns to its owners at the Yovel], then why should he sell the wood and purchase land with its proceeds?

Let him chop it into firewood,

let the lender chop the wood,

and take it,

taking it for himself as fuel and the like!?

And we explain:

If this is the reason,

if you wish to prove against Shmuel and say that this proves that we do not consume the principal,

it is not difficult!

For it is possible that the Sages enacted that the proceeds be used specifically to purchase land because

sometimes the mortgage years end before the Yovel,

and it is therefore preferable to purchase land, since then the borrower too will be able to benefit from it for several years until the Yovel.

But if the lender takes the wood itself, the borrower will derive no benefit from it at all.

Alternatively,

it is possible

that money will come to the borrower,

that the borrower will come into possession of money as the years pass,

and he will redeem it,

redeeming the land from the lender

four or five years before the Yovel,

so that he too will be able to benefit from it for several years.

The Sages taught: If one rents a ship and it sinks halfway along the route,

Rabbi Natan says: If he gave

the renter to the lessor the ship’s rental fee, or part of it,

he may not take

that money back.

And if he did not give

the rental fee,

he should not give

anything at all, not even the fee for half the route.

And we consider the matter:

What are the circumstances?

If you say

that when he rented it, he mentioned

in

his words

“this ship,” and

with regard to the

wine

[that he wished to transport on the ship], the case is one in which he did not say that he wished to rent it in order to transport specifically this wine, but said merely wine

“without specification,”

then even if he gave him the rental fee,

why

may he not take it back?

Let him say to him,

the renter to the lessor:

“Give me the ship, for I will bring wine!”

That is, the renter can claim: The rental was not nullified by the ship’s sinking. Rather, you must raise the ship from the depths of the sea, and I will bring other wine to transport in it [and the lessor cannot rent another ship for him, since he rented him only this particular ship].

And since he cannot do so, he should return his money to him.

Rather, necessarily, the case is one in which, when he rented it from him, it was

an unspecified ship,

that he did not rent this particular ship from him,

and this wine,

as he said to him, “I am renting it in order to transport specifically this wine in it.”

If so, even

if he did not give

him the rental fee yet,

why should he not give it?

After all, the renter cannot fulfill his condition, since he rented it specifically to transport this wine in it!