Bava Metzia 68b — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Abaye said: Like the wage of an idle laborer from that same work from which he is idle.

They assess how much a person engaged in difficult work, such as a carpenter, who earns much from his work, is willing to settle for in order to work at lighter work, which has less profit, such as a shopkeeper. And this will be his wage.

And it is necessary.

The Mishna needed to state all the additional cases as well.

For if the Mishna had stated only the case of a shopkeeper, it could have been said that only

a shopkeeper is sufficient for him

with his wage

like an idle laborer;

specifically a shopkeeper is sufficient to pay him a wage like an idle laborer.

Because his toil is not great,

since, after he received the produce from the managing partner, he can easily sell it in the shop, and he has no toil in purchasing the produce.

But

to give

money with which to purchase produce,

when he gives the managing partner money so that he himself will purchase the produce cheaply from the market and sell it to people little by little at a higher price,

for his toil is great,

as the managing partner has much exertion in the matter,

say that it is not sufficient for him,

it is not sufficient to pay him a wage

like an idle laborer,

because with such exertion, perhaps it is not sufficient to pay for his engagement like an idle laborer; and it follows that what the managing partner toiled in purchasing the produce is payment for the loan, and this is interest.

And if the tan[n]a had stated: “money with which to purchase produce,”

if the tan[n]a in the Mishna had stated only the second case, in which the managing partner himself purchases the produce in the market and sells it in the shop,

I would have said: There, he requires [payment] like an idle laborer, because his toil is great.

I would have said that specifically in this case, in which he toiled much, he must be paid like an idle laborer.

But a shopkeeper, whose toil is not great,

who has no toil in purchasing the produce in the market, but receives it from the giver of the business arrangement,

say that something entirely minimal is sufficient for him,

perhaps it is sufficient to pay him only a small wage, namely,

that even if he did not dip with him except in brine,

that the giver permitted the managing partner to dip his bread in the giver’s brine,

and he ate with him only one dried fig,

or he ate a dried fig at the giver’s house,

this is his wage,

with this it is sufficient for it to be considered payment to the managing partner for his work.

Therefore

it is necessary;

the tan[n]a in the Mishna needed to state all these cases, for in each one of them he must be paid for his engagement like an idle laborer.

How much, goats, and chickens, from him, a mnemonic.

The Sages taught: How much is his wage

of the managing partner?

Whether much or little, these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Whether he pays him much or little, the matter is considered payment of a wage for his engagement with half of the deposit, and there is no prohibition of interest concerning the half of the loan that the managing partner received.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if he did not dip with him except in brine, and he ate with him only one dried fig, this is his wage.

And this means that Rabbi Yehuda is more lenient, for any amount of payment is sufficient. And since he dipped with the managing partner in fish brine, that is enough, for this is his wage for his engagement with the deposit.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: He gives him his full wage.

Rabbi Shimon is more stringent than all of them, and maintains that a complete wage must be paid to him. They assess how much he wishes to take in order to cease from the difficult work in which he had been engaged and engage in this lighter work, and through this it will be his wage for his work.

The Sages taught: They do not assess

the value of animals, so that the managing partner should raise them for his fellow and receive as his wage half the profits, and likewise bear responsibility for half the losses,

not the goats, nor the ewes, nor anything that does not work and eat, for half.

Because in all these the managing partner has no benefit, for it is impossible for him to plow with a goat or load a ewe with a burden. And it follows that if they divide the profit equally, without there being an additional wage for the managing partner, the managing partner is found to be working with the giver’s deposit portion as payment for the loan, and there is a prohibition of interest in this.

But a cow or a donkey may be given to a managing partner for half the profit, even without any additional wage for the managing partner, since there is payment for the managing partner for his labor and food, with which he toiled for the deposit portion: he can plow with the cow in his fields and load the donkey with his burden. This is the view of the first tanna.

Rabbi Yosei the son of Rabbi Yehuda says: They do assess the goats

in order to divide the profits, and there is no concern that he is working with his fellow’s property for free as payment for the loan, because the managing partner has payment for his labor and food in that

they “give milk,”

for the milk that is milked from them comes to the managing partner.

And

also

the ewes

may be assessed in a business arrangement, in order to divide the profit and the loss,

because they “are shorn,”

for the wool from their shearing belongs to the managing partner,

and they “wash themselves,”

in the river, and the water removes things from their wool, and the managing partner takes them,

and they “pluck themselves,”

their wool when they pass among the thorns, and this wool comes to the managing partner as payment for his labor and food.

And

also

the hen

may be assessed in order to divide the profit from raising it and the loss,

because it produces

eggs and chicks

and eats,

and the eggs and chicks come to the managing partner as payment for his labor and food from the deposit portion.

And we raise an objection:

And the first tanna,

who said that one may not assess goats and ewes, since the managing partner has no profit from them for his work—

is it the case that

the shearing and the milk

which the managing partner takes for himself

are not sufficient

and

for the wage of his labor and food!?

Surely taking the shearing and the milk certainly suffices for it to be considered the giving of a wage to the managing partner for his labor and for the food that he supplied to the animals!

And we answer: If the managing partner receives his wage

through the shearing and milk

of the goats,

everyone agrees

that there is proper payment here to the managing partner for his labor and food in the deposit portion, and there is no prohibition of interest concerning the loan portion in his possession.

They disagree

the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei the son of Rabbi Yehuda, in a case where the shepherd receives a small wage,

through whey,

which is the waste-water of the milk,

and through the washings,

which are the washing and plucking of the ewes.

The first tanna holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai, who says: “He gives him

the owner of the house to the managing partner

his full wage,”

for they assess how much a person wishes to take in order to cease from his previous work and engage in this work. Therefore this wage of taking the waste-water of the milk or plucking the wool is not sufficient to be considered payment for his toil in the owner’s deposit portion.

Rabbi Yosei the son of Rabbi Yehuda holds in accordance with his father,

Rabbi Yehuda,

who says: “Even if he did not dip with him

the managing partner

in brine

of the giver of the business arrangement,

and he ate with him only one dried fig, this is his wage.”

And it is not necessary to pay him a wage according to his work; rather, any amount is considered payment for his work. And taking the waste-water of the milk and plucking the wool can, in their view, be considered payment for his work.

The Sages taught: A woman may “rent out” a hen to her fellow

that she has. That is, the owner of the hen says specifically in the language of rental to the owner of the eggs: Give me eggs, and I will seat my hen upon them and raise chicks for you from your eggs, and my wage for my work in raising chicks from your eggs will be

two chicks

per year. And since the matter was conducted in the language of “rental,” the owner of the hen bears no responsibility whatsoever for the eggs, and there is no loan here; consequently, there is no concern about the prohibition of interest.

But

a woman who said to her fellow

in the language of a business arrangement: Come, let us make a business arrangement, and divide the profit and the loss. I will bring

my hen,

and you will bring

your eggs.

I will seat my hen upon your eggs and raise the chicks, and I will likewise accept responsibility for half the value of the eggs,

and I

the owner of the hen

and you

the owner of the eggs

will divide the chicks.

Rabbi Yehuda permits

in this manner, although it was conducted in the language of a business arrangement and division, and there is half a loan here, and there is concern that she is working with half of her fellow’s property in exchange for receiving half the eggs, which will be in her possession as a loan, and she will profit from them; nevertheless, there is no prohibition of interest in this.

But

Rabbi Shimon prohibits.

Since he follows his own position, that a full wage must be paid to the managing partner for his work with his fellow’s portion; for if not, there is a prohibition of interest concerning the loan portion.

And we raise an objection:

And

why

does Rabbi Yehuda not require

that the giver of the business arrangement pay the managing partner

the wage of his labor and food,

for what he toiled in his fellow’s deposit portion!?

And we answer:

There is

payment for his toil

in deformed eggs,

which do not develop into chicks and are permitted for eating. And Rabbi Yehuda follows his own position, that it is sufficient to give the managing partner any amount as payment, and through this there is no longer concern about interest.

And Rabbi Yehuda follows his own view that it is sufficient to give the manager any amount as payment, and consequently there is no longer concern about interest.

The Sages taught:

If they came to engage in raising calves and young foals, where one raises them for his fellow and they divide both the assumption of responsibility and the profit, the half from which the managing partner profits is a loan, and the half from which the owner of the calves profits is a deposit. And the managing partner may not toil with the deposit portion for free, because of the prohibition of interest.

In a place where the practice was

to increase the wage of a “shoulder-bearer” for money for an animal,

where they were accustomed to add [to pay] money as a wage to the person managing young calves [in addition to what he receives as half the profit], for his work as a “shoulder-bearer,” that is, for his exertion in carrying the young calves on his shoulder,

they increase

his shoulder-bearer wage

for him, and they do not deviate from the practice of the country.

And even in a place where the mother of the calf was also included in the business arrangement, so that for the most part the calf follows its mother by itself and the managing partner need not toil to carry it on his shoulder, and he is not entitled to a shoulder-bearer wage, nevertheless, since there are rare occasions when he does need to toil and carry the calf on his shoulder, he must be paid a shoulder-bearer wage. And if they do not pay him this wage, there is concern about interest, through the fact that he toils for free. This is the view of the first tanna.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

With small calves one is lenient, and there is no need to pay the business manager a shoulder-wage. Therefore,

the valuation of a small calf

included in the business arrangement

is together with its mother, and a small foal

small

is together with its mother.

Since there is no exertion in taking them out and bringing them in on one’s shoulder, because it is the nature of a small calf or foal to follow after its mother. Likewise, there is no need to pay the business manager for his expenses for the calf’s food, because the calf’s mother works and eats, and this is considered payment of wages.

And even in a place where it was customary

that if they received it to raise it without its mother, their practice was

to add a shoulder-wage to the money,

for the exertion involved in taking it out, nevertheless, in a place where its mother is included with it in the business arrangement, one does not pay a shoulder-wage, since the calf follows its mother by itself.

And we challenge:

And

if

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel does not require

that one pay the business manager

payment for his exertion and his food,

for even when it is with its mother, at times he has exertion with the small calf and foal.

And we answer:

There is dung,

which the recipient acquires, and through it the provider is exempt from paying payment for exertion to the business manager in the case of the calves.

But the other one,

the first tanna, who holds that one must pay wages for the exertion involved in taking them out, and that it is not sufficient [to pay] with dung, held that

dung,

it is the way of the owners

to declare it entirely ownerless,

because of its lack of importance, and the recipient’s acquisition of it is not considered payment of wages.

Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

that even if the business manager immersed with the provider only in brine, through this he received his wages for his exertion in the provider’s share.

And the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda,

who stated with regard to milk waste and the plucking of wool that the business manager received his wages through these.

And the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

that the business manager who has a calf with its mother receives dung as wages for the times when he must carry the calf on his shoulder.

And all of them follow one approach: it is sufficient to pay the business manager any amount of wages, in order to withdraw from the prohibition of interest.

And their dispute is concerning a situation in which the provider comes to pay the business manager wages as a hired worker for his work each day. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how much he earned previously, and how much food he receives, each according to his approach.

And this valuation is payment for what he did with the deposit portion of his fellow.

But there is another way to pay wages to the business manager: by the business manager receiving an additional share of the profit in the business arrangement, more than what would have come to him according to the loan portion.

This additional profit is the wages for his involvement with the deposit portion, and renders him one who is involved with the deposit portion of his fellow for wages.

And without the addition to the wages, it would be interest that he is involved with the deposit portion of his fellow in exchange for the loan that he received.

An incident occurred involving

the sons of Rav Ilai,

whose father had received money to manage;

there went out against them

there emerged against them

a certain document, in which it was written

in the language of the document:

one-half in profit, one-half in loss.

And from this language it appeared that Rav Ilai had received the business arrangement, half as a loan and half as a deposit. Therefore, responsibility for the half that was a loan was upon Rav Ilai, and half the profits also belonged to him, since the money was with him as a loan.

And it is necessary to consider that Rav Ilai was involved with half of the provider’s deposit as wages for the fact that the provider lent him the other half; and how is this possible?

Rava said:

There is no concern of interest in this document, since

Rav Ilai is a great man,

and he would not feed people a prohibition.

He would not cause people to transgress a prohibition.

And since it is clear to us that he would not feed the provider of the business arrangement a prohibition of interest, we must interpret the language of the document as follows:

Whatever the case, if

Rav Ilai wished the division of the profit to be in a manner that the provider would receive

one-half in profit,

in this manner the provider would accept upon himself

two-thirds in loss.

And since responsibility for two-thirds was upon the provider, responsibility for only one-third remained upon Rav Ilai. Because of this, only one-third is defined as a loan for him. And since Rav Ilai’s wages are half the profits, the additional sixth, which he receives as wages beyond what is due to him in his share, is his wages for having been involved with two-thirds of his fellow’s deposit.