Bava Metzia 79a — the Talmud in English

The words of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

For Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar would say: If it was taken during the course of its journey, the lessor says to him, “Here is yours before you.” And if not, he is obligated to provide him with a donkey.

And if not, he is obligated to provide him with a donkey.

And we challenge this: According to what is explained—that the entire beraita is the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar—it is difficult:

And can you establish for us

the first part of the beraita as [the opinion of] Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar?

But it teaches in the first part

of the beraita:

“One who rents a donkey and it becomes blind or becomes mad, says to him

the renter,

‘Here is yours before you.’”

Whereas

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said

elsewhere:

“One who rents a donkey to ride upon it, and it becomes blind or becomes mad, is obligated

the lessor

to provide him with another donkey.”

And if so, it is impossible to explain that the entire beraita is the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, for he himself said that if it became blind, he provides him with another donkey, unlike what is explained in the beraita.

And we answer:

Rabba bar Rav Huna said:

There is no comparison between the beraita and these words of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, since when Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar states his law—“he is obligated to provide him with another donkey”—it is specifically when he rented the donkey

to ride upon it.

And this

is different,

because it is impossible to ride a blind donkey. But in the beraita, it is speaking of one who rented it for carrying a load, and he can lead it along the roads even if it is blind.

Rav Pappa said: And

even for carrying a load, if he rented it in order to carry upon it

glass vessels

that are liable to break,

it is considered like riding upon it.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: One who rents a donkey

for the purpose of

riding upon it, and it dies for him

the donkey when it was

at the halfway point,

in the middle of the road leading to the place where he sought to arrive,

gives him

the renter to the lessor

the fee for half the journey,

that is, the fee for the part of the journey upon which he rode until it died.

And he has no

the renter

claim upon it

against the lessor

, except a grievance

because he rented him a lean donkey.

And we inquire about it:

What are the circumstances?

If it is common

in the place where the animal died for other donkeys

to rent,

to rent, then

what is the nature of the grievance?

He does not even have grounds to complain against him; rather, he should rent another donkey and continue on his way.

If it is not common

in that place

to rent

other donkeys, then he has against him not only a grievance, but even

the fee,

the payment for half the journey,

he should

give it to him!

For this donkey was of no benefit to him at all, since he did not wish to arrive at this place.

And we explain:

In every case,

indeed, it is speaking of a case where it died in a place

where it is not common to rent

another donkey. And the reason that he is obligated to pay him the fee for half the journey is

because he said to him

the lessor to the renter:

“If you had originally wanted to come as far as here,

would you

not have wanted to give the fee?”

If so, you gained somewhat, in that at the very least you came closer to your desired destination.

And we inquire about it:

What are the circumstances

in which he has against the lessor only a grievance, and the lessor is not obligated to rent him another donkey?

If he said to him

at the time he rented him the donkey, “I am renting you a donkey

‘without specification,’

that is, he did not undertake to provide him with a specific donkey—if so,

he is obligated to provide him with another donkey!

Since he did not rent him a specific donkey, the rental therefore did not apply specifically to this donkey, and the rental was not nullified even after it died.

And therefore,

if there is in its value

of the carcass

to take,

to purchase another donkey with it,

he should take it,

and continue with it on his way—so why does he have against him only a grievance? And the Gemara explains:

It is necessary

indeed, it is speaking

when there is not in its value

of the carcass

to take,

to purchase another donkey.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Even if there is not enough in its value to purchase another,

if there is in its value

of the carcass

to rent

another donkey,

he should rent one,

and continue with it on his way.

And we answer:

Rav follows his own reasoning.

For Rav said:

Although the lessor is obligated to provide him with another, nevertheless

we do not consume the principal.

That is, specifically if he can purchase another with the value of the carcass, the lessor is obligated to do so. But to rent another for him, he is not obligated, since if he rents one, his money will be consumed by the rental payment, and this he did not undertake to provide him.

For it was stated: One who rents a donkey, and it dies for him halfway along the road,

as explained above,

Rav said: If there is in its value

of the carcass

to take,

to purchase another donkey,

he should take one.

But if its value is sufficient only

to rent, he should not rent.

And Shmuel said: Even

if the value of the carcass is sufficient only

to rent, he should rent.

And we explain:

With regard to what do

Rav and Shmuel disagree?

Rav holds: We do not consume the principal,

since he did not undertake to consume his money.

And Shmuel holds: We do consume the principal,

he undertook this as well.

In the chapter “Which Is a Bite” [67b], a case was explained in which the borrower mortgages his field to the lender, and the matter serves as repayment of the debt. This is when the borrower gives the lender the right to take the produce of the field for several years in exchange for the debt, and after those years the field returns to its owners, and he is exempt from paying his debt.

And now the Gemara discusses: If the tree dried up during those years and does not produce fruit, what should they do?

It challenges Rav,

who said that we do not consume the principal, from what we learned:

If the tree dried up

during those years

, or was cut down

and does not produce fruit,

both of them,

the borrower and the lender,

are forbidden with regard to it,

to split wood from it for firewood for themselves.

For if the borrower splits wood from it, the lender will lose, since he will no longer be able to collect his debt from it.

And if the lender splits wood from it, the borrower will lose, since it will not return to him at the end of the mortgage years.

What should he do? It should be purchased with it,

the lender should split the tree, sell the wood, and purchase with the money from the wood

land.

And he,

the lender,

eats its produce,

until the value of the debt.

And from here the Gemara raises a difficulty against Rav:

But here,

if he purchases land with its value,

since when

the year of

the Jubilee arrives, it returns,

that

land to its owner,

as is the law of the return of land to its owners at the Jubilee,

and the principal is consumed!

For when the Jubilee arrives, the borrower will be left without the land and without its wood

! And we answer:

With what are we dealing here? With a case where he sells it

the lender sells that land which he purchases with the value of the wood

for sixty years,

for sixty years. And since he sold it for a fixed period, and that period ends only after the Jubilee, the land does not return to its owners at the Jubilee, and the principal is not consumed.

For Rav Hisda said that Rav Ketina said: From where is it known concerning one who sells his field for sixty years that it does not return

at the Jubilee?

As it is stated [

as the reason for the return of fields to their owners]

“And the land shall not be sold permanently”

forever.

That is, the law of the Jubilee was stated regarding

one who

if

there is no Jubilee, it is permanently sold.

And if so, here too it is speaking of one who sells for sixty years, and therefore it does not return at the Jubilee.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: What does it help that he purchases it for sixty years?

Ultimately, when sixty years arrive, the land returns to its owner,

for he purchased it only for sixty years,

and the principal is consumed—

after sixty years he will be left without its wood and without the land

!? And we answer:

Rather, with what are we dealing here?

This that we learned, “It should be purchased with it,” is

at a time when the Jubilee is not practiced.

And therefore the land will remain in the borrower’s possession forever. And the Gemara adds and says:

Here too it is reasonable,

like the words of Rav, that we do not consume the land.

For if it enters your mind

that it is indeed speaking

at a time when the Jubilee is practiced, and we do consume the principal [

when he purchases land, and it returns to its owners at the Jubilee], then why should he sell the wood and purchase land with its value?

Let him split it into wood,

the lender should split the wood,

and take it,

take it for himself, for firewood and the like!?

And we explain:

If because of this

you wish to prove against the words of Shmuel and say that it is proven from here that we do not consume the principal,

it is not difficult!

For it is possible that the Sages enacted that land specifically be purchased with it, because

sometimes the mortgage years end before the Jubilee,

and therefore it is preferable to purchase land, for then the borrower too can benefit from it for several years until the Jubilee.

But if the lender takes the wood itself, the borrower will not benefit from it at all.

Alternatively,

it is possible

that money will come to the borrower,

that money will come into the borrower’s possession after many years,

and he will redeem it

and redeem the land from the lender

four or five years before the Jubilee,

and he too will be able to benefit from it for several years.

The Sages taught: One who rents a ship and it sinks for him halfway along the road,

Rabbi Natan says: If he gave

the renter to the lessor the rental payment for the ship, or part of it,

he may not take

it back.

And if he did not give

the rental payment,

he should not give

anything at all, not even the payment for half the journey.

And we inquire about it:

What are the circumstances?

If you say

that when he rented it, he mentioned

in

his words

“this ship,” and

regarding the

wine [

which he wished to transport in the ship], it is speaking of a case where he did not say to him, “I wish to rent it in order to transport specifically this wine,” but he said wine

‘without specification,’

then, even if he gave him the rental payment,

why

may he not take it back?

Let him say to him,

the renter to the lessor:

“Give me the ship, for I shall bring wine!”

That is, the renter will claim: The rental was not nullified by the sinking of the ship; rather, you must raise the ship from the depths of the sea, and I will bring other wine to transport in it [and the lessor cannot rent another ship for him, since he rented from him only this ship].

And since he cannot do so, he should return his money to him.

Rather, it must be speaking of a case where, when he rented from him, it was

an unspecified ship,

that he did not rent this particular ship from him,

and this wine,

which he said to him, “I am renting [the ship] to transport specifically this wine in it.”

If so, even

if he did not give

him the rental payment yet,

why should he not give it?

For the renter cannot fulfill his condition, since he rented it to transport specifically this wine in it!