Bava Metzia 69a (סט.) — the Talmud in English

If

Rav Ilish wished to undertake this iska

with half of the losses,

and the half that he had assumed responsibility for would therefore be regarded as a loan in his possession, he would receive

two-thirds of the profit,

and the remaining sixth of the profit, which is added to the loan, would be his compensation for handling his fellow’s half of the deposit.

Rav Kahana said: I stated this teaching

of Rava, who said that in the incident involving the sons of Rav Ilish, the document is to be interpreted either as granting the manager a greater share of the profits or as assigning him less responsibility in return for his compensation for managing the funds,

before Rav Zevid of Neharde’a, and he said to me

that the incident should not be interpreted as meaning that Rav Ilish intended to stipulate for such compensation.

Rather,

perhaps Rav Ilish

would dip bread with him in brine,

and this was the compensation he received from the provider of the iska: dipping his bread in this brine.

And Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

as dipping bread in brine is sufficient to be considered compensation for the manager’s labor.

He said to him,

Rav Kahana:

It was not

the halakha

in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

Rather,

they all intended the same

approach, it was stated.

This too is reasonable:

the Gemara’s intention is not that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, but rather that Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel all followed one approach.

For if you do not say so, why was it necessary to count and say: “The halakha, the halakha,”

indicating that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

Let him say: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who is the most lenient of them all,

and permits compensation consisting of dipping bread in brine; and certainly compensation consisting of plucking wool or dung would suffice. There would have been no need to state that the halakha is in accordance with all three of them.

And if, nevertheless, one says that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and that the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the Gemara’s intention is to say that they all intended a single approach.

Rav said:

If the provider of the iska says to the manager: We will share equally in the loss and in the profit from the animal’s appreciation up to one-third of its value, and

the excess over one-third

will be your compensation,

while you will keep for yourself the portion by which the animal appreciates beyond one-third of its value, then his compensation is constituted by the appreciation beyond one-third, which he does not share with the provider.

This is permitted,

and there is no concern for the prohibition of interest.

And although at times the animal will not appreciate by more than one-third and he will earn nothing, nevertheless, since if it appreciates by more than one-third he will keep the appreciation for himself, this is permitted.

And Shmuel said:

It is impossible to say this, because if

the manager does not find

the

excess over one-third,

but the animal appreciates only up to one-third, it turns out that he

will go home empty-handed,

and will have earned nothing. His labor on the provider’s portion would therefore have been performed for free, on account of the fact that the provider lent him the other half, and this involves the prohibition of interest.

Rather, Shmuel said:

He fixes a dinar for him

as compensation, so that the manager has compensation whether he profits or does not profit.

And we challenge this:

A

did

Rav maintain

that

one does not fix a dinar for him,

but that it is sufficient for him to receive compensation whose payment depends on whether he profits?

But Rav said:

If a person gives a calf to another to fatten, and they divide the profit equally, the manager receives as his compensation

the head of the calf for fattening.

The one who fattens the calf receives its head as compensation for his effort, in addition to half the profit.

Is it not

a case

where he said to him,

the provider saying to the manager,

“The excess over one-third will be your compensation,”

and since it is uncertain that he will receive any compensation, he must give him the entire head of the calf as compensation, in the event that the animal does not appreciate by more than one-third, so that he will have certain compensation? This proves that Rav maintained that a dinar must be fixed for him.

And we answer:

No,

Rav did not speak of such a case.

Rather, it is a case

where he said to him,

the provider saying to the one who fattens the calf: You have the choice between two forms of payment for your effort:

either

your compensation will be

“the excess over one-third.”

In such a case it is uncertain that you will have any compensation.

Or

your compensation will be

“the head of the calf for fattening.”

In this case your compensation is certain and fixed, for even if the animal does not appreciate by one-third, you will receive the head of the calf in any event.

It follows that according to Rav, it is not necessary to give the manager certain compensation; it is sufficient to give him even uncertain compensation in order to avoid the prohibition of interest.

Alternatively,

actually, one must pay the manager certain compensation, and this is what Rav said: that one must give him the head of the calf as compensation for fattening it.

And

when Rav said

that even uncertain compensation, namely

“the excess over one-third will be your compensation,” is permitted, it is in a case where he has an animal

of his own, which he must tend even without this iska. There is no additional effort involved in tending an additional animal.

As people say: “Mix feed for one ox,

the effort involved in mixing barley before one ox,

mix feed for two oxen,”

and one can mix it for two oxen without additional effort.

Rabbi Elazar of Haronia purchased

an

animal,

but did not wish to tend it himself; rather, he wished to give it to another person who would tend it as an iska.

And he gave it to his sharecropper

as an iska: the sharecropper would fatten it, and they would divide the appreciation between them.

He fattened it,

the sharecropper fattened it,

and he gave him its head as his compensation,

giving the sharecropper the entire head of the animal as compensation for the effort he invested in Rabbi Elazar’s portion of the deposit.

And

likewise he

gave

Rabbi Elazar gave

half the profit

to the sharecropper, since half the animal was in his possession as a loan, and the profit from it was due to him as though the animal had belonged to the sharecropper.

The sharecropper’s wife wanted him to earn more.

His wife said to him,

the sharecropper’s wife said to her husband:

“If you had become a partner with him,

if you had joined Rabbi Elazar in purchasing the animal, and half the animal had belonged to you in full ownership as a partner, rather than as a loan,

he would also give you

Rabbi Elazar

the entire tail,”

as your share.

The sharecropper went

and

purchased an animal together with him,

buying another animal with Rabbi Elazar in a full partnership. The sharecropper tended both his own portion and Rabbi Elazar’s portion. When they came to divide the profits,

he divided with him

Rabbi Elazar

from the tail,

just as they had divided the entire animal.

He said to him,

Rabbi Elazar said to him:

“Come, let us divide the head,”

and you will take the portion due to you, namely half the head.

He said to him,

the sharecropper said to him:

“Now, I do not even have what I had at first!”

It turns out that now, when I became a partner in the animal, my compensation has become worse than what I previously had, when I received merely an iska.

He said to him,

Rabbi Elazar said to him: It is true that now I need not pay you compensation even as I did initially.

Because

until now, the money

of the deposit portion

belonged to me,

and you were tending my money.

If I had not given you a little extra

beyond the share of the profits due to you by virtue of your loan, it would have appeared that you were tending my deposit portion in exchange for my having lent you the money, and this would be prohibited because it

appears to be interest.

But

now,

when you joined me in purchasing the animal, there is no loan here at all, and there is no concern about interest; rather,

we are partners.

As for your saying, “I perform a little more labor,”

you are entitled to compensation for tending your half while bringing in and taking out the animal together with your own half, as is the law for every laborer; I need not pay you even this small amount of compensation, since you are my sharecropper in my fields.

And as

people say: “An ordinary sharecropper subjugates himself to the owner of the land to bring him fodder,”

and just as an ordinary sharecropper brings fodder for the sheep for free, so here I need not pay you the small amount of compensation for the additional effort you perform on my portion.

The Sages taught:

A person who received money from another to manage it: Until when does the iska between them remain in force?

One who gives an animal to his fellow,

so that he will manage it and the manager will receive half the profits, and will likewise bear half the responsibility,

until when is he obligated to tend it,

and cannot say to the provider, “I no longer wish to manage it”?

Sumakhos says: For donkeys, eighteen months; for small livestock,

which are smaller animals and require more care,

twenty-four months.

And if

the manager

comes to divide before his term,

when eighteen or twenty-four months have not yet passed,

his partner prevents him

from dividing until the term arrives.

But the care required during one year

the first

is not comparable to the care required during another year.

And we challenge this:

What is the meaning of the “but” that he says!?

On the contrary, this is the reason the owner of the animal prevents the manager from dividing. The word “but” implies that the previous ruling is being qualified.

And we answer:

Rather,

the reason for the ruling that the manager cannot terminate the iska before the end of its term is

because the care required during one year

the first

is not comparable to the care required during another year.

Since the local practice is that recipients tend the animals until this time, he cannot terminate the arrangement earlier.

It was taught in another beraita:

The question of how long one is obligated to manage the animal does not concern the animal itself that he received, but rather the offspring born from it, as we learned:

One who gives an animal to his fellow

and it gives birth,

until when is he obligated

the manager

to tend the offspring,

since half the offspring belongs to the provider of the iska as profits from the deposit portion, while the recipient does not wish to manage this half, from which he derives no profit at all.

For small animals, thirty days, and for large animals, fifty days,

just as we found that the Torah required the Israelite to tend to the firstborn before handing it over to the priest, so too, the tending for thirty days and fifty days is part of the transaction before he hands the offspring over to the owners.

Rabbi Yosei says: For small animals, three months, because tending to them is more extensive.

And the Gemara asks:

What is meant by “tending to them is more extensive”?

Because their teeth are delicate,

and they do not know how to eat on their own; they require their mother and a person to tend to them.

From this point onward,

once the period during which he was required to tend to the offspring on behalf of the giver has passed,

the one engaged in the transaction takes

the offspring for himself,

half of his share,

since half is due to him, as he earned it from the half of the loan that was part of the transaction,

and half of the other half on behalf of his partner.

He receives an additional quarter, which is half of his partner’s share, because we regard the portion belonging to his partner, with which he is now engaged beyond the period of the original transaction, as a new transaction; therefore, the owner’s half is divided, with one quarter going to the person engaged in the transaction and one quarter to the owner.

Rav Menashya bar Gada

was engaged in a transaction involving an animal, and it gave birth to offspring.

He took,

i.e., he took

half of his share

of the profits that came from the offspring. Since half of the animal was a loan, the person engaged in the transaction was entitled to half of the offspring as the profits of the loan, and in addition,

half of the other half on behalf of his partner,

he took another quarter from the half that was the owner’s deposit and had generated profit, since he was now engaged with this half belonging to the owner as part of a transaction, and he was entitled to one quarter, while his partner was entitled to the other quarter.

He came before Abaye

to ascertain whether he had acted properly.

He said to him,

Abaye said to him:

Who apportioned it for you!?

Since you apportioned it yourself without an appraisal—and perhaps your partner was entitled to a larger share—the appraisal is invalid, and the transaction involving the original animal continues; consequently, he is entitled to only half of the offspring and, as for the profits from the offspring, only the amount due to him according to the arrangement governing the animal transaction.

And another

reason why you are not entitled to more than half of the profits is that

it is a place where the custom is to raise them, and we learned: In a place where the custom is to raise them, they shall raise them.

The time for apportionment has not yet arrived at all, since under the terms of the previous transaction you are still required to raise the offspring.

There was an incident involving

two Samaritans,

i.e., Cuthites,

who entered into a transaction

in partnership

with each other.

One of them went,

as one of them wished to terminate their partnership.

He divided the money,

dividing the partnership funds into two

without his partner’s knowledge,

and took half the money for himself.

They came before Rav Pappa,

so that he could rule for them whether the division was invalid, since it had been carried out without the partner’s knowledge, or whether it was valid.

He said to him,

Rav Pappa said to the one who challenged the division:

What difference does it make to you

that your partner divided it alone? After all,

this is what Rav Naḥman said: Money is considered as though it has already been divided.

Since the money itself is present, it is considered as though it has already been divided between the two of you. An appraisal is unnecessary in order to divide money [as it is with other objects]; rather, each of the partners may take his money without the need for an appraisal.

The following year

they again entered into a partnership transaction, and

bought wine

they both purchased wine

with each other,

as partners, in order to sell it at a higher price.

The other one arose,

the one who, the previous year, had challenged before Rav Pappa the division of the partnership without an appraisal, and now no longer wished to continue the partnership in the wine.

He divided it for him,

dividing the wine into two,

without his partner’s knowledge.

They came

again

before Rav Pappa

for judgment, with the one who had divided the money the previous year now challenging the division of the wine without an appraisal.

He said to him,

Rav Pappa said to the one who had divided the wine for himself:

Who apportioned it for you!?

Who was the authority who apportioned the wine for you? Perhaps your appraisal was not proper, and it is therefore invalid.

He said to him,

the same partner who had now divided the wine, although in the previous year he had challenged such a division:

I see

that

you are following his lead

against me!

I have realized that you always rule in favor of the person opposing me. Since you have already ruled in his favor twice—last year, when he divided the money alone, you ruled that his division was valid, whereas this year, when I divided the wine alone, you ruled that he was in the right and that my division was invalid.