Bava Metzia 78b — the Talmud in English

Anyone who acts contrary to the owner’s instructions, ![](pamud.bmp "

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is called a robber.

That is: anyone who takes an object from his fellow [such as a renter or a craftsman] in order to work with it, and alters his work contrary to the will of the owner of the object, is considered to be robbing the object.

And therefore the animal remains in his possession, making him liable for all mishaps that befall it, according to the law of a robber.

And therefore, if the renter altered the terms of the rental and took the animal to a place contrary to the owners’ instructions, he is considered a robber. If so, even if the animal died in its ordinary manner [through accident], the renter is liable to pay the lessor for it.

And we raised an objection concerning it:

Which Rabbi Meir?

To which known ruling stated by Rabbi Meir did Rabbi Yohanan intend, from which it is possible to derive the principle: “Anyone who acts contrary to the owner’s instructions is called a robber”?

If you say

that the reference is to

Rabbi Meir concerning a dyer,

to the ruling that Rabbi Meir stated concerning a dyer,

as we learned [Bava Kamma 100b]:

One who gives wool to a dyer

a dyer, a craftsman for dyeing

to dye it for him

the wool

red,

but the dyer altered what the owner of the wool had told him,

and dyed it

with the color

black.

And likewise in the reverse case: if the owner of the wool asked him to dye it

black,

but the dyer altered it

and dyed it red,

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah disputed:

Rabbi Meir says:

The dyer

gives him

to the owner of the wool

the value of his wool,

according to the market value of undyed wool. Since the dyer altered what the owner had told him, he is considered a robber with regard to the wool, and acquired it through the alteration, and therefore he is liable to pay its value, according to what it was worth at the time of the robbery.

Rabbi Judah says:

The dyer is not considered a robber, and he must give the owner of the wool his dyed wool. But the owner of the wool does not give him his full wage for the dyeing; rather:

If the enhancement,

the difference between the value of dyed wool and undyed wool

, is greater than the expense,

greater than the amount the dyer invested in dyeing the wool [the dye materials and the wood that the dyer burned in order to cook them and prepare the dye from them],

he gives him

the owner of the wool gives the dyer only

the expense,

which is the smaller amount.

And if

conversely,

the expense is greater than the enhancement, he gives him

only

the enhancement.

Since he altered what the owner of the wool had told him, he is to be penalized, and therefore he does not receive his full wage.

And from Rabbi Meir’s view that the dyer who altered the owner of the wool’s instructions is called a robber, one can derive the principle that “anyone who acts contrary to the owner’s instructions is called a robber.” Therefore, the renter in our Mishna is also considered a robber for having altered the lessor’s instructions, and is liable for every mishap that occurs to the animal.

And we refute this:

From where

is this proof? This is no proof that our Mishna follows the view of Rabbi Meir!

Perhaps there it is different,

in the case of one who gave wool to a dyer; only there is the dyer considered a robber and acquired the wool, because

he acquires

the wool

through a change in the object,

because he made a change in the substance of the wool [by dyeing it]. And Rabbi Meir follows the view of the one who says that a robbed object is acquired by the robber when it changes from the way it was at the time of the robbery.

But one cannot bring proof from here concerning the case of our Mishna, in which one rented an animal and took it to a place other than the place permitted to him by the lessor, and the renter is considered a robber. For in such a case, no change at all was made in the substance of the animal. Therefore, one cannot derive from here the principle that “anyone who acts contrary to the owner’s instructions is called a robber.”

Therefore, the Gemara brings another source showing that this is Rabbi Meir’s view:

Rather,

Rabbi Meir, who says that anyone who acts contrary to the owner’s instructions is called a robber, is

the

one who is

Rabbi Meir concerning “the Purim collection,”

as it was taught: The Purim collection,

money collected by charity collectors from the residents of the town in order to distribute it to the poor for the needs of the Purim meal; the collectors must give the money of this collection specifically

for

the needs of

Purim,

and they may not give the money for another charitable purpose.

The town collection,

money collected in this town, must be given specifically

to

the poor of

that town, and they are not particular in the matter

to say that it is enough for the poor to receive less. And the remaining money remains in the charity collector’s purse.

But—

they take

with this money

the calves,

and slaughter even more than necessary,

and eat

them, and the remainder

of the meat

falls into the charity purse.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The Purim collection is for

the needs of the Purim meal

Purim.

And the poor person may not take from it

money to buy

a strap for his sandal, unless he stipulated

the poor person

in the presence of the people of the town

and said: I wish to take this money for another purpose and not for the meal

These are the words of Rabbi Yaakov, who said them in the name of Rabbi Meir.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is lenient,

permitting one to take from this money for his needs.

And the Gemara understood that according to Rabbi Meir, one may not alter the charity money, because anyone who acts contrary to the owner’s instructions is called a robber. Since it was given for the meal, he may not alter the instructions of those who gave it.

And we refute this:

Perhaps there too,

also in the Purim collection, the reason is that those who give the charity

give it with Purim in mind

the money. But

with some other matter in mind

such as a strap for his sandal

they do not give it,

and the money still remains in the owners’ possession.

That is, from the outset, the owners do not intend to give this money to the poor person; rather, they intend that the poor person take from this money what he needs for the meal, and return the remainder. If so, certainly in such a case he is called a robber, for the money was not given to him for another matter. This is not like every case of acting contrary to the owner’s instructions, because there he does not take the donkey for himself, but merely alters the owners’ instructions concerning the manner in which he uses it.

Rather, this is Rabbi Meir,

who holds that anyone who acts contrary to the owner’s instructions is called a robber:

As it was taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: One who gives a dinar to a poor person to buy for himself

the poor person with this money

a cloak may not buy with it

the poor person

a garment.

And likewise in the reverse case: if he gave it to him for the purchase of

a garment, he may not buy with it a cloak, because he acts contrary to the owner’s instructions,

who gave him the money for another purpose.

And the Gemara understood that this is the source for Rabbi Meir’s words, that anyone who acts contrary to the owner’s instructions is called a robber.

And we refute this:

Perhaps there it is different,

in that he may not alter the owner’s instructions

, because people will come to suspect him

the owner,

as people say: So-and-so said,

the owner promised,

“I will buy him clothing” [A0146]]I will buy a cloak

a cloak]

for that poor person, and

in the end

he did not buy it for him,

he did not buy him the garment, and he is one who vows but does not fulfill.

Alternatively,

likewise, in the second case, in which he told him to buy a cloak and he bought a garment, people will say that he said:

“I will buy him a cloak” [A0154]]I will buy a cloak for the poor person,

I will buy a cloak for the poor person],

“but he did not buy it for him.”

If so, the reason there is not “anyone who acts contrary to the owner’s instructions,” but rather this is a regulation for his benefit because of suspicion.

And the Gemara asks:

If so, let it teach

in the beraita that the reason for the matter is

because of suspicion!

What

is the reason that the tanaitic authority stated

“because he acts contrary to the owner’s instructions”?

Rather, infer from it

that indeed

it is because he altered—

that he altered his instructions

, and anyone who acts contrary to the owner’s instructions is called a robber.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who rents a donkey and it became white-eyed:

And we raised an objection concerning it:

What does “and it became white-eyed” mean?

What is the meaning of the expression “it became white-eyed”? And we explain:

Here,

the people of Babylonia

explained,

they interpreted: “it became white-eyed”—

a nahuraita.

That is, a growth covering the pupil of the eye, which covered its eyes.

Rava said: Worm infestation,

worms in the animal’s legs.

And now the Gemara brings a case concerning this matter:

There was an incident involving

a certain man,

that man,

who said to them

to the members of the royal household: I saw

a worm infestation

worms

in the king’s garment

in the king’s clothing.

They said to him: In what

clothing did you see this? Did you see it

in silver garments,

in linen clothing,

or in gold garments, in clothing

of red-dyed wool?

Some say: He said, “In silver garments,” and they killed him,

for there are no worms in linen clothing, and his intention was to disgrace the king; therefore, they killed him.

Some say: He said, “In gold garments,” and they released him.

They released him, because it was possible that he had indeed seen it.

We learned in the Mishna:

Or if the animal became

the animal

requisitioned, he says to him

the lessor

“Here is yours before you,”

and he is not liable to provide him with another one.

Rav said: They taught

that he may say to him, “Here is yours before you,”

, only with regard to temporary requisition,

in which the king’s servants took it for a fixed period, after which they return it to the renter.

But

if they took it

in a permanent requisition, he is liable to provide him with another donkey

in its place, since this is considered as though the animal died, and we learned in the Mishna that “he is liable to provide him with a donkey.”

And the reason for the matter is that with temporary requisition, the rental has not been nullified; rather, he is merely delayed in his work. But with permanent requisition, the rental is nullified. Therefore, either he returns his money to him, or he provides him with another one in its place.

And Shmuel said:

He is not liable to provide him with another one,

whether with temporary requisition or with permanent requisition.

Rather,

if it was taken along its route,

along the route on which the renter goes for his needs,

the animal was taken

and the king’s servants continue taking it along its route, then

he says to him: “Here is yours before you,”

for this is their practice: when they find another donkey farther along the road, they return the first one to its owner and take the second one with them. Therefore, the rental is not nullified through this, since he can travel with them until they return the donkey to him.

And if it was not taken on the way it was traveling,

but the king’s men go with it on a different road from the one on which the lessee wishes to travel

, he is obligated to provide him with a donkey,

and the owner cannot claim, “You must travel in their footsteps,” since by doing so he suffers a loss, for his wish is to travel on a different road.

The Gemara raises an objection:

Meitivi

from what we learned in a beraita

: If one rents a donkey and it becomes blind, or it becomes insane

the animal, but it is still fit for carrying

, he says to him

the lessor says to the lessee

: “Here is yours before you,”

and he is not obligated to provide him with another one.

But if

it dies or becomes angaria,

it is taken for the king’s service, as above

, he is obligated

the lessor

to provide him with another donkey.

And this is apparently different from what is explained in our Mishna: that in the case of angaria he says to him, “Here is yours before you.”

And we considered it:

Granted, according to Rav, there is no difficulty,

there is no contradiction, since it is possible to distinguish and say:

Here

in our Mishna, it is speaking

of angaria that returns,

and for that reason he says to him, “Here is yours before you.”

And here

in the beraita, it is speaking

of angaria that does not

return,

and for that reason he provides him with another donkey.

But according to Shmuel,

who does not distinguish between angaria that returns and one that does not return

, it is difficult!

And if you would say: According to Shmuel also there is no difficulty,

since he can answer

—

Here, in our Mishna, it is speaking

of its having been taken on the way it was traveling.

Here,

in the beraita it is speaking

of its having been taken not on the way it was traveling.

And for that reason the lessor cannot say to the lessee, “Here is yours before you,” since he is not obligated to change his route in order to follow it, as was explained above.

This cannot be explained

! For, from the fact that the latter clause teaches

in that beraita

: “Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If it was taken on the way it was traveling, he says to him, ‘Here is yours before you’; and if not, he is obligated to provide him with a donkey,”

it follows that according to the first tanna,

who said that he is obligated to provide him with a donkey, without distinguishing between the way it was traveling and another way

, it makes no difference to him.

And he obligates the lessor to provide him with another one in every case.

Shmuel could say to you,

indeed, the first tanna does not hold like me but like Rav; nevertheless, my position is not rejected, since is it not the case that

there is Rabbi

Shimon ben Elazar who stands with me? I speak in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar!

And according to this, it is explained that the opinion of the first tanna is like Rav, whereas Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds like Shmuel.

Alternatively, you can say,

there is no difficulty from the beraita against Shmuel; rather, it is possible to explain that indeed there are not two opinions in the beraita, but

it is entirely Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

And it is deficient, and this is what it teaches:

If one rents a donkey and it becomes blind, or it becomes insane

the animal

, he says to him

the lessor

: “Here is yours before you.”

But

if the animal dies or becomes angaria, the lessor is obligated to provide him with a donkey.

In what case are these words said,

specifically

if it was taken not on the way it was traveling

the animal was taken from him

? But if it was taken on the way it was traveling,

that is, on the road on which the lessee originally wishes to travel, the king’s servants who took it now travel with it

, he says to him

the lessor

: “Here is yours before you,”

for you can travel after them, and after a short time they will return it to you.