Bava Metzia 68b (סח:) — the Talmud in English

:

And we explain: Abaye said: Like the wages of an idle laborer from that particular type of work from which he is idle.

They assess how much a person engaged in difficult work, such as a carpenter, who earns a great deal from his work, would be willing to accept in order to work at an easier occupation, which yields less profit, such as a shopkeeper. That is what his wage will be.

And it is necessary.

The Mishna needed to state all the other cases as well.

For had the Mishna stated only the case of a shopkeeper, one might have said that only

a shopkeeper is adequately compensated

by his wage

as an idle laborer,

that is, only in the case of a shopkeeper is it sufficient to pay him the wage of an idle laborer.

Because his exertion is not great,

since, having received the produce from the one managing the investment, he can easily sell it in his shop and does not have the trouble of purchasing the produce.

But

to give

money with which to purchase produce,

when he gives the manager money so that he himself will buy produce cheaply in the marketplace and sell it piecemeal to people at a higher price,

because his exertion is great,

since the manager has considerable trouble in this matter,

say that it is not sufficient for him

it is not sufficient to pay him wages

as an idle laborer,

for with such exertion, perhaps paying him as an idle laborer is insufficient for his involvement. It would then emerge that the effort the manager expended in purchasing the produce constitutes payment for the loan, and this is interest.

And had the tanna stated only “money with which to purchase produce,”

if the tanna of the Mishna had stated only the second case, in which the manager himself purchases the produce in the marketplace and sells it in a shop,

I would say that it is only there that he requires payment as an idle laborer, because his exertion is great.

I would say that specifically in this case, where he exerted himself greatly, he must be paid as an idle laborer.

But in the case of a shopkeeper, whose exertion is not great,

since he does not have the trouble of purchasing the produce in the marketplace but receives it from the provider of the investment,

say that a mere token amount is sufficient for him,

perhaps it is sufficient to pay him only a small wage, namely,

that even if he merely dipped bread with him in brine,

that the provider allowed the manager to dip his bread in the provider’s brine,

and he ate with him only one dried fig,

or he ate a dried fig at the provider’s home,

that is his wage,

as this is sufficient to be considered payment to the manager for his work.

Therefore

it is necessary:

the tanna in the Mishna needed to state all these cases, since in each of them he must be paid for his involvement as an idle laborer.

“How much; goats; and chickens; ‘raises him’”—a mnemonic.

The Sages taught: How much is his wage

of the manager?

Whether much or little, this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Whether he pays him a great deal or a small amount, it is considered payment for his involvement with the deposit portion, and there is no prohibition of interest with regard to the loan portion received by the manager.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if he merely dipped bread with him in brine, and ate with him only one dried fig, that is his wage.

That is, Rabbi Yehuda is more lenient, maintaining that any amount of payment is sufficient. Since he dipped bread with the manager in fish brine, that is enough, as this is his wage for his involvement with the deposit.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: He gives him his full wage.

Rabbi Shimon is more stringent than all the others and maintains that he must be paid a full wage. They assess how much he wishes to receive in order to cease the difficult work in which he had been engaged and engage in this easier work; that will constitute his wage for his work.

The Sages taught: One does not assess

the value of animals so that the manager will raise them for another and receive half the profits as his wage, while likewise bearing responsibility for half the losses,

neither goats, nor ewes, nor anything that does not work and eat [unclear: the final wording is corrupted].

Because in all these cases the manager derives no benefit, since one cannot plow with a goat or load a ewe with a burden. It follows that if they divide the profits equally, without an additional wage for the manager, the manager is working with the provider’s deposit portion in exchange for the loan, and this involves the prohibition of interest.

But in the case of a cow or a donkey, it is permitted to give them to a manager for half the profits even without any additional wage for the manager, since the manager receives compensation [for his labor and feeding, with which he toiled for the deposit portion] by being able to plow with the cow in his fields and load his burden onto the donkey. This is the view of the first tanna.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One assesses goats

in order to divide the profits, and there is no concern that he is working with another’s property for free in exchange for the loan, because the manager receives compensation for his labor and feeding in that the goats

“give milk,”

as the milk drawn from them goes to the manager.

and

ewes as well

may be assessed in an investment, in order to divide the profits and losses,

because they “are sheared,”

as the wool from their shearing belongs to the manager,

“wash themselves,”

in the river, and the water removes wool from them, which the manager takes,

and “pluck”

their wool as they pass among the thorns, and this wool goes to the manager as compensation for his labor and feeding.

and also

a hen

may be assessed in order to divide the profits from raising it and the losses,

because it produces

eggs and chicks,

and eats,

and the eggs and chicks thereby go to the manager as compensation for his labor and feeding with regard to the deposit portion.

:

And what of the first tanna,

who said that one may not assess goats and ewes, since the manager has no profit from his work with them?

Is it that

shearing and milk,

which the manager takes for himself,

are not sufficient

are insufficient

as payment for his labor and feeding?

Surely, taking the wool and milk is certainly sufficient to be considered payment to the manager for his labor and for the food he provided to the animals!

And we explain: If the manager receives his wage

through the wool and milk

of the goats,

everyone agrees

that this is proper compensation to the manager for his labor and feeding with regard to the deposit portion, and there is no prohibition of interest concerning the loan portion in his possession.

When they disagree

the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is in a case where the herder receives only a small wage,

through whey,

which is the liquid waste of milk,

and through the wool that falls off,

which is the washing and plucking of the ewes.

The first tanna follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who says that the owner gives him

the manager

his full wage,

as they assess how much a person wishes to receive in order to cease his previous work and engage in this work. Therefore, this payment of taking the waste of the milk or the wool that falls off is insufficient to be considered payment for his labor with the owner’s deposit portion.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, follows the view of his father,

Rabbi Yehuda,

who says: Even if the manager merely dipped bread with him

the manager

in brine

of the provider of the investment,

and ate with him only one dried fig, that is his wage.

It is not necessary to pay him a wage according to his work; rather, any amount is considered payment for his work. In their view, taking the milk waste and the wool that falls off can be considered payment for his work.

The Sages taught: A woman may “rent out” a hen to another woman

that she owns. That is, the owner of the hen says specifically in the language of rental to the owner of the eggs: “Give me eggs, and I will set my hen on them and raise chicks for you from your eggs, and my wage for my work raising chicks from your eggs will be”

two chicks

per year. Since the arrangement is made in the language of rental, the owner of the hen bears no responsibility whatsoever for the eggs, and this is not a loan; consequently, there is no concern about the prohibition of interest.

But

if a woman said to another woman

in the language of an investment partnership: “Come, let us enter into an investment and divide the profits and losses. I will bring

my hen,

and you will bring

your eggs.

I will set my hen on your eggs and raise the chicks, and I will likewise accept responsibility for half the value of the eggs,

and I,

the owner of the hen,

and you,

the owner of the eggs,

will divide the chicks.

Rabbi Yehuda permits

this arrangement, even though it is formulated as an investment and division, and there is a loan portion here. There is concern that she is working with her partner’s half in exchange for receiving half the eggs as a loan, from which she will profit; nevertheless, this does not involve the prohibition of interest.

But

Rabbi Shimon prohibits.

Since he follows his own view that the manager must be paid a full wage for his work with his partner’s portion; otherwise, this involves interest on the loan portion.

:

and

does Rabbi Yehuda not require

it is not necessary, in his view, for the provider of the investment to pay the manager

for his labor and feeding,

for the work he performed with his partner’s deposit portion!?

:

There is

something the manager receives as payment for his labor,

defective eggs,

which do not develop into chicks and are permitted for eating.

And Rabbi Yehuda follows his own view that it is sufficient to give the manager any amount as payment, and consequently there is no longer concern about interest.

The Sages taught:

If people enter into an arrangement to raise calves and young foals, in which one raises them for the other and they divide both responsibility and profit, the half from which the manager profits is a loan, while the half from which the owner of the calves profits is a deposit. The manager may not toil for free with the deposit portion, because of the prohibition of interest.

In a place where it is customary

to add a wage for “shouldering” to money invested in livestock,

where they were accustomed to add [pay] money as a wage to the manager of young calves [in addition to the half of the profit due to him] for his work of “shouldering,” that is, for the trouble of carrying the young calves on his shoulder,

they add

the shoulder wage for him

and they may not deviate from the custom of the country.

And even in a case where the calf’s mother is also included in the investment, so that for the most part the calf follows its mother on its own and the manager need not trouble himself to carry it on his shoulder, and he is not entitled to a shoulder wage, nevertheless, since there are occasional times when he does need to exert himself and carry the calf on his shoulder, he must be paid a shoulder wage. If he is not paid this wage, there is concern about interest, since he is exerting himself for free. This is the view of the first tanna.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

With small calves, one may be lenient, and there is no need to pay the manager a porter’s wage. Therefore,

the valuation of a small calf

included in the partnership

is made together with its mother, and a foal

small

together with its mother.

Since there is no exertion involved in taking them out and bringing them in on one’s shoulder, as it is the nature of a small calf or foal to follow its mother. Likewise, there is no need to pay the manager for the expenses of feeding the calf, because the calf’s mother feeds and eats, and this is considered payment of his wage.

And even in a place where it is customary

that, if one accepts an animal for raising without its mother, their practice was

to add a porter’s wage to the principal,

for the exertion involved in taking it out, nevertheless, when its mother is included with it in the partnership, one does not pay a porter’s wage, since the calf follows its mother on its own.

And we raise an objection:

But

if

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, does he not require

one to pay the manager

a wage for his labor and sustenance,

as even when it is with its mother, there are times when he must exert himself with the small calf or foal?

And we answer:

There is dung,

which the recipient acquires, and through it the investor is exempt from paying the manager a wage for his exertion with the calves.

But the other one,

the first tanna, who holds that one must pay a wage for the exertion involved in taking them out, and that it is insufficient to rely on the dung, holds that

dung

is something that the owners ordinarily

relinquish ownership of,

because of its lack of importance, and the recipient’s acquisition of it is not considered payment of a wage.

Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that even if the manager dipped with the investor only in brine, he thereby received his wage for his exertion with regard to the investor’s share.

And the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda,

who stated, with regard to the waste of milk and the shearing of wool, that the manager received his wage through them.

And the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

who holds that one who manages a calf together with its mother receives the dung as payment for the times when he must carry the calf on his shoulder.

And all of them share one approach: it is sufficient to pay the manager any amount of wage in order to avoid the prohibition of interest.

Their disagreement concerns a case in which the investor comes to pay the manager a wage as a laborer for his work each day. Therefore, one must assess how much he would previously have earned and how much sustenance he receives, each according to his approach.

This assessment is payment for the work he performed with his fellow’s deposit share.

There is, however, another way to pay the manager a wage: the manager receives an additional share of the profit in the partnership, beyond what he would have received according to the loan share.

This additional profit is the wage for his work, and it renders him one who works with his fellow’s deposit share for a wage.

Without this additional wage, the work he performs with his fellow’s deposit share in return for the loan he received would be considered interest.

There was an incident involving

the sons of Rav Ilai,

whose father had received money to manage.

There emerged against them

there came upon them

a certain document, in which it was written

in the wording of the document:

“Half in profit and half in loss.”

This wording appeared to indicate that Rav Ilai had received the partnership half as a loan and half as a deposit. Therefore, Rav Ilai bore responsibility for half the loan, and he was also entitled to half the profits, since the money was a loan in his possession.

It must be considered that Rav Ilai was working with half of the investor’s deposit as his wage for the investor’s having lent him the other half; but how could this be possible?

Rava said:

There is no concern about interest in this document, since

Rav Ilai was a great man,

and he would not feed people something forbidden.

He would not cause people to transgress a prohibition.

Since it is clear to us that he would not feed the investor in the partnership something forbidden due to interest, we must interpret the wording of the document as follows:

In either event, if

Rav Ilai wanted the profits to be divided in such a manner that the investor would receive

half the profit,

then the investor would assume

two-thirds of the loss.

Since the investor bore responsibility for two-thirds, Rav Ilai was left with responsibility for only one-third. Consequently, only one-third was defined as a loan in his possession. And since Rav Ilai’s wage was half the profits, the additional sixth that he received beyond what was due to him for his share was his wage for working with his fellow’s two-thirds deposit share.