Bava Metzia 67b — the Talmud in English

Rav Ashi performed an act concerning minor orphans ![](pamud.bmp "

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as with adults.

And even if he had consumed produce worth the amount of the zuz, he did not remove the lender from the mashkanta until they paid him the debt .

Rava, son of Rav Yosef, said in the name of Rava: With regard to this mashkanta, in a place where [the borrower] removes [the lender],

, he may not consume

the lender may not consume produce

except with a deduction.

And a Torah scholar,

who must straighten his ways and sanctify himself even regarding what is permitted to him, because perhaps people will learn from him to treat prohibitions lightly,

may not consume even with a deduction.

For this too appears like interest, since the borrower cheapens for him the price of consuming the produce in exchange for the loan. And according to strict law this is permitted, because the lender deducts for him a fixed amount for each year, even if the field is blighted and there is no produce in it; therefore it appears that he cheapens it for him because of the uncertainty. [Even though such an uncertainty is sold in the market for a higher price]. But a Torah scholar must be concerned lest people learn from him to treat prohibitions lightly.

And we raise an objection:

But

a Torah scholar

with what may he consume?

And we answer:

With kitzuta.

For this is preferable to a mashkanta with a deduction, and the Gemara below will explain what kitzuta is.

This works well according to the one who says

below

that kitzuta is permitted.

But according to the one who says that kitzuta is prohibited, what is there to say?

In what manner is it permitted for a Torah scholar to consume the produce of the mashkanta?

And we find a dispute among the amoraim whether kitzuta is permitted:

For it was stated: With regard to kitzuta, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disputed it. One said: Kitzuta is permitted. And one said: Kitzuta is prohibited .

And the Gemara explains:

What are the circumstances of kitzuta? When he says to him

the lender says to the borrower:

“Until five years, I shall consume it without a deduction. From then onward, I shall appraise for you all the produce,”

as it is sold in the market, and the entire sum is deducted from the loan for you. And this is like a mashkanta with a deduction, because he deducts half the value of the produce for him, except that he consumes it during the first five years. And the borrower consumes it during the last five years . And it is preferable to a mashkanta with a deduction, because this is the way of tenant farmers, and he appears as a tenant farmer who makes an agreement with the owner of the house that he will consume produce during the earlier years, and the owner of the house will consume it during the later years .

There is an alternative version: Anything without a deduction is prohibited.

And Rav Aḥa and Ravina did not dispute this.

But what are the circumstances of kitzuta

in which they disputed?

When he says to him

the lender says to the borrower:

“Until five years, I shall consume with a deduction. From then onward, I shall appraise for you all the produce.”

As it is sold in the market; and this is preferable to a mashkanta with a deduction, because the lender appears as a tenant farmer, as stated above.

And the Gemara explains:

The one who prohibits in the first [case],

according to the first formulation, in which the dispute concerns when he consumes during the first five years without a deduction, and in this one authority prohibits it, he too

permits in the latter [case],

when he consumes during the first five years with a deduction. In this manner, a Torah scholar can consume produce.

The one who prohibits in the latter [case],

according to the latter formulation, in which the dispute concerns when he consumes during the first five years with a deduction, and one authority prohibits this; according to him, the question returns:

How is it permitted to consume produce? —

It is permitted, because it is a mashkanta of Sura, concerning which they wrote as follows: “When these years are completed, this land shall leave without money.”

That is to say, in the city of Sura they were accustomed to write the aforementioned wording in the mashkanta document. And the meaning of this is that the lender takes the field into his possession, and after a certain number of years he returns it to the borrower, and the borrower does not need to repay any money at all.

That is, consuming the produce is the repayment, and there is no other repayment here. And this is permitted according to everyone, even for a Torah scholar, because since he specifies in the document the deduction against the entire principal, this does not appear as a loan, but rather as his purchasing from him the produce of those years for that amount .

Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, both say: With regard to this mashkanta,

in a place where he removes him—

a creditor does not collect from it.

In a place where he removes him, the lender has no ownership in the body of the mashkanta, but only a lien upon the produce. Therefore, when the lender dies and his sons inherit the mortgaged field, their father’s creditor does not collect his debt from it as he collects from other lands that they inherited, because this is considered movable property, and the movable property of orphans is not pledged to a creditor.

And the firstborn does not take a double portion in it.

Because his father did not have ownership in the body of the field, but only a lien upon the produce; and this is considered “that which is due to come,” according to the one who says in tractate Bava Batra 124b that a debt owed to one’s father is considered “that which is due to come,” and the firstborn does not take a double portion in it.

And the Sabbatical year cancels it,

the loan, and consequently the mashkanta returns to the borrower .

And in a place where he does not remove him—

the lender has ownership in the body of the mashkanta. Therefore, when the lender dies and his sons inherit the mortgaged field,

a creditor collects from it,

as he collects from other lands that they inherited.

And the firstborn takes a double portion in it.

Because his father had ownership in the body of the mashkanta, and he was in possession of it.

And the Sabbatical year does not cancel it,

because a mashkanta in a place where he does not remove him is considered a sale and not a loan .

And Mar Zutra said in the name of Rav Pappa: With regard to this mashkanta, in a place where he removes him,

when the borrower repays the debt to the lender,

they remove him even from the dates

of the mats,

which have been detached and are lying on the mats.

That is to say, although ostensibly these dates belong to the lender, because during the mashkanta, every produce that comes into existence is immediately acquired by him, nevertheless the law is not so. Rather, the borrower removes him even from dates that have already been detached. For this was the condition between them, and with this understanding the lender entered the field: if the borrower repaid him the debt, he would return to him all produce that he had not acquired through an act of acquisition .

And if

the lender

lifted them together with the mats]

baskets [before the borrower repaid him,

he acquired them

through lifting, and he need not return them to the borrower when he repays [the loan]].

And according to the one who says, “His vessels, when the buyer takes them in the seller’s domain, acquire for the buyer,”

since his vessels are like his domain, and he acquires through acquisition by a courtyard,

even without lifting them together with the mats, he acquired them

the lender, since his mats acquire the produce for him through acquisition by a courtyard.

The Gemara now brings additional laws concerning a mortgage:

This matter

is obvious,

for

in a place where they remove [the lender],

after they had concluded all the matters of the loan, the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification, and did not say that he could remove him from the land only after a certain period had elapsed, and the lender had still not given him the loan.

And

the lender said to the borrower, at the time that he gave him the loan money: I am giving you the loan on condition that I

will not withdraw

for such-and-such years, and the borrower acknowledged this.

He has said

the lender

“I will not withdraw”!

And the borrower cannot remove him until the time they established. This is so even though the lien has already ended in the ordinary manner. Since before the giving of the money the lender explicitly said, “I will not withdraw,” for a specified period, and the borrower acknowledged this, the borrower accepted the money on that condition: that he would not remove him except at the time they established. And the lender acquires the right that the borrower cannot remove him through acquisition by money.

Therefore this matter is obvious.

Rather,

the matter that is in doubt is

in a place where they do not remove [the lender],

where they do not remove the lender from the field even when he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period they established for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification, while he had still not received the loan.

And

the lender said to the borrower at the time that he gave him the loan: I do not conduct myself according to the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I

will withdraw,

that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the land mortgaged to me immediately when my consumption of its produce reaches the amount of the entire debt.

What [is the law]?

Does he

need to acquire from him,

to make an acquisition between them concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume the produce until the end of the mortgage term? And without an acquisition, can the lender retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, according to the custom of the place, and through speech alone his right did not lapse?

Or not,

there is no need to perform an act of acquisition concerning this, because speech alone can also cause the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume [the produce] until the end of the mortgage term to lapse.

Rav Pappa said: He does not need to acquire from him.

Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification. Therefore, this matter is obvious. Rather, the question is in a place where the lender cannot be removed, where the lender is not removed from the field even after he has consumed produce equal in value to the entire loan, until the end of the period fixed for repayment of the debt, and the borrower mortgaged his field to the lender without specification but had not yet received the loan. And the lender said to the borrower when giving him the loan: I do not follow the custom of this place. Rather, I lend to you on the understanding that I will withdraw, that I will withdraw from consuming the produce of the field mortgaged to me as soon as the produce I have consumed from it equals the entire debt. What is the law? Is it the case that he must acquire this from him, meaning that they must perform an act of acquisition concerning the lender’s relinquishment of his right to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period, and without such an act the lender may retract what he said, “I will withdraw,” since the borrower had already mortgaged his field to him without specification, in accordance with the local custom, and his right is not revoked by speech alone? Or not: there is no need to perform an act of acquisition, because speech alone can also revoke the lender’s right under the mortgage to consume produce until the end of the mortgage period. Rav Pappa said: He need not acquire this from him. Eilat HaShachar comments on this: It is not understood, since he has already acquired the field; and in a place where the lender cannot be removed, even if the borrower gives him the entire debt, the lender’s right and acquisition under the mortgage are not revoked. How, then, can relinquishment apply? It could be said that in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the meaning is that although the borrower can always repay the lender against his will, the lender is entitled to say, “I do not wish to collect the debt now.” But if the debt is revoked, the lender’s power over the field is also revoked, because all his power over the field results from the continued existence of the debt. Therefore, relinquishment of the mortgage is applicable. However, the Ritva’s words above, in his explanation of “And if he lifted them together with the baskets,” seem to indicate otherwise. The Ritva writes: We learn that although, in the case of an ordinary debt, if the borrower throws the money owed to the lender into his hand he is released from the debt, if he does so with a mortgage in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the lender does not lose his right to the produce until his appointed time. Otherwise, all places would effectively be places where the lender can be removed, since the borrower could throw the debt to him against his will. The Beit Yosef cites this in section 172, in Bedek HaBayit. Since he did not write that in a place where the lender cannot be removed the borrower is not released from his debt, but only that the lender does not lose the produce, it appears that the debt is in fact paid. If an accident occurs and the money is lost, the borrower is exempt from paying. Nevertheless, this does not cause the lender to withdraw from consuming the produce. These are his words. If we force the wording of the Ritva to mean that this statement is not precise, what the Ritva writes here in explaining the dispute over whether an act of acquisition is needed is readily understood. Regarding the fundamental issue of whether, in a place where the lender cannot be removed, the mortgage automatically ends when the debt ends, this must be considered in light of the Ramban’s responsum cited by the Ran in Ketubot (on folio 81a, folio 40a in the pages of the Rif): Places where the lender cannot be removed maintain that the fixed term of the loan secured by a mortgage benefits the lender as well, since the lender consumes the produce. It follows that if the lender agrees to accept repayment, the mortgage ends, just as in a place where he can be removed. Apparently, this is also stated in Shulchan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 74:3, but the matter requires clarification.

Rav Sheshet son of Rav Idi said: He needs to acquire from him.

And the halakha is: He needs to acquire from him.

The Gemara brings another halakha:

He said

a borrower to a lender in a place where they remove [the lender]:

I will go and bring,

I wish to go and bring

zuz

that are available to me in a certain place, and I will repay you; and from now on, do not consume any more produce.

The law is that from now on the lender

does not consume

[the produce], because the borrower is already about to repay.

And if the borrower has no money ready in another place, but he says to the lender:

I will go and toil,

and bring money

and repay you; and from now on, do not consume any more produce.

The amoraim disputed whether in this case as well the lender stops consuming produce immediately:

Ravina said: He consumes.

And Mar Zutra son of Rav Mari said: He does not consume.

And the halakha is: He does not consume.

Rav Kahana, Rav Pappa, and Rav Ashi did not consume

the produce of the mortgage, even

with nikkaya.

Ravina consumes with nikkaya.

Mar Zutra said: What is the reason of one who consumes with a deduction?

For the lender deducts less than the value of the produce in the market, and the borrower agrees in general that he lent to him; consequently, this appears as interest?

And he explains:

This is analogous to an ancestral holding field,

similar to an ancestral holding field] which a person inherits from his ancestral household [, for if a person consecrated it, the Torah said: when he comes to redeem it from the consecrated property, they calculate for him how many years there are until the Jubilee, and he gives a sela and a pundeyon for each year, for a house of seed of a homer of barley.

An ancestral holding field—no, even though it consumes

consecrated property from the field

in great quantity,

and the produce of each year is worth to the consecrated property much more than a sela and a pundeyon.