Bava Metzia 69a — the Talmud in English

If

Rav Ilish wished to accept upon himself, in this iska,

half in the loss,

and thus the half would be considered with him as a loan, since he accepted responsibility for half, he would receive as his wage

two-thirds in the profit,

and the sixth in the profit, which is additional to the loan, would be his wage for his involvement with his fellow’s half of the deposit.

Rav Kahana said: I stated this teaching

—this teaching of Rava, who said concerning the incident with the sons of Rav Ilish that the document is interpreted either as meaning that the one involved in the business receives more for himself in the profits, or that the one involved in the business bears less responsibility as his wage for his involvement—

before Rav Zevid of Nehardea, and he said to me

that it is not to be interpreted in this incident that Rav Ilish’s intention was to stipulate such a wage.

Rather,

perhaps Rav Ilish

was one who dipped with him in brine,

and his wage was given to him by the giver of the iska through this dipping, in which he dipped his bread.

And Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

that dipping in brine is sufficient to be considered a wage for the work of the one involved in the business.

He said to him

Rav Kahana:

It was not the halakha

in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda

that was stated.

Rather,

everyone intended the same

approach was stated.

This too is reasonable

that the Gemara’s intention is not that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, but that Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel all followed one approach.

For if you do not say so, why was it necessary for him to count and say: “The halakha, the halakha,”

that the halakha is both in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, both in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Yehuda, and in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

Let him say: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who is the most lenient of all of them,

and permits a wage consisting of dipping in brine; and certainly a wage consisting of plucking wool or dung is sufficient, and it would not have been necessary to say that the halakha is in accordance with all three of them.

And if nevertheless we say that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei ben Rabbi Yehuda and the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the intention of the Gemara is to say that they all intended one approach.

Rav said:

If the giver of the iska said to the one involved in the business: We will divide equally in the loss and likewise in the profit that the animal will increase in value up to one-third of its value, and

the excess of one-third

is your wage,

and in the portion by which the animal increases in value beyond one-third of its value you will receive for yourself, it follows that his wage is in that which he does not divide with the giver, in the increase beyond one-third by which the animal increased .

This is permitted,

and there is no concern for the prohibition of interest.

And although at times the animal will not increase in value beyond one-third and he will earn nothing, nevertheless, since if it increases beyond one-third he will receive the increase for himself, this is permitted .

And Shmuel said:

It is not possible to say this, because if

he did not find

the one involved in the business

the excess of one-third,

but the animal increased only up to one-third, it turns out that he

will go home empty-handed,

and it follows that he earned nothing, while he worked with the giver’s portion for free, on account of the fact that he lent him the half, and there is here the prohibition of interest.

Rather, Shmuel said:

He stipulates a dinar for him

as his wage, so that the one involved in the business will have a wage whether he profits or whether he does not profit .

And we raise an objection:

A

re

Rav

of the opinion

that one does not stipulate a dinar for him,

but it is sufficient that he receive a wage that depends on the uncertainty of whether he will profit?

But Rav said,

if a person gave a calf to his fellow to fatten it, and they will divide its profit equally, the one involved in the business takes as his wage

the head of the calf for fattening.

The one involved in fattening takes the head of the calf as his wage for his labor [apart from half the profit].

What, is it not

speaking in a case

where he said to him

the giver said to the one involved in the business:

The excess of one-third is your wage,

and since it is not certain that he will receive a wage, therefore he must give him the entire head of the calf as his wage, in the event that the animal does not increase beyond one-third, so that he will have a definite wage. And it is proven that Rav held that one must stipulate a dinar for him.

And we answer:

No,

Rav said this in such a case.

Rather, in a case

where he said to him,

the giver said to the one fattening: You have the choice to choose between two types of payment for your labor:

If

or your wage will be

“the excess of one-third.”

In this manner it is not certain that you will have a wage.

If

or your wage will be

“the head of the calf for fattening.”

In this case your wage is definite and fixed, for even if the animal does not increase by one-third, you will in any event receive the head of the calf.

It follows that according to Rav it is not necessary to give the one involved in the business a definite wage; rather, it is sufficient to give him even a doubtful wage in order to avoid the prohibition of interest.

Alternatively,

actually, one must pay the one involved in the business a definite wage, and this is what Rav said: one must give the head of the calf as the wage for fattening.

And

when Rav said

that even a doubtful wage,

“the excess of one-third is your wage,” is permitted, it is, for example, when he has an animal

the one involved in the business has an animal of his own, with which he must labor even without this iska , and there is no additional labor here for an additional animal.

As people say: “Mix for the ox,

with the labor of mixing barley before one ox,

mix for the oxen,”

he can mix without additional labor for two oxen.

Rabbi Elazar of Hagrוניא bought

bought

an animal,

and did not wish to labor with it himself, but rather to give it to another person who would labor with it by way of an iska.

And he gave it to his sharecropper

he gave it to his sharecropper through an iska, so that he would fatten it and they would divide the increase between them.

He fattens it,

the sharecropper fattened it,

and he gave him its head as his wage,

he gave the sharecropper the entire head of the animal as his wage for laboring with Rabbi Elazar’s portion of the deposit.

And

likewise

he gave

Rabbi Elazar gave

half the profit

to the sharecropper, since half the animal was with him as a loan, and the profit belonged to him as though the animal had belonged to the sharecropper.

The sharecropper’s wife wanted him to profit more.

His wife said to him,

the sharecropper’s wife said to her husband:

If you participate with him,

if you had participated with Rabbi Elazar in purchasing the animal, and half the animal had been yours, in full ownership as a partner and not by way of a loan,

he would give you

Rabbi Elazar

also the tail,

the entire tail, for your portion .

He went

the sharecropper

and bought with him,

bought with Rabbi Elazar another animal in full partnership. The sharecropper labored with his portion and with Rabbi Elazar’s portion. And when they came to divide the profits,

he divided for him

Rabbi Elazar

from the tail,

as they divided the entire animal.

He said to him

Rabbi Elazar:

Come, let us divide the head,

and take your portion due to you, which is half the head.

He said to him

the sharecropper:

Now, not even as at first!

It follows that now, when I became a partner in the animal, my wage has become worse than what I had previously, when I received merely an iska.

He said to him

Rabbi Elazar: It is true that now I need not pay you a wage even as at first.

For

until now, the money

of the portion of the deposit

was mine,

and you labored with my money.

If I had not given you a little more

than the portion of the profits due to you on account of your loan, it would have appeared that you were laboring with my portion of the deposit in exchange for what I lent you, and this is forbidden, because it

appears as interest.

But

now,

that you participated with me in purchasing the animal, there is no loan here at all, and there is no concern for interest; rather,

we are partners.

What are you saying—that I labored a little more,

and you are entitled to a wage for the fact that you labor with your half, bringing in and taking out together with your half, as is the law of every laborer? I need not pay you this small wage, since you are my sharecropper in my fields.

And as

people say: “An ordinary sharecropper subjugates himself to the owner of the land in order to bring him fodder,”

just as an ordinary sharecropper brings fodder for the flock for free, so here I need not pay you a small wage for your additional labor with my portion.

The Sages taught:

A person who received money from his fellow to work with it—until when does the iska between them continue?

One who gives an animal to his fellow,

so that he will work with it and half the profits will belong to the one involved in the business, and half the responsibility will likewise be upon him,

until when is he obligated to tend to it,

and cannot say to the giver, “I do not wish to work with it any longer” .

Sumakhos says: For donkeys, eighteen months; for small livestock

which are small animals whose care is greater,

twenty-four months.

And if he came

the one involved in the business

to divide within its term,

when eighteen or twenty-four months had not yet passed,

his fellow prevents him

from dividing until the time arrives.

But the care required in this year

the first

is not similar to the care required in another year.

And we raise an objection:

What is the meaning of “but” that he says!?

On the contrary, this is the reason that the owner of the animal prevents the one involved in the business from dividing. And from the wording “but,” it implies that they are coming to qualify the preceding law.

And we answer:

Rather,

the reason for the law that the one involved in the business cannot cancel the iska before the end of its term is

because the care required in this year

the first

is not similar to the care required in another year.

And since it is the practice of the country that those who receive [the animals] tend to them until this time, he cannot stop before then.

It was taught in another beraita,

that the question of until when he is obligated to work does not concern the animal itself that he received, but the offspring born from it, for we learned:

One who gives an animal to his fellow

and it gave birth,

until when is he obligated

the one involved in the business

to tend to the offspring,

for half the offspring belongs to the giver of the iska from the profits of the deposit portion, and the recipient does not wish to work with this half from which he gains nothing.

In the case of a small animal, thirty days, and in the case of a large animal, fifty days,

just as we find that the Torah imposed upon an Israelite the obligation to tend to the firstborn before he hands it over to a priest, so too this tending for thirty days and fifty days is part of the transaction before he hands the offspring over to the owners.

Rabbi Yosei says: In the case of a small animal, three months, because its tending is greater.

And the Gemara discusses this:

What is meant by “its tending is greater”?

Because its teeth are thin,

and it does not know how to eat by itself, and it needs its mother and a person to tend to it.

From this point onward,

once this period has passed, during which he was required to tend to the offspring for the one who gave it,

the one engaged in the transaction takes

the offspring for himself,

half of it for himself,

for that half is due to him, since he earned it from the half of the loan in the transaction,

and one half of the half from his fellow’s portion.

And the one engaged in the transaction receives another quarter, which is half of his fellow’s share, since we view his engagement with his fellow’s share beyond the time of the earlier transaction as a new transaction, and the owner’s half must be divided into a quarter for the one engaged in the transaction and a quarter for the owner.

Rav Manshya bar Geda

was engaged with an animal in a transaction, and it gave birth to offspring.

He took,

he took

half of it for himself

from the profits that came from the offspring, since half of the animal had been a loan, and half of the offspring—the profits of the loan—was due to the one engaged in the transaction; and in addition

one half of the half from his fellow’s portion,

he took another quarter from the half earned by the owner’s deposit, since he was now engaged with this half of the owner’s share as part of a transaction, and a quarter was due to him and a quarter to his fellow.

He came before Abaye

to clarify whether he had acted according to the law,

he said to him

Abaye:

Who apportioned it for you!?

And since you apportioned it yourself without an appraisal, and perhaps a larger share was due to your fellow, the appraisal is void, and the transaction concerning the original animal continues, and consequently only half of the offspring is due to him, as well as the appropriate share of the profits from the offspring, [according to] the transaction concerning the animal.

And furthermore,

there is a reason why more than half of the profits is not due to you, for

it is a place where the custom is to raise them, and we learned: In a place where the custom is to raise them, they shall raise them.

And the time for division has not yet arrived at all, for according to the law of the earlier transaction, you are still obligated to raise the offspring.

There was an incident involving

those two Cutheans,

Cutheans,

who conducted a business venture

of partnership

with each other.

One of them went away,

one of them wished to end the partnership between them.

He divided the dinars,

he divided the partnership funds into two

without his fellow’s knowledge,

and took half of the funds for himself.

They came before Rav Pappa,

so that he could rule for them whether the division was void, since it had been made without the partner’s knowledge, or whether it was valid.

He said to him

Rav Pappa to the one who had argued against the division:

What difference does it make

to you that your partner divided it alone? After all,

this is what Rav Nahman said: Dinars are considered as though they have been divided.

Since the funds are present as they are, they are considered as though they had been divided between the two of you, for an appraisal is not necessary in order to divide funds [as it is with other objects]; rather, each of the partners may take his funds without an appraisal.

For another year,

they again entered into a partnership between them, and

they bought wine

they both bought wine

with each other,

as partners together, in order to sell it at a higher price.

The other one arose,

the second one, who in the previous year had argued before Rav Pappa against dividing the partnership without an appraisal, and now no longer wanted the partnership in the wine,

he divided it for him,

he divided the wine into two,

without his fellow’s knowledge.

They came

again

before Rav Pappa

for judgment, while the one who had divided the money in the previous year now argued against the division of the wine without an appraisal.

He said to him

Rav Pappa to the one who had divided the wine for himself:

Who apportioned it for you!?

Who was the authority who apportioned the wine for you!? Perhaps your appraisal was not proper, and it is therefore void.

He said to him

that same partner who had now divided the wine and in the previous year had argued against such a division:

I see

I see

that you come after him

you, Master!

I have realized that you always issue rulings in favor of the one opposing me. Since you have already ruled in his favor twice: last year, when he divided the funds alone, you ruled that his division was a division, whereas this year, when I divided the wine alone, you ruled that he was in the right and that my division was void.