Bava Metzia 67b (סז:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Ashi carried out a practical ruling concerning minor orphans

as though they were adults.

Even if he had consumed produce worth the amount of the dinar, the lender did not remove him from the mashkanta until they repaid him the debt.

Rava, son of Rav Yosef, said in the name of Rava: With regard to this mashkanta, in a place where the borrower may remove the lender

, he may not consume

the produce

except under a nikyeta arrangement.

And a Torah scholar,

who must make his ways upright and sanctify himself even with regard to what is permitted to him, lest others learn from him to treat prohibitions lightly,

may not consume even under a nikyeta arrangement.

For this too appears like interest, since the borrower lowers the price of the produce he consumes for him on account of the loan. By law this is permitted, because the lender deducts a fixed amount for each year, even if the field is struck by blight and produces no fruit; therefore, it appears that he is lowering the price for him in return for assuming the uncertainty. Even though such an uncertain prospect is sold in the marketplace for a higher price, a Torah scholar must be concerned lest others learn from him to treat prohibitions lightly.

And we challenge this:

Rather,

a Torah scholar,

under what arrangement may he consume the produce?

And we answer:

Under a kitzuta arrangement.

This is preferable to a mashkanta under a nikyeta arrangement, and the Gemara below will explain what a kitzuta arrangement is.

This works well according to the one who says

below

that a kitzuta arrangement is permitted.

But according to the one who says that a kitzuta arrangement is forbidden, what can be said?

In what manner is a Torah scholar permitted to consume the produce of the mashkanta?

And we find a dispute among the amoraim as to whether a kitzuta arrangement is permitted:

As it was stated: With regard to a kitzuta arrangement, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disputed the matter. One said: A kitzuta arrangement is permitted. And one said: A kitzuta arrangement is forbidden .

The Gemara explains:

What are the circumstances of a kitzuta arrangement? It is when he says to him,

the lender to the borrower:

“For five years I will consume it without a nikyeta arrangement. From then onward, we will appraise all the produce for you,”

at its market value, and the entire amount will be deducted from the loan. This resembles a mashkanta under a nikyeta arrangement, since he deducts half the value of the produce for him; the difference is that he consumes the produce during the first five years, while the borrower consumes it during the last five years . This is preferable to a mashkanta under a nikyeta arrangement, because this is the practice of tenant farmers, and he appears to be a tenant farmer who agrees with the owner of the field that he will consume the produce during the earlier years and the owner will consume it during the later years .

There is an alternative formulation: Anything without a nikyeta arrangement is forbidden.

Rav Aḥa and Ravina did not dispute this.

But what are the circumstances of the kitzuta arrangement

about which they disputed?

It is when he says to him,

the lender to the borrower:

“For five years I will consume it under a nikyeta arrangement. From then onward, we will appraise all the produce.”

At its market value. This is preferable to a mashkanta under a nikyeta arrangement, because the lender appears to be a tenant farmer, as stated above.

The Gemara explains:

The one who forbids it in the first case,

according to the first formulation, in which the dispute concerns consuming the produce during the first five years without a nikyeta arrangement, and one opinion forbids this,

permits it in the latter case,

when the lender consumes the produce during the first five years under a nikyeta arrangement. In this manner, a Torah scholar can consume the produce.

The one who forbids it in the latter case,

according to the second formulation, in which the dispute concerns consuming the produce during the first five years under a nikyeta arrangement, and one opinion forbids this; according to him, the question returns:

In what manner is he permitted to consume the produce? —

He is permitted, because this is like the mashkanta of Sura, in which they wrote as follows: “When these years are completed, this land shall emerge without money.”

That is, in the city of Sura, it was customary to write the aforementioned wording in the mashkanta document. The meaning is that the lender takes possession of the field, and after a specified number of years he returns it to the borrower, while the borrower is not required to repay any money at all.

That is, consuming the produce constitutes the repayment, and there is no other repayment here. This is permitted according to everyone, even for a Torah scholar, because since the document specifies a deduction corresponding to the entire principal, it does not appear to be a loan; rather, he is purchasing from him the produce of those years for that amount of money .

Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, both say: With regard to this mashkanta,

in a place where the borrower may remove the lender —

a creditor does not collect from it.

In a place where the borrower may remove the lender, the lender has no ownership of the substance of the mashkanta, but only a lien on the produce. Therefore, when the lender dies and his sons inherit the mortgaged field, their father’s creditor does not collect his debt from it, as he collects from other real estate that they inherited, because this is considered movable property, and movable property belonging to orphans is not encumbered to a creditor.

And the firstborn does not take a double portion of it.

Because his father had no ownership of the substance of the field, but only a lien on the produce, and this is considered property that was expected to come to the estate, according to the one who says in tractate Bava Batra 124b that a debt owed to one’s father is considered property expected to come to the estate, and the firstborn does not take a double portion of it.

And the Sabbatical Year releases it

from the lender, and consequently the mashkanta returns to the borrower .

But in a place where the borrower may not remove the lender —

the lender has ownership of the substance of the mashkanta. Therefore, when the lender dies and his sons inherit the mortgaged field,

a creditor collects from it,

as he collects from other real estate that they inherited.

And the firstborn takes a double portion of it.

Because his father had ownership of the substance of the mashkanta, and it was property in his possession.

And the Sabbatical Year does not release it,

because a mashkanta in a place where the borrower may not remove the lender is considered a sale and not a loan .

And Mar Zutra said in the name of Rav Pappa: With regard to this mashkanta, in a place where the borrower may remove the lender,

when the borrower repays the debt to the lender,

they remove him even from the dates

that are on the mats

that have already been detached and are lying on the mats.

That is, although these dates would seemingly belong to the lender, because during the term of the mashkanta he immediately acquires every fruit that comes into existence, nevertheless, the law is not so. Rather, the borrower removes him even from dates that have already been detached. This was the stipulation between them, and it was with this understanding that the lender entered the field: If the borrower repaid him the debt, he would return all produce that he had not acquired through an act of acquisition .

And if

the lender

lifted them onto mats]

baskets [before the borrower repaid him,

he acquired them

through lifting, and he need not return them to the borrower when he repays the loan.

And according to the one who says: “If his vessels are in the domain of the seller, the buyer acquires,”

since his vessels are like his domain, and he acquires through acquisition by means of a courtyard,

even without lifting them onto mats, he acquired them

the lender, because his mats acquire the produce for him through acquisition by means of a courtyard.

The Gemara now brings additional laws concerning a mortgaged field:

This matter

is obvious,

for

in a place where the lender may be removed,

after they had concluded all the details of the loan, the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification, and did not say that he could not remove him from the field until a particular period had elapsed, and the lender had not yet given him the loan.

And

the lender said to the borrower, at the time he gave him the loan money: I am giving you this loan on the condition that

I will not withdraw

for such and such a number of years, and the borrower acknowledged this.

He has said

the lender

“I will not withdraw”!

And the borrower cannot remove him until the time they established. This is so even though the unspecified lien has already ended. Since, before the money was given, the lender explicitly said that he would not withdraw for a certain period, and the borrower acknowledged this, the borrower accepted the money on the understanding that he would not remove the lender until the time they established. The lender acquires the right not to be removed through acquisition by means of money. However, the Ramban and the Rashba explain that the lender says, “I will not withdraw,” after the money has been given, and the borrower acknowledges this and says, “Do not withdraw.” This is effective without an act of acquisition, because the lender is holding the field, and through speech alone the borrower can transfer to him his right. The Ritva adds an explanation, and this is his language: He acquires it because he is already within the field and holds it at all times; it is as though he said to him, “Take possession and acquire,” and land is acquired through possession. But in a place where the lender may not be removed, and he says, “I will withdraw,” the lender is stipulating for the borrower’s benefit, while the borrower does not hold the field. How can he acquire the right to remove the lender without an act of acquisition? The Ramban offers another reason: When the lender says, “I will not withdraw,” after the money has been given, this is effective without an act of acquisition because, when the borrower mortgages his field to the lender, it is as though he says to him, “Acquire my field for its produce until a specified time.” In a place where it is customary to remove the lender during that period, or where this was stipulated, the meaning is that the borrower reserves for himself the right to remove him. Therefore, through speech alone he can waive his right. But in a place where the lender may not be removed, when he says, “I will withdraw,” since the lender acquired the field until his appointed time, how can the borrower acquire through speech the right to remove him? Therefore, in this case an act of acquisition is necessary.

Therefore, this matter is obvious.

However,

the matter that is subject to doubt is

in a place where the lender may not be removed,

where the lender is not removed from the field even when he has consumed produce equivalent in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period established for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification, but had not yet received the loan.

And

the lender said to the borrower, at the time he gave him the loan: I do not follow the practice of this place. Rather, I lend you the money on the understanding that

I will withdraw,

that I will withdraw from eating the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have eaten from it is equivalent to the entire debt.

What is the halakha?

Does he

need to acquire from him,

to make an act of acquisition between them concerning the lender’s waiver of his right to eat the produce until the end of the mortgage period, so that without an act of acquisition the lender can retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local practice, and his right does not lapse through speech alone?

Or not,

is it unnecessary to perform an act of acquisition for this, because speech alone can also terminate the lender’s right under the mortgage to eat the produce until the end of the mortgage period?

Rav Pappa said: He does not need to acquire from him. It could be said that in a place where the lender may not be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, here the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to be repaid from the debt now.” But if the debt is terminated, the lender’s power over the field is also terminated, because all his power over the field derives from the continued existence of the debt; therefore waiver of the mortgage is relevant. However, it appears from the Ritva that this is not his view. Earlier, in his commentary on “And if he lifted them onto mats,” the Ritva writes: We learn that although, with regard to an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws his debt into the lender’s hand he is absolved from his debt, if he does this with regard to a mortgage in a place where the lender may not be removed, the lender does not lose the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would have the status of places where the lender may be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he does not write that in a place where the lender may not be removed the borrower is not absolved from his debt, but rather that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is indeed repaid; and if an unavoidable accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from repayment. It is only that this does not cause the lender to withdraw from eating the produce. If we force the Ritva’s language to mean otherwise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily resolved. Regarding the fundamental issue—whether, in a place where the lender may not be removed, the mortgage ends automatically when the debt ends—one must consider the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in tractate Ketubot, according to which those who hold that the lender may not be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by the mortgage is also for the lender’s benefit, since the lender eats the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, as in a place where the lender may be removed. Apparently, this is also what is indicated in Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat, section 74, subsection 3; this requires clarification.

Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification.

Rav Sheshet son of Rav Idi said: He must acquire from him.

And the halakha is: He must acquire from him.

The Gemara brings another halakha:

He said

a borrower to a lender in a place where the lender may be removed:

I will go and bring

I wish to go and bring

money

that is available to me in a certain place, and I will repay you; from now on, do not eat any more produce.

The law is that from now on the lender

may not eat

because the borrower is already about to repay him. b. The Beit Yosef, section 172, folio 18, cites the students of the Rashba: According to Rashi, even with regard to a mortgage that does not involve the prohibition of interest—for example, according to the opinion that permits a mortgage with a deduction in a place where the lender may be removed—if the borrower says, “I will go and bring money,” the lender may not eat. The Bach disputes this; see there. This is also the opinion of the Ramban, who establishes that the Gemara is discussing a permitted mortgage. But the Rashba disagrees and maintains that, with a mortgage that does not involve the prohibition of interest, even if the borrower says, “I will go and bring money,” he cannot remove the lender until he actually repays him. The Rashba asks: If the case involves an arrangement constituting the dust of interest, how can it say that Ravina said, “He may eat,” since it is forbidden for the lender to eat on account of interest? Therefore, he explains that the Gemara is discussing a place where the lender may be removed and a mortgage with a deduction. In such a case, according to Ravina there is no prohibition of interest, as will be written below: “Ravina eats with a deduction.” However, the borrower did not write for him, “Eat with a deduction for as long as this mortgage remains in your possession.” The period established for repayment passed, and the lender continued eating with a deduction as he had initially eaten. This is permitted because, although the appointed time passed, the lender’s acquisition under the mortgage did not lapse; it is similar to a sale permitting him to eat with a deduction until the borrower redeems the field or protests and tells him to stop eating. Therefore, when the borrower says to the lender, “Your money is certainly available to me; I will go and bring it to you,” he may not eat. The borrower’s intention is certainly to protest and require him to stop eating, and he may protest even though he has not yet actually repaid the money, since the established time has passed. But when he says to him, “I will exert myself and bring you the money,” Ravina holds that this is not a clear protest, and therefore the lender may continue eating with a deduction; Mar Zutra holds that this is considered a protest, and therefore the lender stops eating. This is cited by the Nimukei Yosef, and the בעל התרומות writes likewise, in the name of the Raavad. See below, letter v, concerning whether the protest must be made before a court. The Beit Yosef, folio 16, in the entry beginning “It is written in the Nimukei Yosef,” writes that the Rashba here follows his position stated earlier, cited in note 9: A mortgage in a place where the lender may not be removed retains that status even when the repayment date arrives, because every mortgage, although its term has passed, does not lose the lender’s acquisition under it. The Rosh, who holds above that when the time arrives his acquisition lapses, would apparently also hold here that once the time arrives the lender may not continue eating with a deduction unless it was written in the mortgage document that he may eat its produce even after the time. If he holds like Rashi, on folio 64b, that wherever one eats produce conditionally there is no prohibition of interest, then here too it is permitted. Earlier, in section 16, two opinions are cited concerning this. c. The Rif omits this passage. The Ramban explains that the passage follows the opinion that permits eating with a deduction in a place where the lender may be removed, whereas the Rif rules according to the opinion that prohibits it. The Ramban derives from this that in a place where the lender may be removed, if a person transgressed and mortgaged his field, and later the borrower came to court and said, “I do not want him to continue eating the produce of my field as interest; when I have money I will repay him,” the lender is removed from the produce. The reason is discussed in letter v. Otherwise, the Rif should have cited the passage, since it would have practical legal relevance when a person transgressed and mortgaged his field. But if the lender is removed, the passage has no practical legal relevance, because if the borrower tells him to stop eating the produce, the lender is removed even when the borrower has no money with which to repay him. Apparently, according to the Rashba’s interpretation—that the dispute between Ravina and Mar Zutra concerns whether “I will exert myself and bring the money” constitutes a protest—the Rif should have cited the passage; this requires consideration. Earlier, the Rashba sought to explain that the case concerns one who transgressed and mortgaged his field, and that the dispute is whether this constitutes a protest. Examine this carefully. d. The Ramban is uncertain: If the borrower says to the lender, “I do not want you to continue eating my produce as interest,” and the lender continues eating, is he liable to pay the value of the produce as a robber, or not? According to his explanation of the Rif’s omission, it is proven that if the lender ate the produce, he must pay; otherwise, the passage would still have practical legal relevance concerning whether he must pay after eating. This is also the straightforward position of the Rashba and the Ritva, above, in the entry beginning “If he ate more.” e. The Ramban writes that when the borrower says, “I do not want you to continue eating my produce as interest,” and the lender is removed, the court arranges matters for him and collects the borrower’s debt for the lender, as with any creditor. This means that the court immediately collects the debt from the borrower. The reason is written by the Ritva, above, in the entry beginning “If he ate more,” and cited in Bedek HaBayit here: “They compel him to repay immediately, because he established a time only on the understanding that he would eat the produce.” f. The Shakh, in section 172, subsection 15, writes in the name of the students of the Rashba that the early authorities disputed whether the borrower must protest before the lender so that he will no longer eat his produce as interest specifically before a court, and only in that case is the lender removed from the produce, or whether he may protest even outside a court. But the Havot Da'at, in subsection 6, disagrees and maintains that where it is forbidden for the lender to eat the produce, it is entirely implausible that a court is necessary. Interest exists only when the payment is made willingly; here, when the borrower protests even outside a court, this is not interest but robbery. The students of the Rashba are discussing the case as the Rashba explains our passage: The borrower did not write for him, “Eat with a deduction for as long as this mortgage remains in your possession,” the repayment time passed, and the lender may continue eating with a deduction as long as the borrower does not protest. g. The Ramban further writes that in a place where the lender may not be removed, even if the borrower protests that the lender should no longer eat interest, it is impossible to remove the lender entirely from eating the produce. The Shakh, in section 172, subsection 17, writes that the opinion of the Raavad and the Rashba is that, before the time of removal, the borrower cannot protest; even if he protests, the lender continues eating the produce as before the protest. The Havot Da'at, in subsection 7, is astonished at the Shakh, saying that he did not find this in the words of the Raavad and the Rashba. Apparently, the novellae of the Rashba explicitly indicate the opposite of what the Shakh writes in his name: The Rashba held that the passage should be established in a place where the lender may not be removed and where there is no deduction, which constitutes the dust of interest. If the borrower says, “I do not want you to eat my produce as interest,” everyone agrees that the lender may not eat it; and if he eats it, this is robbery. It is thus clear that the Rashba is more stringent than the Ramban and holds that the lender is removed entirely from eating the produce. The Shakh and the Havot Da'at saw the Rashba’s words in the Nimukei Yosef, where a section is missing.

And if the borrower has no money available elsewhere, but says to the lender:

I will go and make the effort,

and bring the money

and repay you; from now on, do not eat any more produce.

The amoraim dispute whether in this case too the lender stops eating the produce immediately:

Ravina said: He may eat.

And Mar Zutra son of Rav Mari said: He may not eat.

And the halakha is: He may not eat.

Rav Kahana, Rav Pappa, and Rav Ashi did not eat

the produce of the mortgage, even

with a deduction.

Ravina ate with a deduction. a. The approach of the Rif and the Ramban is that this concerns every mortgage with a deduction. Rav Kahana, Rav Pappa, and Rav Ashi hold that it is forbidden to eat with a deduction, as the Gemara will state shortly: “And the one who prohibits will say to you,” etc. The Ramban adds that since the statement says simply, “They did not eat with a deduction,” and does not say that this applies only in a place where the lender may be removed, it follows that they prohibit it even in a place where the lender may not be removed. Ravina permits it initially even in a place where the lender may be removed, and disputes Rava at the beginning of the page, who says: “A Torah scholar should not eat even with a deduction.” b. Tosafot cite the words of Rabbenu Tam, who disagrees with the Ramban on one point. He holds that Ravina does not dispute Rava, and also holds that a Torah scholar should not eat with a deduction. Ravina ate only because he did not wish to assume the title and present himself as a Torah scholar. c. The Rashba cites the approach of the Raavad, and the Rosh likewise cites the approach of Tosafot: Rav Kahana, Rav Pappa, and Rav Ashi did not prohibit eating with a deduction; rather, they were stringent with themselves in accordance with the rule applying to a Torah scholar. They derive this from the wording of the Gemara, which says “They did not eat,” rather than “They prohibited.” The Rashba writes that according to this approach, the statement below, “And the one who prohibits,” does not mean that it is prohibited for everyone, but that they prohibited it for themselves and for every Torah scholar like them. He further writes that some texts do not read “the one who prohibits,” but rather “the one who does not eat”; this is also the reading of the Rosh. The Rashba raises a difficulty against this approach: Why does the Gemara not mention Rava together with the amoraim who prohibit a Torah scholar from eating with a deduction? Apparently, according to this approach, the entire dispute concerns whether it is permitted for a Torah scholar. If so, how does Ravina prove his position—that it is permitted for a Torah scholar—from the law of an ancestral field? The Rosh explains that since the Torah permitted it in the case of an ancestral field, even a Torah scholar need not be stringent. d. The Rashba here, and earlier on folio 62a, cites the approach of the Raavad that Ravina ate with a deduction only in a place where the lender may not be removed; but in a place where the lender may be removed, he agrees that it is forbidden. The Rashba asks against him: Ravina derives the permission from the law of an ancestral field, and from there one can derive the law even for a place where the lender may be removed. The Ramban writes similarly in his commentary beginning “Ravina acted.” e. Tosafot cite an anonymous interpretation that “Ravina ate with a deduction” means that he followed the arrangement discussed above: five years with a deduction, and from then onward the value of all the produce was assessed. But ordinary deduction is prohibited. This follows his position above, where he permits the fixed arrangement. According to this, the reason for the derivation from the law of an ancestral field requires clarification. The Maharsha explains: The dispute between Ravina and the other amoraim concerns whether a fixed arrangement is permitted for a Torah scholar, and this depends on whether ordinary people are permitted to use a deduction. For a Torah scholar must always be one degree more stringent than other people. Ravina derives from the law of an ancestral field that ordinary people are permitted to use a deduction, and consequently holds that a Torah scholar is permitted to use the fixed arrangement.

Mar Zutra said: What is the rationale of one who consumes [the produce] with a deduction?

The lender deducts less than the market value of the produce, and the borrower agrees in principle that he lent it to him; consequently, this appears to be interest.

And he explains:

It is just as it is with an ancestral field,

similar to an ancestral field, which a person inherits from his forefathers: if a person consecrated it, the Torah said that when he comes to redeem it from the consecrated property, the calculation is made according to how many years remain until the Jubilee, and he gives a sela and a pundion for each year, for a seed-homer of barley.

An ancestral field—is it not the case that although he consumes

the produce of the consecrated field

in great quantity,

and the produce of each year is worth much more to the consecrated property than a sela and a pundion.